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This thesis examines the ideas about pain and suffering which were put forward by
masters of theology at the university of Paris between c.1230 and c.1300. The
masters developed these ideas while debating a range of distinct theological issues
which were treated separately in their writings and disputations. Devoting a chapter
to each of these distinct theological issues, the thesis analyses how their ideas about
pain and suffering were constructed and the extent to which masters developed a
shared terminology and conceptual framework in order to understand pain and
suffering. Furthermore, the thesis explores the way in which these ideas about pain
and suffering were used to address many other longstanding theological problems.
The chapters explore the masters' attitudes to human suffering and the Passion of
Christ; ideas about suffering and gender; views about penitential suffering; theories
surrounding the fate of unbaptised children; the problematic area of the separated
soul's suffering and ideas about the suffering of resurrected bodies in hell. In each
case, it is argued that the masters generally established a consensus of opinion about
the way in which suffering was expressed. This is seen particularly in terms of
penitential suffering and debates about whether there was suffering in the state of
innocence. On one level, therefore, the masters developed their own technical
language for suffering. However, the masters developed more than a language for
suffering; they also created a conceptual framework for pain and suffering which
they could use to explain problematic areas of theology with greater precision and
clarity. This is most evident in their discussions about the human nature of Christ;
their formulation of the concept of children's limbo and their ideas about the
resurrected body. Ideas about pain are thus crucial to the complete understanding of
the theological work of this important group of thirteenth-century theologians.
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Introduction
This thesis examines the ideas about pain and suffering which were put forward
by masters of theology at the university of Paris between c.1230 and c.1300. The
masters developed these ideas while debating a range of distinct theological
issues which were treated separately in their writings and disputations. Devoting
a chapter to each of these distinct theological issues, the thesis analyses how their
ideas about pain and suffering were constructed and the extent to which masters
developed a shared terminology and conceptual framework in order to
understand pain and suffering. Furthermore, the thesis explores the way in which
these ideas about pain and suffering were used to address many other
longstanding theological problems.
A consistent approach is applied to the material gathered in each chapter. First,
the specific questions addressed by the masters are explained in terms of the
broader theological issues with which they were concerned. Second, the views of
the masters are compared in order to establish the extent to which they agreed on
a common language and conceptual framework for understanding pain and
suffering. Third, changes in the ideas of individual masters and in the ideas of the
masters collectively are explored. These ideas are examined chiefly in relation to
intellectual developments in the study of theology. In some instances, however,
there is also a brief investigation into changes outside the university which may
have had an impact upon the masters' debates. Although this is not the main
thrust of the thesis, such complementary questions will serve to enrich the overall
argument.
Why is research into ideas about pain and suffering in the Middle Ages a
legitimate area of intellectual inquiry? As a subject for philosophical and
phenomenological study, pain has produced many interesting modern studies
which have focused specifically on its inexpressibility and concentrated on the
breakdown of language when it is described as a personal experience.' There
have also been numerous valuable contributions demonstrating the importance
that ideas about pain and suffering hold for the historical understanding of
theological development, but these have either fallen within the realms of biblical
scholarship and biblical notions of suffering,2 or within research on modem
theology which has recently been especially concerned with the impassibility of
God.3 It is therefore widely accepted that the study of pain is important as a
vehicle for observing shifts in ideas and sentiments in many historical contexts.
With both the philosophical problems in conveying the language of pain and the
importance of suffering to theology, there are clearly valid reasons for studying
pain in the Middle Ages. However, there has been no systematic study examining
pain and suffering for this period. The relatively few historical studies about pain
in the Middle Ages have either been overviews arguing for the inclusion of
I See, in particular, G. Pitcher, 'The Awfulness of Pain', Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), 481-
92; E. Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford, 1985); N.
Nelkin, 'Pains and Pain Sensations', Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), 129-48.
2 See, for example, J.A. Sanders, 'Suffering as Divine Discipline in the Old Testament and Post-
Biblical Judaism', Colgate Rochester Divinity School Bulletin, 28 (1955), 1-135; DJ.
Sirriundson, Faith Under Fire: Biblical Interpretations of Suffering (Minneapolis, 1980).
3 See especially C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London, 1940, repr. 1977); B. Hebblethwaite,
Evil, Suffering and Religion (London, 1979); P.S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford,
1988).
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research on pain as integral to research on the medieval period,4 have concerned
themselves with iconographical representations of suffering, 5 or have examined
pain in only brief or general terms.° Other studies have treated the study of pain
in an anthropological context. 7 Although valuable in their own right, such studies
have produced a generalised and skewed perception of pain and suffering in the
medieval period. 8 Important and relevant issues have come out of these surveys,
but on their own, there is still much work to be done given the importance pain
held for religious expression and explanation in the Middle Ages.
The dearth of studies on pain is all the more surprising when some core areas of
research on the medieval period are observed. It is therefore worthwhile
mentioning the main fields of historiography into which this thesis falls. The way
in which each chapter offers new and important contributions to them is
presented in detail below.
In the last decade in particular, discourse surrounding the body in the Middle
Ages has become a subject of great interest amongst historians and theologians.
Studies have tended to concentrate on the ascetical practices of bodily
4 E. Cohen, 'Towards a History of Physical Sensibility: Pain in the Later Middle Ages', Science
in Context, 8,1 (1995), 47-74.
5 E.M. Ross, The Grief of God: Images of the Suffering Jesus in Late Medieval England (Oxford,
1997); M.B. Merback, The Thief the Cross and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment
in Medieval and Renaissance Europe (London, 1999).
6 G. Duby, 'Observations on Physical Pain in the Middle Ages', Love and Marriage in the Middle
Ages, trans. J. Dunnett (Chicago, 1994), 168-73.
7 E. Seifert, Der Wandel im menschlichen Schmerzerleben (Munich, 1960); D. de Moulin, 'A
Historical-Phenomenological Study of Bodily Pain in Western Man', Bulletin of the History of
Medicine, 48 (1974), 540-70.
8 Seifert, for example, argues that pain only becomes pain when it is experienced as such. He
claims that his study of facial expressions in paintings and sculptures from the Middle Ages
shows that medieval people had an underdeveloped pain perception similar to patients who have
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renunciation, the religious practice of female mystics, and imagery of the body,
primarily in literary texts. 9 Whilst these are interesting and important routes for
studying ideas about the body, only one recent study has given any detailed
attention to attitudes to the body expressed by university intellectuals. 10 This
comprehensive volume, Medieval Theology and the Natural Body has, however,
neglected academic debates of masters of theology about the suffering body.
Research on the suffering of the body in this context has emerged in terms of a
general overview of the period." This thesis thus seeks to redress the balance and
amend this omission, by enhancing research on medieval theological perceptions
of the body and elucidating the way in which it was understood to suffer.
This thesis also offers new insights into the study of female suffering in the
Middle Ages. There have been many interesting recent studies which have
examined the role of the female body and religious practice in the Middle Ages.12
Female religious writings of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in particular
undergone a pre-frontal lobotomy: they still feel pain, but tolerate it with indifference. See Der
Wandel, 68-92.
9 See, for example, F. Bottomley, Attitudes to the Body in Western Christendom (London, 1979);
C.W. Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body (New
York, 1991); B. Ribemont, Le Corps et ses enigmes au Moyen Age (Orleans, 1992); S. Kay and
M. Rubin (eds.), Framing Medieval Bodies (Manchester, 1994). For attitudes to the body in Late
Antiquity, see P. Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early
Christianity (London and Boston, 1991).
10 Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Studies in
Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997). See also B.C. Bazan, 'La Corporalite selon S. Thomas',
Revue Philosophigue de Louvain, 81 (1983), 369-409. On Franciscan preaching about the
positive view of the body in the sacrament of marriage see D.L. D'Avray, 'Some Franciscan Ideas
about the Body', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 84 (1991), 343-63.
11 Cohen, 'Towards a History of Physical Sensibility', 47-74.
12 E.V. Spelman, 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views', Feminist Studies, 8
(1982), 109-31; J. Price, 'Inner and Outer: Conceptualizing the Body in Ancrene Wisse and
Aelred's De Institutione inclusarum', Medieval Ethical and Religious Literature: Essays in
Honour of George Russell (Cambridge, 1986), 192-208; C.W. Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy
Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley, 1987); E. Roberston,
'The Rule of the Body: the Feminine Spirituality of the Ancrene Wisse', Seeking the Woman in
Late Medieval and Renaissance Writings: Essays in Feminist Contextual Criticism, ed. S.Fisher
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demonstrate how the female body was used to describe and understand female
religious feelings. It has been suggested that in the realms of expression for
female spirituality, there was an increase in `bodiliness' from the twelfth century
onwards. This was integrated into expressions of sanctity in this period, which
witnessed a plethora of seizures, swellings, cases of holy anorexia, stigmata and
instances of miraculous lactation. 13 Accounts which have a bodily focus occur in
a variety of genres, but ideas about the function of the body were far from
consistent. For example, hagiography was sympathetic to violent bodily
movements at times, but at others it interpreted them as demonic, favouring
rather outward bodily control as a sign for inner, spiritual harmony. 14 Female
saints were noted for mourning the bodily suffering of Christ in the Passion.
Notable examples include the Franciscan tertiary Angela of Foligno 15 and the
recluse Elizabeth of Spaalbeek whose practice of acting out the persecution of
Christ by dragging herself about, cutting and beating herself, was described in
about 1275 by Philip of Clairvaux. 16 Caroline Walker Bynum has suggested that
there was an increased medieval preoccupation with physicality in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries. This found its expression in the visions and practices of
female mystics, who, Bynum argues, identified the female flesh with the body of
the suffering Christ. The Eucharist was central to this religious devotion.
and J.E. Halley (Knoxville, 1989); E.A. Petroff, Body and Soul: Essays on Medieval Women and
Mysticism (New York, 1994).
13 C.W. Bynum, 'The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages', in
Fragmentation and Redemption, 186-7.
14 W.Simons, 'Reading a Saint's Body: Rapture and Bodily Movement in the Vitae of Thirteenth-
Century Beguines', in Framing Medieval Bodies, ed. S.Kay and M.Rubin (Manchester, 1994),
12,18.
15 See especially 'Christi stunmus et continuus dolor': Acta Sanctorum, January, i, cap. xvi
(Venice, 1734), 186-234.
16 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, 256.
5
Consuming the body of Christ was the ultimate in religious imitation. 17 Much has
thus been made of the association of female mystics with the suffering Christ.
There has been much less work done on the way in which masters of theology
understood gender relations within their theology.
and female suffering and its relation to gender has not received sufficient
treatment. This thesis will pursue this line of inquiry and add a further dimension
to ideas about female suffering.
Ideas about suffering are also essential to perceptions of life after death and there
have been many histories of hell and purgatory. 19 However, these studies have
tended to focus on medieval beliefs about the existence of such afterlife abodes,
or they have linked the punishments to certain types of sin. 20 Conversely, the way
in which university masters explained the nature of pain and suffering in the
17 Ibid, 245-60. Bynum explains imitation thus: 'Imitation" meant union, fusion, with that
ultimate body which is the body of Christ', 246. For a detailed discussion of women mystics, see
C.W. Bynum, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1982), 170-262. On the imagery of the suffering Christ in the Eucharist, see M.
Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge, 1991), 302-15.
18 See, however, K. Borresen, Subordination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Women in
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C., 1981); M.T. D'Alveniy, 'Comment les
thdologiens et les philosophes voient la femme', La Femme dans la civilisation des dixieme et
treizieme siecles: Actes du colloque tenu a Poitiers le 23-25 septembre 1976. Cahiers de
civilisation medievale, 20 (1977), 105-29.
19 See, for example, D.D.R. Owen, The Vision of Hell (Edinburgh and London, 1970); P.
Dinzelbacher, Visionen und Visionsliteratur im Mittelalter (Monogyaphien zur Geschichte de
Mittelalters, 23; Stuttgart, 1981); R.K. Emmerson, Antichrist in the Middle Ages. A Study of
Medieval Apocalypticism, Art and Literature (Manchester, 1981); M. Hinunelfarb, Tours of Hell:
An Apocalyptic Form of Jewish and Christian Literature (Philadelphia, 1983); R.Bauckham,
'Early Jewish Visions of Hell', Journal of Theological Studies, 41 (1990), 355-85; J. Le Goff,
The Birth of Purgatory, trans. A. Goldhammer (New York, 1990); P. Camporesi, The Fear of
Hell: Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Modern Europe, trans. L. Byatt
(Pennsylvania, 1991); A.E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell. Death and Retribution in the
Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (London, 1993). For Limbo see: R. Weberberger, `Limbus
Pueronnn: Zur Entstehung eines theologischen Begriffes', RTAM, 35 (1968), 83-133; 241-259.
20 Specific categories of sinners from the utterly reprobate in Hell to the non valde mali in
Purgatory have been ascertained by Le Goff, Birth of Purgatory, 149.
18 Moreover, the issue of male
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afterlife has been given little consistent treatment. 21 An investigation into the
development of ideas about pain and suffering is thus a new route of inquiry
where histories of purgatory and hell are concerned. However, instead of
exploring them as places, this thesis will focus on the way in which a language of
suffering was used as a tool to understand them.
This study also contributes more generally to the history of academic study.
There is evidence to suggest that during the formation of their system of ideas
about pain, masters of theology created or sought to maintain positions which
arose out of study of theology which was freer from intellectual and religious
constraints than has previously been thought. The belief that masters of theology
merely followed 'schools of thought', that is, abided by their affiliation to a
particular religious order when they presented answers theological issues, is too
rigid.22 The creation of a common set of phrases to describe pain, stemming from
the use of authorities, suggests that in their desire to understand suffering of the
body and the soul, any absolute adherence to specific 'schools of thought' was
not a basis upon which masters of theology perceived their function or position.
In this way, pain, as a conceptual tool, might also be employed to unlock
complex areas of dispute between masters.
21 A.E. Bernstein has briefly examined Aquinas' understanding and explanation of the fire of Hell
and how the separated soul experiences this, but he has failed to account for this explanation or to
set it within the wider context of historical and theological developments at the University of
Paris. See A.E. Bernstein, 'The Invocation of Hell in Thirteenth Century Paris', Supplementum
Festivum. Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller (Medieval and Renaissance Text and
Studies, 49; New York, 1987), 13-54, esp. 24-9. See also Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William
of Auvergne and the Fires of Hell and Purgatory', Speculum, 57 (1982), 509-531.
22 For the claim that theologians followed 'schools of thought', see E. Gilson, A History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), 327-40; E. Gilson, La philosophie
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The parameters of this thesis require some explanation. Why are masters of
theology at Paris an interesting and relevant group to be used in the study of ideas
about pain and suffering? The masters of theology studied in this thesis comprise
some of the most influential individuals in the medieval period and their
significance has been widely acknowledged both for their role in developing
theology and for their contribution to various social and political debates.23
Moreover, the authority which masters possessed beyond the university and how
this authority and view of themselves led to the creation of a discernible 'self-
image' has been the focus of two recent studies.24 Although not a major theme of
this thesis, the way in which ideas about pain were affected by key events outside
the university is given serious consideration.
The setting for their intellectual pursuits was the university of Paris, arguably the
most important centre for the study of theology in the thirteenth century.25
Indeed, the university was one of the first to be organised around specific rights
and statutes, and the masters there enjoyed a unique position of influence and
franciscaine (Paris, 1927); L. Veuthey, Les divers courants de la philosophie augustino-
franciscaine au moyen age, (Scholastica Ratione-Critica Instauranda; Rome, 1951), 629-52.
For example, see J.W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants: the Social Views of Peter the
Chanter and his Circle, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1970); E.A.R. Brown, `Cessante causa and the taxes
of the last Capetians: the political applications of a philosophical maxim', Studio Gratiana 15
(Post Scripta) (1972), 567-87; B. Smalley, The Becket Conflict and the Schools (Oxford, 1973);
R. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water (Oxford, 1986).
24 I.P. Wei, 'The Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early
Fourteenth Centuries: An Authority Beyond the Schools', BJRL, 75 (1993), 37-63; I.P. Wei, 'The
Self-Image of the Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early
Fourteenth Centuries', JEH, 46 (1995), 398-431.
For this view, see R. Avi-Jonah, 'Career Trends of Parisian masters of theology 1200-1320',
History of Universities, 6 (1986), 47-64. On the university of Paris in general, see J. Le Goff, Les
intellectuels au moyen age (Paris, 1957); G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Centuries (New York, 1968); A.B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities (London,
1975).
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independence.26 The terminal dates for this thesis reflect arguably the highpoint
of intellectual activity at the university of Paris. The approximate terminus a quo
of 1230 is important for two reasons. First, this date represents the beginning of
both Dominican and Franciscan presence in the faculty of theology at Paris. In
1229, the Dominicans obtained their first chair at the university. 27 The time also
marks the inception of the first Franciscan master of theology at the University of
Paris, Alexander of Hales. Alexander joined the Franciscan order and held the
first Franciscan chair of theology at Paris from 1231.28 Second, this period also
marks the end of the strike by secular masters at the university with the
acknowlegement of the position of the mendicants in the university. 29 In two
important ways, therefore, the beginning of the 1230s heralded significant
changes in the faculty of theology at the university of Paris, and thus in the study
of theology itself.
The terminus ad quem of 1300 is also approximate and has been selected for
various reasons. After about 1300 there were important changes occurring in the
field of theology. The emergence of a more conservative movement in the study
of theology towards the close of the thirteenth century altered perceptions about
the way in which theology was interpreted and expressed. 3° The tide was turning
against speculation and particularly against radical philosophical explanations of
28 S. Menache, 'La naissance d'une nouvelle source d'autoritd: l'universite de Paris', Revue
Historigue, 268 (1982), 305-27.
27 F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (eds.), Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays (Norman,
Oklahoma, 1980), x.
28 R.M. Huber, 'Alexander of Hales, 0.F.M.: His Life and Influence on Medieval Scholasticism',
Franciscan Studies, 5 (1945), 355-6.
29 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction (1150-1350) (London, 1987), 15.
The dispute between seculars and mendicants persisted beyond this date, however.
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theological subjects. For this reason, the changes which occurred in the
fourteenth-century study of theology at Paris and beyond are only alluded to
where necessary points of comparison to the thirteenth century dictate.
Apart from their chronological proximity to one another, what other factors
determined the coherence of these masters of theology as a viable group to study?
The masters studied in this thesis are a coherent group because they were
influenced by similar changes in theological study throughout their careers. The
central change which affected them all was the reception of Aristotle in the
West.31 Many of the debates studied in this thesis thus fall within an even more
temporally-limited period of 1240-1270. These dates are significant because they
encapsulate a time during which Aristotelian philosophy became an important
element in theological debate. Various works of Aristotle, including the
Metaphysics, had been banned as teachable texts at the University of Paris in
1210.32 Furthermore, lecturing on the libri naturales was absolutely prohibited
again in 1215. 33 However, by the middle of the thirteenth century, translated
works of Aristotle formed an important part of theological learning and
stimulated theological debate. In the 1240s, Roger Bacon was lecturing on the
Physics and the Metaphysics and the full Aristotelian corpus was formally
introduced to the Arts Faculty curriculum in 1255. 34 The condemnations of 1270
30 For this argument, see G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier Fourteenth
Century', BJRL, 43 (1960), 354-72; G. Leff, 'Faith and Reason in the Thought of Gregory of
Rimini (c.1300-1358)', BJRL, 42 (1959), 88-112.
31 See F. van Steenberghen, Aristotle and the West, trans. L. Johnston (London, 1955).
32 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 1200-1479, 6 vols., ed. H.Denifle and A.0 Chatelain
and others (Paris, 1889-1964), i, 70-1.
33 Ibid., 78.
34 J.F. Wippel, 'The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris', JMRS, 7 (1977), 169-201, at
172. Chartularium, i, 277-9.
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and 1277 by the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, signalled the problems which
Aristotle had created within the realm of theological study. 35
 Chapter 5 focuses
specifically on the issues surrounding these condemnations in relation to masters'
debates about the suffering of the separated soul. The extent to which the Church
influenced the study of theology, and consequently affected the nature and style
of debate amongst masters, is a sub-theme which permeates the thesis as a whole.
Moreover, the importance of Aristotle as an authority whom masters employed
and interpreted in formulating their ideas about pain and suffering is central to
one of the approaches applied to the source material in this study.
The choice of source material itself requires some explanation. The works which
are studied in this thesis comprise Commentaries on the Sentences; quodlibetal
disputations; disputed questions and questions in theological Summae. The first
type of source used in this thesis are collections of theological questions known
as Commentaries on the Sentences. 36 The commentary was the essential training
piece for those who coveted the vaunted position of master of theology. Only a
small elite became masters in the Faculty of Theology, but many students would
listen to the bachelor lecturing on the Sentences before they moved out of the
university and into positions in the Church hierarchy, ranging from
administrators to parish priests. 37 The Sentences originated in Paris in the mid-
33 See A. Zinunermann, (ed.), Die Auseinandersetzung an der Pariser Universiteit im
Jahrhundert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 10; Berlin, 1976).
36 For the tradition associated with the production of Sentence commentaries, see F. Stegmaller,
Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Wilrzburg, 1947); V.
Doucet, `Commentaires sur les Sentences: Supplement au Repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmtillee,
AFH, 47 (1954), 88-170.
37 The following are particularly useful: P. Glorieux, `L'enseignement au moyen age: techniques
et methodes en usage A la faculte de theologie de Paris au xiiie siècle', AHDLMA, 35 (1968), 65-
186, esp.111-18; B.C. Bazin, J.W. Wippel, G. Fransen, D. Jacquart, Les questions disputees et
les questions quodlibetiques dans les facultes de thiologie, de droit et de medecine (Typologie
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twelfth century, composed by Peter Lombard, a pupil at the schools of Rheims
and St-Victor. His work raised questions of doctrine and then set about
answering them using various scriptural and patristic authorities. It was divided
into four main books dealing respectively with: God; the creation and the history
of the world before Christ; the Incarnation and Redemption; and the Sacraments,
Death, Judgment, Heaven and He11. 38
 Between around 1233 and 1237, the work
became established as the textbook 39
 with which prospective masters of theology
proved their credentials as theologians by commenting on the questions raised by
Peter Lombard and introducing new ones of their own. The Commentaries on the
Sentences were essentially the doctoral thesis of the thirteenth century. Although
the function of the commentaries was to establish that a particular theologian was
worthy of the magisterial title, many commentaries were revised by their authors
at a later date, providing fuller explications to questions they had debated as
bachelors.° Moreover, not every master felt obliged to ask the same question
about the same subject. There is thus some evidence to suggest that masters
debated issues which were of interest to them.
The source base of the thesis also includes disputation literature. Disputations
were university exercises which were employed to debate matters of theological
interest in the faculty of theology. One type of disputation examined in this thesis
des sources du Moyen Age occidental, 44-5; Turnhout, 1985); J. Marenbon, Later Medieval
Philosophy, (1150-1350): An Introduction (London, 1987), esp. 20-5; M.D. Knowles, The
Evolution of Medieval Thought (London, 1962, repr. 1988), 158, 164-6.
33 Knowles, Evolution, 162-3.
39 A.J. Minnis, 'De impediment° sexus: Women's Bodies and Medieval Impediments to Female
Ordination', Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York,
1997), 109-39, at 110.
413 These are the so-called ordinationes, as compared with reportationes which were students'
notes: ibid., 112.
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is the quodlibetal disputation, 4 ' a source which has been shown to have authority
beyond the schools, that is, they had social and political reasons for being
debated and their conclusions were respected beyond the university. 42 These were
formal disputations held only at or close to Christmas and Easter by masters of
theology. Questions could be asked a quolibet, that is by anyone, and about any
subject, de quolibet: hence their name. They have recently been aptly dubbed by
one historian as 'Medieval Theologians' Question Time'. 43 The audience for
quodlibetal questions included people who were not members of the university,
and who expressed an interest in the authority of the masters. Questions which
appear in Commentaries on the Sentences also appear in the quodlibets of certain
masters. The two sources are thus legitimately comparable and, in some
instances, demonstrate the development of thought of a particular master over
time.
The third type of source material used is the disputed question. This was a
question which dealt with specific areas of theology. In contrast to quodlibets,
ordinary disputed questions arose out of a particular master's teaching and from
41 For details on quodlibetal disputations, see J.A. Destrez, 'Les disputes quodlibetiques de Saint
Thomas d'apres la tradition manuscrite', Bibliotheque Thomiste, I (Le Saulchoir, 1921), 49-108;
P. Glorieux, La Litterature Quodlibitique de 1260 a 1320, 2 vols. (Kain and Paris, 1925-35); P.
Glorieux, 'Le quodlibet de Pierre de Tarentaise', RTAM, 9 (1937), 237-80; A. Maier, 'Das
Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton', RTAM, 14 (1947), 106-10; L.E. Boyle, 'The Quodlibets of St.
Thomas and Pastoral Care', The Thomist, 38 (1974), 232-56; J.F. Wippel, 'The Quodlibetal
Question as a Distinctive Literary Genre', Les genres litteraires dans les sources th gologiques et
philosophiques medievales: Deyinition, Critique et Exploitation: Actes du Colloque International
de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981. Publications de 1 'Insitut d'etudes medievales, 2nd series
(Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982), 67-84; J.F. Wippel, 'Quodlibetal questions, chiefly in theology
faculties', in Les questions disputees et les questions quodlibitiques dans les facultes de
theologie, de droit et de meclecine, 151-222.
42	
• 'Masterssters of Theology', 37-63; L. Meier, 'Les disputes quodlibetiques au dehors des
universitës', Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, 53 (1958), 401-42.
43	 cP. Biller, John of Naples, Quodlibets and Medieval Theological Concern with the Body',
Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, 3.
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working with his bachelors.44 The master himself set the agenda for these
questions, rather than the audience, and decided which ones would be addressed
first. Nevertheless, as with questions in Sentence commentaries and quodlibets,
there is much cross-pollination between this type of source and the other two.
However, the ordinary disputed questions often probed their subject at greater
depth. 45
The fourth type of source to be examined are questions which appear in
theological Summae. Generally, the questions framed in Summae are
representative of the intellectually-mature master of theology. Compared with
other sources, therefore, the conclusions presented in summae may be used to
detect individual masters' developments in thought throughout their careers.
In addition to being an ideal body of material for answering the central issues and
questions set out at the beginning, the sources allow historians to answer another
key question which is a central theme of this thesis: the way in which masters of
theology used, interpreted and criticised different authorities. The introduction of
Aristotle into theology, as was detailed above, presented theologians with many
difficulties of interpretation and translation. It was no exception when they
debated questions about pain and suffering. Indeed, the way in which masters of
theology integrated the language and ideas of a discrete group of authorities, and
more specifically Aristotle and Augustine, into their questions about pain and
44 See B.C. Bazan, 'La question disputata', Les genres litteraires dans les sources theologiques et
philosophiques medievales, 31-49.
45 J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-
Centuty Philosophy (Washington D.C., 1981), xxii; Glorieux, `L'Enseignement', 123-32.
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suffering appears to have been a crucial element in developing a language and
system of ideas for understanding pain itself. The source material lends itself
perfectly to this type of assessment because this kind of theological literature
used authorities to back up its conclusions. It is thus central as a source-base for
understanding the development of ideas about pain and suffering in the thirteenth
century.
The sample of masters of theology examined in this study comprises seventeen,
although only seven are analysed in comprehensive depth throughout.
Nevertheless, this sample of seven is a rational and adequate one for two reasons.
First, it consists of the greatest and most influential theologians of the thirteenth
century. Second, there is a fairly even spread of Franciscan and Dominican
masters. The works of one secular master and one Augustinian canon are
investigated also. 46 When conclusions about intellectual attitudes to pain and
suffering are drawn, therefore, they are more or less representative of trends in
the study of theology in the thirteenth century in general.
How is the thesis structured? This thesis is divided into two principal sections.
The first section, which contains the first three chapters, relates to questions
about pain and suffering in this life. Chapter 1 covers the development of ideas
about human suffering and its relation to the body and soul and their use in
explaining the suffering of Christ. As was suggested above, intellectual ideas
46 Franciscans: Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta and Richard of
Middleton; Dominicans: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas; Secular masters: Henry of Ghent;
Augustinian Canon: Giles of Rome.
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about pain and suffering are useful vehicles for understanding the theology
associated with the body. It is the contention of this thesis that despite the
position expressed by certain 'dualist' theories, which understood body and soul
to exist as separate entities, the perception of the body and soul in pain
transcended such differences in intellectual perception and emphasised the
importance of the psychosomatic unit in suffering. However, the way in which
the body was perceived to be related to the soul is central to comprehending the
way in which the body, and concomitantly, the soul, could suffer. The other
important and closely-related area explored in chapter 1 is the relationship
between theories of human suffering and the suffering of Christ. The hypothesis
advanced here is that masters developed an intricate language for pain which
enabled them to understand the complexities of the human body. They also used
this language in their Christology. Pain, it is asserted, was central to
understanding the humanity, divinity and body of Christ and allowed masters to
form a degree of consensus amidst the raging controversies surrounding theories
about the hypostatic union.
The themes and ideas about pain discussed in the first chapter are then examined
in a different context in chapter 2, where the importance of gender and pain is
analysed. Chapter 2 examines the idea of sex difference and notions of female
and male suffering, and asks in what contexts pain and gender were linked. It
then considers the position taken by masters of theology on the relations between
man and woman in the contexts of Creation, State of Innocence and the Fall.
Within this linear chronological structure, it is argued that male and female
suffering cannot be understood without reference to notions of sex difference, nor
16
can sex difference be fully explained without understanding masters' ideas about
pain.
Chapter 3 assesses how masters dealt with the notion of voluntary suffering in
penance, whether this necessitated new ideas about the nature of suffering, and
how they integrated these ideas within an overall structure of explanation for
pain. The nature of penitential practice was a key part of medieval theological
discussion. As far as identifying the nature of suffering which was necessary to
achieve reparation for sin is concerned, little research has been done. 47 What has
been written has tended to concentrate upon suffering for sin as a ritual, rather
than focusing upon locating the idea of pain itself within any particular
framework of explanation.48 Chapter 3 thus locates the nature of pain and
suffering in penance within the vocabulary and language masters developed to
understand and explain pain in general. It argues that a new dimension to pain
was created. Pain was perceived as restorative rather than destructive. However,
this necessitated an extension of the language masters employed to understand
suffering. It also meant that masters had to re-assess the way in which they
understood the action of pain on the body. Study of their ideas about pain and
suffering in penance thus not only contributes to an understanding of this
sacrament, it also shows how masters used one existing set of ideas to form
another.
47 Or, rather, research has centred around the theological and sacramental differences between
contrition and attrition, that is, penance informed and uninformed by grace respectively. See A.
Vanneste, 'La theologie de la penitence chez quelques maltres parisiens de la premiere moitie du
treizieme siècle', EThL, 28 (1952), 24-58.
48 For example, see G. Constable, 'Attitudes toward Self-Inflicted Suffering in the Middle Ages'
Ninth Stephen .1 Brademas Sr. Lecture (Brookline, Mass., 1982), 5-28; T. Asad, 'On Ritual and
Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism', Economy and Society, 16 (1987), 159-203.
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The second section focuses upon ideas about pain and suffering after death.
Three chapters consider three specific areas of discussion. Clarifying the nature
of pain and suffering was central to two particular aspects of punishment after
death: the formation of children's limbo and the way in which the separated soul
could suffer the punishment of corporeal fire. Detailed studies of these two
aspects form chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Each of these chapters pursues
themes about pain which interlink throughout the thesis. For example, the notion
of sin which merited certain types of suffering discussed in chapter 3 is the focus
for understanding the experience of children in limbo in chapter 4. Determining
the links between sin and pain was what led to the definition of limbo, it is
argued. Another theme which emerges in chapter 4 and permeates the entire
thesis is the deliberate re-interpretation by masters of theology of one main
patristic authority: Augustine. It is suggested that by clarifying their own
language for pain, masters could explain an apparently contradictory position
held by Augustine. It is therefore argued in this chapter that the intellectual
construction of children's limbo was dependent upon the masters' systematic
application of their ideas about suffering to an overall picture of the afterlife.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the immensely complicated area of discussion about
the separated soul. It demonstrates that explanations of the separated soul were
reliant upon the language of the corporeal, and the language of suffering allowed
masters to understand the separated soul in greater depth. As with chapter 4, the
attention to the language used by authorities is also explored in chapter 5. It is
argued that by explaining and contextualising certain formulae associated with
18
pain and suffering, masters claimed the support of certain authorities for their
language of pain. The case study on the suffering of the separated soul in this
chapter analyses in greater depth some points of conflict in a discourse which
was essentially constructed around the corporeal. In this way, developments
outlined in the first chapter are explained in greater detail by focusing on an area
of debate which led to much contemporary concern. Indeed, interest in the
suffering of the separated soul was a source of dispute between masters of
theology and certain masters of arts. The dispute was only apparent, however,
because, as chapter 5 explains in its second part, it was the way of describing
pain and suffering for the separated soul, an issue which was contentious long
before the condemnation of 1270, that provoked masters to debate it. This
chapter claims that the condemned master of arts, Siger of Brabant, although
clearly heretical in other respects, was misunderstood by ecclesiastical authorities
over the issue of the separated soul's suffering by hell-fire.
Chapter 6 returns to ideas about the body: the damned body. This chapter picks
up on strands developed in the first chapter and views them through a different
filter, that of the body in hell. It shows how, through their system for explaining
pain, masters used different ways of explaining the corporeal to define the body
in hell. The idea of body was associated with corruptibility and death. The bodies
of the damned had to remain incorruptible and yet spend all eternity suffering the
pains of hell-fire. Through their careful construction of ideas about pain, it is
argued, masters created a multi-layered conceptual framework about the body
and corporeality. How they applied a language of suffering to the damned body
19
was the crucial element in its definition. This thesis thus makes a significant,
original contribution to a much-debated field of research in medieval studies."
The language which masters of theology developed to understand ideas about
pain and suffering was not static. The different contexts in which they addressed
issues of pain necessitated constant discussion and the creation of new
dimensions to their thought. This involved an intricate systematisation of theories
about sense perception culled from a particular group of authorities. The
language which masters developed for pain was also used as a conceptual
framework to explain problematic areas of theology. This framework of ideas
about pain thus provides historians with a more sophisticated and complex
understanding of attitudes to the body, soul, spirituality, physicality and the use
of corporeal imagery in thirteenth-century intellectual circles.
49 For example, see C.W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-




Thirteenth-Century Theological Ideas about Human Pain
and Suffering and the Passion of Christ
This chapter examines the way in which masters of theology discussed pain and
suffering in two closely related contexts. The first part of the chapter examines the
nature of human bodily suffering according to masters of theology from about 1230
to 1285. Masters asked questions about the way in which the soul and body suffered
and how the suffering of each ought to be understood. They were deemed to be
important questions because certain patristic authorities had been ambiguous in their
use of language concerning suffering and its relationship to the soul and body. These
questions came about largely because of the impact made by Aristotelian theories
about the nature of the body. This chapter will enhance and expand upon recent
debates about the nature of the body in the Middle Ages and offer the new
dimension of intellectual attitudes to pain and the suffering body and the use of ideas
about suffering to understand the nature of the human body.
The ideas which masters developed about pain and suffering were also applied in
other areas of their theology. In the second part of this chapter it is argued that
masters also used a technical language for suffering when they debated the humanity
of Christ. Both the human and divine natures of Christ were issues of serious debate.
The charge of heresy was brought to bear on groups who denied Christ's suffering.
However, the way in which masters applied their ideas about pain and suffering to
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Christ's suffering enabled them, it will be argued, to understand the nature of
Christ's humanity. A significant degree of consensus emerged surrounding the
explanation for Christ's suffering, which, in turn, led to a consensus about how
human he was. The development of theories about human pain allowed masters to
explain the human nature of Christ in a way which resolved the contentious theories
about the relationship between his humanity and divinity.
1. Human bodily suffering
During the twelfth century, there was much speculation by intellectuals about the
nature of the body and its relationship to the soul. Indeed, the relationship between
soul and body has been called 'one of the fundamental issues in medieval thought'.'
Peter Abelard, for example, was interested in the resurrection of the body and the
suffering in hell caused to the souls when separated from the body. These pains he
dismissed as a mystical or spiritual, rather than literal or physical. 2 Other theological
inquiries explored the reasons for God's Incarnation, a tradition which was inspired
by Anse1m in the Cur Deus Homo (1095-98).3
 In the mid-twelfth century, Peter
D. Luscombe, 'Peter Abelard's Carnal Thoughts', Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, ed. P.
Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Studies in Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997), 32.
2 Petrus Abaelardus. Dialogus inter Philosophorum, Judaeum et Christianum, ed. R. Thomas
(Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt, 1970), ii, 2967-3014. Luscombe, 'Carnal Thoughts', 37.
3 Cur Deus Homo, Opera Omnia, 6 vols., ed. F.S.Schmitt (Rome and Edinburgh,1938-68), ii, 37-133.
For the debate about the Incarnation in the face of Jewish denials, see A.S. Abulafia, 'Bodies in the
Jewish-Christian Debate', Framing Medieval Bodies, ed. S. Kay and M. Rubin (Manchester, 1994),
123.
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Lombard also debated the nature of Christ's body in his book of Sentences,4 but,
unlike his later commentators, he did not specifically deal with the notion of
suffering, nor did he investigate the notion of the human body in isolation.
In the thirteenth century, the nature of discussion about the body and its suffering
was very different to that in the twelfth century. There is, of course, one important
reason for this: the works of Aristotle which discussed the nature of the body were
not available in the West until the early part of the thirteenth century. 5 It is clear that
the reception of these works heralded profound changes for the study of theology
and philosophy,6 and particularly in relation to ideas about the union between body
and soul. The thirteenth century was a time when ideas about the body and its
suffering were discussed in new ways.
Which theories about the nature of the relationship between soul and body affected
masters of theology in the thirteenth century? It would appear that ideas about the
4 Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae (Specilegium
Bonaventurianum iv-v, 3 vols.; Grottaferrata, 1971-81.) An excellent, recent monograph on the
Lombard is M.L. Colish, Peter Lombard, I/11, 2 vols. (Studies in Intellectual History, 41; Leiden,
New York and Cologne, 1994). On the Lombard's notions of the human body and its relation to the
body of Christ, see Section ii below.
5 The key work of Aristotle which dealt with the union of body and soul (hylomorphic composition)
was De anima. Although the translation of this work was made in about 1150 by Gerard of Cremona,
few readers in the West actually obtained it. It became popular through Arabic commentaries,
although Aquinas based his commentary on the translation of the Greek version almost a century after
its first appearance. See M.D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London, 1988), 173-4.
On hylomorphic composition and its origins, see D. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception (London,
1961), 17-28.
6 Much twelfth-century philosophy was concerned with Plato. He was highly regarded because his
views, especially in the Timaeus, accorded with what was believed about Trinity and creation.
Aristotle, on the other hand, provided more precise ways of explaining theological problems. Some
historians believe that the popularity of Aristotelian thought in thirteenth-century theology was due to
its ability to deal with the particular, whereas platonism offered a universal explanation of Christian
truth by dissociating itself from concrete reality. For this view, see G. Wieland, 'Plato or Aristotle- a
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complex relationship between soul and body emerged as a result of the existence of
rival theories about human body-soul relations: neoplatonic dualist theories on the
one hand and the Aristotelian-based theory of hylomorphism on the other.7 A major
opponent of the Platonic theories of dualism was the Dominican master of theology,
Thomas Aquinas. 8 Aquinas did not follow the neoplatonic view of people as
collections of physical things. Instead he followed Aristotle, understanding the
human being as a composite of soul and body, spiritual and corporeal. Aquinas
pursued the notion of unity of form, where the soul is the form of the body and the
body is its matter:
Just as the body gets its being from the soul, as from its
form, so too it makes a unity with this soul to which it
is immediately related.9
Aquinas rejected the platonic idea that the body was the instrument of the soul.'
Rather, Aquinas argued, the soul subsists in the body, because it has a natural
tendency to embodiment. It thus tends towards a body and gives it the life-giving
Real Alternative in Medieval Philosophy?', Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed J.F. Wippel
(Washington D.C., 1987), 71.
'For further information on neoplatonic theories of the relationship between body and soul, see A.
Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys (Oxford, 1981); J.
Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction (1150-1350) (London, 1987), esp. 96-117.
8 The literature on Aquinas is vast. For general accounts of his life and theology see E. Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook (London 1957); M.-D. Chenu,
Towards Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964); J.A.
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Washington D.C., 1983). On his
use of platonic texts see R.J. Henle, St. Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and Platonici
Texts in the Writings of St.Thomas (The Hague, 1956).
9 De Anima 2.1.234. Quoted by B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford, 1992), 210.
10 'Plato dicens animam esse in corpore sicut nauta est in navi...Hoc autem videtur inconveniens':
SCG, ii, cap.57, 406.
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force that the body requires." The soul is the form of the body in so far as it is the
life-giving principle. 12 Aquinas understood that humans possess powers which are
not purely bodily. The soul as intellect can act independently of the body. However,
it can only do so following the abstraction of received sense images:
While the soul is joined to the body it understands by
turning to sense images, it cannot even understand itself
except in that it comes to be actually understanding
through the species abstracted from sense images."
Thus, the body was deemed integral to human understanding and perception. The
fact that the soul and the body are needed together to make up a human being means
that when the body dies, the human being, properly speaking, ceases to exist. Most
of the powers attributed to the soul do not remain after death, although the soul itself
does not perish. Aquinas stated:
"'Anima humana habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem': ST la q.76,
a.1 ad.6. Aquinas was also following Augustine. In De Civitate Dei, Augustine quoted Marcus Varro,
who states that man is neither soul alone, nor body alone, but body and soul together: City of God
against the Pagans, 7 vols., trans. W.C. Greene (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), vi, bk. xix, ch.iii, 117.
12 In classical Latin anima literally means the 'breath of life': A Latin Dictionary, ed. C.T. Lewis and
C. Short (Oxford, 1966), 121.
13 ST la q.98, a.2. Quoted from Davies, Thought of Thomas, 214. Aquinas' theory of sense perception
is drawn heavily from Aristotle. Aristotle's phrase: `nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu' is
used by Aquinas in his theory of the mind being a tabula rasa. Aquinas believed that during the
process of sense perception the organ was altered in some way. He differed from Aristotle, in that, for
Aquinas, reception of a sensible without matter is not something that happens to the sense organ, but
something that happens to the faculty of soul or mind. Aquinas' theory of the process of sense
perception is very complicated. A concise explanation of it is as follows: the sense organ receives a
species of the object being sensed. This causes some kind of physical change in the sense organ. A
spiritual change follows which leads to the production of phantasmata (sensory images). The senses
and intellect are linked by the intellectus agens, which illumines the phantasmata. This is called the
conversio ad phantasmata. The active reason then abstracts the universal concept from each
particular phantasm and imposes it on the passive intellect. This is how Aquinas overcame Aristotle's
problem with the conversion from potentiality to actuality in the intellect. For further information, see
Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, 47-51.
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Certain powers, namely understanding and will are
related to the soul taken on its own as their subject of
inhesion, and powers of this kind have to remain in the
soul after the death of the body. But some powers have
the body-soul compound for subject; this is the case
with all the powers of sensation and nutrition.. .And so
it is wrong to say, as some do, that these powers remain
in the soul after the dissolution of the body. And it is
much more wrong to say that the acts of these powers
continue in the disembodied soul, because such powers
have no activity except through a bodily organ. 14
The importance of the soul-body unit was emphasised overtly by Aquinas. His
theories were affected to a large degree by the theories of Aristotle. He was also
interested in understanding the nature of suffering in both the soul and body. It
seems that Aquinas was aware of arguments which certain authorities had advanced
concerning the nature of suffering in the soul and body and the language used to
describe this suffering. Aquinas was writing at a time when understanding the nature
of both soul and body and their union was being refined. The conscious attention to,
and interpretation of, words which described pain and suffering was to play a large
part in this process of refinement.
The language which certain authorities used when they talked about pain and
suffering was a major concern for the masters. It also directly affected the masters'
views about the body and its relationship to the soul. One authority whose use of
language for pain appears in debates discussed in the present chapter was Aristotle.
A stock formula emerged from Aristotle, which stated : 'dolor est sensus rei
14 ST la q.77, a.8. Translation by Davies, Thought of Thomas, 216.
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contrariae', 15 that is, dolor, some kind of pain, is the perception of contrary things.
What this, in effect, meant to masters was that the presence of something contrary to
another thing would cause the second thing to suffer. In order to explain what was to
be understood by this phrase, masters had to integrate the language of their
authorities with their theories about the body.
This constant tension between theories about body and soul, and the ambiguous
language which some authorities used for pain and suffering was also found in
certain biblical passages, as we will see below. The use of vocabulary to describe
different types of suffering was to become a key concern for the masters.
Ultimately, this would lead to the development of a separate language for suffering.
To sum up the position in the early part of the thirteenth century: masters were
influenced on the one hand by Platonic theories which explained the body and soul
as separate entities, only united together by their operations. They were also
influenced on the other by the increasing impact of Aristotle, who perceived the soul
and body as inseparable components of a single unit. The debates which arose
surrounding body, soul and the way in which each part suffered are thus fruitful
areas of research within which to analyse the notion of body and the way in which it
suffered according to masters of theology in the thirteenth century. It would thus
seem appropriate to identify the main debates which affected the masters' views
15 Nichomachean Ethics, 1.4,c.2 (1121 a 2-3; 1172b 9 - 1175 a17.) This phrase also occurs in Galen, De
symptcausis, 1.1,c.6, (ed. Kuhn, VII, 115.) and Avicenna's Canon, 1.1, fen.2, doctr.2, c.19.
27
about the human body and also which main authorities expressed notions of pain to
view the way in which masters perceived the suffering of the human body.
How, then, did masters of the thirteenth century discuss pain and suffering? What
issues were they interested in and why were these issues of such importance?
Ultimately, was a language for suffering forged within their debates? One master of
theology who asked specifically about pain was Alexander of Hales. He was Regent
Master of Theology at Paris and held the first Franciscan chair there from 1231 to
1241. Alexander used the Sentences of Peter Lombard for his lectures on theology,
by dividing the most contentious areas into distinctions for discussion. His Glossa in
quatuor libri sententiarum Petri Lombardi was written between 1222 and 1229,
while his quaestiones disputatae were composed prior to 1237. He died in 1245. 16 In
his disputed questions, Alexander asked whether the soul is capable of suffering by
its nature. 17
 He replied that the soul is naturally inclined to unite to the body, and
through this union, it will suffer from the body's suffering. 18 To prove the
importance of this union, Alexander quoted the eighth-century monk, John
Damascene, who stated that if the body is damaged, the soul itself will not be
16 For Alexander's life, see I. Herscher, 'A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies,
5 (1945), 434-54; R. Huber, 'Alexander of Hales, 0.F.M.', Franciscan Studies, 5 (1945), 353-65;
W.H. Principe, Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1967), 13-15; C.
Harkins, 'Alexander of Hales', Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. J. Strayer, i (New York, 1982),
148.
17 q.10: `Utnun anima de natura sua prima sit passibilis': Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset
frater' qq.60-68 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevii, xxi, vol.iii; Quaracchi, 1960),
1412-1419.
Ig `Praeterea, anima secundum suam naturam est unibilis corpori; et propter ham unibilitatem
compatitur corpori patienti.': ibid., 1417. The same conclusion is found in an earlier set of disputed
questions by Alexander: 'Item, anima per naturam unibilis est corpori, angelus autem non; ham
autem differentiam ostendit Augustinus inter animam et angelum, XII Super Genesim in glossa. Et
propter ham unibilitatem compatitur anima corpori patienti; unde Damascenus: "Anima, corpore
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damaged, but it will suffer with the body. I9 This emphasis on the inclination of the
soul to unite with a body was to become a tenet of Franciscan thinking after
Alexander in the works of Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta. 20
The soul thus had a natural inclination to union with the body. All its experiences
and suffering occur by and through this union. The body is needed by the soul in its
experience of suffering. Suffering, it would seem, only happens to a conjoint of both
body and soul. Furthermore, this is testament to the influence of Aristotle on
Alexander of Hales. Although his question does not mention any direct source, the
notion of body and soul as one implicitly denies belief in Platonic theories of
dualism.
Albert the Great, German Dominican and teacher of Aquinas, 21 completed his
Commentary on the Sentences some time towards the end of the 1240s. He asked
whether Christ had a soul which was capable of suffering. 22 Albert used the issue of
Christ's suffering as a pretext to discuss the nature of suffering in the soul and body.
Albert did not explore the dual nature of Christ as human and divine here, but rather
inciso, ipsa non incisa, condolet et compatitur m : Quaestiones 'antequam esset frater 1-33, i
(Quaracchi, 1960), 228.
19 `Uncle Ioannes Damascenus: 'Anima, corpore inciso, ipsa non incisa, condolet et compatitur'.
Propter enim unionem naturam, quod est nocivum corpori, reputatur nociviun animae, et conveniens
conveniens; ergo est passibilis': q.10, 1412.
H.M. Beha, 'Matthew of Aquasparta's Theory of Cognition', Franciscan Studies, 20 (1960), 187.
21 Useful surveys on Albert's life and thought are F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (eds.), Albert the
Great: Commemorative Essays (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980); G. Meyer and A. Zimmermann (eds.),
Albertus Magnus: Doctor Universalis, 1280-1980 (Mainz, 1980); A. Zimmermann (ed.), Albert der
Grosse, seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14; Berlin and New York,
1981).
22 'An anima Christi fuit passibilis7': Super III Sententiarum, Opera Onmia, ed. P. Jammy, 21 vols.
(Paris, 1651), xv, d[istinctio]15, a[rticulus] 2, 150.
the human relation of body to soul. Albert employed a familiar rubric, the Passion of
Christ, under which to develop his theories about human suffering.
The objections23
 which Albert advanced denying the possibility of a passible soul in
Christ were heavily indebted to the theories of Aristotle. One example was Albert's
assertion that there is no dolor, or pain, except from the action of contrary things.
Christ's soul, said Albert, never had contraries and therefore could not suffer. 24 This
is a direct reference to the terminology Aristotle used to describe pain. It occurs time
and again in theological treatises concerned with pain and suffering. The use of this
formula was to become an important element in the explanation of pain and
suffering in different contexts. 25
Albert stated in conclusion that Christ's soul and every soul in a state of mortality,
that is, when it is conjoined to a body, is capable of suffering from the suffering of
the body.26 Through this union, argued Albert, there are certain movements from the
body which act upon the soul and opposite movements of the soul on the body. The
movements, or motus, of the body on the soul occur in sensing. Here the sensible
species received by the senses are apprehensive passive powers, where passivae is
23 By 'objections' it is meant the arguments which masters either put for or against a particular
question before resolving the issue within the solutio. They are thus not evidence of a particular
master's thinking. However, occasionally it is useful to examine them to discover which issues
masters felt themselves compelled to resolve.
24 `Non est dolor nisi ex contrario agente ad dissolutionem continui vel compositi: anima Christi nihil
habuit contrarium: ergo patiebatur nihil, ita quod doloret': ibid.
25 For a detailed discussion about `contraries' see Chapter 5, 195-7.
26 Dicendum, quod anima Christi et omnis anima in statu mortalitatis huius quamdiu coniuncta est
corpori, passibilis est compatiendo corpori, et patiendo ex corpore': Albert the Great, III Sent., d.15,
a.2, 150.
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derived from the Greek `patin', to receive. 27 The species mentioned here are the
immaterial form of the object being sensed. In this first way, they have no material
impact on the body or its senses.
Albert also outlined a second way in which the soul could suffer. The other
movement, which involves the soul acting upon the body, is the perception of good
or evil. The perception by the soul of some evil causes a passion in the sensible part
of the soul to rise, which leads to tristitia, or sadness.28 The third way in which the
soul can suffer the sense of pain, argued Albert, is from the dissolution of the
cohesion of' the body and soul's union. This is caused either by an imbalance in the
humours as one gets with fevers, or by violent acts, such as stabbing and
wounding.29
Albert's conclusions to this question emphasised the importance he attached to the
body and soul being united as matter to form. This, for Albert, was what constituted
the individual human being. The composite of matter and form, of body and soul
was the hoc aliquid, a something, or being. Only God was thought to be simple; all
27 ,
Sunt enim (ut dicit Philosophus) motus quidam ex corpore venientes in ipsam animam, et quidam
e contrario venientes ex anima in corpus. Ex corpore autem in anima veniunt, sicut in
sentiendo....quidem recipiendo in organis corporalibus species sensibiles, secundum quad sensus
proprius et conununis et phantasia et caetere vires apprehensivae passivae dicuntur, secundum quad
pati dicitur a graeco patin, quod sonat recipere': ibid. For a further discussion of species in sense
perception see L. Dewan 'St. Albert, the Sensibles and Spiritual Being', Albertus Magnus and the
Sciences: Commemorative Essays, ed. J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980), 291-320.
28	 •	 •
enam ratione passibilis est anima itenun secundum quod passionem diffmit Damascenus,
quod est motus animae suspicatione boni, vel mali. Ex hac enim suspicatione surgit passio illata parti
animae sensibili quae dicitur tristitia, vel delectatio: ex apprehensione enim boni convenientis surgit
delectatio, et ex apprehensione mali inconvenientis tristitia': Albert the Great, III Sent., d.15, a.2, 150
29 `Tertio modo dicitur passio sensus doloris ex dissolvente continuum corpus coniunctum animae,
sive illa dissolutio sit ex intemperantia humonun, ut in febribus. Sive per agens violenti, ut in ictibus,
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other beings must necessarily be composed, that is, be a composite being. 3° In this
sense, Albert applied the human meld of matter and form to the man Christ. This is
more problematic than it might at first seem. Technically, he said, there are no
contraries in the soul of Christ, but because the soul is part of a composite form, it
can be said to suffer in this sense, but not simpliciter, that is, not in itself.31
However, this is true of any human being, not just Christ. Further on, he examined
Augustine's claim that the nails and sword which pierced Christ's flesh were not
stronger than the soul of Christ. Albert affirmed this belief and argued further that
they are not stronger than any soul, and the soul is not touched directly. The soul
understands the species of the passion in the body and understands them as
contraries to the conjoint of body and soul itself. From this understanding suffering
et vulneribus, et huiusmodi: et hoc modo quaeritur hic de passione et sic dicimus anima[m] Christi
compassibilis esse corpori': ibid., 151.
3° L. Ducharme, 'The Individual Human Being in St. Albert's Earlier Writings', Albert the Great:
Commemorative Essays, ed. F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980), 133-4. Other
masters had problems with this theory's implications. The difficulty for Aquinas on this issue was
that although he too agreed that God was absolutely simple and all creatures were composites, he
faced the difficult Aristotelian principle that matter obstructs knowledge. Aquinas deemed the
knowing power to be completely immaterial. His way around this conundrum was to state that a
composite did not necessarily have to be composed of matter and form. Another kind of composition
was possible: essence (what something is) with existence (whether something is). This explained
how immaterial entities such as angels could still be composites. See, P.V. Spade, 'Medieval
Philosophy', The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy, ed. A. Kenny (London, 1994),
91. Aristotle had taught that the mind, or the part which knows, cannot be mixed with the body: 'It
is...necessary, since its understanding extends to everything, that, as Anaxogoras says, it [soul, or
mind] be uncompounded with anything so that it may command, i.e. know. For what appeared
inwardly would prevent and impede what was without. Hence it has no nature and is not one, except
in being potent. What then is called the 'intellect' of the soul...is not, before it understands, in any act
of reality. Hence it is a reasonable inference that it is not involved in the body. Were it so, it would
also have some quality either hot or cold and it would have an organ, like the sensitive faculties; but
in fact there is none such': De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of
St.Thomas Aquinas, trans. K. Foster and S. Humphries (London, 1954), 3.4.429a 24-5, 400.
31 `Dicendum quod verum est, quod anima in se et secundum naturam suam non habet
contrarium...sed tamen coniuntum sibi habet contarium, scilicet corpus....et haec passio est ex
contrario sibi, vel eius quod sibi est coniunctum: sic enim contrarium coniuncto, est contrarium sibi in
hoc statu, licet non simpliciter': ibid.
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and the sense of pain occurs. It is, thus, per coniunctum, through the conjoint of
body and soul, that the soul suffers.32
Albert was in agreement with Alexander of Hales. The soul and body suffer as a
unit. However, Albert was indebted explicitly to theories of sense perception from
Aristotle in his question. Bodily sense perception caused a movement acting on the
soul, whilst movements of the soul, like sadness, could act on the body. Albert
furthered the theory of the body-soul unit suffering to explain the action of each part
of that unit. This demonstrates Albert's theology of the relationship between the
body and the soul, and also how important bodily suffering is to the soul's suffering.
The Aristotelian theory of matter-form relationships makes the composite pivotal for
Albert in his ideas about how the human body and the human Christ suffered.
According to the masters, body and soul experienced different kinds of suffering, but
each had an effect on the other. The soul could only suffer on account of its
relationship to the body within the composite. However, the movement of soul on
body produced different pain from that caused by movement of body on soul.
Masters appear to be developing a technical language for pain which enabled them
to understand the complex relationship between soul and body.
32 'Ad aliud dicendum secundum Augustinus quod clavus vel gladius non fuerunt fortiora quam
anima Christi, nec sunt etiam fortiora quam anima alterius: sed passione facta in corpore....anima
punit seipsam. Et hoc intelligitur sic: quia anima species passionum factatum in corpore apprehendit,
abstrahendo ab organo tactus, et apprehendit ut contraria coniuncto sibi, et ex illa apprehensione
causatur dolor ut inunediata causa sensus doloris. Unde licet gladius non scindit earn: tamen ipsa
dolet causato dolore ex huiusmodi speciebus apprehensis, et immediate affligens et huiusmodi species
apprehensa. Et haec solutio est salvando dictum Augustinus....licet non immediate tangat gladius
anitnam, tamen tangit per coniunctum, ut tactus dicatur secundum quod tangit species dissolventis
apprehensa: et sic sequitur ipsa alteratio doloris': ibid.
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In the third book of his Commentary on the Sentences, written some time between
1252 and 1256, 33
 Aquinas debated whether the human soul could suffer. 34
 Like
Albert, Aquinas' arguments were richly imbued with quotations from Aristotle.
Aquinas, however, was much more refined than Albert in his arguments about the
soul suffering through the body and which of the soul's powers are used. The soul,
stated Aquinas, is an incorporeal substance, like others before him, he argued that it
will only suffer in as far as it is connected to the body. 35
 Strictly speaking, the soul
suffers according to its sensitive parts, but because these powers are not subsisting,
that is, integral to the essence of the soul, but are the forms of corporeal organs, the
soul does not suffer per se (in itself), but per accidens (by association) because it is
the composite that suffers.36
 The suffering of the soul was thus inseparable from the
suffering of the body.
Aquinas then explained exactly how the soul suffers through the body. He elucidated
two kinds of sense perception. The first is concerned with the vires apprehensivae,
the abstracting powers of the senses. In this case, the soul receives the species of the
thing sensed and not its material form, an argument which was seen in Albert's
question. The reception is therefore spiritual and so there can be nothing contrary to
33 This dating is according to Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 358.
34 `UM= anima sit passibilis': Scriptum super III Sententiarum, ed. M.F. Moos (Paris, 1929), d.15,
412, a.1, quaestiuncula [hereafter ql 2, 482-7.
35 `Dicendum quod ex dictis de facili potest patere qualiter in anima possit esse passio. Quia cum
anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur.':
ibid., 484.
36 'Relinquitur ergo quod pati proprie sit animae secundum partem sensitivam, ut dicitur in VII Phys.
Sed quia hujusmodi vires non sunt subsistentes, sed formae organonun corporalium, ideo non
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the sense. It is a perfection, and as such, cannot be called suffering, for something
which leads to perfection cannot cause suffering. The sensitive appetitive powers, on
the other hand, are brought into motion by the action of things themselves and not
their spiritual messengers. The movement is not spiritual, and there can be things
which are contrary to the soul in this movement. Thus, the soul can be said to suffer
from contrary things in this way; it can also experience things which are harmonious
to it.37
When Aquinas also considered whether there can truly be said to be suffering in the
intellect, he replied that there is none in this part of the soul. The soul is moved to a
greater degree by affection (affectum) than by the intellect. Affection is moved by
things according to their real properties and the soul can thus perceive whether there
is contrariety or harmony. So the soul is dependent on a certain kind of sense
perception which will enable it to experience suffering. It is also only properly said
to suffer in as far as it is part of the human composite. Whatever is apprehended and
abstracted by the intellect is harmonious, in as far as the truth of it is grasped.
Therefore in the operation of the apprehensive, or intellectual powers, there is
dicuntur pati per se, neque anima secundum eas, sed per accidens, inquantum composittun patitur, ut
dicitur in I De anima': ibid., 485.
37 `Sed quia potentiae apprehensivae sensitivae sunt tantum in recipiendo speciem- quae quidem non
recipitur in sensu per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis,- ideo in operatione hartun virium est
quidem aliquo modo pati, quantum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales et quantum ad hoc quod aliquid
recipitur. Et propter hoc dicitur in II De anima quod sentire est pati quoddam. Sed quia sensus non
movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem moventis, cum forma sensibilis non recipiatur in sensu
secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium
sensui- unde non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perfectio ejus, nisi secundum quod excedit
proportionem sensus- ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod
excellentia sensibilium comunpit sensum, aut debilitat. Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur
secundum vires appetitivas sensitivas, quia hae vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum
proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed rei ipsius; et secundum hoc habet res
convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem': III Sent., d.I5, q.2, a.1, ce 2, 485.
35
always pleasure, whereas the operation of the affective powers can lead to either
sadness (tristitia), or pleasure.38
In line with earlier masters, Aquinas followed the argument that the composite was
essential to the experience of sensation and suffering. The soul only sensed things as
a consequence of its relationship to the body. He developed the notion of two
different kinds of sense perception which Albert used in his question. The sense
information which the soul abstracts in the intellect cannot cause suffering: this is
tantamount to a perfection of sense perception and is incorporeal. However, the
corporeal action of suffering on the body could cause suffering in the soul also. It is
the corporeal link which makes this possible. There was a clear emphasis on the
body and bodily sensation. The importance of the body was emphasised as the
medium which experiences and feels according to its nature.
The soul relied on the body to experience things. Ideas about the different ways in
which soul and body could suffer ran parallel to masters' theories about the way in
which the body was perceived. Moreover, the use of key passages from Aristotle
which described suffering acted as a blueprint which masters could use to explain
what they meant by corporeality and incorporeality. The language of suffering which
38 `Sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia irrunateriales sunt, tamen
est ibi aliquid de ratione passionis
	 [sed] magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et
vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum...Et quia movetur affectus a re secundum
proprietatem rei quam res habet in se ipsa, ideo per hunc modum contingit quod res habet
contrarietatem et convenientiam ad anirnam sed secundum quod apprehenditur ab intellectu, omnis
res habet convenientiam, inquantum apprehenditur ut verum. Et ideo in operatione apprehensivae
semper est delectatio, in operatione autem affectivae est delectatio et tristitia. Et sic etiam tristitia
magis proprie adhuc dicitur passio, sicut et in affectu sensibili dictum est. Et sic accipitur hic passio':
ibid., 486.
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can be identified within these questions was enhanced by the distinction between
material and immaterial aspects of sense perception. Pain was still understood as a
bodily experience. The application of new theories of sense perception, from the
extensive use of Aristotle in their theological debates, gave masters more control
over their understanding of pain and suffering.
One of Aquinas' later works, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, 39 composed
between 1256 and 1259,4° also described how the soul suffers through its union with
the body in a series of debates about the passiones animae.41 A definite progression
in Aquinas' thought can be detected in one particular question. 42 Aquinas stated that
it is impossible for something incorporeal to suffer in the proper sense. If passio
pertains to the soul it is only in as far as it is joined to the body; then it only suffers
per accidens. Whatever suffers per se is a body.° This part goes as far as his
conclusion in the Commentary on the Sentences. However, Aquinas then explained
that the soul is united to the body in two ways, first as form (ut forma) in its role as
life-giver to the body, and second as mover (ut motor), in that it performs its
operations through the body. In both cases the soul suffers per accidens, but by two
different means. When a passio is felt in the body and it is experienced by the soul in
39 Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Opera Omnia IUSSU Leonis XIII P.M Edita, xxii.1-3, 3 vols.,
qq.21-29 (Rome, 1976).
4'3 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 362.
41 The passiones animae belong to man as a unified composite of soul and body. The soul is the form
of the body, so it experiences the changes undergone by the body in response to each passio. There
are eleven categories: love (amor) and hatred (odium); desire (desiderium) and aversion (fuga);
pleasure (delectatio) and pain (dolor); hope (spes) and despair (desperatio); fear (timor) and daring
(audacia); and anger (ira).
42 
`Quomodo anima coniuncti corpori patiatur': q.26, a.2, 751-3.
43 `Dicendum quod proprie accipiendo passionem impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati, ut supra
ostensum est; illud ergo quod per se patitur passione proprie accepta corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie
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its role as form of the body, the soul's union with the body is weakened. The body
suffers and the soul suffers also because it is joined to the body. This is called the
passio corporalis. If, however, the passio starts in the soul, in its role as mover
(motor), and ends in the body, this is called the passio animalis. Such passions of the
soul as anger and fear are experienced in this way. The result is an alteration in the
body, and this alteration causes the soul to suffer per accidens as a result.44
This is clear evidence of the development in Aquinas's thought about suffering.
Aristotle's philosophy of the body as form and mover plays a large part in his
discussion. Aquinas was able to define the soul's links with the body in more precise
ways by developing a new vocabulary for its suffering by using the terms passio
corporalis and passio animalis. The development of a consistent vocabulary for the
suffering of the human composite appears to have been an important means of
furthering masters' understanding of the nature of the body.
In a later question, Aquinas explored what he deemed to be ambiguities in the
vocabulary for pain and suffering. In the first division of the second part of his
Summa Theologiae, composed sometime between 1269 and 1272, during his second
dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per
accidens': ibid, 752.
" Tnitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, in quantum dat esse corpori vivificans ipsum;
alio modo ut motor, in quantum per corpus suas operationes exercet...Dupliciter ergo passio corporis
attribuitur animae per accidens: uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in animae
secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma, et haec est quaedam passio corporalis; sicut cum laeditur
corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum
suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima in quantum est corporis motor, et
terminetur in corpus, et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore et aliis huiusmodi
peraguntur per apprehensionem et appetitum animae, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio...Et sic
corpore transmutato per aliquam alterationem, etiam ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens': ibid.
38
Parisian regency,45
 Aquinas dealt specifically with the passiones animae. In one
question he asked whether tristitia is the same thing as dolor. He quoted Augustine
who attributed dolor to the body.' However, Aquinas noted the ambiguity shown by
the apostle Paul, who used dolor and tristitia synonymously:
However the Apostle says the opposite, My tristitia is
great and dolor continues to be in my heart. Tristitia
and dolor are being used for the same thing."
Aquinas went on to explain that suffering can be perceived by interior perception
and exterior sense perception. When interior perception occurs, then there is a kind
of dolor called tristitia. When exterior perception occurs, this is called dolor, but not
tristitia:
Only that dolor which is caused by interior perception
is called tristitia...thus that dolor which is caused by
exterior perception is indeed called dolor, but not
tristitia..."
Aquinas acknowledged Augustine's use of vocabulary. Dolor is used most often to
refer to bodily pain," whereas tristitia can only, according to Aquinas, be applied to
spiritual, interior pain. Tristitia, or dolor interior, is caused by something which is
45 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'ilquino, 361.
" 'Utrwn tristitia sit idem quod dolor': ST I a2ae q.35, a.2.
47 Ibid
48 `Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Tristitia est mihi magna et continuus dolor cordi meo, pro
eodem utens tristitia et dolore': ibid. My translation.
49 'Ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione interiori causatur nominatur trisititia...ita ille dolor qui ex
exteriori apprehensione causatur nominatur quidem dolor non autem tristitia': ibid. My translation.
50 'Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum vocabuli, quia dolor magis usiatur in corporalibus
doloribus, qui sunt magis noti quam in doloribus spiritualibus': ibid., ad.1 .
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directly repugnant to the appetitus.51 Dolor, caused by an evil repugnant to the body,
is, through this route, also repugnant to the appetitus. However, although dolor is
generally used to mean bodily pain, it is in fact the genus of which tristitia is a
species. 52
In a subsequent question, Aquinas asked whether exterior suffering was greater than
interior. 53
 In his reply, he distinguished between the cause of each type of suffering.
Exterior suffering is caused by being joined to some evil which is repugnant to the
body. Interior suffering, on the other hand, is caused by being joined to evil which is
repugnant to the appetite. If their causes are compared, said Aquinas, it is apparent
that one pertains to the appetite per se, whilst the other pertains to it by association.
Interior suffering is caused by something which is directly repugnant to the appetite,
whilst exterior suffering results from something which is repugnant to the appetite
only because it is also repugnant to the body. The per se relationship is greater than
that by association. 54
 Aquinas concluded, therefore, that interior suffering was
greater than exterior.
51 Aquinas' use of the term app etitus here refers to the natural inclination which humans have towards
things, or away from them. In sensation, the sensory appetite is affected, but when the will desires
something intellectually, the intellectual appetite is where discrimination is made. There are,
however, contradictions in Aquinas' use of this term. See A. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London and
New York, 1993), 59-66.
52 'Si vero dolor accipiatur communiter, sic est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est': ST 1 a2ae q.35, a.2.
53 `Utrum dolor exterior sit major quam interior': ST la2ae q.35, a.7.
54 Tausa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum quod repugnat corpori: causa autem interioris
doloris est malum coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui...Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad
causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est uterque dolor: alia vero per aliud. Nam
dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui: exterior autem dolor, ex hoc quod
repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per
aliud': ibid.
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In addition to complementing earlier theories on the links between body and soul,
the focus of these questions moved more to the discussion of the vocabulary of
suffering. Whether certain terms may be used for different types of suffering and the
ambiguity introduced by authorities were points which were highlighted in the
Summa Theologiae. Aquinas argued that certain kinds of sense perception should
only be talked about with the correct terminology. By attributing certain words to
physical and mental suffering within a framework of the body-soul composite,
Aquinas was able to distinguish between the elements of soul and body and discuss
them with greater precision. In this way, whereas the soul was only said to suffer
accidentally through the body in the early part of the thirteenth century, Aquinas
placed the soul above the body in terms of how intensely it suffered.
Where masters previously emphasised the importance of the composite to suffering
and highlighted the indivisibility of soul and body, the process of definition of
certain specific terms for interior and exterior suffering allowed the composite to be
taken apart and discussed separately. Although soul and body still depended on each
other for existence and sensation, a vocabulary of pain created a new dimension and
framework for analysing them as separate entities. So it would appear that the
development of a language for pain and suffering was integral to understanding the
nature of body and soul and their relationship.
What insights about intellectual attitudes to pain and suffering may be obtained from
the foregoing analysis? Masters deemed it important to discuss whether the soul and
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body could suffer because both soul and body and the relationship between them
were undergoing a period of revision and definition in the mid-thirteenth century.
There were various spurs which made this question of particular interest. First,
Aristotle's theories about the soul-body composite contradicted the Platonic belief of
the soul using the body as its instrument. Such contradictions required elucidation
and these newly-acquired theories gave masters an increased level of sophistication
when they discussed the human composite. Second, the issue of suffering was
directly pertinent to discussions of body and soul, for it was interwoven with debates
about the nature of the corporeal. It was seen at the beginning that the language used
to describe suffering by one key authority, Aristotle, was imbued with bodily
imagery. Moreover, the language which explained human suffering potentially
threatened masters' own views about corporeality. In this way, the use of language
for suffering and consequently for the soul and body, required formulation to avoid
ambiguity and in order that the theories masters had developed for the body and soul
were not threatened.
All masters agreed that the body and soul were necessary together to experience
suffering. Indeed, in the earlier part of the thirteenth century, the theory of
overwhelming dependence of the soul on the composite union is striking. All
masters agreed also that whatever suffered pain properly speaking was a body.
However, the way in which soul and body were linked in the composite received
increasing attention. Aquinas developed his ideas on this issue during his career.
Although he emphasised the accidental nature of the soul's suffering in his earlier
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works, the Summa Theologiae demonstrates the increasing interest he attached to the
suffering of the soul. The evidence for this is to be seen in the development of the
language of suffering. Not only does the language help Aquinas pinpoint the links
between soul and body, he also gave each part of the composite its own vocabulary
for suffering.
This last statement on the use of language is directly pertinent to the increasingly
complex frameworks being developed by masters to view the body composite. When
Aquinas applied certain sets of words to the soul and others to the body, he was
effectively using language to analyse each part of the composite separately. So, in
one sense the composite was viewed as an impenetrable unit; suffering in one part
was experienced in the other, for example. In another sense, each part, body and
soul, could be examined separately. More importantly, however, the masters
developed a technical language which could be used to describe human suffering, in
both physical and spiritual terms. Ideas about suffering, which previously only had
physical traits attached to them, were developed to embrace the theory of the soul-
body unit. Conversely, the way in which masters used the language of suffering
helped clarify their understanding about the exact relationship of body to soul with
greater precision. Pain was essential, therefore, to their understanding of human
beings and to understanding fundamental questions about the relationship of body to
soul.
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2. The human suffering of Christ
The previous section has shown how masters discussed the relationship of body to
soul in new and more complex ways through developing their ideas about suffering.
Suffering was also integral to their theological perceptions of Christ. Christ's
physical suffering on the cross had, in theological terms, redeemed the sins of
mankind in a very tangible way. The humanity of Christ and the issues surrounding
his Incarnation were of keen interest. However, was the union of the soul and the
body in humans essentially different from that in Christ? The problem for masters
was how to explain Christ's suffering in human terms when they had to confront his
divinity at the same time.55
 It is worth examining the background and theories of the
composition of Christ's soul and body, and how he experienced and understood
things, according to thirteenth-century theology, to put the debates about Christ's
suffering in their correct context. Exactly how the human and divine elements were
united and functioned in Christ were topics of fierce debate. Moreover, in their
examination of the suffering of Christ with reference to their theories about human
suffering, the masters needed to define the human Christ with greater precision and
sought greater understanding of the reasons behind the Incarnation.
55 Theology at this time was extremely concerned with development of the relationship between
humanity and divinity in Christ, and also why the Incarnation had occurred at all: D. Goergen, 'Albert
the Great and Thomas Aquinas on the Motive of the Incarnation', The Thomist, 44 (1980), 523-38.
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Theologians were aware of the difficulties that the divine nature in Christ would
cause when they tried to describe what knowledge he had of his own pain, where he
suffered in the soul, and to what degree of intensity. In fact, opinions about how the
divine and human natures were related and how they coloured explanations of
Christ's suffering, were extremely varied. There is a vast secondary literature on the
subject of the hypostatic union and the theories which theologians developed to
explain the human and divine natures of Christ, and his different modes of
knowledge. 56 It is worthwhile exploring these theories in some depth to pinpoint
exactly which issues masters of theology thought were essential to the understanding
of the nature of Christ. In this way, these earlier theories can be usefully compared
to the debates about the suffering of Christ in which masters took part.
Different theories about the hypostatic union and the nature of Christ emerged in the
twelfth century, the main ones appearing in the Sententiae of Peter Lombard. 57 The
56 V-M. Pollet, Vunion hypostatique d'aprês saint Albert-le-Grand', Revue Thomiste, 38 (1933),
505-32; 689-724; F. Haberl, Die lnkarnationslehre des heiligen Albertus Magnus (Freiburg i.B.,
1939); A. Vugts, La grace d'union d'apres St. Thomas d'Aquin: essai historique et doctrinal
(Tilburg, 1946); J. Rohof, La saintete substantielle de Christ dans la theologie scolastique: histoire
du probleme (Fribourg, 1952); A.M. Landgraf, 'Das Wissen der Seele Christi' in: Dogmengeschichte
der Friischolastik, 2.2 (Regensburg, 1954); L.S. Vaughan, The Acquired Knowledge of Christ
according to the Theologians of the 12th and 13th Centuries (Rome, 1957); W.I. Forster, The Beatific
Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries (Rome, 1958); H-M Diepen,
'I:existence humaine du Christ en metaphysique thomiste', Revue Thomiste, 58 (1958), 197-213; W.
Breuning, Die Hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St.Cher und
Rolands von Cremona (Trier, 1962); W.H. Principe, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the
Early Thirteenth Century, 4 vols. (Toronto, 1963-75); J.C. Murray, The Infused Knowledge of Christ
in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries (Windsor, Ontario, 1963); E. GOssmann, Metaphysik
und Heilgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)
(Miinchen, 1964); J.T Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen
Erkenntnis Christi: Ein Versuch zur Auslegung der Klassischer Dreiteilung: Visio Beatifica, scientia
infusa und scientia acquisita (Freiburg, 1971); W.H.Principe, 'St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of
the Incarnation', St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies, 2 vols., i (Toronto, 1974),
381-418.
57 Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, (Specilegium
Bonaventurianum iv-v, 3 vols.; Grottaferrata, 1971-81.)
45
issues which faced theologians about Christ centred around the main question cur
deus homo? However, there was more than the soteriological concern that Anse1m
had developed in his work;58 beginning with Peter Lombard in the twelfth century,
theologians questioned whether there was a two-fold being in Christ; whether the
divine nature could become flesh; if Christ was a single person or many; and
ultimately whether Christ could be understood as a person at al1.59
Peter Lombard had distinguished three theories of union in the person of Christ. 60
 It
is worth examining these theories in some detail, for they are central to later
theological ideas about how Christ possessed knowledge and experience. The three
theories have been dubbed by modern theologians the Assumptus theory, the
Subsistence theory and the Habitus theory.61 The Assumptus theory essentially
meant that Christ possessed the substance of a man, that is, a complete composite of
58 Cur Deus Homo, Opera Omnia, 6 vols., ed. F.S.Sclunitt (Rome and Edinburgh,1938-68), ii, 37-
133 .
59 Breuning, Hypostatische Union, 15; Diepen, `L'existence humaine du Christ', 197-8. On earlier
ideas about the human nature of Christ, see A.-M. Dubarle, 'La science humaine de Christ selon Saint
Augustine', RSPhTh, 29 (1940), 244-63.
60 'An Christus secundum quod homo est sit persona vel aliquid...Ex =ague parte quaestionis
argumenta concummt. Quod enim persona sit, his edisserunt rationibus: Si secundum quod homo
aliquid est, vel persona, vel substantia, vel aliud est; sed aliud non; ergo persona vel substantia. Sed si
substantia est, vel rationalis, vel irrationalis; sed non est irrationalis substantia, ergo rationalis. Si vero
secundum quod homo est rationalis substantia, ergo persona, quia haec est definitio personae:
`Substantia rationalis individuae naturae'. Si ergo secundum quod homo est aliquid, et secundum
quod homo persona est. Sed e converso, si secundum quod homo persona est vel tertia in Trinitate,
vel alia; sed alia non; ergo tertia in Trinitate persona. At si secundum quod homo, persona est tertia in
Trinitate, ergo Deus. Propter haec inconvenientia et alia, quidam dicunt Christwn secundum
hominem non esse personam nec aliquid, nisi forte `secundum' sit expressi yum unitatis personae.
'Secundum' enim multiplicem habet rationem: aliquando enim exprimit conditionem vel
proprietatem naturae divinae vel humanae, aliquando unitatem personae; aliquando notat habitum,
aliquando causam. Cuius distinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae
recondat, ne eius confundatur sensus cum de Christo sermo occurrent': Sententiae in IV Libris
Distinctae, (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum v, ii; Grottaferrata, 1981), liber iii, d.10, cap. 1, 72-3. See
Colish, Peter Lombard, i, 400-1.
81 Breuning, Hypostatische Union, 20.
46
body and soul, which began to assume the nature of God. Two natures remained, but
the substance of Christ was not composed of two natures. 62 This theory was upheld
by Hugh of St. Victor.63
Adherents to the Subsistence theory, on the other hand, believed that the natures of
divinity and humanity formed the composition of a single substance in Christ. Christ
was believed to have been a person from all eternity and from the Incarnation
became a man and thus a composite. The main problem which arose with this theory
was that if Christ's human nature was a substance (aliquid), then he would have
been a human person. 64
 This conclusion was drawn because much of theology about
what a human person comprised was based on the theory of human nature advanced
by Boethius where the person was thought to comprise a single, rational nature.
Thus, a person was supposed to represent one substance, not two.65
62 N.M. Haring, 'The Case of Gilbert de la Porree, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-54)', Mediaeval Studies,
13 (1951), 1-40. Gilbert de la Porree professed belief in the Habitus theory until, like the twelfth-
century theologian John of Cornwall, he renounced this belief. On John of Cornwall: E. Rathbone,
'John of Cornwall: A Brief Biography', RTAM, 17 (1950), 46-60; N.M. Haring, 'The Eulogium ad
Alexandrum Papam tertium of John of Cornwall', Mediaeval Studies, 13 (1951), 253-300; Breuning,
Hypostatische Union, 20ff. Secondary works tend to refer to the three main theories as 'theories one,
two and three', following the order I have cited above.
63 'Considerandum vero est quod cum verbum et homo una sit persona in Christo; recte tamen per se
dicimus verbum est persona; et iterum recte per se dicimus, homo est persona. Et recte dicimus, quod
simul homo et verbum non duae sunt sed una persona. Quia enim verbum et ante assumpttun
hominem persona fuit; et post assumptum hominem persona fuit; et post assumptwn hominem
persona esse non desinit, ideo recte per se dicimus verbum est persona': De Sacramentis, ii, 1 PL 176,
411.
" Haring, 'Gilbert de la Porree', 32-3.
65 'Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia': Boethius, Liber de persona et duabus naturis,
PL 64, 1343. Colish notes that Boethius presented theologians of the twelfth century with many
problems because he advanced six different ways of defining human nature: Peter Lombard, i, 92.
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The problems that the first two theories created engendered the development of the
Habitus theory which held sway amongst theologians for some time. This third
theory denied the union of body and soul in Christ that would form a man's
substance, for this would entail the creation of a human person. The body and soul
were said to cover the Word, just as a piece of clothing covers a person. 66
 Hence the
use of the term habitus to describe this theory. In the Aristotelian sense, the human
nature of Christ was related to the Word like a habitus is related to a substance.67
Masters were clearly at the centre of debate surrounding these different theories. For
example, in terms of his response to the various theories of the hypostatic union,
Aquinas began by defending the second theory, although his thought changed over
time. In the De Unione Verbi Incarnati, written around 1272, Aquinas argued that
there was one esse in Christ simpliciter, but two secundum quid. Christ was one
because of the unity of the suppo sit, or hypostasis and two because of his two
natures, the human and the divine. 68
 However, by the time Aquinas was writing the
tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae, he had changed his mind. No longer was there
an esse in Christ secundum quid. There was only to be one esse, and the Word had
" Breuning, Hypostatische Union, 23; Haring, 'Gilbert de la Porree', 34-5.
Habitus is one of the Aristotelian kategoriai designating a kind of quality of a thing, which could
include its natural capacity, colour, or emotion: Aristotle, The Categories, ed. H.P. Cook (Cambridge,
Mass., 1962), ch.viii, 63-79. The phrase is also linked to the Pauline text: 'Habitus inventus est ut
homo': Paul's Letter to the Philippians 2:7. This was expanded to a greater degree by Peter Lombard:
Habitu inventus est ut homo, manifeste ostendit Deum dici factum esse hominem vel esse hominem
secundum habittun...Deus enim filius semetipsum exinanivit, non formam suam mutans, sed formam
servi accipiens; neque conversus aut transmutatus in hominem, amissa incommutabili stabilitate, sed
in similitudine hominum factus est ipse susceptor, verum hominem suscipiendo, et habits inventus est
ut homo': Sententiae in IV Libris distinctae, lib.3, d.6, cap.6, 56-7.
68 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, 310-12; Diepen, `L'existence humaine', 197-202. Diepen says that the
particular question where Aquinas defines the simpliciter against the secundum quid, was a report atio
and therefore not necessarily what Aquinas believed. However, there is no evidence to suggest that
reportationes of a certain master are not the conclusions of that master either.
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been subsumed into God-created human nature. Furthermore, Aquinas was
vehemently opposed to the Habitus theory. It had already been condemned at the
Council of Tours in 1170 by Alexander III, who had once put his faith in it.69
Aquinas attacked the habitus theory on the basis that it denied the existence of Christ
as an aliquid and relegated him to something qualitative." He argued that those who
deny the humanity of Christ are heretics because if the soul and body are not united
to form a human substance (aliquid) then this would mean that Christ was divine
substantially, but human accidentally.71
Charges of heresy played an important role in determining which questions were
asked about the nature of Christ. One major reason for the care taken by masters
over these various theories was to prevent the recurrence of various branches of
monophysite heresies. The most well known of these was probably Eutychianism.72
This heresy held that there is only one nature (physis) in Christ after the hypostatic
union. Exponents of this heresy were mainly keen to avoid admitting that there were
two persons in Christ, as opposed to two natures, which would lead to the charge of
69	 •Haring, Gilbert de la Porrie', 37; The text of the council can be found in Mansi, xxii, 119-20.
John of Cornwall describes the action of Alexander III: 'Item Papa Alexander IIIus precipit in
quadam decretali Cum Christus quod quilibet qui negauerit Christtun esse aliquid secundum quod
homo, excommunicetur': Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall', RTAM, 17 (1950), 52.70 ,
Ut quidam dicunt, opinionem eorum qui dicebant Christum, secundum quod est homo, non esse
quid, sed qualiter se habens': III Sent., d.2, expositio textus. See Principe, 'St. Thomas on the
Habitus Theory', 382.
71 `Differt etiam a primis duabus quantum ad comparationem hartun duarum substantianun ad
tertiam; quia ponit has duas substantias conjunctas Verbo accidentaliter, sicut vestis conjungitur
homini, et sicut Angelus assumit corpus, ut in eo videatur': III Sent., d.10, a. q., 218. See Principe,
'St. Thomas on the Habitus Theory', 384.
72 Eutyches was a fifth-century monk from Constantinople who embroiled himself in theological
controversy to avoid the spread of Nestorianism. He was condemned for his heresy at the Council of
Chalcedon in 451. See G. Owens, 'Eutychianism', NCE, vol.5, 642-3.
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Nestorianism. 73 However, accusations of heresy were also made against those who
claimed that Christ's nature meant that he could not suffer. The Summa Halensis, or
Halesian Summa, attributed to Alexander of Hales, though not authored by him,74
draws attention to some early heresies which claimed that Christ assumed a body
without a human soul, so that he could not experience suffering. This was one belief
of Arianism. Aquinas attacked a number of heretical positions, attributing to them
the taint of Arianism. However, in many cases, it was just convenient shorthand for
positions that contradicted the faith.75
In the early thirteenth century, there was a much more present danger from another
type of heresy, which denied the possibility of Christ's suffering: Catharism. Its
doctrines denied the possibility that Christ suffered in the flesh and that Christ was
divinely created. 76
 This led preachers such as Jacques de Vitry to compile sermons
emphasising the passibility of Christ's sou1.77
 In addition, treatises against the
73 Also a fifth-century heretic, Nestorius distinguished between the human and divine natures of
Christ without denying their union. See 'Nestorianism', NCE, vol. 10, 346-7.
74 Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica, 4 vols.(Quaracchi, 1924-1948). On the development of the
Summa and the former view, now discredited, that it immediately fell into disuse upon its
compilation, see M. Gorce, `La somme thdologique d'Alexandre de Hales est-elle authentique?', New
Scholasticism, 5 (1931), 1-72. On the manuscript tradition surrounding the Summa and the
importance this held for its uses, see Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica, iv, Liber Tertius,
Prolegomena, xxx-xxxi.
P.Worrall, 'St. Thomas and Arianism', RTAM, 23 (1956), 208-59; 24 (1957), 45-100.
76 Later on in the century Raymond de l'Aire of Tignac gave a graphic account of Christ's
conception. According to this Cathar peasant, Christ was created 'through fucking and shitting,
rocking back and forth and fucking, in other words through the coitus of a man and a woman, just like
the rest of us': E. Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1284-
1324, trans. B. Bray (London, 1978), 144. See M.D. Lambert, The Cathars (Oxford, 1998), esp. 25-
31.
77 'Contra hereticonun perfidiam qui Cristum uere incarnatum et uere passum negant: Dicunt igitur
Patareni [i.e. Cathars] Cristwn non uere incarnatum, nec uere passum, contra quos Iohannis in
epistola canonica: Qui negat Cristum in carne uenisse, hic est anticristus. Et ipse Cristus ait: Palpate
et uidete quoniam [Vulgate= quia] spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me uidetis habere. Et
Apostolus ait de Cristo: Qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid secundum carnem. Cum autem dixerit
Cristus: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, patet quod habuit animam. Quomodo autem fatigatus
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Cathars were compiled by inquisitors and the claim that Christ had not suffered for
human sins appeared among the list of condemned, heretical positions. 78 The issue
of heresy still seems to have been a concern for masters in the middle of the
thirteenth century. In his Commentary on the third book of Sentences, Bonaventure
argued that Christ had flesh capable of experiencing real pain, or dolor.79 He then
stated that certain heretics repeat the ancient error of the Saracens that although
Christ was seen to be suffering, he did not actually have dolor and the sense of
suffering. 80
 If this is so, argued Bonaventure, it not only destroys faith in Christ, but
renders void any chance of human redemption. If Christ did not actually suffer, then
he is not a mediator, but a deceiver. 81
 Exactly who Bonaventure referred to as
heretics here, is not clear.
The issue of Christ's human nature and how it was linked to and affected his divine
nature was clearly a subject of unresolved debate and also an area which provoked
[fo.14761 esset ex itinere, nisi ueram humanitatem haberet? Certwn est enim quod apud diuinitatem
non est transmutacio nec uicissitudinis obumbracio.': Jacques de Vitry, Sermones feriales et
communes, Liege, Universite de Liege, Centre d'Information et de Conservation des Bibliotheques,
MS 347, ff.147'-47 th. This is an extract from a collection of sermons by Jacques de Vitry, currently
being edited by Dr Carolyn Muessig in the Department of Theology at the University of Bristol. I am
indebted to her for this reference.
78 See, in particular, Moneta of Cremona, Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque (Rome,
1743), esp. 256-7. Moneta of Cremona was a Dominican friar who composed his treatise in 1241 and
apparently gained fame from it. He was a professor at the University of Bologna and may also have
been an inquisitor. See W.L. Wakefield and A.P. Evans, Heresies of the High Middle Ages. Selected
Sources Translated and Annotated (New York and London, 1969), 307-29.
79 'In ipso [Christo] enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis...fuit etiam virtus sentiendi, secundum
quam anima compatitur corpori laesio': III Sent., d.16, a.1,q.1: `Utrum in Christo fuerit vera passio
doloris', 345-7.
80 'Nam si aliquis aliter dicat, secundum quod quidam haeretici dicunt, et est error antiquus
Saracenorum, quod Christus, etsi videretur pati et dolore, non tamen veraciter habuit': ibid., 346.
81 'Non solum evacuat fidem Christi et Christi Evangelium, sed etiam evacuat redemptionem nostram
et dicit, Christum non esse Christum': ibid.
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accusations of heresy. Understanding Christ's humanity and his suffering were thus
issues which were closely linked.
i. Christ's human nature and suffering
The following three questions demonstrate that there were two ways in which
Christ's human nature was discussed: directly in terms of his nature, and in terms of
his suffering. What analysis of the two different kinds of question intends to show is
that describing Christ's nature in terms of his suffering displays remarkably less
ambiguity than discussing his nature in terms of the hypostatic union. This will be
followed up in the next section with a more in-depth study of Christ's human and
divine natures specifically found in questions about the suffering of Christ's soul.
When masters debated the way in which Christ suffered, they discussed whether he
suffered in the way they understood humans to suffer. This was the crunch where
their theories of soul-body interaction and union confronted their faith.
Albert the Great examined the nature of Christ Within a traditional framework: the
nature of the union between humanity and divinity. In his Commentary on the
Sentences, he debated whether Christ took on the common, that is, human, species.82
Albert stated that in Christ there is a twofold composition: the first is natural and the
second by the grace of union to the divine. One is also proper and the other
82 'An in Domino lesu est communem speciem accipere?': III Sent., d.2, a.5, 15-16.
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improper, in terms of calling it a union. 83
 The composition which is properly a union
is the union of soul and body. The result of this union is what Albert terms the forma
totius, which is what constitutes man (homo), or humanity if it is referred to in the
abstract." Therefore, Christ was a true homo, or part of the human species in the
sense that he had this natural composition and is one being, or supposit, in the
human species.85
However, although Christ was part of the human species, the divine composite is not
really a composite in human terms, argued Albert. It is only a composite to the
extent that there is one position, or idea, related to another. He explained this phrase
in the following way: in the case of Christ, his whole human nature was related to
his divinity. However, one defining characteristic of every composite is its
imperfection in composition. The divine cannot partake in such a compositional
imperfection. Albert's explanation is rather unclear on this point, but it seems that he
understood the union between human and divine natures to be by some sort of
association. In any case, it is not strictly a proper composite union.86
83 , In Domino Iesu...quod intelligantur in Christ° esse duae compositiones, quarum una est naturalis,
alia gratia unionis': ibid., 15
84 , Propria vocatur compositio prima, quae est ex anima et corpore...et hanc compositionem sequitur
forma totius quae est homo, vel humanitas Si abstractiue liceat loqui de ipsa': ibid.85 ,Et talem consequentem formam habuit Dominus Iesus propter compositionem naturalem, propter
quam est verus homo, et supposition unum in specie hominis': ibid.86•
'Alia autem compositio est in Christ°, quae non vere compositio est nisi compositio exponatur,
quod sit unius cum altera positio et haec est totius humanae naturae cum deitate...Et hoc ideo oportet
ponere quia omnis componentis ratio, est ratio partis et imperfecti respectu formae compositionis:
divinitas autem nec in se nec posita cum alia potest cadere in rationem partis et imperfecti: unde ipsa
non est componens aliquod proprie, sed posita secum trahit in aliquem actum sui suppositi: et ideo
humana natura posita secum in supposito fuit per societatem suppositi diuinae naturae': ibid. The use
of the term ratio here is problematic. Ducharme suggests that it may mean 'ultimate reality', in that
the forma partis gives the ultimate reality and being to the composite: I. Duchanne, 'The Individual
Human Being in St. Albert's Earlier Writings', Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays, ed. F.J.
Kovach and R.W. Shahan (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980), 137.
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This question shows the difficulty masters had in explaining Christ's human nature.
On the one hand, they wanted to portray Christ as a real member of the human
species, but his divinity made the proper union of the composite impossible. So the
body of Christ was similar to the human body in one respect, but different in
another. The theory of composition determined both these similarities and
differences. Like humans, Christ had a kind of composite which was based on the
union of body and soul. Unlike humans, his second form of composition was the
union of human and divine natures. Distinguishing more than one level of union
between body and soul permitted discussing Christ's humanity and divinity
simultaneously.
In his Commentary on Lombard's Sentences, completed in the early 1250s, the
Franciscan master Bonaventure of Bagnoregio 87
 considered the union of Christ's
body and soul in relation to the suffering he felt in his soul. He debated whether
Christ's suffering was more intense in the sensitive or rational part of his sou1.88
Bonaventure distinguished between the dolor passionis of Christ and the dolor
compassionis. The former was experienced more by the sensitive part of Christ's
soul, whilst the latter was to a greater degree in its rational part. Bonaventure went
on to explain that the dolor passionis begins in the flesh and reaches the soul
87 Important introductions to Bonaventure are: J.G. Bougerol, Introduction to the Works of
Boncrventure (New Jersey, 1964); E. Gilson, The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure, trans. I.
Trethowan and F.J. Sheed (London, 1938); J.F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St.
Boncrventure's Philosophy (Toronto, 1973).
88 `thrtun dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali': III Sent., d.16,
a.2, q.3, 357-9.
54
through the sensitive part first and then attacks the other powers, whereas the dolor
compassionis starts in the reason and is experienced subsequently by the sensitive
part of the sou1. 89
 Bonaventure concluded that the dolor compassionis of Christ is
greater than his dolor passionis. This is because Christ chose to be separated from
his body rather than see man separated from God. The other sign of his great
suffering was that he wept for the sins of mankind, but did not weep for the physical
pains which were inflicted upon him.9°
Although this question does not tackle precisely the same issue as Albert's question
about whether Christ was part of the human species, the definition of the union
between body and soul through suffering explains Bonaventure's thought on how
'human' Christ was. In terms of his suffering, then, Christ experienced pain in a
similar way to humans. Suffering beginning in the body was also felt in the soul,
whilst internal suffering emanated outwards to have an effect on the body.
The nature of Christ was thus described by his suffering. The two different terms
used for different types of pain in Christ are crucial for they are analogous to the
terms used to describe the two kinds of human suffering. The dolor passionis can be
compared with the passio corporalis, which Aquinas also used in relation to human
89 
'In Christo duplex dolor fuit...Nam dolor passionis et carnis primo attingebat animam secundum
sensualitatem, et deinde secundum alias vires. Dolor vero compassionis primo erat in ratione, et ex
ratione redundabat in sensualitatem': ibid., 358.
90 'Unde multo plus compassio Christi excessit aliorum compassiones quam passio passiones, sicut
fuit in eo major excellentia dilectionis quam passionis respectu alionun...quod maluit animam suam a
corpore separari, quam quod nos essemus a Deo separati. Aliud vero signum est, quod flevit pro
peccatis nostris, sed non flevit pro poenis corporis sui': ibid., 359.
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suffering, 91 and likewise the dolor compassionis and the passio animalis are
comparable. This suggests very strongly that the ideas used to understand human
suffering were also used to explain the nature of Christ.
It has already been seen above which theories of the hypostatic union Aquinas
accepted and rejected at various points in his career - in his Sentence Commentary,
for example. In a different work, Aquinas asked about the nature of Christ with
reference to his human passions. After debating and discussing the different passions
of the soul, Aquinas then asked whether such passions were in Christ. 92 He argued
that these passions are in sinners in one way, in the just in another, and in other ways
in the perfect and the imperfect. They are also in Christ the man in one way, and in
the first man and the beatified in another. They are not, however, in God or the
angels, for they have no sensitive appetite, which is the motus, or movement behind
these passions. 93 What Aquinas seems to have been arguing was that, as a man,
Christ will experience these passions of the soul in some way.
Furthermore, argued Aquinas, the passions of dolor, tristitia and timor and all those
passions which are concerned with evil cause more suffering than those which are
concerned with good, such as joy and love. He added later on that Christ did not
only possess the passions related to goodness, but also those related to evil because
91 See above, 38.
92 'Utrum huiusmodi passiones in Christo fuerint': De Veritate, q.26, a.8, 774-78.
93 `Dicendum quod passiones istae aliter sunt in peccatoribus, aliter in iustis et perfectis et
imperfectis, aliter in Christo homine, aliter in primo homine et beatis; in angelis enim et Deo omnino
non sunt, quia appetitiva sensibilis in eis non est, cuius sunt motus huiusmodi passiones': ibid.,775.
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he had a body which was capable of suffering. In this way, Christ could have
possessed the passion of fear and sadness from imagining harm done to him."
In the same way that Bonaventure had done for Christ before him, Aquinas used the
context of the passions of the soul, which included pain, to discuss his nature. This
demonstrates that there were other means than the theories used to discuss the
hypostatic union to understand the nature of Christ. The emphasis appears to have
centred around aspects of his humanity. Pain and suffering played a central part in
clarifying this.
Defining Christ's nature was clearly a crucial element in theological debate. The
theories devised to explain the nature of the hypostatic union are testament to this.
However, the theories themselves had led to inconclusive solutions, and opinions
were divided about them. Masters used other ways in which to discuss the nature of
Christ. One important area, it appears, was how Christ suffered or experienced
human passions.
In some respects it was argued that Christ possessed human nature and a human
body. This was further defined by explanation of the way in which his body
suffered. The vocabulary of suffering created for Christ of the dolor passionis and
dolor compassionis functioned in the same way as passio corporalis and passio
" 'Et inde est quod dolor et tristitia et timor et aliae huiusmodi passiones quae sunt respectu mali
habent rationem passionis magis quam gaudium et amor et alia huiusmodi quae sunt respectu
boni...Sed hoc interest quod in Christ° non solum fuertmt passiones respectu boni, sed etiam respectu
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animalis in humans. This section demonstrates that ideas about suffering could be
used to elucidate Christ's human nature and supplement other kinds of theory.
Explaining Christ's suffering, it seemed, made the differences between his human
and divine natures more clear-cut.
ii. Conflict between Christ's human suffering and his divinity
In the previous sub-section it was shown how masters employed notions of suffering
to understand the nature of Christ in different ways. However, they needed also to
confront Christ's union with the divine. The difficulties which masters faced in
expressing the union between human and divine natures in Christ were closely allied
to the problems of accurately clarifying the nature of his union to the divine. The
following section thus explores the idea that masters engaged in debate about
whether pain could reach the superior part of Christ's reason, where he was joined to
the divine, in order that they could distinguish between and explain the complex
relationship within the hypostatic union. It is further argued that ideas about pain
were indispensible for the masters as a means by which to debate and ultimately
comprehend both the humanity and divinity of Christ.
Debates surrounding the suffering of Christ in the superior part of his soul obviously
caused the nature of the soul itself to be debated. The Dominicans and Franciscans
had differing ideas about the soul's composition, including the thorny issue of the
role of the reason, or rational soul. The Franciscans almost without exception upheld
mali; habebat enim corpus passibile, et ideo ex imaginatione nocivi naturaliter passio timoris et
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a theory of plurality of forms in the soul. That is, they believed the human soul to
comprise vegetative, sensitive and rational forms. 95 Aquinas and Albert the Great,
on the other hand, held that there was only one substantial form in the human soul. It
was united to prime matter to form the human composite. This theory originated in
Aristotle and also Avicenna. 96
 Apart from this difference over forms, all masters
believed that the rational part of the soul existed on two levels. First was the ratio
superior which considered eternal things and whose object was contemplation. It
was directed towards the ultimate understanding of the physical and spiritual cosmos
and its main goal was sapientia. The ratio inferior was understood to be concerned
with concrete things, things of which knowledge was immediate and temporal. Its
object was scientia.97 So the reason was concerned with two different types of
experience or knowledge: the eternal and the worldly. Although much has been
made of the differences between Dominicans and Franciscans over the issue of the
unity or multiplicity of forms in the sou1, 98
 the distinction between inferior and
superior parts of the reason was a much more significant issue for masters discussing
Christ's suffering and whether his suffering was human. So when masters disputed
the nature of suffering in Christ's soul, they were also establishing their theories
about the human soul and where it was related to the divine soul in Christ.
tristitiae et huiusmodi in eo poterant esse': ibid., 776.
95 D.A. Callus, 'Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form', The Thomist, 24 (1961), 258.
96 Ibid.
97 M.-D.
 Chenu, 'Ratio Superior et Inferior: Un cas de philosophic chrdtienne', RSPhTh, 29 (1940),
84-9, at 85. Aquinas debated whether there existed a superior and inferior part to the soul: 'Utrwn
ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae': De Veritate, q.15, a.2, 483-89.
98 See D.A. Callus, 'The Problem of the Plurality of Forms in the Thirteenth Century: The Thomist
Innovation', L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age, Acres du Premier Congres
International de Philosophie Mediivale 1958 (Louvain and Paris, 1960), 577-85.
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Many masters appear to have been interested in the way in which Christ suffered in
his soul. For example, Alexander of Hales debated whether the soul of Christ was
capable of suffering in all its parts. 99 He divided passion into three forms: joy;
inordinate joy; and a punitive form. m° The superior reason can be considered in two
ways, said Alexander: of its nature, that is, in as far as it is a power of the soul in
itself and joined to a body; and as reason, that is, in as far as it understands through
choice and consideration. If the superior reason of Christ is considered ut natura,
then it had the possibility of suffering. But his superior reason ut ratio is necessarily
disposed to joy, from its union with God. ml In his Gloss on the Sentences,
Alexander argued that punitive passion, which he called tristitia, or sadness, is not
present in the superior part of Christ's soul, for this part of the soul is involved in the
continual contemplation of God. Tristitia is present in the inferior part of the reason
011131.102
Alexander thus considered that the suffering which he termed tristitia was not
present in the superior part of Christ's soul, but only the inferior part. The division
" `An passibilis anima Christi secundum omnem sui partem': Quaestiones `antequam esset frater',
06, disp. ii, membrum 3, 244-7.
l 'Respondeo: Passio dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo dicitur passio gaudium; alio modo gaudium
inordinatum; tertio modo dicitur poenalitas. Secundum ergo quod passio gaudium dicitur, possibilis
fuit ad passionem secundum omnem vim animae suae Christus; et sic dicitur passio a `patin', quod est
informatio': ibid., 245-6.
101 ' Superior portio rationis consideratur dupliciter: quia ut est `natura', scilicet ut est quaedam
potentia animae in se, secundum se cami unita, et apprehendens ex cognitione innata....Vel dicitur
ratio ut 'ratio', scilicet quando apprehendit cum electione et deliberatione. Dico ergo quod ratio
superior in Christo, ut natura fuit possibilis ad quoddam pati; sed ratio ut ratio disposita fuit ad
passibilitatem quae est gaudium; ye! non tantum etiam disposita, sed habuit necessitatem ad gaudium,
propter unionem cum deitate': ibid.
1 °2 `Dicendum quod Christus non habuit tristitiam secundum superiorem partem rationis, quoniam
secundum illam continue contemplabatur Deum patrem; sed habuit tristitiam secundum partem
rationis inferiorem': Glossa in IV Sententiarum in librum tertium (Bibliotheca Franciscana
Scholastica, xiv; Quaracchi, 1954), 152.
60
of parts of the soul allowed him to explain both the presence of suffering and its lack
due to Christ's union with the divine. The language which masters used to
understand pain was thus applied to the soul. The functions of the different parts of
the human soul enabled masters to explain Christ's suffering in one part and his joy
from union to God in another.
Albert the Great advanced the thesis that the superior reason and the inferior reason
were divided; 103
 the superior part considered some of the suffering, whilst the
inferior part considered other parts of the suffering. 104 It should also be pointed out
here, however, that despite treating a question which other masters had discussed,
Albert was obliged to address this issue on account of an external influence. He
stated that it was preached by a certain abbot that Christ's soul was not capable of
experiencing suffering in its superior part. Moreover, Albert claimed that this abbot
was duly condemned for heresy in Paris by the university of masters. 105 So the issue
concerning Christ's suffering and the superior part of his soul was evidently a matter
of serious contention.
103 'An anima Christi secundum se totum sit passibilis?': III Sent., d.15, a.3, 152.
104 
aliud dicendum, quod hoc non est necessarium quia licet tota patiatur, ut est natura hominis:
non tamen patiuntur omnes vires, ita quod ferantur ad considerationem passionis ut occupentur et
detineantur circa illam: quia per hanc considerationem vires divisae sunt, et quaedam feruntur in
superiora, quaedam autem in inferiora': ibid. See Haberl, Die Inkarnationslehre, 127-39.
10 quod anima secundum se totam passibilis est in corpore: fuit enim praedicatum, quod
Christi anima non fuisset passa secundum partem superiorem a quodam abbate: sed Pariis ab
universitate Magistrorum pro haeresi condemnatum est': III Sent., d.15, a.3, 151-2.
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Bonaventure asked the same question as those masters described above, 106 but
argued it in slightly different terms. Bonaventure stated that the common position of
the masters was that the suffering of Christ did not only remain in his senses, or in
the inferior reason, but extended to the superior reason. In the same way as human
souls are affected in all their parts, Christ's soul, when joined to his body, would
suffer completely, even in the superior part, explained Bonaventure. However,
Christ was also able to experience the joy of fruition (with God) in the superior part
of his soul following his union with God. Bonaventure agreed that it is difficult to
understand how there can be joy and pain in the same part of Christ's soul at the
same time. I °7
Bonaventure broke down his explanation of this difficult concept into three parts.
First, Christ's joy of fruition and dolor passionis are not contrary to one another
because they are not related to each other and are not in Christ's soul in the same
capacity. That is, the joy of fruition is in the superior part of the soul per se, whilst
the dolor passionis is there per accidens. The joy of fruition is in Christ's soul by the
grace of union with God, whilst the dolor is resident from the natural conjoining of
Christ's soul to his body. So, each can be present because they are not contrary
106 'Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis': III Sent., d.16, a.2,
q:2, 355-7.
107 `Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistonun passio Christi non solum stetit in
sensualitate nec tanttun pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem
portionem. Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione sui ad corpus infecttun tota corrumpitur et tota
inficitur secundum omnem sui vim et secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem quam
inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflicttun tota patiebatur et
affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem ilium tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit
et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium
Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima
Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundum eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium;
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affections. 108 Second, not only are the joy and suffering not contrary to one another,
one is 'material' in respect of the other. By this Bonaventure meant that they can
exist together. He compared the situation to a penitent who suffers and at the same
time derives joy from this suffering. Likewise, the soul of Christ suffered according
to the nature of the suffering body. However, his soul also derived joy from this
passion and compassion. 1 °9 Third, Christ was able to turn towards God and at the
same time direct himself towards humans. The one did not impede the other. In the
same way, one part of his soul can enjoy the union with God and experience
suffering from his body simultaneously and repeatedly. 110 Bonaventure thus
described how one kind of joy and a kind of suffering were not mutually exclusive,
nor self-contradictory in their simultaneous presence.
Like Albert, Bonaventure argued that Christ could experience pain in all parts of his
soul. However, he added a new dimension to his argument which gave it a greater
degree of refinement. Christ, he argued, could experience joy in his soul at the same
time because joy and pain were present in the soul for different reasons. The
inuno fuerunt simul, nec itenun, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde fecera, gaudium esse minus
perfectum' : ibid., 356.
'° 
'Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probablia, videlicet quod
gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non stint respectu eiusdem
nec omnino eodem modo insunt eidem, sed unum inest per se, alterum per accidens: quia gaudiun
inest propter coniunctionem gratuitam ipsius cum Deitate, sed dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem
ipsius cum carne; et quia non stint affectiones contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem
partem': ibid.
t09 `Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huiusmodi dolor et gaudium non stint contraria, sed unum
est materiale respectu alterius; et ideo simul eidem inesse poterant, sicut in viro poenitente videmus,
quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum naturam corpori patienti
compatiebatur, tamen de illa passione et compassione laetebatur': ibid.
11 ° 'SiCUt simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos ita quod una illarum
conversionum alteram non impediebat nec retardabat; sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae
simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a
dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem': ibid.
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language for pain was central to this argument. Dolor passionis, the pain which was
experienced in the soul through its union in the body, was completely different from
the divine joy which was present in the soul per se. The two were not contrary to one
another and could thus be present simultaneously.
Furthermore, the language of pain was applied to stress Christ's humanity. The links
between human souls and Christ's soul were firmly drawn. If humans could suffer in
all parts of the soul, then so could Christ. Suffering was thus a key indicator of
humanity. Moreover, it was the expression of pain as a precise idea which enabled
masters to explain the dual presence of joy and suffering in the sou1.111
In his Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas tackled the question of whether Christ
could suffer in the superior part of his reason. 112 He distinguished between dolor and
tristitia. Aquinas divided the kind of suffering into external and internal. The
external pain he called dolor, the internal, tristitia. Dolor can extend to the superior
part of the reason, because it extends to all the powers of the soul who have their
root in its essence. However, it can only strictly be perceived through the sense of
touch, explained Aquinas. 113 Tristitia, on the other hand, can only be present in the
reason, by showing what is repugnant to the will. The object of the superior reason is
the eternal good, which can in no way be repugnant to Christ's will. So there can be
111 The comparison of Christ to a penitent is important in this. For a further discussion of pain and
joy in penance, see Chapter 3, p.000.
112 ,Utrum dolor usque ad superiorem rationem pervenerit': III Sent., d.15, q.2, a.3, cr2, 493-500.113 c Loquendo de dolore proprie dicto, sic quantum ad laesionem quae est materiale in ipso, se
extendit in Christo ad omnes potentias animae, secundum quod in essentia animae radicantur, ad
quam etiam laesio corporis pervenit, secundum quod est forma eius; sed quantum ad perceptionem
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no tristitia in Christ's superior reason. However, tristitia may be present in the
inferior reason which is concerned with temporal things. 114
In the Quaestiones de Veritate, Aquinas also argued that there could be some
element of corporeal suffering in the superior part of the soul, in as far as the soul is
united to the body by its essence; in this essence all the potency has its root. The
wounding of the body can extend to all the parts of Christ's soul in this sense.
However, there is no way in which tristitia can be present in the superior part of
Christ's soul, because the object of the superior part of the soul is the eternal."'
Once again, the language employed to describe pain and suffering allowed masters
to understand the nature of Christ and to clarify the ideas about his soul. The way in
which ideas were used for Christ's suffering also emphasised his human nature.
Sometime between 1279 and 1287, Matthew of Aquasparta asked whether the
suffering caused in the passion of Christ remained in the senses or the inferior part
of the reason, or whether it extended to the superior part. 116 Like other masters
laesionis quae est formale in dolore, sic consistit in solo tactu cuius solius est percipere laesivum
inquantum laedit scilicet inquantum corporaliter conjungitur': ibid, 497.
114 `Tristitia non potest esse in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed solum sicut in ostendente id quod est
voltunati repugnans...0biectum autem superioris rationis sunt bona aetema, ex quibus nihil erat
contrartum voluntati Christi. Unde in ratione superiori...non poterat esse tristitia in Christo; poterat
autem esse, quantum ad rationem inferiorem cuius obiectwn sunt res temporales': ibid.
115 `Unitur autem anima corpori per suam essentiam; in essentia vero animae omnes potenitiae
radicantur, et secundum hoc ilia laesio ad animam et ad omnes parte eius in Christ° pertinebat, etiam
ad superiorem rationem secundum quod in essentia animae fundatur...Ex obiecto autem superioris
rationis in anima Christi nulla ratio tristitiae accidere poterat, scilicet ex pane aetemorum quibus
perfectissime fruebatur; et ideo tristitia animalis in superiori ratione animae Christi esse non potuit':
De Veritate, q.26, a.9, 780. Aquinas put forward an almost identical argument in ST 3a, q.46, a.7.
116 ‘Utrum dolor in passione Christi stetit tantum in sensualitate vel in pane rationis inferiori, aut
attigit partem superiorem', Quaestiones selectae de Christo et de Eucharistica (Bibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, ii; Quaracchi, 1957), q.5, 210-13.
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before him, Matthew distinguished between two types of suffering which could
pertain to the soul. However, Matthew believed both could reach the superior part of
the reason. 117 The first kind of pain, which comes through the body, Matthew
described as being present in the superior part of the soul by its nature, ut natura.
This is because this external pain causes a movement in the soul according to nature,
rather than according to reason, when it perceives harm done to the body to which it
is united by nature. 118 The other kind of suffering, tristitia, is not only present in the
superior part of the soul by nature, but also by reason, argued Matthew. Christ's
apprehension of the injustice done to him by the Jews caused him to suffer, as well
as the compassion he felt for the sins of the human race and the dishonour done to
God. The suffering of compassion, stated Matthew, was greater than his own
suffering. He explained that the superior part of the soul is not only concerned with
eternal things, but also reflects and makes judgements upon inferior things.119
The disagreement between masters over this issue appears to have concerned
differing views about the nature of the superior part of the soul. Apart from Albert,
who did not specify the kind of suffering which could exist in the superior part of the
117 `Dicendum quod in anima Christi, etiam quantum ad partem superiorem, duplex fuit dolor: unus
ex passione et laesione corporis; alius ex semetipsa': ibid., 210.
118 `Iste dolor attigit partem superiorem rationis non ut ratio est, sed ut natura. Dicitur autem moveri
ratio non ut ratio, sed ut natura, quando apprehendens corporis nocumentum, cui naturaliter colligata
est, et afflictionem sensualitatis, quae quidem sensualitas aut est aliquid animae intellectivae, aut ei
anima intellectiva naturaliter est unita, dissentit et renititur': ibid., 211.
118 `Alius dolor fuit in parte superiori, vel in anima quantum ad illam partem, ex ipsa; et iste dolor
vocatur tristitia....Et iste utique dolor fuit in parte superiori, non solum ut natura, sed ut ratio.
Apprehendens enim passionem suam ut iniuste sibi a Iudaeis illatam, utique displicebat sibi nequitia
Iudaeorum; considerans nihilominus et attendens passionis causam, quoniam pro peccatis hominum
expiandis et abolendis, utique dolebat et compatiebatur humano generi, et maior et intensior erat
dolor compassionis quam passionis; attendens nihilominus Dei inhonorationem, multo magis
afficiebatur. Quod autem iste dolor, qui vocatur tristitia, fuerit in parte superiori, apparet....ad partem
66
soul with any degree of precision, Matthew was the only master who believed that
one function of the superior part of the soul was also to consider inferior things.
In a subsequent question Matthew debated whether the suffering in the superior part
of Christ's soul could lessen his joy derived from his union with God. 12° He
concluded that neither interior nor exterior dolor in any way diminished the joy of
Christ's union with God. He gave four reasons for this. First, Christ can be in
different states of being simultaneously, without them being contrary to one
another. 121 Secondly, following Bonaventure, Matthew argued that the joy of union
and the suffering for human wickedness are not contrary in themselves. Christ's joy
was in his reason ut ratio, whilst his suffering was also in his reason, but ut natura
according to the natural inclination of soul to body. 122
 Third, he repeated another
argument of Bonaventure: suffering was the material part of joy in Christ in as far as
the suffering has an element of joy: the expiation of sin for humankind. Here
Matthew made a comparison with the suffering penitent. 123 However, it is the fourth
superiorem spectat non solum respicere illas rationes aeternas, sed illas de inferioribus consulere et
secundum illas de inferioribus iudicare': ibid., 211-12.
120 Quae sti o est utrtun dolor qui fuit in anima Christi quantum ad partem superiorem, diminuerit vel
remiserit gaudium fruitionis': Quaestiones selectae de Christo, q.6, 213-17.
121 Iste autem uterque dolor in parte superiori existens, in nullo diminuit aut remisit gaudium
fruitionis. Et hoc quatuor conditionibus manifestari potest. Primo propter diversitatem statuum...Sicut
igitur Christus fuit in duplici statu sine contrarietate et repugnantia, ita et cognitionem et affectionem
habuit utrique statui respondentem sine omni repugnantia, ita quod una illarum cognitionum seu
affectionem aliam non impediebat. Quemadmodum ergo simul convertebatur ad superiora et
inferiora, ita simul Deo fruebatur, et corpori patienti et eis pro quibus patiebatur compatiebatur': ibid.,
214-5.
122 'Istae enim affectiones in Christ° non fuerunt contrariae; et ideo nec se mutuo expellebant aut
remittebant...Gaudium enim est in ratione ut ratio, sed dolor in ratione ut natura, propter naturalem
inclinationem et colligationem ad corpus': ibid., 215.
123 'Dolor enim est materia gaudii in Christ°. Etsi enim corpori patienti compatiebatur et condolebat
humanae infelicitati, tamen de isto dolore gaudebat, dum per hoc pro peccatis nostris satisfaciebat et
voluntatem Patris implebat. Huius exemplum est de poenitente, qui dolet et flet ex recordatione
divinae offensae, sed gaudet se dolore et flere propter spem veniae; et ideo quanto crescit dolor, tanto
amplius crescit gaudium': ibid., 216.
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argument which demonstrates why this question was so important an issue. Matthew
explained that there is one supposit or being in Christ in which two natures, the
human and divine, exist. Therefore the divine being suffers and gains joy according
to human nature. Christ assumes both joy and suffering at the same time. Matthew
said that it is no great wonder that Christ exercises joy and suffering simultaneously;
rather the miracle exists in the fact that they have been assumed by him at al1.124
As Bonaventure had argued before him, Matthew explained how joy from union to
the divine and suffering were not contrary in themselves. Matthew applied the same
method of argumentation as Bonaventure by attributing joy to the soul ut ratio and
the physical suffering which was present in the soul ut natura. However, Matthew
did not explain how tristitia existed simultaneously with joy in the soul, although, in
the previous question, he had argued that it was present ut ratio in the superior part
of the soul. Instead, in this particular question, he conflated the two types of
suffering and considered them as one.
There were some definite areas of agreement and disagreement between masters
over this issue. Albert and Matthew of Aquasparta apparently agreed in principle,
but Albert's failure to distinguish between external and internal suffering makes it
difficult to perceive exactly where the two masters agreed. However, this lack of
clarification may have led Bonaventure and Aquinas to distinguish clearly between
124 
'Quarto hoc manifestatur per comparationem ad divinum suppositum. Gaudere et tristari
affectiones sunt suppositi; in Christo autem unum tantum fuit supposittun, in quo utraque natura
substantificabatur. Uncle suppositum divinum erat quod tristabatur et laetabatur, licet secundum
naturam humanam. Illud ergo suppositum, quod assumpsit humanam laetitiarn et tristitiam, non est
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different types of pain. The language which masters developed for describing human
suffering was also applied to this contentious issue about the superior reason.
Explaining how one kind of suffering could be present whilst another could not, not
only helped to explain Christ's human and divine natures, it also addressed
fundamental questions about the nature of the soul. Matthew of Aquasparta
developed his different notion of the superior part of the soul within this same
framework.
A clear vocabulary for suffering emerged which helped masters understand how the
human and divine elements of Christ interacted. Suffering it seems, was pivotal to
defining the border between Christ's humanity and divinity. The language which
was developed for suffering was used to debate unresolved ideas about different
parts of the soul. In ascertaining the way in which Christ's soul suffered, masters
were also re-assessing their understanding of the human soul. For example, Matthew
of Aquasparta's explicit reference to the dual natures in Christ and how they
responded to suffering is strong evidence suggesting that masters used their notions
of pain as a tool or theory at a time when ideas about the hypostatic union had
lacked any consensus. Defining a language for Christ's suffering was an alternative
route in the formulation of christological theory.
minim si simul potui tristari et laetari. Maius enim fuit miraculum quod istam assumpsit, quam quod
ista simul exercuit': ibid., 216.
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Conclusion
The evidence gathered in this chapter demonstrates that issues of pain and suffering
were integral to the study of theology in the thirteenth century. Masters of theology
asked questions about the way in which humans suffered and they also concentrated
in a similar fashion on the suffering of Christ. There were various reasons why pain
was an important focus within their theological treatises. First, masters debated
issues of suffering within the context of the human body and soul, a subject which
was afforded much attention and discussion in the thirteenth century. Second, the
suffering of Chirst was closely associated with notions of his humanity and divinity,
which had been a matter of serious dispute for centuries. Thus, issues of pain were at
the centre of two key debates in theology.
Within their debates, masters displayed certain areas of agreement and disagreement.
For example, in the belief that the soul and body relied upon one another for the
experience of suffering, all masters were in agreement. Indeed, their notion of the
composite structure of body and soul allowed masters to explain how the soul
suffered when pain was thought to pertain only properly to the body. Masters also
used their theories of body-soul relations when they discussed the issue of Christ's
Passion. Here, there was more dispute as to the precise nature of Christ's suffering.
This was due to difference of opinion about the nature of the superior and inferior
parts of the human soul. However, the most important point which emerges out of
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disputations on the suffering of Christ was the way in which masters were able to
form some kind of consensus of opinion on Christ's human and divine natures,
which other theories had not managed to produce. Ideas about pain were thus
important tools in clarifying the nature of the human body and soul and both the
human and divine natures in Christ.
However, pain was only able to play a central part of these theological areas because
masters deliberately constructed a language for understanding suffering and
developed a conceptual framework to support it. This was effected in various ways.
First, masters were conscious of the vocabulary used by key theological authorities
and thus sought to develop different types of pain. Second, their theories about the
relationship of body and soul permitted the creation of different concepts for pain.
These different pains thus had a function which ran parallel to the actions and
relationship in the soul-body composite and, moreover, the language which they
constructed for pain added considerable depth to their comprehension and
explanation of both the human soul and body. Third, masters also appeared to used
their typology of pain for humans to explain the suffering of Christ. In this way, they
were more readily able to explain Christ's Passion, a central tenet of theological
treatises, in more sophisticated ways. Furthermore, a language for suffering provided
masters with a new and pertinent focus on Christ's humanity.
Ideas about pain and suffering were thus not static areas of debate, but pivotal axes
for masters of theology when they discussed important subjects in theology. The
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.language they devised for understanding pain was developed continually in order to
clarify these areas. Ideas about pain, it would seem, helped underpin theological
works in the thirteenth century.
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2Gendering Pain: Theological Ideas about Female and
Male Suffering
Pain and suffering were key topics of discussion in theological treatises.
Understanding them was essential to explaining the complex relationship of body
and soul. Pain was a human experience, but did it, according to thirteenth-century
theological perceptions, pertain to both sexes equally? This chapter examines
three areas of theology in which masters of theology discussed the nature of
males and females: creation, the state of innocence and the Fall. In each context,
it is to be determined to what extent masters linked pain and gender. It must also
be discovered whether the links between them were more pronounced in certain
contexts than others. It is also asked to what extent pain at the Fall affected
perceptions of sex difference. Indeed, it may have been the presence or absence
of sin at the Fall which played an important part in establishing the differences
between male and female in theological treatises.
The three areas of inquiry have been chosen because they follow the theological
history of humankind. They also form part of the logical sequence within many
works of medieval theology. The hypothesis with which this chapter proceeds is
that throughout this theological timescale, masters were reliant upon their ideas
about pain and suffering to explain the differences between man and woman. The
thesis may be defended that they used `gendered' notions of pain to clarify these
differences. However, they also modified their conceptual framework of pain and
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suffering to define similarity between males and females, and to describe the
`ungendered' body: a body without sin.
Creation
As was seen in the first chapter, pain was integral to human experience and also
an important medium which masters of theology used to explain the nature of the
human composite, and to distinguish between the divine and human natures in
Christ. In their questions about creation, masters did not use pain as a focal point
for discussion. However, in both the state of innocence and the Fall, issues about
pain were integral to their theories about sex difference. It is necessary, therefore,
to pursue briefly some arguments which masters used to understand the creation
of man and woman, which will demonstrate how they initially constructed ideas
of sex difference without reference to pain. This will be subsequently juxtaposed
with their use of pain as a tool for defining sex difference in both the state of
innocence and the state of sin.
When the masters examined the moment of creation, they were forced to
confront the creation of both man and woman. Biblical exegesis and the
traditions which were associated with the creation of man and woman dictated
the framework in which creation was discussed to some extent. For example, the
passage in Genesis which stated that man was created in God's image' led to a
tradition of asking whether woman also partook in God's image. 2 In earlier
'God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him': Genesis 1:27.
2 See, in particular, C. Horowitz, 'The Image of God in Man - Is Woman Included?', Harvard
Theological Review, 72 (1979), 175-206; M.T. d'Alvemy, 'Comment les theologiens et les
philosophes voient la femme', La Femme dans la civilisation des Xe et Mlle siecles: Actes du
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centuries it was believed that woman had not been created in the image of God.
Such beliefs attained canonical status which decreed that women cover their
heads as a mark of respect. 3
 Historians have given much attention to this method
of analysing the differences between male and female.4 As for research on
thirteenth-century theologians' attitudes to whether the image of God also
pertained to woman, one study in particular has demonstrated that Bonaventure
argued for the absence of sex difference in the soul. This study has shown that
Bonaventure perceived the image or likeness of God in man to be spiritual, or
otherwise God would have been corporeal. Moreover, the image of God was
believed to be in the highest part of the human soul where there was no gender
distinction. In this way he could argue that both man and woman were created
equally in the image of God, and both sexes were termed homo. 5 Aquinas, on the
other hand, believed that although both man and woman possessed the image of
God, man took part in this image in a superior way to woman. He used an
analogy of the differences between superior and inferior angels to exemplify
this.6 For masters, however, whether or not woman played a greater or lesser part
in the image of God is not, therefore, a useful means of ascertaining how the
colloque tenu a Poitiers le 23-25 septembre 1976, Cahiers de civilisation medievale, 20 (1977),
105-29.
3 See 'Mulier debet': Decretum Magistri Gratiani, ed. E. Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, i
(Leipzig, 1879, repr. Graz, 1959), C. 33, q.8, c.19, 1255-6.
4 See, especially, L. Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender and Godlikeness', Downside Review, 106
(1988), 171-94; P. Bird, 'Male and Female, He Created Them: Genesis 1:27 in the Context of the
Priestly Account of Creation', Harvard Theological Review 74, no.2 (1981), 129-59.
5 Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender', 182-5. Despite the belief that the image of God was
common to both sexes, masters still argued that only men could receive holy orders because it
was necessary for a man to represent Christ. Christ, after all, had taken on the male form. See A.J.
Minnis, 'De impedimento sexus: Women's Bodies and Medieval Impediments to Female
Ordination', Medieval Theology and the Natural Body, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Mhmis (York
Studies in Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997), 116-20; F. Cardman, 'The Medieval Question of
Woman and Orders', The Thomist, 42 (1978), 582-99.
6 E.C. McLaughlin, 'Equality of Souls, Inequality of Sexes: Women in Medieval Theology',
Religion and Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. R. R. Ruether
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masters differentiated between the sexes. Sex difference can instead be detected
in questions concerning creation of the female body, for masters of theology
believed, following Aristotle, that males and females differed materially, but not
in essence. Therefore, it was argued that men and women possessed the same
substantial form of the soul and only differed from one another accidentally.7
If we accept that masters believed in the accidental, physical differences between
males and females, then it is unsurprising that their discussions about creation
focused sharply on the physicality of the creation. What questions did masters
ask with reference to gender in the context of human creation? It seems that
masters were concerned with the production of woman's body and how it was
possible that it came from the rib of man. It is worth briefly investigating their
theories about the creation of woman in this regard, for although they do not use
concepts of pain to understand the female gender, issues of pain arise as a direct
consequence. Moreover, it would seem that masters sought to understand the
nature of physical difference at creation as an important prelude to debating the
nature of suffering in other parts of their theological systems.
So, what were the circumstances surrounding woman's physical creation? The
questions of two masters, Bonaventure and Aquinas are to be studied with this
question in mind. Bonaventure asked where woman's body came from. 8 He spent
a large proportion of his question describing many reasons which supported the
belief that woman was formed from the rib of man. Some metaphorical
(New York, 1974), 218; K. Borresen, Subordination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of
Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C., 1981), 136-7.
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relationships were used by Bonaventure to explain the creation of woman and her
relationship to man. These included the metaphorical relationships between God
and the soul, Christ and the Church, and the superior and inferior reason.9
However, although woman always played the second partner in her relationship
with man, she was nevertheless afforded an equality of association. By this,
Bonaventure meant that woman conferred certain elements of support on man,
whilst he supported her in other ways. It was for this reason that woman was
created from the rib of man and not just from any bone in his body.1°
In his discussion of the creation of woman, Bonaventure further pursued a line of
questioning which was directed towards the issue of suffering which was caused
to Adam. He asked whether the loss of a rib caused Adam pain. Or did it happen
when he was asleep and not cause him pain? Bonaventure explained that if it had
caused Adam pain, he would have had poena before culpa. If it had not caused
Adam pain, it would have been a greater manifestation of God's power."
Although the presence of these questions appears to deviate from the main issue,
it suggests that the issue of pain was never far from the masters' minds when
they discussed the human body. Indeed, pain was one major focus when masters
7 Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender', 173.
8 'Uncle fuerit corpus mulieris': ll Sent., d.18, a.1, q.1, 431-4.
9 'Consonat enim nihilominus his quae significantur per mulierem et virum. Per virum namque et
mulierem significantur Deus et anima, Christus et Ecclesia, superior portio rationis et inferior':
ibid., 432.
10 
'Quia igitur forti vinculo et singulari mulier coniungitur viro et e converso, ideo unus sexus
productus est de altero. Quia vero illa coniunctio dat viro quietationem, ideo producta est de viro
dormiente. Rursus, quia vir dat mulieri fortitudinem et sustentationem, hinc est, quod mulier
dicitur esse facta de osse. Et quia in omnibus his quaedam aequalitas mutuae societatis, ideo
formata est mulier de osse non quocumque, sed de costa et eius latere': ibid.
II 'In separatione illius [i.e. the rib] aut fuit aliqua laesio et afflictio, aut non. Si sic, ergo Adam
ante passus est poenam, quam committeret culpam. Si non: ergo ita bene potuit fieri de latere
vigilantis, sicut de latere dormientis. Item, maiori potentiae attestatur separare partem a toto ab
homine vigilante sine dolore quam a dormiente: magis igitur fuisset manifestata Dei potentia, si
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came to discuss Adam in the state of innocence. This will be explored at length
in the following section.
• Aquinas was another master who deliberated about the reasons why woman
ought to have been created from man's rib. 12
 He also argued that woman ought to
have come from man's rib because she could not come from his head: that would
signify dominance; nor from his feet, which would make her servile. I3 So
Aquinas appeared to follow the notion of equality of association too. He too
established a metaphorical relationship between the flowing of blood from
Christ's side at the crucifixion and the creation of woman from man's side. 14 On
this level alone, the creation of woman was related to the suffering Christ.
It appears that in their discussions of the physical creation of woman, masters did
not think that any suffering was caused. How, then, did they construct sex
difference in their discussions of creation without reference to pain? It was clear
that the earlier theory that man and woman differed as to their participation in the
image of God was an issue which masters had resolved in terms of the creation of
souls. The souls of both man and woman were created ex nihilo by God. The
image was present in the soul and so, despite Aquinas's belief that man partook
of God's image in a more superior way, sex difference per se did not apply
absque dolore produxisset mulierem de latere Adae vigilantis, quam cum produxerit de latere
dormientis': ibid.
12 Ttrum mulier debuerit formari de costa virr: ST la, q.92, a.3.
13 `Dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem ad
significandum quot inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis conjunctio; neque enim mulier
debet dominari in vinun et ideo non est formata de capite; neque debet a viro despici, tanquam
serviliter subjecta et ideo non est formata de pedibus': ibid. See J. Cadden, Meanings of Sex
Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science and Culture (Cambridge, 1993), 193.
14 `Secundo propter sacrament-um; quia de latere Christi donnientis in cruce fluxenutt sacramenta,
id est sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta': ibid.
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regarding God's image. Both man and woman were created in his image. This
discounted one possible level of sex difference. Instead, masters used the
physical creation of the female body from the male rib as a tool to differentiate
between males and females in other respects, that is, to elucidate symbolic
representations of the relationship between the Church and the soul, for example.
Woman's physical creation from the rib of man was different from man's
creation directly from God. This enabled masters to distinguish between man and
woman more precisely. Sex difference may therefore be perceived through the
filter of woman's physicality. The body was the locus of gender difference
between man and woman.
In their account of creation, masters did not engage with ideas about pain
directly. However, the issue of woman's creation from man permitted masters,
such as Bonaventure, to frame questions about suffering in the state of innocence
and whether there could be pain before the presence of sin. This context thus
merits more detailed attention.
Innocence
The state of innocence was the state of existence after creation and before the
Fall. Despite the lack of sin there, masters were interested in debating whether
there was any kind of corruptibility or suffering before the descent into sin. This
was in part due to their belief in the corruptible and mortal nature of the created
human body. I5
 Authorities such as Aristotle also believed that all mortal bodies
15 See Chapter 1, 28-43.
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were capable of corruption. So, new theories about the nature of the body led to
specific debates asking whether Adam could suffer before the presence of sin, for
example. Such debates also clarified what masters meant by the influence of sin
on human suffering.
However, there is a further aspect to the masters' disquisitions about suffering in
the state of innocence. Certain questions were asked about Adam; specifically,
whether his body could suffer and corrupt. Other specific questions were asked of
Eve: whether she would suffer the pains of childbirth and whether her virginity
was corrupted. Masters thus appear to have grouped their questions according to
gender distinction; and the way in which each of the first parents suffered seems
to have been the factor which differentiated them. However, the state of
innocence came before the Fall and thus the bodies of the first parents were
untainted by sin. It would appear then that the masters used post-Fall categories
as a means for discussing the bodies of the first parents. In fact, the masters did
not define sex difference by suffering for the state of innocence. On the contrary,
it is argued that their conclusions about suffering in the state of innocence
explained the nature of the bodies that were ungendered before the state of sin.
With this in mind, masters would have supported the patristic view that just as
there was an equality in experience of punishment or reward in the next life,
there could also be a similar equality in experiences in the state of innocence. 16 It
would seem useful, therefore, to explore these questions according to their
16 See St. Basil the Great, De hominis sfructura, 1.22, PG 30,345.
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division between the first parents. For this reason, they are examined under the
headings 'Adam' and 'Eve'.
i. Adam
The Halesian Summa, compiled in about 1250 by students of Alexander of
Hales, 17 hence its name, asked whether Adam was capable of suffering from the
reception of external impressions in the process of sense perception. 18 The first
part of natural passio which comes from external impressions is harmonious to
nature and that which is unnatural is destructive to nature, argued the authors of
the Summa. The second part of natural passion is concerned with the perfection
of being, such as in the reception of sensible species in the sensitive organ, and
intelligible species in the intellect. These impressions from the exterior can be
said to cause passibility in the first parents. 19 The other way in which passibility
occurs is from an unnatural passion. This passion occurs with the reception of
17 It certainly contains elements of Alexander's original and authentic works, but it was almost
certainly compiled by John of La Rochelle and others in around 1250. Gilson maintains that it is
of interest because the works of others in it are all from the same 'doctrinal school': E. Gilson, A
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), 327. For the comparison of
the Halesian Summa with another collection of theological questions, see I.P. Wei, 'Guy de
l'AumOne's 'Summa de diversis quaestionibus theologie", Traditio, 44 (1988), 275-323.
18 
,thnlin primis homo fuerit passibilis per impressionum extrinsecanun receptionem': Summa
Theologica (Quaracchi, 1928), Tract. 3, q.1, t.1, cap.2, 633-6.
19 `Respondeo quod est passio vel passibilitas proveniens ex impressione relicta ab extrinseco
duplex, scilicet naturalis sive consona naturae et innaturalis sive destructiva naturae. Prima autem
est duplex, quia quaedam ea quae sunt ad salvationem esse, quaedam ea quae sunt ad
perfectionem esse. Ea quae sunt ad salvationem esse respicit passio quae relinquitur ex operibus
generativae et nutritivae...Ad ea quae sunt ad perfectionem esse refertur passio quae est ex
receptione specierum sensibilium in organo sensitivae et ex receptione specienun intelligibilium
in intellectu. Huiusmodi autem passiones, quae erant consonae naturae, poterant relinqui ab
extrinseco in primis parentibus in statu primo, et respectu huiusmodi passiones erant passibiles':
ibid., 634
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contraries. Furthermore, they lead to corruption and alteration of the senses.2°
Adam was in no way susceptible to this kind of passion.
In terms of suffering, or passibility, Adam was only capable of receiving the kind
of passion which amounted to a reception of data in the senses. Thus, masters
appear to have used suffering as a way to describe the nature of the human body
in the state of innocence. Their language of suffering helped differentiate
between passibility that was destructive and passibility that was not. As far as
gender distinction is concerned, the question may have been asked of Adam, but
the authors of the Hale sian Summa applied their solution to both parents. In this
sense, gender does not appear to have affected their ideas about suffering or the
nature of the body before sin.
Bonaventure debated whether the body of Adam, before sin, was capable of
being corrupted. 21
 He noted that Adam had a mortal body in the state of
innocence. All mortal bodies were believed to be corruptible by necessity, which
would mean that his body could be corrupted. 22 However, Bonaventure
circumvented this belief by distinguishing between something which was called
immortal from its relation to the act of dying, and something which was immortal
with regard to the potential of dying. In other words, Bonaventure created a
20 •
'Alto modo est passibilitas a passione innaturali...et haec passio, ut dictum est, est cum
contrarietate receptibilis et recepti; haec autem est a contrario alterante et abiciente a
substantia...Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam dispositione coniuncta, propinqua
vel remota, nequaquam, sed impassibilis': ibid.21 ,
Utnun corpus Adae, ipso non peccante, posset dissolvi': II Sent., d.19, a.2, q.1, 464-6.
22 'Adam in statu innocentiae habeat corpus mortale, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister in littera,
ergo corruptibile; sed 'onme corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur, sicut vult Philosophus,
quamvis non omne generabile de necessitate generatur': ergo, corpus Adae corruptem fuisset, esto
quod in statu innocentiae permansisset': ibid, 464.
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distinction between the actual dissolution of the human body and the possible
dissolution of the human body. This distinction itself came from Aristotle, and
Bonaventure acknowledged him here. 23
 In the case of Adam, if the corruption
referred to is actual, then the proposition is false. It is impossible for innocence
and death, or the poena of corruption, to co-exist, because the presence of the
order of divine justice prevents such disorder in the universe. 24 However, if the
proposition that the body of Adam would dissolve in the state of innocence is
phrased in terms of a possibility, then it was true.
The emphasis of this question was somewhat different to that in the Halesian
Summa. Bonaventure focused on the nature of corruptibility. All mortal bodies
were corruptible. This included Adam's body in the state of innocence. However,
the distinction between actual corruptibility and potential corruptibility allowed
Bonaventure to explain the nature of the body in the state of innocence.
Bonaventure only applied the question to Adam. He did not consider the nature
of Eve's body in the same way.
Masters were thus involved in applying their knowledge of act and potentiality to
their ideas about suffering and corruption. Bodies without sin had the potential to
suffer and corrupt, whereas sinful bodies were corrupted in actuality. The
presence or absence of sin was the deciding factor here.
23 'Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quemadmodum, iuxta verbum Philosophi,
haec est duplex: aliquid est nunc inunortale, quia adverbium potest determinare hoc quod est
irnmortale ratione actus moriendi, vel ratione potentiae; ita et locutio praecedens: utrum corpus
hominis esset dissolubile, sive posset dissolvi, ipso non peccante, distingui debet': ibid., 465.
24 `Si autem ablativi illi referantur ad actum, qui est dissolvi, sic locutio falsa est. Est enim sensus,
quod Adam posset dissolvi in statu innocentiae, ita quod simul esset innocentia et mortis sive
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Aquinas turned his attention to the same issue in his Commentary on the
Sentences.25 He concluded that the word for suffering could be construed in two
ways: commonly (communiter) and properly (proprie). In the first case, suffering
is the reception of something by some means. Everything which receives lacks
that which it receives and thus is in potential in relation to it. By this Aquinas
meant that there was a state of potentiality before the senses received something
external to them. Nothing is absolved from this kind of suffering or passibility,
except that which is pure act, namely God, stated Aquinas. So every creature is
called passible because it is receptive of some perfection. Adam is 'passible' to
such a reception. The second type of suffering concerned the change of
something from one nature to the other. This could be, for example, when water
is heated, or when a body becomes ill, but not, however, when it changes from a
state of ill-health to being well again. Aquinas thought that Adam's body could
only be passible in this sense if he were to sin, which he could not do in the state
of innocence.26
corruptionis poena; hoc est impossibile, providente ordine divinae iustitiae, quae nullam
inordinationem in universo sustinet': ibid.
25 Thrum corpus Adae fuerit passibile': II Sent., d.19, q.1, a.3, 488-90.
26 `Respondeo dicendum, quod `pati' dicitur dupliciter: uno modo communiter, alio modo proprie.
Communiter dicitur pati quidquid recipit aliquid quocumque modo; et sic cum omne recipiens
careat eo quod recipit et sit in potentia ad illud, et e contrario omne quod est in potentia ad aliquid
sit receptivum alicujus; a tali passibilitate nihil absolvitur, nisi illud quod est actus purus, scilicet
Deus; omnis enim creatura passibilis dici potest, secundum quod alicujus perfectionis receptibilis
est...Dicitur ideo proprie dicitur `pati' secundum quod passio sequitur alterationem qua aliquid
transmutatur ab eo quod est sibi secundum naturam: sicut si aqua calefiat...et si corpus animalis
infirrnetur, non autem si sanetur. Primo ergo modo, accepta passione, corpus Adae passibile erat;
sed secundo modo accepta, tunc dicendum est, corpus ejus fuisse passibile secundum quid,
scilicet si peccaret; et impassibile simpliciter, sicut de mortali et inunortali dictum est supra': II
Sent., d.19, q.1,a.3, 488-9.
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Aquinas applied both methods used in the previous two questions. He separated
the terms used for suffering and then demonstrated whether each was related to
the body of Adam actually, or only potentially. Like Bonaventure, he only
mentioned Adam in his question. The body of woman was not discussed directly.
More important for masters appears to have been the way in which the body in
the state of innocence received experiences. The language of suffering was
refined in order to define the nature of bodies without sin.
In his unfinished Summa Theologiae, which was composed some time in the
1270s,27 Albert the Great addressed a similar question. 28 Albert considered what
was meant by passibility. He divided his definition into two. In the first sense,
passibility could refer to the Greek patin which meant 'to receive'. In other
words, anything which receives an action from something which is acting is
called 'passible'. Albert termed this passible in its genus sense (in genere). The
second sense of passible is when an action is received from an agent which is
contrary to the recipient. This will lead to dissolution, just as Aristotle said that
every passion subverts substance. 29 Adam was susceptible to the first kind of
passibility, argued Albert, but not the second. Adam was passible on account of
his own nature, but impassible to the dissolution from contrary things in that he
27 Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays, ed. F.J. Kovach and LW. Shahan (Norman,
Oklahoma), xiii.
28 c
Utrum corpus Adae fuerit passibile, vel impassibile, et qua passibilitate?', Summa Theologiae,
ed. P. Januny (Paris, 1651), v, 2 pars, tractatus xiv, q.83, 408-10.
29 ,Ad primo quaesitum dicendum, quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Dicitur enim a Graeco patin
quod est recipere: et sic omne quod actionem recipit ab aliquo agente, passibile dicitur, et hoc est
passibile in genere. Dicitur etiam passibile quod recipit actionem agentis contrarii quod agit ad
dissolutionem, secundum quod dicit Arist. in topic. quod omnis passio magis facta abiicit a
substantia': ibid., 409. See Aristotle, Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis
Alterius, et Translatio Anonyma (Brussels and Paris, 1969), vi, c.6, 128.
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was protected by the tree of life. 30 Albert went on to elucidate the three states of
man distinguished by Augustine. In the state of innocence, there is a possibility
of dying by nature and if he sins; in the state of sin, dying is a necessity, because
sin is present. Lastly, after resurrection, dying is impossible. The possibility of
dying in the state of innocence does not cause any suffering in Adam simpliciter,
but only secundum quid.31 In other words, Adam could not suffer in actuality. He
could only suffer potentially. Other conditions, such as sin, were required in
order for there to be actual suffering.
Albert's way of explaining the nature of Adam's 'suffering' in the state of
innocence was very similar to that of Aquinas. He also used the bipartite
description of a general sense of the term passibility and the act-potentiality
dichotomy. He also only applied his conclusion to Adam. Eve was not
mentioned.
These questions demonstrate that suffering was talked about in new ways.
Theories of act and potential were applied to ideas about suffering to analyse the
sinless body. Furthermore, apart from the authors of the Halesian Summa, such
discussions focused on the body of Adam. However, these were not the only
30 'Primo ergo modo corpus Adae in primo statu fuit passibile: secundo modo non. Et sicut
Augustinus dicit, ex natura propria habuit passibilitatem, ex ligno autem vitae habuit
impassibilitatem, ita quod non patiebatur a contrario ad dissolutionem substantiae': Summa, q.83,
409.
31 `Dicendum quod Augustinus distinguit tres status hominis. In primo habuit posse mori ex
natura et sub conditione si peccaret. In secundo, post peccatum scilicet, necessitatem moriendi
propter peccatwn habuit...In tertio statu, post resurrectionem scilicet habebit impossibilitatem
moriendi...Unde mors qua potuit mori in primo statu non induxit in Adam passionem simpliciter
secundo modo dictam, sed secundum quid': ibid.
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questions asked about pain and corruption in the state of innocence. Other
questions were asked about the nature of Eve's suffering.
ii. Eve
In the 1270s Albert the Great debated whether the first woman experienced the
burden of pregnancy, and whether she suffered when giving birth in the state of
innocence.32 In answering whether Eve experienced the burden of carrying a
child (gravitas gravida), he distinguished between gravitas as a burden and
gravitas as a kind of punishment (poena). Eve experienced the first kind, argued
Albert, but not the second, in that the first parents are protected by the tree of life
from the suffering caused to the body by burden of a child. 33 In the third section
of the question, Albert stated that it is true that the birth of children in the state of
innocence occurs without dolor. Augustine clearly said this, argued Albert, and it
would be impious to contradict him regarding those things which concern faith
and customs. Albert went on to explain that in the state of innocence there is no
pain in partu and no laceration, but only extension and expansion.34
The issue of pregnancy and giving birth was thus clearly an important focus for
analysing the nature of woman in the state of innocence. Although this question
was obviously specific to woman, the way in which her experience was described
32 
'Et utnun cum gravitate fuisset gravida, vel sine gravitate? Et utrum cum dolore puerpera, vel
sine dolore?': Summa Theologiae, tract. xiv, q.84, 410-12.
33•
'Ad id quod quaeritur ulterius, dicendum quod est gravitas oneris tantum, et est gravitas
inducens poenam. Secundum primum modum non fuisset gravida sine gravitate, sed secundum
modum. Ad id quod contra obiicitur, dicendum, quod sicut ab aliis poenis corpora primonun
parentum gratia innocentiae et virtute ligni vitae praeseruebantur a dolore pressiuo': ibid.
34•
'Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, Utnun sine dolore fuisset puerpera? Dicendum quod sic: quia
hoc Augustinus aperte dicit, cui contradicere impium est in his quae tangunt fidem et mores.
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by Albert used similar formulae to the discussions about Adam. So, on the one
hand there were specific pains for males and females, but on the other hand, their
experiences of them were analysed in similar terms.
Other questions which focused on the corruption, or suffering, of woman
concerned whether virginity35 was preserved, after sexual contact, in the state of
innocence. The thematic basis of such questions is similar to that asked by Albert
above. For example, Bonaventure asked whether, through coitus in the state of
innocence, the integrity of the body was corrupted. 36 He argued that sexual
intercourse in the state of innocence would have caused the virginal membrane to
open, but this would have been without poena or filth.3T Bonaventure admitted
that the proposed question has more to do with curiosity than utility, but given
that it came from the writings of Augustine, 38 it had been included.39
Bonaventure considered Augustine's supposition that there could be a union
between man and wife and no resulting corruption of integrity as unintelligible,
for if there were no corruption, then there could not have been a union. The
Dicendum quod in illo statu parte fuisset sine dolore et sine lacerationes, per solam extensionem
et laxationem': ibid.
35 Interest in the ideas of virginity has its roots in the ascetic religious movements of the eleventh
and twelfth centuries. The debate about whether virginity was superior to marriage took its
provenance from the writings of St. Jerome, St. Paul and Augustine. Jerome maintained that the
the flesh was evil and the only way to live truly was in a state of virginity, which caused him to
comment 'marriage fills the earth, virginity heaven'. The eleventh century saw the great
theologian Peter Damian espouse Jerome with new vigour. He claimed that Christ had entered the
world without breaking Mary's hymen and that virginity could conceivably be restored. See
Adversus louinianum, i, 13.16, in C.N.L. Brooke, The Medieval Idea of Marriage (Oxford, 1989,
repr. 1994), 62-74; J.M. Bugge, Virginitas: An Essay in the History of a Medieval Ideal (The
Hague, 1975).
36 'thrum in coitu in statu innocentiae fuisset integritatis corruptio': II Sent., d.20, a.un., q.4, 482-
3.
37 'In status innocentiae, si vir uxorem cognovisset, fuisset claustrorum apertio, tamen sine poena
et foeditate': ibid., 482.
38 De civitate Dei, xiv, c.26.
39 `Dicendum, quod proposita quaestio plus habet curiositas quam utilitas: quia tamen habet ortmn
ex verbis Augustini, ideo introducta est': ibid.
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corruption of bodily integrity can be understood in three ways, said Bonaventure:
the opening of the virginal membrane, the suffering of punishment, and the filth
of pleasure. The first came from nature, the second was a punishment, and the
third is from the fault of corruption. The first kind of corruption would occur in
the state of innocence, but not the other two because the generative power would
not be corrupted or infected. Physical actions in the state of innocence, after all,
would obey reason.4°
Sexual intercourse in the state of innocence would mean a physical breach, but
this would not lead to the loss of virginity because the sexual act itself would
occur without filth or punishment. Bonaventure developed the notion of
corruption by distinguishing between three different corruptions. In this way, he
could apply certain notions of corruption to the female body in the state of
innocence and separate them from those which would occur in a state of sin.
Although the question asked about the corruption of virginity in general, the
answer is definitely centred upon the woman. However, like the previous
question, the female body was believed to corrupt to a certain extent only. This is
similar to the way in which masters used their ideas about the potential suffering
of Adam's body. So, at one remove, gender could be distinguished in terms of
40 ,Propter explanationem illius verbi, quod dicit, quod maritus conunisceretur uxori sine ulla
corruptione integritatis; quod quidem non videtur esse intelligibile. Si enim mulier perrnaneret
integra, nunquam esset viii ad mulierem camis commixtio. Propter quod intelligendum est, quod
integritatis corruptio tria dicit, scilicet claustorum apertionem, poenalem passionem et foedam
delectationem. Primum est naturae, secundum est poenae, tertium vero est corruptionis vitiosae,
quae tenet medium inter culpam et poenam. Si igitur vir uxorem cognovisset in tempore naturae
institutae, fuisset ibi claustronun apertio sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae; non tamen
fuisset ibi poenalis passio ac foeda delectatio, quia vis generativa nec esset corrupta nec esset
infecta; immo obedirent rationi illa membra': ibid., 483.
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suffering, whilst, at another, the experience of suffering demonstrated common
ground between the sexes.
Somewhat later in his career, Albert the Great debated the same question. He
asked whether Eve could have conceived in the state of innocence and yet still
have remained incorrupt and a virgin. 41 He used the distinctions made by
William of Auxerre on the three kinds of corruption resulting from sexual
congress: the unbroken succession of the division of the body, that is, the body's
perpetual corruption; the filth caused by the itching of concupiscence and a
libido, which corrupts the body and mind; and the impurity in the mixing with a
foreign nature. 42 If Eve conceived through sexual intercourse with Adam, she
would not be subject to the first two corruptions because the first parents used
their sex organs according to the order of reason, argued Albert. Eve would,
however, be subject to the third corruption. The mixture of semen from another
with her would mean that she was unable to remain pure. 43 Albert contended that
it was the privilege of the virgin Mary to conceive without corruption, but her
conception was occasioned by the Holy Spirit, and not by male semen.44
41 `Utnun Eva in primo statu concepisset et peperisset incorrupta et virgo permanisset?': Summa
Theologiae, tract. xiv, q.84, 410-12.
42 
'Ad primo quaesitum satis bene responderunt antiqui, scilicet Praepositiuus et Guillel. Altis.
distinxerunt enim triplicem corruptionem, scilicet continuitatis, foeditas, et impuritas. Continuitas
quae est in diuisione corporis. Foeditas quae est in pruritu concupiscentiae et libidinis, quae
foedat et mentem et corpus, in quae ratio descendit sub delectatione camis...Impuritas, quae est in
susceptione naturae alienae, sicut aurum quando immixtum sibi fuerit aliquid alienum': ibid., 411.
43 `Dicunt ergo, quod si Eva conuenisset cum Adam per coitum, non incurrisset primas duas
corruptiones: quae sic usi fuissent primi parentes genitalibus membris ad ordinem rationis...Sed
incurrisset onmi modo corruptionem impuritatis: quia oportuit, quod conciperet ex semine alieno
sibi perrnixto: et sic pura non remansissee: ibid.
" `Dicendum quod privilegium singulare beatae Virginis est in hoc, quod manens in omni puritate
mentis et corporis, non ex semine alieno, sed de Spiritu sancto concepit: Eva autem de semine
viii': ibid.
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It would seem that suffering and corruption were described in different ways in
order to account for their existence in the state of innocence. Issues of suffering
and corruption were also used to show where the differences lay between the
state of innocence and the state of sin. In the state of innocence, woman
experienced the impurity of sexual intercourse, but nothing else. Are issues of
gender difference important here? It would appear that they are. Even though the
questions which applied to sexual function and virginity applied to both parents
by implication, the masters only talked about this suffering in relation to women.
Despite attributing a limited degree of corruption to woman in the state of
innocence, masters discussed three types of punishment for woman in order to
discuss her suffering.
In one way, therefore, the masters analysed men and women separately in the
state of innocence, whilst in another they analysed them in similar terms. That
masters asked certain questions of Adam and others of Eve suggests that they
applied a framework of sex difference, using suffering as a tool to define it.
However, on one level, suffering according to gender difference in the state of
innocence was only apparent. Despite having different bodies, both man and
woman experienced pain in the same way and to the same degree of intensity.
Furthermore, masters deployed a sophisticated set of arguments to explain the
differences between potentiality and actuality in the suffering of man and woman.
In this sense, the body was ungendered in terms of suffering. The way in which
suffering itself was meant to occur was similar for both sexes.
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On another level, however, masters' ideas about sex difference can be construed
through the types of pain that man and woman were to receive. Given that these
questions were debated with the sinful body in mind, the terms of reference used
by masters when they discussed Adam and Eve meant that they attributed certain
types of pain or punishment to each, and specifically to woman. In this sense,
gender difference regarding pain and suffering depended on the type of pain,
rather than the way in which it was experienced. This notion will be examined in
further detail with respect to the Fall.
Fall
The Fall from the state of innocence denoted the onset of corruption, illness,
suffering and death. Pain was identified with all of these.45 The cause of the Fall
was the sin of pride from a desire to be like God.46 The decay of the body was a
result of the loss of original justice, which ensured an existence of perfection in
the state of innocence.47 In the Middle Ages, there was no agreement about
whether man or woman was more responsible for this descent into sin and
death.48 Both, however, were to be punished for it. Two key passages of Genesis
described the punishments which woman and man would inherit from the first
parents.49 These passages formed the basis of much biblical exegesis and
45 E. Cohen, 'Towards a History of European Physical Sensibility: Pain in the Later Middle
Ages', Science in Context 8,1 (1995), 57.
" See Berresen, Subordination and Equivalence, 206-8.
47 On the role of original justice in theological systems, see C. Vollert, 'The Two Senses of
Original Justice in Medieval Theology', Theological Studies, 5 (1944), 3-23.
48 I. Maclean, The Renaissance Notion of Woman: A Study of the Fortunes of Scholasticism and
Medical Science in European Intellectual Life (Cambridge, 1980), 15.
49 'Mulieri quoque dixit multiplicabo aerurnnas tuas et conceptos tuos in dolore pries filios et sub
viii potestate ens et ipse dominabitur tui...Ad Adam vero dixit quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae et
comedisti de ligno ex quo praeceperam tibi ne comederas maledicta terra in opere tuo in laboribus
comedes earn cunctis diebtis vitae tuae. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi et comedes hebas terrae.
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debate. 5° Masters therefore debated the nature of both male and female pains
which were a result of the Fall. To establish how masters linked pain and gender,
the following three questions are posed in this section: what kind of suffering
was specific to woman? What pains were specific to man? What pains were
common to both? In addition to these questions, an investigation will be made to
ascertain whether masters perpetuated the traditional view of man as spirit and
woman as flesh 51 , or whether the body composite played a greater role in their
discussions. Furthermore, with regard to the previous section, the assignation of
types of pain in the state of sin might also be distinguishable from the way in
which they were experienced.
The Halesian Summa differentiated between the types of suffering attributed to
the first parents. 52 First, it dealt with the punishments of woman, which were on
three levels: an increase in the hardship of conception; pain in childbirth; and
female subjection to the power of man. These different punishments were related
to the rational and sensible parts of the soul. The punishment which pertained to
the rational part of the soul was the woman's subjection to man. The
punishments relating to the sensible part of the soul were believed to be twofold:
In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane donec revertaris in terrain de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es et
in pulverem reverteris': Gen. 3:16-17.
5° See, for example, Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria. Facsimile Reprint of the Editio
Princeps of Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480-81, 4 vols. (Turnhout 1992), i, fo.291b.
51 The idea of the woman being associated with the flesh had a long heritage: Augustine had
perceived man as the form or mind, whilst woman was equated with matter. The roots of this
notion stemmed from middle platonism, the epitome of which was the philosopher Philo Judaeus.
He allegorised Genesis and interpreted the man as mens and the woman as sensus. See, in
particular, R.H. Bloch, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love
(Chicago and London, 1991), 27; R.A. Baer, Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female
(Leiden, 1970), 38-44; E.V. Spehnan, 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views',
Feminist Studies, 8 (1982), 109-31.52 Summa Theologica, Liber 2, pars 2 (Quaracchi, 1930), 224-6.
93
one according to increase, in the sense that hardship and suffering will increase;
and the other concerning magnitude, which is the result of the pain caused in
childbirth."
In the act of generation of human beings, which is central to the conservation of
the species, stated the Summa's authors, there exists a twofold suffering: first in
the carrying of the foetus and second in the act of birth itself. The first
corresponds to the growth of the child and the other to the consummation of the
act of generation. At first there is pleasure and there is no poena. However, in
terms of the act which corresponds to the conservation of the individual, the
woman must be necessarily under the domination of another. This poena
designates the woman's servitude to man.54
So three types of suffering were believed to pertain to woman as a result of
original sin. The first amounts to suffering in the carrying of the foetus and in the
act of childbirth itself. The second involves hardship in conception, during which
woman's sexual pleasure will lead to suffering. These first two punishments were
physical. Thirdly, woman was subjected to the power of man: a punishment of
the soul or reason. These ideas clearly came from Genesis 3:16. The Halesian
Summa interpreted them and attributed some types of suffering to the body and
53 'Et ponuntur tres ex parte mulieris: multiplicatio aenunnanun in multitudine conceptuum, dolor
in partu et subiectio sub potestate viii. Est enim duplex vis animae cognoscitiva: rationalis et
sensibilis. Quantum ad rationalem sumitur poena subiectionis; quantum ad sensibilem duplex
poena: una secundum multiplicationem, cum dicit: Multiplicabo aerumnas; altera secundum
magnitudinem, cum dicit: In dolore paries': ibid., 224-5.
54 'Nam iuxta actum generationis, qui est ad conservationem speciei, duplicem poenam contrahit:
in portando foetum et in pariendo, quorum untun pertinet ad progressum, alterum ad
consurnmationem. In initio vero est delectatio, et ibi videtur esse sine poena...Ex parte vero actus
qui est ad conservationem individui...subesse scilicet alterius dominationi necessario; et haec est
ilia poena quae designatur, cum dicitur: Sub potestate viri ens': ibid.
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others to the reason. In this case, the authors of the Summa did not consider
woman to be completely related to the flesh.
What kinds of suffering did the Halesian Summa attribute to man? Man was
given some particular punishments of his own." There were certain punishments
for man which were due to the loss of good and others which followed the
presence of evil. As far as the first set of punishments was concerned, these were
divided into three elements: first was the loss of power following the removal of
the tree of life; the second part of this loss of good was the expulsion from the
place of pleasure, that is, the state of innocence; and the third part was the
prohibition from returning there. The first part corresponded to a punishment of
the body, the second to a punishment of the soul, and the third part to both body
and soul together.56
As far as man's punishment due to the presence of evil was concerned, the
authors of the Halesian Summa distinguished between the afflictions of life and
death. In life, the various elements in the relevant passages of Genesis were
explained. Man was to experience difficulty in providing subsistence. Man's
work caused him hardship, in the cultivation of land. And his lack of
achievement is to be confirmed by the fruitlessness of his labours. Punishment in
55 De poenis peccati ex parte viri': ibid., cap.2, 226.
56 • 	 •
`Significantur autem ibi plures poenae: quaedam enim sunt in ablatione boni et quaedam
poenae sunt in positione mali...Ablatione vero boni dicitur quantum ad causam conservationis
vitae, quantum ad locum voluptatis. Primum est impotentia sumendi de ligno vitae propter
prohibitionem; secundum est expulsio de loco voluptatis; tertium est prohibitio reditus...Prima
poena ex parte corporis; secunda ex parte animae: voluptas enim ex parte animae attenditur; tertia
ex parte totius': ibid.
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respect of death involved the necessity of dying and incineration, which referred
to the scriptural account of returning to the ashes from which mortality came.57
Man thus experienced the physical detriment of labor. His failure to provide
subsistence and the fruitlessness of such labours caused him suffering and were
his punishment for original sin. Man also experienced the knowledge that death
would come and that his body would be incinerated. However, the authors of the
Halesian Summa also expressed the belief that there were other pains which man
would experience which involved being banished from the state of innocence.
Some of these pains pertained to the body, some to the soul and others to body
and soul together. Despite discussing these latter punishments under the suffering
of man, they must have been applied to woman also. The Halesian Summa is
unclear on this point.
The Halesian Summa followed the vocabulary used for suffering found in
Genesis. The authors of the Summa interpreted the relevant passages of Genesis
within the structure of their answers. They explained that men and women were
to suffer different kinds of pain. The pains which signalled the differences
between the sexes were both physical and spiritual. Thus, masters used pain to
determine sex difference. Moreover, it was based on the ultimate theological
authority: the Bible.
"'Quantum autem ad positionem mali distinguuntur poenae turn in vita, turn in morte...In vita
vero distinguitur quantum ad initium sustentationis, quantum ad progressum et quantum ad
consununationem...In primo laborandi difficultas, quae est in excolendo terram; in secundo
infructuositas...in tertio victus parcitas, ad quem victum alia duo tendunt. Poena vero quae respicit
mortem, duplex est: moriendi necessitatis et incineratio': ibid.
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On the punishments or afflictions to be inflicted upon the first parents, Aquinas
tackled two questions in his Summa Theologiae. In the first, he explored the
pains which were common to both sexes, by asking whether death was the
punishment for the sin of the first parents. 58 He concluded that if someone is
deprived of a gift because of guilt, then the loss of this gift amounts to a
punishment for guilt. In their first disposition, humans possessed the gift of being
bound to God which had the corollary that the human mind was subjected to
God, the inferior powers of the soul were under the control of the rational mind,
and the body was controlled by the soul. However, Aquinas explained that the
human mind fell away from its subjection to God which had the result that the
inferior powers of the soul were not under complete control of the reason. Thus,
there is a rebellion of the carnal appetite against reason. Life and the safety of the
body comprise the subjection of body to soul. However, death, illness and all
corporeal defects arise as a consequence of the collapse of this relationship
between soul and body.59
In the following question Aquinas asked whether it was fitting that particular
punishments of the first parents were determined in scripture. 60 Aquinas
separated his explanation of the punishments into two: the first parents will suffer
58 Ttrwn mors sit poena peccati primonun parentum': ST 2a2ae, q.164, a.1, 334-5.
59 `Respondeo dicendum quod, si aliquis propter culpam suam privetur aliquo beneficio sibi dato,
carentia illius beneficii est poena culpae illius...Homini in prima sui institutione hoc beneficium
fuit collatwn divinitus, ut quandiu mens eius esset Deo subiecta, inferiores vires animae
subiicerentur rationali menti, et corpus animae subiicerentur. Sed quia mens hominis per
peccatum a divina subiectione recessit, consecutwn est ut nec inferiores vires totaliter rationi
subiicerentur, unde tanta est rebellio carnalis appetitus ad rationem: nec etiam corpus totaliter
subiicerentur animae, unde consequitur mors, et alii corporales defectus. Vita enim et incolumitas
corporis consistat in hoc quod subiiciatur animae...unde, per oppositum, mors et aegritudo, et
quilibet corporalis defectus, pertinet ad defectum subiectionis corporis ad animarn': ibid., 334.
60 1.1trum convenienter particulares poenae primorum parentwn determinentur in scriptura': ST
2a2ae, q.164, a.2, 336-8. See Borresen, Subordination and Equivalence, 214-5.
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the loss of participation in Paradise and they will not return to the state of
innocence. The second punishment is further sub-divided: Aquinas explained that
the first parents were punished according to the body and soul. According to the
body, which pertains to the difference between the sexes, there is one kind of
punishment for women and another for men. The female punishment is twofold,
according to her union to man. It comprises the bearing of children and the
responsibility of tasks relating to domestic relations. The bearing of children also
has two aspects to it: the disgust in having to carry a child and the pain sustained
when giving birth. In terms of domestic behaviour, woman is punished in as far
as she is subjected to the domination of man.61
Man has certain specific punishments too, and Aquinas categorised them in three
areas which corresponded to the relevant passages in Genesis. Essentially each
punishment involved tasks which were necessities of life. The first punishment to
face the man was the sterility of the earth; the second punishment was the anxiety
caused by labour, and the third was that he was impeded in his cultivation of the
land.62
61 •
'Et ideo dupliciter puniti fuerunt. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod subtracttun fuit eis id
quod integritatis statui competebat, scilicet locus terrestris Paradisi: quod significatur Gen.III cum
dicitur: Et emisit eum Deus de Paradiso voluptatis...Secundo autem puniti fuerunt quantum ad hoc
quod attributa sunt eis ea quae naturae conveniunt tali beneficio destitutae. Et hoc quidem et
quantum ad corpus, et quantum ad animam. Quantum quidem ad corpus, ad quod pertinet
differentia sexus, alia poena attributa est mulieri, alia viro. Mulieri quidem attributa est poena
secundum duo propter quae viro coniungitur: quae sunt generatio prolis, et cornmunicatio openun
pertinentium ad domesticarn conversationem. Quantum autem ad generationem prolis, punita fuit
dupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad taedia quae sustinet portando prolem conceptam: et hoc
significatur cum dicitur: Multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptos tuos. Et quantum ad dolorem
quem patitur in pariendo: et quantum ad hoc dicitur: In dolore panes. Quantum ad domesticarn
conversationem, punitur secundum hoc quod subiicitur dominationi viii, per hoc quod dicitur:
Sub viri potestate ens': ibid., 336-7.
62•
`Sicut autem ad mulierem pertinet ut subdatur viro in his quae ad domesticam conversationem
pertinent, ita ad vinun pertinet quod necessaria vitae procuret. Et circa hoc punitur tripliciter.
Primo quidem, per terrae sterilitatem, cum dicitur: Maledicta terra in opere tuo. Secundo, per
laboris anxietatem, sine quae fructus terrae non percipit: unde dicitur: In labore comedes de ea
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Aquinas then described further punishments of the soul which were not gender-
specific, and thus pertained to both sexes. There were three aspects to this
suffering of the soul. The first punishment was the confusion caused by the
rebellion of the flesh to the spirit. The second pain of the soul was caused by the
rebukes of personal guilt. Lastly, knowledge of future death completed the
punishments for the soul after the Fa11.63
Aquinas agreed with the authors of the Halesian Summa to the extent that there
were certain types of suffering specific to man and other types of suffering
specific to woman. In addition, he associated woman's suffering with her union
to man. So woman suffered because of man. However, he also elucidated
subsequent punishments which were not gender-specific. These were
punishments of the soul caused by the rebellion of the flesh to the soul's rational
powers. Aquinas also reinforced the notion that bodies of men and women were
different. These differences were demonstrated by specific gender-based types of
suffering. However, there was also suffering which was not contingent upon
gender. This suffering was not physical, but spiritual which conformed to the
belief that there was no gender difference in the soul. The definition of particular
gendered pains in the body helped define the masters' notions of sex difference.
cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Tertio, quantum ad impedimenta quae proveniunt terram colentibus:
unde dicitur: Spinas et tribulos germinabit fib?: ibid., 337.
63 'Similiter etiam ex parte animae triplex eortun poena describitur. Primo quidem, quantum ad
confusionem quam passi stint de rebellione carnis ad spirittun...Secundo, quantum ad
increpationem propriae culpae...Tertio, quantum ad commemorationem futurae mortis': ibid.
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The passages of Genesis attributed the punishment of dolor to woman and labor
to man. Masters did not dwell on these differences in vocabulary. Dolor was also
used generically by them to discuss suffering in an ungendered context. Instead,
both the Halesian Summa and Aquinas interpreted the meanings of these types of
suffering. From the foregoing analysis, it would appear that gender distinction
could be made by the physical pains attributed to each sex at the Fall, whereas
the punishments which applied to the soul were not gender-specific.
Conclusion
Masters were keen to define notions of gender and gender difference. Women
and men possessed different bodies and this became the focus for understanding
gender difference; gender was not present in the human soul. The deployment of
physical motifs of suffering and punishment to define the difference between
male and female was an important development here. Masters interpreted their
biblical authorities in a way which emphasised the physical differences between
the sexes. Specific, gender-based suffering was the hallmark of these differences.
Sin and the corruption of the body was effected through sexual intercourse. It
was this physical corruption which led to certain types of suffering for men and
women. However, where suffering was related to the soul, the suffering was
equal for men and women. Such suffering comprised a rebellion of the flesh to
the rational powers of the soul, which led to the subsequent descent into carnal
depravity and specific physical punishments for each sex.
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In the state of innocence, however, gender difference was not an issue. Masters
did not think sex difference important here because the soul and body were
united to one another in perfect harmony. Therefore, masters had to develop a
new notion of body. Although bodies fri the state of innocence did not possess the
stain of sin, they were mortal and thus capable of corruption. Masters used
different ways of talking about suffering to determine the nature of these bodies.
The development of the theory of 'potential suffering' was the epitome of their
construction of a mortal, ungendered and incorruptible body.
However, masters still framed their questions about suffering in the state of
innocence according to gender. They asked certain questions of Adam and others
of Eve. This is testament to their viewing of pre-Fall questions through post-Fall
categories. The Fall affected notions of gender difference. Woman was faced
with the burden and pains of childbirth. She was also subject to the power of
man. Man's suffering entailed the hardship of work and his failure to succeed at
it. However, there were also pains which both sexes had in common. These
involved suffering of the soul. There was no gender distinction here.
What does this contribute to our understanding of thirteenth-century attitudes to
pain in this life? Issues of pain and suffering helped masters understand notions
of sex difference. We cannot understand their attitudes to pain without gender;
and we cannot fully understand their ideas about sex difference without reference
to pain. Physical pains were pains which were linked to gender. However, there
is a distinction to be made between the different types of suffering attributed to
man and woman, and the way in which they experienced them. The relationship
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of body to soul and how this determined suffering was the same for both sexes.
So while pains of certain types could determined sex difference, the experience
of established common ground between the sexes.
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3Pain as a Restorative Power: Voluntary Suffering and
Satisfaction for Sin
The importance which theologians attached to painful means of redemption from
sin was, it seems, immense. Christ as a model of suffering to be imitated is most
often associated with the fifteenth century and most particularly with Thomas a
Kempis. I However, the links between human and divine suffering were of
especial interest to theologians in the thirteenth century. A framework of
explanation was required which would encompass the suffering of humans, on
the one hand, and the divine on the other. Where Christ was concerned,
theologians performed a delicate balancing act to resolve apparent contradictions
within his human and divine natures, and to account for his voluntary acceptance
of suffering for the sins of humankind. This was outlined in chapter one.
However, when it came to human suffering, taken on in a voluntary capacity,
masters had another set of issues which necessitated attention. First, suffering
was repugnant to both body and soul. Second, the suffering of soul and body
were different and each experienced pain in its own way and to its own degree of
intensity. Third, how could suffering prevent disorder in the soul and body when
pain itself caused disruption and corruption? These issues clearly required
clarification if suffering were to be afforded beneficial status to a sinner.
Suffering voluntarily had been part of penitential practice for centuries and it
appears that it required more detailed explanation and even justification. How
the soul and body are joined, and how they are related to the will when pain is
'Thomas a Kempis, Of the imitation of Christ: four books (London, 1990).
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present are themes which form the core of theological questions on contrition,
fasting and bodily castigation. It is for these reasons that questions on penance
and questions on fasting are to be considered together in this chapter. Ultimately,
both areas of discussion involved reaching the goal of re-ordering the soul and
body, and returning to the simple good that is God. Moreover, how the theology
of voluntary suffering addressed issues of pastoral care and the improvement of
sinners' souls, in life and after death, is a persistent and crucial undercurrent in
the masters' questions.
Historiography of Penance
Before examining the questions which masters asked about certain aspects of
penance, it seems worthwhile to review the immense body of existing literature
on medieval penance, to gauge what level of treatment the theme of penitential
suffering has been given. There have been many studies of the history of penance
since Henry Charles Lea's magisterial three volume work in the late nineteenth
century.2 The common position taken by historians of penance following Lea
was that public penance and the practice of tariff-imposing, impersonal
penitentials, were replaced by a personal, introspective private penance
2 H.C. Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church, 3 vols.
(London, 1896). The major accounts are: O.D. Watkins, A History of Penance, 2 vols. (London,
1920); N. Paulus, Die Geschichte des Ablafies im Mittelalter: Vom Ursprung his zur Mine des 14.
Jahrhunderts (Paderborn, 1922); B. Poschmann, Die abendleindische Kirchenbufie im friihen
Mittelalter (Breslau, 1930); E. Amanne, 'Penitence', D7r, vol.12 (1933); J.A. Spitzig,
Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Washington D.C., 1947); P.
Anciaux, La theologie du sacrement de penitence au XIle siècle (Louvain, 1949); B. Posclunann,
Penance and the Anointing of the Sick, trans. F. Courtney (London and Freiburg, 1964); C.
Vogel, Le pecheur et la penitence au Moyen Age (Paris, 1969). More recent studies include: T.N.
Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, 1977); M.C. Mansfield,
The Humiliation of Sinners. Public Penance in Thirteenth Century France (Ithaca and London,
1989).
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contingent upon annual, private confession to the parish priest, the institutional
culmination of which was the canon Omnis utriusque sexus of the Fourth Lateran
Council in 1215. 3 The long-standing theory held by historians following Lea
argued that, before the ninth century, penances were harsh and prescribed for
offences without the personal needs of the individual being taken into account.4
The genesis of private penance thereafter fitted neatly into the twelfth-century
framework of the growth of the individual and the ethic of intention, replacing
public ritual humiliation.5
This theory has been discredited most recently by Mary Mansfield, who argues
that recent historiography of penance has been unduly concerned with the
theological categorisation of penance, to the exclusion of explaining its actual
practice. 6 This is partly due to the viewing of pre-scholastic developments in
penance through scholastic categories, which Mansfield calls 'unconsciously
teleological'. Furthermore, she criticises thirteenth-century theologians for
failing to elucidate a theology of private penance: theologians, according to
Mansfield, did not construct satisfactory definitions of their terms which could
3 Lea, Auricular Confession and Indulgences, ii, 81-101; Poschmarm, Penance and the
Anointing, 156f.; Tentler, Sin and Confession, 16-17; J. Tambling, Confession: Sexuality, Sin, the
Subject (Manchester, 1990), 35. Mansi, xxii.1007-1010.
4 This rather simplistic view of the penitentials has been dismissed by P.J. Payer who maintains
that there are strong elements of continuity between the penitentials and later, more 'personal'
summae: 'The Humanism of the Penitentials and the Continuity of the Penitential Tradition',
Mediaeval Studies, 46 (1984), 340-354. For source material on the libri poenitentiales, see J.T.
McNeill and H.M. Gamer, (eds.), Medieval Handbooks of Penance (New York, 1938, repr.,
1990).
5 The link between private penance and the ethic of intention is to be found particularly in Vogel,
Pecheur et Penitence.
6 Mansfield, Humiliation of Sinners, 9.
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be easily translated into other media such as confessors' manuals, nor did they
distinguish between interior and exterior penance to an adequate degree.7
Other recent histories of penance have considered whether the nature of pain was
important to masters in their theological treatises. Thomas Tentler, for example,
claims that theologians were preoccupied with the presence or absence of grace
in their examination of penance and, moreover, that they avoided distinguishing
and explaining the reasons and motivations behind the pain of penance because
these emotions could easily lead the penitent into error. 8 However, the reason for
Tentler's claim may lie in the inherent complexity of the theological problems
discussed in treatises and questions on penance. Disentangling the role of the
priest in the penitential system from other aspects, such as penance as a
'condition' of remorse or penance as sacrament, are thorny issues which cloud
analysis of issues of suffering, and which also exceed the parameters of this
thesis.9
Instead, it is argued in this chapter that thirteenth-century masters of theology
had a more coherent and carefully constructed explanation of the role of
voluntary suffering than has hitherto been appreciated. To this end, questions on
7 Ibid., 20-37.
8 'St. Thomas did not spend a great deal of time exploring the nature of perfect sorrow: he did not
meticulously define the proper motives of contrition or distinguish it psychologically from
imperfect contrition. Indeed, he explicitly warned against examining the reasons for sorrow,
"because a man cannot easily measure his own emotions": T.N. Tentler, Sin and Confession, 24-
5. See also A. Vanneste, 'La theologie de la penitence chez quelques mattes Parisiens de la
premiere moitie de XIIIe siècle', EThL, 28 (1952), 42.
9 There was some ambiguity over which part of penance had what meaning, following the
problematic phrase introduced by Peter Lombard: 'Quid in actione penitentiae sit sacramenttun et
res'. Some held that exterior penance was the sacrament of interior penance (contrition), whilst
others believed that contrition was equal to sacrament and res. See Vanneste, `Theologie', 32-7;
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the voluntary assumption of contrition are to be considered alongside debates
about the voluntary mortification of the flesh, abstinence and fasting. The
relationship between bodily affliction and its concomitant spiritual effects sheds
light on the way in which masters understood the relationship between body and
soul in suffering, and how this in turn could lead to reparation for sins which had
been committed.
1. Penitential Suffering
Many questions which masters of theology asked about penance involved
discussing the nature of contrition. Masters wanted to know what contrition was
because it was an essential part of penance. Contrition involved suffering for sin.
The nature of this suffering was important for masters because it was voluntary,
but the idea of accepting pain voluntarily went against the framework masters
had constructed for understanding pain and suffering. It thus seems pertinent to
analyse the way in which pain was treated in a voluntary sense in questions on
contrition. How masters developed their ideas of pain is central to the way in
which penance was understood. Two main areas appear to have been central to
defining the nature of contritional suffering. First was the way in which masters
understood the relationship between suffering and the will. Second, masters
investigated the extent to which the penitent should suffer. These themes are
examined under two subsections: the role of the will and degrees of suffering.
Analysis of the conclusions in these sections will provide evidence that, contrary
R.Ohlmann, 'St. Bonaventure and the Power of the Keys', Franciscan Studies, 6 (1946), 293-
315; 437-65; esp. 307-14.
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to the claims of Thomas Tentler, masters were indeed interested in the nature of
pain and sought to define it in terms of the motivations of the sinner.
i. Role of the Will
Since the twelfth century, it had been presumed that contrition alone sufficed to
remit sins which had been committed. This presented some difficulties in
assigning the correct role of the priest and his powers to 'bind and loose' the
sinner, according to the power of the keys. 10 Masters were thus keen to define the
nature of contrition and how the will was involved within it. Albert the Great, for
example, asked what the proper definition of contrition was. 11 His actual
response was very brief12 but we can learn much about the way in which he
related pain to the will when he answered his many objections. For this reason,
some key objections and their responses are considered together. In the first key
objection and its reply, the main issue appeared to be the nature and function of
the will itself. In the objection it was argued that as the will was part of the
rational soul, and there was no pleasure there, neither would there be suffering in
the will. 13 Albert replied to this objection by arguing that the will is not divided
into two parts, deliberating and natural, as some have written. The will suffers in
I ° For example, Abelard contended that if contrition was motivated by love of God, this would
suffice to annul sin. See Posclunann, Penance and Anointing, 159-60; Tentler, Sin and
Confession, 19-20.
"'Quid sit contritio propria diffinitione?': IV Sent., d.16, a.7, 312-14.
12 Albert argued that all of the descriptions in his question sufficed to describe the nature of
contrition: `Dicendum, quod omnibus his descriptionibus satis bene describitur contritio et in fine
dicemus penes quid differunt': ibid., 313.
13 'Non videtur Philosophicum dictum esse, quod voluntas dolet: sic enim dicunt Damasc.,
Gregorius Nazianzenus et Aristot. Omnis voluntas in ratione est: et Si rationalis non est, voluntas
non est. Dicit enim Aristot.in 7. Ethiconun, quod omnis delectatio est generatio vel motus in
sensibilem animam: ergo nulla delectatio est in rationali...ergo nulla tristitia est in voluntate': ibid.
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its nature from contraries to that nature and gains joy from things harmonious to
it. I4 So the will was understood to suffer according to its own nature.
However, the main difficulty in assigning pain to the will was the apparent
paradox of possessing both joy and suffering at the same time. Albert explained
that joy from the pursuit of desire and pain are not present in the will for the
same reason and thus are not contrary to one another. Voluntary suffering is
made by the will and Albert explained this suffering in two distinct ways. It is
pain in as far as it punishes fault and voluntary to the extent that it cures and
expels sin. I5 In other words, Albert meant that voluntary suffering was punitive
on the one hand, and purgative on the other.
In a further objection, Albert examined the nature of the will and the nature of
suffering which pertained to it. As far as the nature of the will was concerned,
Albert stated that nothing could be afflicted unless it had contraries in itself.
However, the will, as part of the rational soul, does not have contraries in itself,
so it cannot be afflicted by pain in itself. On the type of pain itself, Albert put
forward the argument that pain which is generally destructive of sin, stems from
every sin, whereas pain which is in the sensitive part of the soul does not always
come from sin. Thus, it cannot destroy sin.16
14 'Nec dicimus hoc esse soluendum, ut quidam scripserunt, scilicet quod voluntas duplex est: ut
diliberans, et ut natura...Quia hoc omnino nihil est: quia voluntas ut natura dolet de contrariis
naturae, et gaudet de conuenientibus eidem': ibid.
15 `Gaudium de assecutione voliti et dolor non secundum unam rationem se habent ad voluntatem:
et ideo non sunt contraria: quia iste dolor est factus a voluntate, et est dolor inquantum est
punitiuus delicti, et voluntarius inquantwn curatiuus et expulsiuus peccati': ibid., 314.
16 `Nihil dolore potest affici secundum se, nisi quod habet contrarium secundum se: sed voluntas
secundum se accepta prout est pars animae rationalis, non habet contrarium secundum se: ergo
dolore non afficitur secundum se...Dolor qui est generaliter destructiuus peccati, est de omni
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In his reply to the above objection Albert argued that something which is simply
spiritual does not have contraries in being, but to the extent that it is ordered to
something, it can possess a contrary to that ordering. Albert illustrated this
argument by explaining that the rational soul has sin, and this sin is contrary to
the soul's union and ordering to God. 17 The use of the concept of ordering
permitted Albert to explain how the soul could possess contraries. This ordering
of the soul towards God is a theme which will be examined later in this chapter.
Albert thus found ways to define the nature of voluntary pain. Pain in the will is
seemingly paradoxical. One kind of pain is in the part of the soul which deals
with sense perception, whilst the will is in the rational part of the soul. But Albert
defined the precise nature of the will and argued that another kind of pain which
has beneficial aspects can be present in the will at the same time as pleasure.
Compared with other notions of pain seen in previous chapters, the pain of
contrition was directly related to the will rather than to the interaction of soul and
body. It was also a general pain capable of expelling sin. Thus, a new type of
suffering was defined. This definition helped to elucidate the complex process
involved in the remission of sin.
peccato: dolor autem in sensibili anima acceptus, non est de onmi peccato: ergo non est
destructiuus peccati': ibid., 312.
17 'Dicendum, quod simpliciter spirituale non habet contrarium in esse, sed prout ordinatur ad
aliquid, potest habere contrarium ordini illi: et hoc modo anima rationalis habet contrarium
peccattun, quia contrariatur coniunctioni et ordini ad Deum': ibid., 312.
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Some years after Albert had tackled this issue, Bonaventure asked what
contrition was in its substance. I8
 His reply was clear and succinct. He argued that
just as sin was performed by the agreement of the rational will, so it is destroyed
through the discord of the rational will. He then used a quotation from Augustine
which stated that discord of the will generated dolor. In this way, said
Bonaventure, contrition is dolor in essence. He further explained that dolor can
be defined in two ways: first, it is itself discord of the will; second, it is the
passion which arises as a consequence of this discord, which prompts a human to
burst into tears. The discord is the essence of contrition, whilst this passion is its
effect. 19
Thus, Bonaventure also focused on defining the precise nature of contritional
pain, so he agreed with Albert in the premise of his question. Contrition
amounted to pain in as much as it signified discord in the will. Bonaventure used
the authority of Augustine to back up this claim. However, it was not a pain of
the senses. The pain which resulted from the discord in the will is the pain
required to destroy sin. This discord is also pain in two ways: in itself as the
discord, and the passion which results in the senses from this discord.
Thus, for Bonaventure, the pain of contrition was not a pain of the senses, but
nevertheless contritional pain could cause pain in the senses. This supported the
18 'Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam': IV Sent., d.16, p.1, a.1, q.1, 383-5.
19 `Dicendum, quod sicut peccatum perpetratur per consensum, sic econtra deletur et destruitur
per dissensum voluntatis rationalis; et quia dissensus ab ea re, quam impossibile est non esse,
generat dolorem, sicut dicit Augustinus: ideo dicendum, quod contritio est dolor per essentiam.
Sed attendendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipse dissensus voluntatis, alio modo
passio resultans in sentientem ex illo dissensu, per quam prorumpit homo in lacrymas; et ille
dissensus est de essentia contritionis, sed illa passio est effectus eius': ibid., 383.
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masters' understanding of the links between soul and body. The movement of
pain from one to the other displayed this. Contritional pain was not the same as
pain of the senses. Nevertheless, the two were clearly linked.
Aquinas addressed similar issues when he asked whether contrition was an act of
virtue.20 He argued that, according to its proper name, contrition did not signify
an act of virtue, but rather a certain corporeal passion. He then proceeded to
argue that just as the capacity of the will to do evil introduces evil ex genere, so
the annihilation of this will introduces good ex genere because it involves a
detesting of the will which commits sin. Aquinas then stated that in contrition
there were two kinds of suffering for sin: one in the sensitive part of the soul,
where it is a passion; and the other in the will itself. The first kind of suffering
was not essential to contrition, but rather an effect of it. The virtue of penance
afflicts exterior punishment on the body as repayment for the sin committed
against God. This kind of suffering can pertain to contrition in as much as it is a
part of the sacrament because the sacraments are not only in interior acts, but also
in exterior and sense-related things. Bonaventure also argued that there could be
a kind of suffering in the will when the state of will was given the name of a
passion. This suffering was displeasure caused by some evi1.21
20 'An contritio sit actus virtutis': IV Sent., d.17, q.2, a.1, ce2, 857-61.
21 `Dicendum quod contritio secundum proprietatem sui nominis non significat actum virtutis, sed
magis quamdam corporalem passionem...Sicut enim inflatio propriae voluntatis ad malum
faciendum iniportat, quantum est de se, malum ex genere; ita illius voluntatis annihilatio et
comminutio quaedam de se importat bonum ex genere; quia hoc est detestari propriam voluntatem
qua peccatum commissum est... Dicendum quod in contritione est duplex dolor de peccato. Unus
in parte sensitiva, qui passio est. Et hic non est essentialiter contritio, prout est actus virtutis, sed
magis effectus ipsius...Enim poenitentiae virtus exteriorem poenam suo corpori infligit ad
recompensandum offensam quae in Deum commissa est officio membrorum...Sed tamen hic dolor
potest pertinere ad contritionem, inquanttun est pars sacramenti; quia sacramenta non solum in
interioribus actibus, sed etiam in exterioribus et in rebus sensibilibus, nata sunt esse. Alius dolor
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Like the other masters before him, Aquinas also clarified the nature of contrition
by determining what kinds of suffering were present. There is pain in the will
itself, which is proper to contrition. And pain which is in the sensitive part of the
soul. But this is a non-essential pain and an effect of the first. However, Aquinas
focused more closely on the exterior pain which would be inflicted on the body
as a result of penance. He argued that this was fitting, given that the sacraments
are concerned with both interior and exterior acts.
Contrition could have physical as well as spiritual attributes. Types of pain were
distinguished which made discussion about contrition in penance more
accessible. The links between types of pain were also considered. There is thus
clear evidence that there was a definite interest in understanding the precise
nature of pain in penance. In this case, Tentler's theory that masters did not
explore the nature of suffering in penance is wrong.
The masters were agreed that there were two types of pain. The pain caused by
the discord of the will was most important in contrition. Discord of the will was
the essential part of contritional suffering. It was thus essential to penance. They
also developed the idea of the involvement of physical suffering in penance. It
was linked to the pain of the will, but played a secondary role.
est in voluntate, qui nihil aliud est quam displicentia alicujus mali, secundum quod affectus
voluntatis nominatur per nomina passionum': ibid., 861-2.
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Although there were separate pains, the links between body and soul meant that
interior pains had effects on the body, and vice-versa. However, these pains were
still distinguishable from one another. The will had its own particular pain which
was different from other sorts of pain. Its presence in the will was not
contradictory. So creating a new type of pain, contritional pain, and explaining
how it differed from other kinds of suffering, helped explain the nature of
penance and expulsion of sin. Suffering was thus afforded beneficial, purgative
attributes.
ii. Degrees of suffering
When discussing contrition, masters were interested in the kind of suffering
which was required and how perfect that suffering should be. There was much
debate about the differences between contrition and attrition. In earlier centuries,
the states of contrition and attrition denoted whether the soul felt a greater or
lesser degree of affliction respectively. However, by the thirteenth century, the
difference between these two states of existence represented a penance informed
by God's grace (contrition) and uninformed penance (attrition). 22 Moreover, the
role of the priest in the sacrament of penance was closely linked to the role of
contrition or attrition in the penitent. At Oxford, Dims Scotus reconciled the two
by arguing that perfect contrition was an exception, and that an attrite sinner was
sufficient to begin a period of penance. 23 The issue of whether attrition could
22 Posclunann, Penance and Anointing, 164.
23 Tentler, Sin and Confession, 26.
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become contrition was hotly debated, and a general consensus emerged that it
could not, given that it was uninformed by God's grace. 24
It has been overlooked, however, that masters also addressed questions about the
degree to which a penitent had to suffer in order for sin to be remitted. Such
questions focused sharply on the extent and kind of suffering which was
involved. For example, Bonaventure asked whether it was necessary for the pain
of contrition to be the greatest. 25 He replied that pain could mean displeasure of
the reason or a passion in the senses resulting from this displeasure. With regard
to the second of these, Bonaventure argued, it is not necessary to suffer more
greatly as a result of sin than from temporal things. Such dolor does not follow
love, but follows its affection and the affection of experiential cognition. 26 By
this, Bonaventure meant that it was only associated as an effect of the destruction
of sin.
Bonaventure was quite definite that to repent for sin, there was no reason for the
pain of the senses to be greater than that for temporal things.27 Nevertheless, he
went on to compare suffering in contrition, which we have seen as 'displeasure of
the reason' with other kinds of pain, and whether there is a preference for other
kinds of suffering. In the present state of suffering and detesting sin, argued
24 For example, 'An attritio possit fieri contritio': Aquinas, IV Sent., d.17, q.2, a.1, q°3, 856-62;
'thrum attritio possit fieri contritio': Richard of Middleton, IV Sent., d.17, a.1, q.2, 241.
25 'Utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum': IV Sent.,d.16, p.1, a.2,q.1, 387-9.
26 `Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de quantitate doloris, dolor potest dici displicentia rationis, vel
passio ex hac resultans in sensualitatem...Talis enim dolor non consequitur amorem, sed
consequitur ipsam affectionem, et affectio experimentalem cognitionem': ibid., 387.
27 'Si hoc secundo modo accipiatur; dico, quod non est necesse magis dolore de peccato quam de
re temporali': ibid., 387.
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Bonaventure, where one must choose between sinning and tolerating poena: one
is bound to choose punishment or suffering over sin. He argued that to prefer
punishment to sin is a perfect virtue. However, it is dangerous and foolish to seek
this kind of preference from someone infirm or of oneself, for this can put man
into temptation. Thus, said Bonaventure, no confessor should ask this of
someone who confesses to him. If the penitent offers himself and says he would
rather be dead than have sinned, it is to be a cause for joy and the sign of a good
will. In comparison to other pains, the dolor of contrition has predominance.28
Following the terminology for contritional pain outlined in the previous
subsection, Bonaventure again distinguished between contritional suffering and
other kinds of pain. Contritional suffering was deemed to be greater in
comparison to other kinds of suffering. It could also lead to other kinds of
suffering, for example in the senses. However, there is an important distinction
made between actual contritional suffering (displeasure of reason) and
subsequent supplementary suffering of the senses. This is evidence that a clear
framework for discussing contrition in penance was emerging.
28 'Si vero de comparatione et praeelectione quaeratur; respondent aliqui et faciunt in hoc vim,
quia potest intelligi respectu praeteriti vel futuri. Sed ego non video in hoc vim, quia iusta
voluntas et vere poenitens ita detestatur praeteritum peccatum, ut futurum, ne fiat; et ita est
peccatum velle peccasse, sicut velle peccare. Ideo de peccati praecedentis dolore et detestatione
dicendum, quod in casu, in quo oportet praeeligere vel consentire in peccatum sive
complacentiam peccati, vel tolerantiam poenae, quilibet tenetur praeeligere sive magis eligere
poenam quam velle peccare ye! pecasse. Praeter casum necessitatis dico, quod praeeligere omnem
poenam est perfectae virtutis...sed praeeligere culpam alicui poenae, hoc est iniquitatis, Si est cum
deliberatione et plena voluntate, quia omnis talis voluntas est iniqua, quae peccatum vult vel
absolute vel conditionaliter. Unde periculum est et stultitia quaerere hoc ab aliquo infirm°, vel
etiam a se ipso, quia hoc est hominem ponere in tentationem; unde nullus confessor debet hoc ab
aliquo, qui sibi confitetur, quaerere. Sed si poenitens se offerat et dicat, se malle mortuum esse
quam pecasse...gaudendum est, quia hoc est signum bonae voluntatis...In comparatione ad alios
dolores dico, sicut de amore, quod oportet, quod habeat praedominium': ibid.
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Whether the pain of contrition was greater than any other pain in nature was also
debated by Aquinas.29 He differentiated between two sorts of suffering in
contrition. One is in the will itself, which is nothing other than displeasure for
past sin. This kind of suffering in contrition excedes all others, for however
much something is pleasing, so much the contrary of it is displeasing. The divine
end is pleasing above all things and thus sin which detracts from this end ought
to be most displeasing above al1.30
The other kind of dolor exists in the part of the soul involved in sense
perception. This suffering arises as a result of the first pain, either from the
necessity of nature, according to which the inferior powers follow superior
motion, or from choice, in which the penitent himself arouses dolor so that he
suffers from sin. In neither of these cases, argued Aquinas, is this secondary
suffering the greatest of pains. The reason for this is that the inferior powers are
more vehemently moved by objects which are close to them, than they are from
the overflow of pain from the superior powers. The nearer the operation of the
superior powers to the inferior object, so much greater is their movement. Thus,
there is greater dolor in the sensitive part of the soul from wounding of the
senses than that which overflows into the senses from the reason. Similarly, the
deliberation of the corporeal overflows into the senses to a greater extent than the
consideration of the spiritual. It follows from this that the suffering in the
29 
'An contritio sit major dolor qui esse possit in natura': IV Sent., d.17, q.2, a.3, qa l, 872-3.
30 ' In contritione est duplex dolor. Unus in ipsa voluntate, qui est essentialiter ipsa contritio, quae
nihil aliud est quam displicentia praeteriti peccati. Et talis dolor in contritione excedit alios
dolores, quia quantum aliquid placet, tantum contrarium ejus displicet. Finis autem super omnia
placet, cum omnia propter ipsum desiderentur. Et ideo peccatum quod a fine ultimo avertit, super
omnia displicere debet': ibid., 872.
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sensitive part from the displeasure of the reason as a result of sin is not greater
than other pains present in it.31
Aquinas differentiated between contritional suffering as discord of will and
subsequent suffering of the senses, agreeing on this paradigm with Bonaventure.
Aquinas was also building on his previous distinction, as seen in the previous
section. But he believed that suffering which was discord of the will exceeded all
others. The pain of the senses emanated from this discord, either from the
necessity of nature or from choice of the penitent. However, the other kinds of
suffering which were caused directly to the senses were felt more keenly there
than the pain which overflowed into the senses from the discord of the will. The
discord felt in the will thus also had physical aspects because of the links
between body and soul. Inherent in this was the idea of overflow from the will
into the senses.
The two different types of suffering accrued in the practice of penance were also
analysed for their potentially harmful effects. Bonaventure asked whether it was
possible for the dolor of contrition to be excessive.32 He explained that when
contrition is the displeasure of reason, it cannot be excessive. When, however, it
31 'Mins dolor est in parte sensitiva, qui causatur ex primo dolore, vel ex necessitate naturae,
secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motwn superiorum; vel ex electione, secundum quod
homo poenitens in seipso hunc dolorem excitat et de peccatis doleat. Et neutro modo oportet quod
sit maximus dolorum. Quia vires inferiores vehementius moventur ab objectis propriis, quam ex
redundantia superiorum virium. Et ideo quanto operatio superionun virium est propinquior
objectis inferiorum, tanto magis sequuntur earwn motwn. Et ideo major dolor est in sensitiva
parte ex laesione sensibili quam sit ille qui in ipsa redundat ex ratione. Et similiter major qui
redundat ex ratione de corporalibus deliberante quam qui redundat ex ratione considerante
spiritualia. Unde dolor in sensitiva parte ex displicentia rationis proveniens de peccato, non est
major doloribus qui in ipsa sunt': ibid., 872-3.
22 'Utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis esse excessum': IV Sent., d.16, p.1, a.2, q.2, 389-90.
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is a passion overflowing into the senses, it can be excessive. The second kind of
suffering which overflows into the senses is scarcely or never excessive, but one
can experience only so much of it because human frailty cannot suffer without
great detriment. It is necessary therefore to be temperate. However, Bonaventure
conceded that someone who is not temperate, because this person is not directed
towards temperance, but seized by a fervour, does not sin because they are
directed towards licit things. If the sinner does not practice temperance, either
through the affection of joy or the consolation of hope, then the goals of virtue
and contrition are transcended. Contrition, like charity, is so called because it is
informed by grace. The suffering of contrition can never be excessive because
the displeasure of sin can never be extended to excess when it is out of correct
consideration.33
The distinction between two types of pain allowed masters to ask this question
and provide a sophisticated answer. Masters could talk about grace-informed
contrition and still explain the potentially excessive effects. The excess lay in the
associated suffering in the senses if temperance is not practised. Links between
soul and body were crucial in explaining the nature of suffering. Also, pastoral
concerns could be confronted by explaining the nature of suffering in both will
33 `Contritio quoad displicentiam rationis non potest esse nimia, sed quoad passionem
redundantem in sensualitatem posset habere excessum...Quantum autem ad passionem
redundantem in sensualitatem, vix aut nunquam est nimia; tamen posset esse tantus dolor, quod
humana infinnitas non posset sufferre sine magno detrimento; et tunc dico, quod temperandus
esset. Sed esto, quod non temperaret quis, quia non adverteret et raperetur a fervore; non credo,
quod in tali casu peccaret, quia daret operam rei licitae...Si autem non temperaret vel per
affectionem gaudii, vel per consolationem spei; credo, quod transcenderet metas virtutis, et ita
contritionis. Contritio enim, sicut caritas, nominat quid informatum gratia. Unde dolor
contritionis, manens contritionis, non potest esse nimius, quia displicentia peccati nunquam
LIM= potest intendi, quod possit esse nimia, cum sit ex consideratione recta': ibid., 389-90.
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and body. In certain ways, therefore, masters linked the theology of penance to its
practice within their theological treatises.
Aquinas inquired about the same issue some years later. 34 In a similar way, he
found that the dolor in the reason resulting from displeasure for sin committed
against God cannot be excessive, just as the love of charity to which this
displeasure is directed cannot be excessive. Sensible suffering, on the other hand,
can be excessive in the same way as affliction of the body can be excessive.35
Like Bonaventure, Aquinas argued that pain in the reason resulting from
displeasure for sin could not be excessive. Aquinas, however, introduced the idea
of comparison with the love of charity which also cannot be excessive. Both this
pain and charity are informed by grace. Suffering of the senses which results can
be excessive, just as bodily affliction can be excessive. A conscious distinction
between physical suffering directly affecting the senses, and physical suffering as
a result of the overflow from the discord in the soul was made. Masters were thus
adhering to a system of pain which they had applied in other areas of theological
discussion.
A third master to debate whether contritional suffering could be excessive was
Richard of Middleton. 36 Richard was a Franciscan and was a bachelor of the
34 'An possit esse nimis magnus contritionis dolor': IV Sent., d.17,q.2, a.3, qs2, 874-5.
35 `Dicendum quod contritio ex parte doloris qui est in ratione, scilicet displicentiae, quo
peccatum displicet inquantwn est offensa Dei, non potest esse nimia: sicut nec amor caritatis, quo
intenso talis displicentia intenditur, potest esse nimius. Sed quantum ad dolorem sensibilem potest
esse nimia: sicut etiam exterior corporis afflictio potest esse nimia': ibid., 874.
36 'thrum possit esse nimis magnus dolor in contritione': Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 4
vols. (Brixiae, 1591, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1963), iv, IV Sent., d.17, a.1, q.8, 246.
120
Sentences in 1283, during which time he played a part in the Franciscan
commission examining Jean-Pierre Olivi. 37 Richard distinguished between the
kind of suffering essential to contrition, that is, the displeasure caused by the
transgression of the divine law, and the non-essential suffering of physical pain.
The first he deemed not to be excessive, for it is motivated directly by charitable
love of God.38 For the physical suffering in contrition, Richard essentially
followed the argumentation offered by Bonaventure and Aquinas before him.
However, he added a distinction: if the penitent out of the most vehement love of
God, so greatly suffers for his sins, from which is caused such vehement
suffering in the sensitive appetite, that it corrupts the harmony of the body
necessary for life, this is not excessive according to custom, nor does it detract
from the perfection of penance. The exception to this is when the penitent
deliberately wills suffering which leads to death. This, Richard considered,
would be excessive.39
Consistent with the beliefs of other masters, Richard also argued that the discord
of the will could not be excessive because it was motivated directly by charitable
37 E. Amann, 'Richard de Mediavilla', DTC, 13.2 (1937), 2669-75; For his life and works, see E.
Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine (Paris and Louvain, 1925); J.
Reuss, 'Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des Richard von Mediavilla',
Franziskanische Studien, 22 (1935), 11-43.
38 'Dolor in contritione quo ad displicentiam voluntatis rationalis nimius esse neutiquam potest,
quo ad corporis vero afflictionem, et appetitus sensitivi passionum, aut vix, aut nunquam est
nimius. Respondeo, quod in actu penitendi duplex est dolor, unus essentialis penitentiae, et hoc
est in voluntate rationali. Est enim quaedam voluntatis displicentia qua sibi displicet peccatum
inquantum est transgressio legis diuinae et quia haec displicentia directe causatur ex charitativa
Dei dilectione, qua nimis intendi non potest, ideo haec displicentia non potest esse nimis magna':
IV Sent., d.17, a.1, q.8, 246.
39 `Si penitens ex vehementissimo Dei amore, tam vehementer doloret de suo peccato, quod ex
hoc causaretur in appetitu sensitiuo tam vehemens dolor, quod comunperet harmoniam corporis
necessarium ad vitam, non esset excessus in genere moris, nec perfectioni penitentiae derogans,
sed concordans, nisi forte hominis voluntas directe, et ex intentione ferretur ad procurandum
talem passionem ad hoc, vt ipse moreretur: et sic credo, quod intelligtmt illi qui dicunt, quod in
dolore, qui est in appetitu sensituo potest esse excessus': ibid.
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love of God. However, Richard added that if a penitent corrupted the harmony of
the body through vehement love of God, this should not be regarded as
excessive, unless the penitent were will suffering which would lead to death. So
suffering caused by the link between body and soul could be excessive, but not
pain which was directly related to the will. Furthermore, the pain of contrition
was related to love or charity. This was a clear focus on its motivation.
Masters asked about contrition because the conceptual framework they had
created for pain, as seen in previous chapters, viewed pain as destructive to the
human body. It was thus potentially pardoxical to speak of willing pain. For
masters, it was essential therefore to understand the role of the will in suffering
and how it pertained to contrition within the sacrament of penance. Masters also
had pastoral concerns in their discussions of penance. They warned against
penance being too severe. Masters were indeed concerned about the motivation
of penitents. How penitents should suffer in order to overcome sin was
vigorously debated by them. This is clear evidence that masters were interested
directly in the nature of penitential suffering. It also demonstrates that far from
only being concerned with the presence or absence of grace in penance, masters
did indeed discuss the nature of suffering and penitential motivation. In this case,
Tentler's theory fails to stand up to scrutiny.
The masters were all in agreement that the will could suffer and needed to suffer
in contrition. They overcame the apparent pardox of willing suffering by
explaining that this suffering would expel sin. They warned that if suffering was
too great, the physical pains caused by discord in the will would be damaging, or
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even fatal, to the penitent. They also all agreed that suffering and joy could be
present in the soul of a penitent at the same time because they were present for
different reasons.
It appears that penitential suffering could be understood only with a clear
understanding of the links between the soul, the will and the body. The pain
caused by discord in the will was believed to overflow into the senses. It was this
mechanism which permitted masters to explain how penitential suffering could
be excessive, for example. It also allowed masters to attribute physical
characteristics to contrition. The pain of contrition existed properly in the will. It
was different from other sorts of pain. Its main goal was the expulsion of sin.
However, like other pains in the soul-body composite, it could have effects on
the senses too. These, however, were different from other physical afflictions.
So, a further aspect to the typology of pain was created. Contritional pain was
different from other sorts of pain which had been explained by masters in that it
had beneficial effects. Distinguishing the pain of contrition from other types of
suffering, whilst still keeping it in a familiar conceptual framework of suffering,
allowed masters to understand the nature of penance and penitential suffering
more precisely. Moreover, it enabled masters to explain an important aspect of
penance in terms of its most important element: the way in which the penitent
ought to experience remorse for sin.
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2. Bodily Affliction: Fasting and Castigation of the Flesh
Despite the many questions which masters asked about contrition and penance,
they were also interested in accounting for the positive outcome of suffering
through the practice of fasting or mortification of the flesh. The relation of
physical chastisements to the expulsion of sin had a long history in Christian
religious practice. The ascetic practices of repeated genuflexions, immersions in
cold water, the wearing of hairshirts, and flagellation are common themes in
medieval monastic treatises and vitae.° The origins of such practices are to be
found in monastic rules, especially the Regula Magistri, upon which the Rule of
St. Benedict is largely based, in which certain practices were to be performed at
strict times of the day. Early medieval ecclesiastical texts prescribed corporeal
chastisements for children, monks and minor clerics, and Augustine advocated
the imposition of disciplina for serious offences. 41 To purge their bodies from
sin, monks engaged in ritual flagellation until they produced blood. 42 Flagellation
was practised in this way most notably by the monks of Peter Damian at Fonte-
Avellana every Friday. Other ascetic practices were often aimed at the imitation
of Christ's suffering and followed the example set to Christians by the early
Christian martyrs. 43 However, the personal hold on self-inflicted suffering gave
4° G. Constable, 'Attitudes toward self-inflicted suffering in the Middle Ages', Ninth Stephen J.
Brademas Sr. Lecture (Brookline, Mass., 1982), 13; T. Asad, 'On Ritual and Discipline in
Medieval Christian Monasticism', Economy and Society, 16 (1987), 159-203.
41 L. Gougaud, Devotions Pratiques et Ascetiques du Moyen Age (Paris, 1925), 176-7; Augustine,
Sermon 82.2, PL 38, 506.
42 Peter Damian, `De laude flagellorwn', PL 145, 679-86. See P.Bailly, 'Flagellants', DdeS, v
(1964), 392-408; G. Bareille, 'Flagellants', DTC, vi.1, 12-19.
43 H. Mursurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford, 1972).
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way to suffering expressed by groups such as the Flagellants in the thirteenth
century, whose actions reflected the social and political climate of the time.44
There were thus many different treatises in which voluntary physical
chastisement was related to reparation for sin. The masters were no exception
when they addressed questions about this subject. Indeed there appear to have
been two main areas of inquiry concerning reparation for sin. The first consisted
of questions about the nature of good works which would make amends for sin;
and whether it was necessary for such works to be painful. Second, masters were
compelled to address how the physical suffering of fasting or other kinds of
mortification of the flesh were linked to an improvement in the union between
soul and body. Each issue is explored in the subsections below.
i. Reparation for sin through pain
How did masters link 'painful works' to achieving reparation for sin which had
been committed? Bonaventure asked which works ought to make satisfaction for
sin.45 He argued that satisfaction should occur through painful or punitive works
for four reasons. First, making amends for sin involved returning the respect for
God which had been taken away by this sin. Man must pay more respect back
than was taken away. For this reason, it must not be through good works, but
rather, he must purge himself through the assumption of poena. Second, there
44 J. Henderson, 'The Flagellant Movement and Flagellant Confraternities in central Italy, 1260-
1400', Religious Motivation: Biographical and Sociological Problems for the Church Historian,
ed. D. Baker (Studies in Church History, 15; Oxford, 1978), 147-60; G. Dickson, 'The
Flagellants of 1260 and the Crusades', JMH, 15 (1989), 227-67.
45 'Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio': IV Sent., d.15, p.2,a.1, q.3, 364-5.
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should be a reordering of disorder. The disorder caused through culpa is best
ordered in poena. Third, Bonaventure argued that someone who is weakened by
the heat of pleasure will be cured by the cold of pain. Fourth, Bonaventure stated
that the sinner can pay back the debt incurred by sinning through punishment.46
Various key themes result from analysis of the above question. It would seem
that masters laid emphasis on painful works as the means of making reparation
for sin. This kind of pain was purgative and caused the re-ordering of the
disorder which had been caused by sin. More will be said about the precise
relationship between physical suffering and re-ordering of the soul to the body
below. Another important theme was the use of a contrary disposition to cure an
infirmity. The pain of self-inflicted suffering was believed to cure the pleasure of
sin.
Aquinas asked directly whether amends for sin could be made through painful
works.47 He argued that reparation is made in respect of past offence and in order
to protect from future guilt. For both of these, painful works ought to be
practised. Recompense, argued Aquinas, is a making equal by the offender to the
person against whom the offence was committed. To make recompense,
something should be subtracted from the sinner in honour of God. Aquinas
46 `Dicendum, quod satisfactio est per opera poenalia. Et huius ratio est quadruplex. Prima est,
quia ibi est honoris ablatis redditio; wide honorem istum debet homo reddere amplius, quam Si
non abstulisset; et ideo requiritur, ut non tanttun Deo famuletur per operationem bonam, verum
etiam se ipsum deiiciat per poenam assumtam. Secunda ratio est, quia ibi est prius deordinati
reordinatio; et quia deordinatum per culpam optime ordinatur in poena, ideo etc. Tertia ratio est,
quia ibi est infirmati curatio; quia infinnatus per delectationis calorem curatur per poenalitatis
algorem, et ideo etc. Quarta ratio est, quia ibi est debiti absolutio; et quia peccator est debitor
poenae, ideo debet per poenam satisfacere': ibid., 365.
7 Ttnun satisfactio possit fieri per opera poenalia': IV Sent., d.15, q.1, a.4,	 1, 659-61.
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reasoned that a good work does not subtract anything from the person
performing it, rather it perfects him. Such a subtraction can only be made by
good works if they are painful. Thus for a work to make amends for sin, it is
necessary that it is good, so that it is in respect of God, and painful, so that
something is taken away from the sinner.48
Aquinas agreed with Bonaventure that painful works would be sufficient for
reparation of the sin committed. Aquinas argued that something had to be taken
away from the sinner to make recompense. Suffering did this. Also, painful
works would stop the penitent from falling into the same sinful position again.
The physical side of suffering was thus closely linked to reparation. Pain also
seemed to have a preservative nature: undergoing such physical punishment
could mitigate against similar sins in the future.
Richard of Middleton tackled a similar question some years later. 49 He agreed
with other masters that satisfaction could be made through painful works, even if
they end up being pleasureable through the fervour of charity. Richard stated that
a painful work could be understood in two ways: with regard to the type of work,
and with regard to the person who performed it. As far as the former was
concerned, Richard maintained that the work is directed towards the punishment
48 `Dicendum...quod satisfactio, ut dictum est, respectum habet ad praeteritam offensam pro qua
recompensatio fit per satisfactionem; et etiam ad futuram culpam, a qua per earn praeservamur. Et
quantum ad utrwnque exigitur quod satisfactio per opera poenali fiat. Recompensatio enim
offensae importat adaequationem quam oportet esse ejus qui offendit ad eum in quem offensa
commissa est...Recompensatio fiat, quod aliquid subtrahatur a peccante per satisfactionem quod
in honorem Dei cedat. Opus autem bonum, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi, non subtahit aliquid ab
operante, sed magis perficit ipsum. Unde subtractio non potest fieri per opus bonum, nisi poenale
sit. Et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquod opus sit satisfactorium, oportet quod sit bonum, ut in honorem
Dei sit; et poenale, ut aliquid peccatori subtrahatue: ibid., 660-1.
49 `Utnun satisfactio debeat fieri per opera poenalia': IV Sent., d.15, a.1, q.3, 196.
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for past guilt, and the preservation from incurring more in the future. He quoted
Aristotle, who said that poenae are medicines: they are not only curative, but also
preservative. With regard to the person who performed the work, the work did
not have to be painful. Although the works performed may be punitive according
to their genus, frequently through fervent charity, they are delightful when
performed.5°
Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, he argued that painful works and the
performance of them were both appropriate for past guilt and future preservation
from sinning. However, he also added that the actual performance of such works
might lead to pleasure rather than pain. This was explained as being the result of
the charitable fervour of the performer.
However, mitigation from sin could be effected through the assumption of
physical suffering. The links between physical affliction and the spiritual
improvement of the soul were explained in terms of the system of pain which
masters had created. Reparation for sin could thus be attained through suffering
of the will in contrition and through the physical burden of painful works. The
masters had devised a framework which explained how this was possible.
50 
'Per poenali opera prorsus fieri satisfactio debet, licet satisfacienti non poenalia, sed
delectabilia per charitatis feruorem quandoque euadant. Respondeo, quod opus poenale dupliciter
potest intelligi, aut ratione generis opens, aut ratione operantis: loquendo de opere penali primo
modo dicto, satisfaciendum est pro peccato per opera poenalia, et propter emendationem culpae
preteritae, et preservationem a future culpe enim debetur pena. Poenae etiam secundum
Philosophus 2 ethicorum c.3 medicinae sunt, scilicet non tantum curatiue, sed etiam
praeseruatiue: loquendo de opere penali, secundo modo non oportet, quia frequenter opera,
quantum est ex suo genere poenalia, ratione feruentis charitatis in operante sunt ei delectabilia, et
sic procedebat': ibid.
128
ii. Suffering and conversion in the re-ordering of soul to body
This subsection brings together aspects of both the first section and the preceding
subsection. Referring back to earlier strands about the will and its relationship to
suffering, and subsequently how the will's suffering is related to suffering of the
body, it examines questions which were concerned with how physical pain could
help the soul re-order itself to the body. Sin, after all, was the main factor which
had caused disorder in the relationship between soul and body.
The disorder present in the body-soul composite was frequently explained as a
'conversion', or turning away from the divine, unchanging good to changeable,
worldly goods. The phrase `conversio ad bonum commutabile' came from
Augustine51 and was cited by theologians when they talked about the different
kinds of pain and punishment due for sin. 'Conversion' of this sort was closely
related to the way in which the human will could determine a person's salvation
or damnation and how re-ordering of the soul by such a 'conversion' might
lessen its own suffering.
The concept of the incorruptible and unchangeable was an important concern for
Augustine when he discussed the nature of the will and its relation to God. In De
libero arbitrio, Augustine described the will as an intermediate good. When this
good adheres to the immutable good, which is common to all, then man will lead
a happy life. The will commits sin by turning away from immutable and common
goods, and turning or converting to its own private good, which is something
51 De libero arbitrio, PL 32, 1240.
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either external to, or lower than, itself. It converts to its own private good when it
desires to be its own master; it converts to external goods when it concerns itself
with the affairs of others or what does not concern it; and it converts to goods
lower than itself when it loves bodily pleasures. 52 He concluded:
Evil is an aversion to the immutable good, and
a conversion to changeable goods. This
aversion and conversion result in the just
punishment of unhappiness, because they are
not compelled, but committed voluntarily.53
The conversion and aversion described by Augustine determined the nature of
human beings and explained why they should be punished in specific ways. This
was a particularly useful framework of explanation when theologians defined the
kind of suffering to which unbaptised infants would be subject in Limbo.54
Bonaventure used this means of explanation when he asked whether fasting
attains satisfaction for sin. 55
 Fasting is a work of reparation (for sin), he argued,
when it is painful and causes liberation from punishment. It is pleasing to God,
for there is a re-ordering of the body and spirit, so that the body no longer
stubbornly opposes the spirit. God is not pleased by the affliction of the flesh nor
52 `Voluntas ergo, quae medium bonum est, cum inheret incommutabili bono eique communi, non
proprio, sicuti est illa de qua multum locuti sumus et nihil digne diximus veritas, tenet homo
vitam beatam...Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad
proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae
potestatis vult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent
cognoscere studet, ad inferius cum voluptatem corporis diligit': De libero arbitrio 2, 196-200,
CSEL, 74 (1956), 86-7.
33 `Malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen
aversio atque conversio quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et iusta earn miseriae
poena subsequitur': ibid., 87. My translation.
.)4 See chapter 4 below.55 ,Utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere': IV Sent., d.15, p.2, a.2, q.2, 372-3.
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its mortification in itself, but in as far as the spirit is punished in the flesh.
Bonaventure supported this argument by quoting Augustine who wrote that pain
is not of the flesh, but of the soul in the flesh.56
There was thus a clear relationship between the affliction of the body or flesh
and its effects on the soul. The compositional relationship of body and soul made
the explanation of the benefits of pain in fasting easy to understand. Suffering
can also re-order the bonds between body and soul. Physical pain usually
destroys the body-soul relationship. In the case of fasting, however, it was
believed to re-align it and allow the sinner to move towards God. Different kinds
of pain could thus have radically different effects.
Aquinas was also interested in the positive effects of fasting. In the Summa
Theologiae, he debated whether fasting was an act of virtue." He stated that
fasting has three main aims: first, to keep the concupiscence of the flesh in check;
second, to allow the mind to rise freely and contemplate sublime things and third,
to make amends for sin. Here, Aquinas provided a quotation from Augustine
which explained how fasting purged the mind and caused the senses to lift up,
whilst the flesh was subordinated to the spirit.58
`Dicendum, quod ieiunium est opus satisfactorium...est, inquam, satisfactorium liberando a
poena, cum sit poenale; et Deo est placitum, quia corporis et spiritus est reordinativum: ut corpus
spiritui non repugnet contumaciter...dicendum, quod Deo non placit afflictio carnis sive eius
maceratio secundum se, sed in quantum in ea punitur spiritus- quia 'dolor non est carnis, sed
animae in came', ut dicit Augustinus': ibid., 373.
67 'thrum ieiunium sit actus virtutis': ST 2a2ae, q.147, a.1, 153-4.
88 `Asstunitur enim ieiunium principaliter ad tria. Primo quidem, ad concupiscentias carnis
comprimendas...Secundo, assumitur ad hoc quod mens liberius elevetur ad sublimia
contemplanda...Tertio, ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis...Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in
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Like Bonaventure, Aquinas argued that fasting would give the mind freedom to
raise itself to the contemplation of sublime things. He also stated that fasting
would lead to reparation for sin. The relationship between soul and body was
improved by the physical affliction of fasting. A beneficial nature of suffering
was clarified which amounted to a new dimension to the masters' system of ideas
for pain.
Matthew of Aquasparta debated whether maceration or affliction of the flesh was
an act of virtue, a praiseworthy or meritorious act. 59 Matthew claimed that
affliction or castigation of the flesh is virtuous and worthy of praise if it is done
for the right purpose, with the right intention and practised discretely and
rationally; man must not mortify the flesh so that it is destroyed in the process.6°
The more the flesh is subjected to the spirit and sensuality to reason, maintained
Matthew, the more the mind is subject to God. Through affliction, the flesh and
sensuality are brought under reason, and the mind is thus subjected to God.61
Moreover, said Matthew, the desires of the flesh oppose those of the spirit: those
of the flesh incline downwards and those of the spirit incline upwards. Therefore,
the more the desires of the body are diminished, the more spiritual desires are
elevated. The entire grounds for the virtue of this bodily affliction is the turning
quodam serrnone de Orat. et leiun.: "Ieiunium purgat mentem, sublevat sensum, cumin spiritui
subiicit": ibid., 153.
59 'Utrum maceratio sive afflictio carnis sit actus virtutis sive sit actus laudabilis vel meritorius':
Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima Separata, De Anima Beata, De leiunio et De Legibus
(Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, xviii; Quaracchi, 1959), q.1, 365-86.
60 'Ergo camis mortificatio et afflictio sive castigatio est actus virtutis et laudabilis, si fiat eo fine,
ea intentione qua debet, et eo modo, id est et discrete et rationabiliter, ut sic homo carnem
mortificet quod non exterminet': ibid., 372-3.61-
'Quanto autem magis subicitur caro spiritui et sensualitas rationi, tanto magis mens Deo
subicitur. Sed caro...et sensualitas...per camis macerationem et afflictionem rationi subduntur;
igitur et mens per consequens ipsi Deo': ibid., 374.
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away from the flesh and its desires, and the conversion or elevation into God
through desire.62
Matthew then further elucidated the link between the spiritual and the physical
within the `supposie. When he talked about a `supposie, Matthew meant man
composed out of soul and body. Thus, by affliction of the flesh, the man who has
committed sin is punished and through this affliction, that which has sinned is
punished. Alternatively, says Matthew, because the soul is the perfection of the
body and united to the body, according to this union, every punishment of the
body overflows into the soul, which necessarily suffers with the body. However,
Matthew gave a third explanation, which pinpointed the differences between
voluntary and involuntary suffering. He quoted Anselm, who argued that just as
one does not sin except by willing it, so one is not afflicted or punished except by
the will. Nothing is painful unless it is contrary to the will, and although the
poena of mortification is voluntary according to the rational will, it is involuntary
according to the natural and sensual will, for the body and soul always suffer
to gether.63
62 `Desideria enim camis et desideria spiritus contraria sunt: desideria carnis inclinant deorsum,
desideria spiritus elevant sursum. Igitur quanto magis diminuuntur et remittuntur desideria camis,
tanto magis sublimantur desideria spiritus...Sed tota ratio virtutis est averti a came et desideriis
carnalibus et converti sive fern sursum in Deum per desiderium': ibid., 375.
63 `Dicendum quod, quia unum suppositum est homo compositus ex anima et corpore, ideo,
afflicta came, affligitur homo qui peccatum commisit, ac per hoc punitur ille qui peccavit. Vel
dicendum quod, quia anima est perfectio corporis et corpori colligata, propter colligantiam
animae et corporis omnis poena corporis redundat in animam, quae necessario corpori compatitur.
Vel tertio dicendum quod, ut dicit Anselmus, 3 capitulo De conceptu virginali, sicut in omnibus
non peccat nisi voluntas, ita nec affligitur vel punitur nisi voluntas...nec est aliquid poenale, nisi
quia contra voluntatem; et quamvis poena mortificationis sit voluntaria voluntate rationis, est
tamen involuntaria voluntate naturae et sensualitatis: compatitur enim semper anima corpori':
ibid., 379.
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Matthew answered in greater detail than the previous two masters and, indeed,
devoted a series of disputed questions to fasting and the mortification of the
flesh. His key argument was that affliction of the flesh is meritorious if it is done
for the right reason and with prudfmce. Like previous masters, Matthew
accentuated the way in which affliction of the flesh would cause flesh and spirit
to be re-ordered and sensuality to be brought under the control of reason. In this
way, the soul could come closer to God. Affliction of the flesh will allow the soul
to do this. Matthew also dealt with areas which have emerged as key themes in
this chapter: the soul and body is one, a composite. Both soul and body have their
part to play in sinning, and so they will both suffer in the reparation for that sin.
The mechanism of 'overflow' (redundantia) which allows suffering of the will to
be experienced in the senses also works the other way around. Suffering from
physical affliction is experienced in the will. However, Matthew then made a
further distinction between voluntary and involuntary suffering. Nothing, argued
Matthew, is painful unless it is contrary to the will. Pain of mortification of the
flesh is not contrary to rational will, because this wills the suffering, but it is
contrary to the natural and sensual will.
Physical suffering could have beneficial effects, especially where the union of the
human body and soul was concerned. Under certain circumstances, pain would
be destructive to this union. When pain was deleterious, the union between soul
and body could even be destroyed. However, fasting and the practice of painful
works for the reparation of sins committed against God were physical pains
which could have a restorative power on the human composite. Instead of
causing destruction and disorder, they led to improvement and order. The soul
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was encouraged through such practices to return to God. This, after all, was its
natural desire.
Conclusion
The masters were presented with an essentially paradoxical position. Their
system of ideas and language for pain and suffering in this life hinged on the
destructive nature and deleterious effects of pain on both the soul and the body.
Any voluntary acceptance of suffering would go against this system according to
which pain occured against the human will. To understand the nature of
voluntary suffering, which was so important when they came to debate
penitential practices, masters had to expand the framework which they had
developed to understand pain and create a new dimension to it. Only by
developing their ideas about pain in new and different ways in terms of new
theories about the relationship of suffering to the will and to the bonds between
body and soul could pain be described as a restorative power.
Masters asked questions directly relating to the concept of contrition in penance.
This was a form of voluntary pain. They also asked questions about the intensity
and amount of contrition needed in order to expel sin. In this way, masters were
able to explain the nature and amount of suffering required to complete practices
of contrition. In terms of the nature of voluntary suffering, masters tackled
various questions about whether certain painful works were enough to repair sins
which had been committed. They also determined the nature of fasting and other
types of mortification of the flesh with reference to the role which suffering
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played. In each of these areas masters addressed and developed their ideas about
pain and suffering to develop the concept of voluntary suffering as a beneficial
power.
Understanding the nature of the will was central to explaining what voluntary
suffering was. In previous chapters the concept of repugnance to the will was a
crucial point defining what pain was and how it functioned in the human
composite. The idea of willing pain and suffering necessitated a further branch of
explanation within their complex framework. In questions on contrition, masters
clarified the apparently paradoxical relationship between the will and pain by
attributing a special kind of pain to the will. The object of this pain in the will
was to expel sin. It differed from other sorts of pain. However, it could still have
effects on the body. Masters could still understand voluntary suffering therefore
within existing models of explanation for pain.
Theories about the relationship between body and soul meant that spiritual
suffering would also cause suffering in the senses. However, the difference where
voluntary suffering was concerned was that the physical pain would also cause a
re-ordering of soul and body. Masters argued that the sinful soul-body composite
was disciplined and harmonised as a result of this kind of physical suffering. So
where some kinds of suffering could lead to a collapse in the relationship
between soul and body, voluntary suffering strengthened it.
Masters formulated a new branch to their language for understanding voluntary
pain. Voluntary pain was a different kind of suffering compared to others. It was
136
closely related to pleasure, as the beneficial effects of its presence were
experienced. It was also attributed a complex co-existence with the will. Masters
used the language which they developed to understand what pain was to
differentiate voluntary pain from involuntary. However, they also placed
voluntary suffering within their typological structure for pain in general.
Voluntary pain, like other pains, whether physical or spiritual, could cause other
sorts of suffering in the body composite. So, although the object of their
existence differed, the mechanisms and way in which they were experienced
were similar.
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4The Intellectual Development of Limbo: Pain, Children
and Original Sin
Some types of pain and suffering were related to the presence of sin and guilt, as
the previous chapter highlighted. Much of this hinged on the presence of the
human will and the suffering which the will deserved for its misguided actions.
But how were the masters to understand the suffering of those who lacked free
will? Masters turned their attention to the fate of children who had died only with
the stain of original sin. This caused problems for them on two levels. First,
original sin did not involve the use of the 'individual's free Will and it was not
clear which punishments were deserved by those who only possessed this sin.
Second, the masters were faced with an authority in Augustine, who advocated
the damnation of unbaptised children. The masters used their ideas about pain
and suffering to explain Augustine's position and defend their own. The link
between individual sin and the experience of pain in the afterlife necessitated a
development in the topography of the otherworld. This development culminated
with the construction of limbo in both its physical and experiential aspects.
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1. The fate of infants: historical and theological background
i. Augustine, Pelagianism and Origenism
The thirteenth century inherited centuries of debates which focused on what
happened to children when they died. The fate of infants who died unbaptised
was a particularly hotly debated issue in the final years of the fourth century and
the beginning of the fifth century. Whether these infants were to be punished in
hell or saved became the focus of a series of debates about how sin was
transferred from Adam and Eve, the nature of free will, and the origins of the
human soul. One recent study has suggested that the source of disputes over the
fate of the unbaptised and the reasons for infant baptism has much to do with a
reaction to the theories of Origenism. One main tenet of Origenism was that the
soul was said to have 'lived' before it was born, and creation was based upon
merits accrued by the soul before birth. Thus, one main cause for dispute over the
nature of sin and punishment after death might be the failure of theologians to
produce a consistent doctrine regarding the creation of the human soul.'
During the same period, Augustine discussed children and their fate when they
died. He believed in the inherently sinful and evil nature of children, who were
born into a world inherited from Adam and Eve. He emphasised in particular the
drives of children which included importunity, jealousy, anger and
I E.A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian
Debate (Princeton, 1992), esp. 194-244. Clark argues that Augustine's controversy with the
Pelagians was an arena in which the determinist theories of the creation of the human soul, as held
by Origen, were debated in new and different ways.
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aggressiveness.2 In the first book of his Confessions, Augustine aired the
negative perception of children which was held at this time:
Who can recall to me the sins I committed as a
baby? For in your sight [God] no man is free
from sin, not even a child who has lived only
one day on earth.. .It can hardly be right for a
child, even at that age, to cry for everything,
including things which would harm him; to
work himself into a tantrum against people
older than himself and.. .to try his best to strike
and hurt others who know better than he does,
including his own parents, when they do not
give in to him.. .This shows that, if babies are
innocent, it is not for lack of will to do harm,
but for lack of strength.3
Sin was thought to be present in the limbs of infants and it was the suffering
caused by this sin which made the child scream when being baptised. 4 This sin
required immediate destruction. Baptism, then, was fundamental for Augustine in
exorcising the stain of original sin from the child. It also meant a great deal more
than this. The human soul was believed to be created in the image of God, and
was therefore always trying to return to its Creator. 5 Baptism was equated with
the idea of self-sacrifice, of offering oneself to God and identifying oneself with
Christ. It was also a rite of passage by which the individual became a member of
a community, with Christ as its head. In the City of God, Augustine wrote:
It immediately follows [from baptism] that the
whole redeemed community, that is to say, the
congregation and fellowship of the saints, is
offered to God as a universal sacrifice, through
the great Priest who offered himself in his
suffering for us- so that we might be the body
of so great a head.. .This is the sacrifice of
2 S. Shahar, Childhood in the Middle Ages (London and New York, 1992), 14.
3 Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, 1961), bk.I, c.7, 27-28.
4 Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum, CSEL 42, 1.26-7.
5 P.Cramer, Baptism and Change in the early Middle Ages c.200-c.1150 (Cambridge, 1993), 88.
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Christians who are many making up one body
in Christ.6
Augustine's intellectual inquiry over the problem of infant baptism concerned the
apparent paradox of the universal Church practice of baptism and the inability of
the infant to make a personal conversion to Christianity. However, although
unbaptised infants were innocent, they could not individually voice their
commitment to Christianity and they were still involved in the sin of the first
man. In this way, the fate of damnation was consistent with this stain of sin if
they died before reaching the font. 7 In comparison, fifth-century sermons on the
Feast of the Holy Innocents contain many allusions to the theory that these
children were saved due to their innate ignorance of what was happening to them.
They were sanctified by grace, not by merit, for they had had no opportunity to
use their free will. This was a further reaction to the Origenist position that souls
committed sins in heaven before they were bom.8
Augustine's view was influenced to a great extent by the Pelagian movement.
Pelagianism has received the name of its supposed originator, Pelagius, who was
a renowned ascetic in Rome from about 390, though there is some evidence to
suggest that 'Pelagian' doctrines were in circulation some decades before this.9
6 Augustine, The City of God, trans. H. Bettenson (Harmondsworth, 1972 repr., 1984), bk.10, c.6,
379-80.
7 E.R. Fairweather, 'Saint Augustine's Interpretation of Infant Baptism', Augustinus Magister
Congres International Augustinien, Paris 21-24 septembre 1954, 3 vols. (Paris, 1954), ii, 897-9.
8 P.A. Hayward, 'Suffering and Innocence in Latin Sermons for the Feast of the Holy Innocents,
c.400-800', The Church and Childhood: Papers Read at the 1993 Summer Meeting and the 1994
Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. D. Wood (Studies in Church History,
31; Oxford, 1994), 67-80.
9 In particular the works of Ambrosiaster, Paulinus of Nola and Rufinus the Syrian are important
here: Clark, Origenist Controversy, 198-207. For details on the main Pelagian authors and
doctrines see A. Soulignac, 'Pelage et Pèlagianisme', D de S, xii:2, 2889-2942. For the social and
political circumstances surrounding the rise of Pelagianism, see P. Brown, `Pelagius and His
Supporters: Aims and Environment', Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 19 (1968), 93-114; P.
Brown, 'The Patrons of Pelagius: The Roman Aristocracy between East and West', Journal of
Theological Studies n.s. 21 (1970), 56-72.
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Pelagius denied the idea that there was a tradux peccati from the first parents,
Adam and Eve. Furthermore, if Adam's sin were to affect everyone, Pelagius
argued, then Christ's righteousness would also save non-believers. So we ought
not to believe in an unjust sin, imputed for the actions of someone else, when
God came to save our own sins. 10 Nevertheless, he did not actually condemn
infant baptism in itself, for it contained many positive attributes including
spiritual illumination and the citizenship of Jerusalem. However, it was not to be
performed for the reason of remitting sin, as he believed there was no sin to be
remitted." It was Pelagius's disciples, Caelestius and Julian of Eclanum, who
developed the idea of Pelagianism proper. Using the phrase of John 14 verse 2:
'In domo Patris mei, mansiones multae sune, they put forward the view that
there existed an intermediary place in which unbaptised children who had died
remained happy and shared more or less in the goods of the elect. 12 This position
was strongly condemned by the Synod of Carthage between 411-412, and it was
also strongly opposed by Augustine.
Augustine believed that the fate of unbaptised children after death was
damnation, which involved not only privation of the vision of God, but also
punishment through hell-fire. The most often quoted work in which his ideas
were transmitted was the De Fide ad Petrum, actually written by Fulgentius of
i ° Clark, Origenist Controversy, 210.
II N.P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin: A Historical and Critical Study
(London, New York and Toronto, 1929), 317-346.
12 Augustine gives evidence of the Pelagian position in De Anima et Eius Origine, Bk.1, c.9: 'Non
baptizatis parvulis nemo promittat inter damnationem regnumque coelorum, quietis vel felicitatis
cujuslibet atque ubilibet quasi medium locum. Hoc enim eis etiam haeresis Pelagiana prornisit:
quia nec damnationem metuit parvulis, quos nullum putat habere originale peccatum; nec sperat
eis regnurn coelorwn, si non perveniunt ad Baptismatis sacramentum': PL 44, 481. See also J.
Bellamy, 13apteme', DTC, ii.1 (Paris, 1932), 364.
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Ruspe, but attributed in the Middle Ages to Augustine. I3 Unbaptised children
were, according to this work, subject to eternal suffering. In Augustine's
Enchiridion, however, he added a corollary: the poena of the children was
deemed to be the mildest (mitissima). What this mildest punishment entailed was
left unexplained and it stimulated much of the debate and speculation in the
Middle Ages. I4 However, in his assertion that the children should be damned,
Augustine was in line with many of the Christian Fathers.I5
The masters of the thirteenth century thus inherited a highly contentious series of
debates about the fate of unbaptised children. One of their main authorities,
Augustine, believed that children would be damned, but in some ambiguously
lesser way than others in hell. To deny punishment for original sin, on the other
hand, would attract the charge of heresy. The masters thus required a closer
definition of original sin and its relation to the individual and that individual's
punishments.
13 B. Leeming, 'Is their baptism really necessary?', The Clergy Review, 39 no.4 (1954), 193-212,
at 203. Augustine also discussed the fate of infants who have not been baptised in De peccatorum
merit is et remissione, c.16,20: 'Infantes non baptizati lenissime quidem, sed tamen damnatur.
Pena peccati Adae gratia corporis amissa. Potest proinde recte dici, parvulos sine Baptismo de
corpore exeuntes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros': PL 44, 120.
14 `Mitissima sane omnium poena erit eorum qui, praeter peccatum quod originale traxenurt,
nullum insuper addidenmt; et in ceteris qui addiderunt, tanto quisque ibi tolerabiliorem habebit
darnnationem quanto hic minorem habuit iniquitatem.': Augustine, Enchiridion 23,93, CCSL xlvi
(Turnhout, 1969), 99.
15 See St. Basil, Homilia in sanctum baptisma, xiii, PG 31,427; Gregory of Nyssa, De baptismo,
PG 46,424B and Gregory of Nazianus, In sanctum baptisma, xl, PG 36,390.
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ii. Original Sin: thirteenth-century attitudes
The nature of original sin and its implications for children who had died before
they had had the opportunity to be baptised continued to be debated in the
thirteenth century. The important relationship of free will and sin acted as the
focus for many questions. Aquinas, for example, discussed the added implication
of the links between free will and individuality. This, in itself, was an important
prerequisite to discussions about the fate of the unbaptised, for suffering was
related to the sins of the individual. Understanding the nature of individuality
was thus crucial to determining whether the unbaptised would be damned or
saved after death.
The Summa Contra Gentiles, begun probably in the third year of Aquinas's first
Parisian regency, that is, sometime in 1258-59, was a work for missionaries to
aid their combat against the errors of the infide1. 16 Chapter 52 of the fourth book
of this work considered the communal nature of man in relation to original sin.
Sin can pertain to a human in two ways, argued Aquinas: first as an individual;
and, second, man's participation in the species makes many men seem like one
Man. 17
 Actual sin leads to the taking away of some personal goods, that is: grace
and the ordering of the parts of the soul. However, the sin of the first man did not
only cause these things to be taken away from him personally, but also led to the
16 For a fuller description of the Summa Contra Gentiles and its contents, see J.A. Weisheipl,
Friar Thomas Aquino: His Life Thought and Works (Washington D.C., 1983), 129-34.17 
'Non enim est inconveniens quod, uno peccante, peccatum in omnes dicimus per originem esse
propagatum, quamvis unusquisque ex proprio actu laudetur vel vituperetur...Aliter enim est in his
quae sunt unius individui, et aliter in his quae sunt totius naturae speciei': SCG, iv, c.52, 164.
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privation of a good pertaining to a common nature. 18 This idea of privation will
be discussed at length later on.
Original sin was also discussed by Aquinas in the Quaestiones Disputatae de
Malo. Although the precise date of the disputed questions is uncertain, they were
probably disputed in Rome in 1266-67, or in Paris in 1269-70. The work contains
sixteen questions about the causes and varied nature of evil, and a detailed
account of the seven deadly sins. 19 The fourth question is specifically concerned
with original sin. Aquinas stated that due to the transferral of sin from the first
parents a single man can be understood in two ways: in one sense as an
individual and singular person, and in another sense as part of a "college". 2° By
this he meant that the human being can be understood as part of a large
community of sinners stemming from the transgression of Adam in the Garden of
Eden. Both states of man involve a state of voluntariness in their own way. The
individual man is made by the acts he himself performs according to his own free
will. This is what distinguishes him as an individual. The man as part of a college
can have an act pertain to him, even though he did not perform it of his own free
will. Rather, the act is performed by the whole college, by many members of the
college, or by the principal of that college. Aquinas gave an example from
Aristotle: it is like saying that when the ruler of a city performs a certain act, that
18 Peccata igitur actualia, quae communiter ab hominibus aguntur, adimunt aliquod bonum
personae peccantis, puta gratiam et ordinem debitum partium animae: unde personalia sunt, nec,
uno peccante, alteri imputatur. Prirnum autem peccattun primi hominis non solum peccantem
destituit proprio et personali bono, scilicet gratia et debito ordine animae, sed etiam bono ad
naturam communem pertinente' : ibid.
19 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, 212.
20 'Et ideo simpliciter dicendum est quod peccatum traducitur per originem a primo parente in
posteros. Ad cuius euidentiam est quod aliquis homo singularis dupliciter potest considerari: uno
modo secundum quod est quedam persona singularis, alio modo secundum quod est pars alicuius
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the city itself has performed it. 21 Further on in the same question, Aquinas
suggested that no individual could have any culpa (guilt) from the sin transferred
through the generations from Adam because this would require use of the will.
However, if mankind is understood as one single man, then there is guilt on
account of the actual sin of the first parents, Adam and Eve. 22 Aquinas provided
a useful analogy here: when murder is committed by the movement of a hand, the
hand is not in itself considered culpable, for it is necessarily moved by something
else. However, it is part of the whole man who acts by will, and as part of the
whole, it bears some responsibility. 23 The relationship of suffering to the
presence of culpa is a common theme in these questions, and one which we shall
have cause to examine later on in this chapter. The belief that there was a
common sin, original sin, for all which detracted from the individuality of the
sinners was an issue which gained universal assent. So, Aquinas was typical of
thirteenth-century attitudes to original sin in this respect.
Original sin formed a community of which all human beings were members to
begin with. Children dying with the stain of original sin were thus part of this
collegii': Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Opera Omnia, Issu Leonis XIII, P.M. Edita (Paris,
1982), xxiii, q.4, a.1, 105.
21 'Et utroque modo ad eum potest aliquis actus pertinere: pertinet enim ad eum in quantum est
singularis persona ille actus quem proprio arbitrio et per se ipsum facit, set in quantum est pars
collegii, potest ad eum pertinere aliquis actus quem per se ipsum non facit nec proprio arbitrio, set
qui fit a toto collegio vel a pluribus de collegio vel a prinicipe collegii, sicut id quod princeps
civitatis facit dicitur civitas facere, ut Philosophus dicit.' The reference is to Aristotle, Ethics, ix,
c.9.
22 'Si ergo consideretur iste defectus hoc modo per originem in istwn hominem derivatus
secundum id quod iste homo est quedam persona singularis, sic huiusmodi defectus non potest
habere rationem culpe, ad cuius rationem requiritur quod sit voluntaria. Set si consideretur iste
homo generatus ut quoddam membrum totius humane nature a primo parente propagate ac si
omnes homines essent unus homo, sic habet rationem culpe, propter voluntaritun eius principium
quod est actuale peccatum prirni parentis.': ibid., 106.
23 `Sicut si dicamus quod motus manus ad homicidium perpertrandum, secundum quod manus per
se consideratur, non habet rationem culpe, quia manus de necessitate mouetur ab alio; si autem
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'community of sin'. Moreover, because they possessed no actual sin, they could
only strictly be understood in this communal sense and were denied individuality.
This was an important development in assessing the fate of the unbaptised. They
had not sinned as individuals and thus could not be placed in hell or purgatory.
The unbaptised required a separate location in the topography of the afterlife.
2. The Intellectual Development of Limbo
Theologians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, for the most part, refused to
countenance a separate place in the afterlife for children who had died
unbaptised. Anselm denied the existence of any middle place for the punishment
of the unbaptised. He considered that their damnation was according to the
justice of God. 24 Hugh of St. Victor also claimed that children could not be saved
because they possessed no belief. 25 Towards the close of the twelfth and
beginning of the thirteenth centuries, the position of unbaptised children after
death was compared to that of the pagan fathers. This group of worthy pagan
unbaptised had the special dispensation of occupying a place on the edge of hell.
Unbaptised children were not distinguished from these pagans at this time. Their
common association was the fact that they had not been baptised as Christians.26
consideretur ut est pars totius hominis qui voluntate agit, sic habet rationem culpe, quia sic est
voluntarius.': ibid.
24 R. Weberberger, `Limbus Puerorum: Zur Entstehung eines theologischen Begriffes', RTAM, 35
(1968), 85.
25 Summa sententiarum, PL 176, 132. See Weberberger, `Limbus Puerorum', 97.
26 See J. Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. A. Goldhanuner (London, 1984), 220-1; C.
Daniell, Death and Burial in Medieval England (London, 1997), 10.
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Children who had died unbaptised all possessed the stain of original sin, as was
outlined in the previous section. This led to the development of their own
separate place in the afterlife from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. First, the
development of the idea of a physical place separate from heaven and hell was
mooted. In the fourth book of his Commentary on the Sentences, Albert the Great
asked what was to be understood by the term the bosom of Abraham. 27 Albert
stated that the bosom of Abraham could be understood in two ways: specifically
(proprie) and generally (communiter). Generally, it is the resting place of the
fathers who will be beatified, that is, worthy pagan fathers who will achieve the
eternal life in heaven at the time of Judgement. Specifically, sinus signifies that
place on the edge or rim of hell between hell itself and the abode of the elect. It is
also called limbus, because limbo is the edge of a piece of clothing.28 It is in the
upper edge of hell and at a distance from the hell of the damned. 29 Albert was
probably the first master to use the term limbus as such and to associate it with
unbaptised children.
In his Sentence Commentary, Aquinas distinguished between limbo and hell,
arguing that they were separate places. Limbo was equated with the abode of the
pagan fathers. 3° In the Supplement of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas asked
22 'Quid dicatur sinus Abrahae: et an paruuli decedentes sint in aliqua miseria': IV Sent., d.1, a.20,
21.
29 `Dicendum quod sinus dicitur proprie et communiter. Communiter est requies beatorum
patrwn...Proprie autem dicitur locus in ora infemi sequstratus ad habitationem electorum...Unde
etiam limbus vocatur. Limbus ora est vestimenti, sicut locus ille in ora fuit infemi': ibid.
29 `Dicendum quod iste locus est in ora infemi superior, et longe ab inferno damnatorum% ibid.
3° `Utrwn limbus infemi sit idem quod sinus Abrae': Divi Thome Aquinatis Super Quarto
Sententiarum, 4 vols. (1520), iv, fos.581"-582.
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whether the limbo of the fathers was the same as he11. 31 He differentiated
between the two in terms of both their pains and their location. In hell, argued
Aquinas, there is pain of the senses. Such pain is not present in the father's
limbo. This is because the pain in hell is eternal whereas the fathers are only
detained for a time. As far as the location of each part is concerned, Aquinas
stated that they were in all probability in the same place, but the fathers were
somewhat higher. Moreover, because souls in hell were divided according to
different levels of guilt, the fathers, whose level of guilt was lowest of all,
occupied the highest and least dark place of all those punished. 32
In the following question, Aquinas debated whether the limbo of the children was
the same as the limbo of the fathers. 33 He argued:
The limbo of the fathers and the limbo of
children, without any doubt, differ as to the
quality of punishment or reward. For children
have no hope of the blessed life, as the fathers
in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth
the light of faith and grace. But as regards their
situation, there is reason to believe that the
place of both is the same; except that the limbo
of the fathers is placed higher than the limbo of
children, just as we have stated in reference to
limbo and he11.34
31 'Utrum limbus sit idem quod infemus danmatorue: ST 3a, Supplement, q.69, a.5. Although
the Supplement was a posthumous compilation, many of the questions, including this one, are
identical copies of questions from Aquinas' commentary on the Sentences.
32 `Si ergo consideretur limbus patrum et infemus secundum locorum qualitatem praedictam, sic
non est dubium quod distinguuntur. Turn quia in inferno est poena sensibilis, quae non erat in
limbo Patrum. Turn etiam quia in inferno est poena aetema, sed in limbo Patrurn detinebantur
sancti temporaliter tantum. Sed si considerentur quantum ad situm loci, sic probabile est quod
idem locus, vel quasi continuus, sit infemus et limbus, ita tamen quod quaedam superior pars
infemi limbus Patrwn dicatur. Existentes enim in inferno secundum diversitatem culpae diversam
sortiuntur et poenam...Unde et sancti Patres, in quibus minimum erat de ratione culpae, supremurn
et minus tenebrosum locum habuerunt omnibus puniendis': ibid.
33 'Utrum limbus puerorum sit idem quod limbus patrwn': ST3a, Suppl. q.69, a.6.
34 `Dicendum quod limbus Patrum et limbus puerorum absque dubio differ= secundum
qualitatem praemii vel poenae; pueris enim non adest spes beatae vitae, quae Patribus in limbo
149
The limbus puerorum was then, according to Aquinas, to be placed physically
below the limbus patrum, but above hell. Unlike the pagan fathers, the children
in limbo would remain there for eternity. This was a crucial distinction between
the two places, for it determined the nature of their punishments. Their
experience there, however, was to differ significantly from the damned in hell.
The genesis of the idea of the limbus puerorum was based theologically on the
punishment due for original sin.
But it is clear that, for the masters, an association based around sin was only one
part of the separation from other souls in the afterlife. The real development of
children's limbo hinged on defining the experiences of suffering which awaited
them there. However, masters were confronted with the existence of one of their
main authorities who had argued categorically for the damnation of the
unbaptised: Augustine.
i. Debates about physical suffering
Masters had developed a rational basis for claiming that =baptised children
deserved to be placed in a separate abode in the afterlife. But they also required
the support of authorities. However, their key authority surrounding this topic
was in conflict with the masters' own views on the fate of children who died
unbaptised. It is necessary therefore to examine questions which were concerned
aderat, in quibus etiam lumen fidei et gratiae refulgebat. Sed quantum ad situm probabiliter
creditur utrorumque locus idem fuisse, nisi quod requies beatorum adhuc erat in superiori loco
quam limbus puerorum, sicut de limbo et inferno dictum est': ibid. Translation by the Fathers of
the English Dominican Province (London, 1921), 15.
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with whether infants in limbo would suffer particular types of pain there. Such an
examination will demonstrate how they re-interpreted Augustine, making him a
viable authority for their creation of limbo as a concept and a place. Furthermore,
how masters applied and developed their ideas about pain and suffering to the
case of limbo will show the importance of a defined set of terms for talking about
pain to new developments in theological systems.
The legacy Augustine bequeathed to the eleventh and twelfth centuries was one
of harshness in attitude towards the unbaptised. Gratian quoted the De Fide ad
Petrum in his Decretum,35 and clerics such as Guibert of Nogent (d.c.1125)
voiced contemporary attitudes. In Monodiae, Guibert recounted a vision his
mother had, in which she saw Guibert's dead father:
She then asked him where he was staying. He
indicated that the place was located not far
away, and that he was detained there. She also
asked how he was. Baring his arm and his side,
he showed both of them so torn, so cut up with
many wounds that she felt great horror and
emotional distress as she looked. The figure of
a little child was also there, crying so bitterly
that it troubled her greatly when she saw
it.. .Now, the crying of the child and the
wounds on his arm have meaning. When my
father in his youth was separated from lawful
intercourse with my mother. ..some evil
counsellors appealed to his youthful spirit with
the vile advice to find out if he could have
intercourse with other women. In youthful
fashion he took their advice, and, having
wickedly attempted intercourse with some
35 Tirmissime tene, non solum homines ratione utentes, verum etiam parvulos qui sive in uteris
matrum vivere incipiunt, et ibi moriuntur: sive jam de matribus nati, sine sacramento baptismi
quod datur in nomine patris et flii et spiritus sancti, de hoc seculo transeunt, sempiterno igne
puniendos: quia et si peccatwn propriae actionis nullum habet originalis tamen peccati
damnatione carnali conceptione ex nativitate traxerunt': Gratian, Decretum, ed. E. Friedberg,
Corpus luris Canonici (Leipzig, 1879-81), i, 1362.
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loose woman unknown to me, he begat a child
which at once died before baptism. The
rending of his side is the breaking of his
marriage vow; the cries of that distressed voice
indicate the damnation of that evilly begotten
child."
Although Guibert still believed in the damnation of tmbaptised children, attitudes
were beginning to change. In his Expositio in Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos,
Abelard interpeted Augustine's notion of the `poena mitissima' as the `carentia
visionis dei', that is the lack or privation of the vision of God. 37 However, such a
punishment also included the presence of internal, ever-lasting suffering. The
theological language and framework for understanding pain and suffering was to
prove crucial not only to the construction of limbo as a place, but also to the re-
interpretation of Augustine, who believed in the eternal damnation of children, as
a viable authority for masters when they discussed limbo.
The thirteenth century, in contrast to the twelfth, portrayed children in a much
more positive light. The innocence, weakness and ignorance of children was
emphasised and the aspect of sinfulness was played down. The reception of
Aristotle in Europe in the thirteenth century may have had something to do with
this as his view of children is much more positive. 38
 However, the thirteenth
36 Guibert of Nogent, Self and Society in Medieval France. The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of
Nogent, trans. J.F. Benton, (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1984 repr. 1991), bk.I, c.18, 94.
37 Peter Abelard, Expositio in Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos, 1.ii. See R. Weberberger, `Limbus
Puerorum', 106.
36 S. Shahar, Childhood in the Middle Ages (London and New York, 1992), 15. In the
Nichomachean Ethics, book 3, chapter 2 Aristotle talked about the difference between appetite
(concupiscentia) and anger, and between the will and choice. Children, like animals, have
voluntary action, but not choice. There seems to be a tone of forgiveness in this: 'Choice, then,
seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For
both children and other animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the
spur of the moment we describe as voluntary but not as chosen. Those who say it is appetite or
anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational
creatures as well, but appetite and anger are.': The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J.Barnes, 2
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century still had to grapple with the debates which had raged in Rome some eight
centuries before. Masters constructed a separate place for the unbaptised after
death. Physically, they were to be separate from the damned in hell and the elect
in heaven. The creation of limbo, however, was reliant upon the definition of
suffering.
However, opinion among theologians in the thirteenth century was divided as to
what the Augustinian notion of mitissima poena entailed. For example, in 1246
Albert the Great examined a series of questions on the fate of unbaptised
infans . : 9 In one of the articles, Albert asked whether these children will be
punished by a pain of the senses.° He argued that original sin does not deserve
the punishment of the senses, but the mildest punishment of all, which is the loss
of the vision of God. Original sin is the smallest sin, smaller even than venial sin,
because it is less voluntary. In comparison to other sorts of sin in which the will
plays an intrinsic or universal part as regards its first movement, original sin is
voluntary from its relation to the fountain of nature, that is, it is not an individual
expression of the will.41 It seems therefore, that the pain of the senses was related
to the individual rather than the communal nature of humanity's lapse into sin.
vols. (Princeton, 1984), ii, 1755. In his book on Rhetoric, Aristotle argues for the importance of
children to the community in general: 'Possession of good children and of many children is clear
enough. Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good
quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic prowess;
and also in regard to excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage.
Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good
qualities we have described': ibid., bk. I, ch.5, 2163.
39 Quaestiones, Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Wilhelmo KObel praeside, ed. W. Kilbel and H.
Anzulewicz, xxv, ii (Aschendorff, 1993), 139-45. Parallel discussions by Albert are to be found in
De Resurrectione, Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Bernardo Geyer praeside, ed. A.Ohlineyer,.
I.Backes, W. Kilbel, )ocvi (Aschendorff, 1958), tract.iii, q.7, aa.1-3, 318-9.
4° `Utriun pueri puniantur poena sensibili': Quaestiones, a.3, 142-3.
41 `Dicendum, quod peccato originali non debetur poena sensibilis, sed mitissima poena, sicut
dicit Augustinus, quae est carentia divinae visionis, sed non poena materialis ignis vel vermis
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Albert was suggesting by his arguments that physical suffering in the afterlife
was related to the individual. The children in limbo could not really be
understood as individuals because they had died whilst only possessing original
sin. In this sense they would not experience physical pain. Such claims
reinforced the notion that the unbaptised should be communally separate from
others in the afterlife. Individuality depended upon movement of the will. The
unbaptised children had not used their will and so were denied individual status.
In the early 1250s Bonaventure tackled the issue of whether the unbaptised
infants would be punished by material fire. 42 He concluded that the children
would not experience the pain of fire, but would lack the vision of God and be
put in a 'low place'.43 However, opinion about this is divided, stated
Bonaventure. Those who follow divine justice most rigorously hold that children
do in fact burn in material fire, but to a lesser extent than those who have
committed actual sin. This is how the mitissima poena of Augustine is
interpreted by such people. It is not mitissima absolutely, but in relation to the
suffering of others." The second position is less harsh. Children who have died
with original sin lack the justice and grace of the holy spirit. They are put in the
vile place due to the filth of their flesh, but they have not had the pleasure of sin
conscientiae. Est enim minimum peccattun; minus enim veniali, quia habet minus de voluntario.
In aliis enim est propria voluntas vel universalis quoad primus motus...Sed originale non propria
voluntate vel universali vel particulari est voluntarium, sed voluntate fontis naturae': ibid., 142.
42 , tit= parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur poena ignis materialis': II Sent., d.33, a.3,
c1.1, 793-795.
43 'Parvuli decedentes in peccato originali non sentiunt poenae ignis acerbitatem, privantur tamen
Dei visione et ponuntur in loco viii': ibid., 793.
" 'Quidam enim, attendentes rigorem divinae iustitiae ac sententiae...dicunt quod parvuli
cremabuntur igne materiali, longe tamen minus quam illi qui peccaverunt peccato
actuali...Mitissimam enim illam vocat poenam non absolute, sed respectu aliortun': ibid.
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in spirit or in the flesh. They cannot, therefore, experience the punishment of
material fire. 45
 This explanation is accepted, says Bonaventure, by the masters in
genera1.46
Bonaventure was in agreement with Albert that unbaptised children would
experience the loss of the vision of God. However, he showed where the point of
debate among masters lay: some interpreted the mitissima poena of the
unbaptised as a less intense suffering in hell-fire, than the damned would
experience. Bonaventure also added the idea of a disgusting physical place for
the unbaptised, for their flesh was still regarded as unclean.
The bodies of the unbaptised were to experience some physical detriment. An
unbaptised body was regarded as unclean and deserved to be placed in an
location that was low both physically and in terms of dignity. However, this fact
alone did not merit the same punishment of fire as the damned would experience
in hell. The state of existence of the unbaptised, therefore, has less of a
connection with the filth of their flesh than with the lack of free will, according
to Bonaventure.
In a series of questions in his De Malo, Aquinas went into some detail about the
kind of punishments due to unbaptised children.47 Aquinas asked whether
45 `Quia vero in came fuit foeditas, ideo ponuntur in loco viii, utpote infemali; sed quia non
habuenmt in se actualem delectationem peccati, nec in spiritu nec in came, ideo non sentiunt
poenae ignis acerbitatem': ibid., 794.
46 `Flunc modum dicendi magis approbant magistri communiter': ibid.
47 Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, q.5, aa.1-3, 129-136.
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original sin is due poena sensus." He stated the common perception of this
issue: children dying only with original sin are not due poena sensus, but rather
poena damni: privation of the vision of God, (the carentia visionis del). This is
defensible for three reasons. First, actual sin is fault (vitium) of the person,
whereas original sin is the fault of nature. Grace and the divine vision are above
human nature and thus the privation of both of these is not due only to someone
who has committed actual sin, but also to someone who has original sin.49
The second reason is that poena is proportionate to culpa (guilt, or fault).
Aquinas explained the differences between mortal and original sin with reference
to the theory of the 'conversion to changeable goods'. 5° Mortal sin involved a
deliberate rejection of the divine, which is unchanging, and a conversion to
worldly goods, which are changeable. In terms of the pain received for this sin,
privation of the vision of God corresponded to the rejection of the divine, whilst
the poena sensus corresponded to the 'conversion'. In original sin there is no
conversion because the children have been unable to use their free will. There is
48 `Utrum peccato originali debeatur pena sensus', q.5, a.2, 133-5.
49 `Dicendum, quod sicut communiter dicitur, peccato originali non debetur pena sensus set
solum pena dampni, scilicet carentia visionis diuine. Et hoc uidetur rationabile propter tria: primo
quidem quia persona quelibet est alicuius nature suppositum; et ideo ad ea que sunt nature per se
immediate ordinatur, ad ea uero que sunt supra naturam ordinatur mediante natura. Quod igitur
detrimenttun aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in his que sunt supra naturam, potest contingere uel
ex uitio nature uel etiam ex uitio persone; quod autem detriment= patiatur in his que sunt nature,
hoc non uidetur posse contingere nisi propter uitium proprium persone. Ut autem ex premissis
patet, peccatum originale est uitium nature, peccatwn autem actuale est uitium persone. Gratia
autem et uisio diuina sunt supra naturam humanum, et ideo privatio gratie et carentia uisionis
diuine debetur alicui persone non solum propter actuale peccatum, set etiam propter originale':
ibid., 134.
50	 •	 •
This is explained in detail in Chapter 3, 129-31.
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only a rejection, or something which comes very close to it: the abandoning of
the soul by original justice.51
The third reason is that poena sensus is not due someone who has a disposition
(habilis) to commit a certain act. Aquinas gave the example that someone who is
diposed to steal is not punished for this reason,but for the act of stealing.
However, disposition to privation without any act deserves some sort of loss: just
as someone who is unlearned (non habet scientiam litterarum) is unworthy of
being promoted to the dignity of the episcopacy. In original sin, there is
concupiscentia, or desire: in children, there is a revealed propensity to have this
disposition, in adults it is demonstrated by the act of desire. Thus, a child who
dies with original sin, is not deserving of poena sensus, but only poena damni.
The latter punishment was merited because the child was not fit to be led to the
divine vision on account of the privation of original justice.52
One of the main difficulties in discussing such an issue was the language used
for suffering. Aquinas pointed this out on two occasions in this particular
question. He explained that if we were to use similar terms to the church fathers,
such as Gregory the Great, then it would be difficult not to attribute physical
51 `Secundo quia pena proportionatur culpe; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur
aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad bonum commutabile, debetur pena dampni,
scilicet carentia visionis divine respondens aversioni, et pena sensus respondens conversioni. Set
in peccato originali non est conversio, set sola aversio, vel aliquid aversioni respondens, scilicet
destitutio anime a iustitia originali': De malo, q.5, a.2, 134.
52 `Tertio quia pena sensus numquam debetur habituali dispositioni: non enim aliquis punitur ex
hoc quod est habilis ad furandum, set ex hoc quod actu furatur; set habituali privationi absque
omni actu debetur aliquod dampnum: puta, qui non habet scientiam litteranun ex hoc ipso
indignus est promotione ad episcopalem dignitatem. In peccato autem originali inuenitur quidem
concupiscentia per modum habitualis dispositionis que paruulum facit habilem ad
concupiscendum, ut Augustinus dicit adulttun autem actu concupiscentem. Et ideo paruulo
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suffering to the unbaptised. Gregory used the word tormentum, and this signified
punishment of the senses. 53 However, Aquinas resolved this difficulty in the
authorities by explaining the nuances of vocabulary. Quite often, he argued,
species of words are used, such as tormentum, supplicius and cruciatus, which
really refer to the genus word poena. The saints use this way of speaking, said
Aquinas, to counter the errors of the Pelagian heretics who maintained that
unbaptised children lacked sin and did not deserve any poena at al1.54
Although Aquinas agreed with both Albert and Bonaventure before him that the
unbaptised should lack the vision of God and not receive the punishment of hell-
fire, a significant development can be seen in the rational basis for this claim.
Aquinas directly related punishments of the afterlife to individual guilt and an
individual's action in turning away from God and towards worldly pleasures.
The punishment of physical suffering thus required personal action and decision-
making. Aquinas explained that the unbaptised had the disposition to act in this
way potentially, but they did not actually act. Masters used this idea of
potentiality to explain how all the dead shared the same characteristics, but
unbaptised children possessed them in a different way. The use of this formula of
'potentiality' has been seen already in a previous chapter.55
defunct° cum originali non debetur pena sensus set solum pena dampni, quia scilicet non est
ydoneus perduci ad uisionem diuinam per privationem originalis iustitie': ibid.
53 'Set tonnentum nominat penam sensus. Ergo peccato originali debetur pena sensus': ibid., 133.
54 `Dicendum quod nomen tormenti, supplicii et iehenne et cruciatus, vel si quid simile in dictis
sanctorum inveniatur, est large accipiendum pro pena, ut ponatur species pro genere. Ideo autem
sancti tali modo loquendi usi sunt, ut detestabilem redderent errorem Pelagianorum qui asserebant
in parvulis nullum peccatum esse nec eis aliquam penam deberi': ibid.
55 See Chapter 2, 82-7.
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The Augustinian canon Giles of Rome addressed the same issue in his
Commentary on the Sentences some time in the mid-1270s. 56 He compared
original sin to actual sin in a general sense. Generally, actual sin corresponds to
the turning away from the immutable good and the turning towards a changeable
good. In the punishments meted out for this, the turning away merits the poena
damni, which is the loss of the vision of God, and the conversion deserves poena
sensus, pain of the senses. Giles gave his reasons for this: firstly, turning away
from the divine light deserves the privation of the vision of that light. Secondly,
the sinner himself converts to the changeable, and thus it is correct for this
conversion to the changeable and created good to be punished by the pain of
material fire.57
In original sin, Giles continued, there is a turning away from the unchangeable
good because there is a lack of original justice which orders us towards this
good, but there is no conversion to a changeable good. Such sin merits the poena
damni, but not the poena sensus because there is no personal guilt per se. There
is, however, natural guilt per se. If there is any personal guilt, it is in as far as
nature infects the person. This is not through the application of evil, but rather
through the subtraction of some good in original justice.58
`Utrwn decedentes in originali tanttun doleant de eo quod carent visione divina': Egidio
Romano Archiepiscopus Biturciensis Ordinis Sancti Augu.stini in Secundum Sententiarum
(Venice, 1482), ii, d.33, q.1, no foliation.
57 ' In omni peccato actuali generaliter loquendo est aversio ab incommutabili bono et conuersio
ad cornmutabile. Auersioni ergo respondet pena damni. Conuersioni respondet pena sensus. Nam
quia peccator se auertit a divino lumine dignus est quod careat visione diuini luminis...Sed quia
peccator se conuertit ad commutabile bonum et ad creaturam...dignus est quod...a materiali igne
et pena sensibili puniatur': ibid.
58 Sed in peccato originali est ita auersio ab incommutabili bono quia est carentia originalis
iustitie que nos subiciebat et ordinabat ad illud bonum quamvis non est ibi conuersio ad
commutabile bonum, propter quod tale peccatwn sic meretur penam damni, quod non meretur
penam sensus, meretur enim penam damni ex eo quod est culpa. Sed non meretur penam sensus
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The punishment of mortal sin required a pain which corresponded to its
conversion to changeable pleasures. The soul's concern with the changeable and
the worldly meant that it deserved a punishment commensurate with such a sin:
material hell-fire. The rejection of the divine, unchanging good demanded the
deprivation of its vision. Both kinds of punishment faced the damned in hell, and
which was to afflict them more was also a subject for debate among masters.59
However, unbaptised infants only received partial punishment for original sin.
Aquinas and Giles both stressed the kind of punishments due to the movement of
the will in sin. Aquinas explained that unbaptised children had no opportunity to
exercise their free will, and therefore would not have been able to make the
conversion to changeable pleasures. This is one main reason why children in this
case will not suffer from the pain of fire, for that required the conversion of the
will to the mutable good which arises in actual sin. Giles maintained that the
pain of sense was merited for the act of changing to the sensible, and moving
away from the spiritual.
The masters adopted the theory of changeable and the unchangeable good when
they discussed whether unbaptised children would be damned. This theory
originated with Augustine, and it was reworked by masters and used by them to
prove that children were not to be damned. So, Augustine's own terminology
was effectively being used against him. The move towards worldly pleasures was
quia non est culpa actualis et personalis per se. Sed est culpa naturalis per se. Si autem est culpa
personalis, hoc est inquantum natura inficit personam; sed ista infectio ut patet per habita non est
per appositionem alicuius mali per se loquendo, sed solum per subtractionem alicuius boni in
originalis iustitia': ibid.
59 See Chapter 6 below.
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the way in which physical punishment was merited. Unbaptised children were
unable to make this move, so the masters argued that they should not receive
physical punishments after death. The body only came into the equation when
there was the presence of free will. Although the unbaptised would possess
bodies, `bodiliness' was not an issue of overwhelming importance to their state
after death. The reason for this was that sin was punished through the body by
the poena sensus, and the unbaptised did not experience this pain at all.
In the 1280s, Richard of Middleton questioned whether children dying
unbaptised would be susceptible to a punishment of the senses. 6° He argued that
children who had experienced neither the spiritual, nor the carnal pleasures of sin
could not be punished through the senses. They would, however, be punished by
the poena damni, for they had died without grace, without which they may not
possess the vision of God; and because they inhabit filthy flesh, they occupy an
ignoble place, although some say that this will be on the surface of the earth.61
Richard also has something to say about the bodies of unbaptised infants. Their
bodies are not impassible by the resisting action of virtue, which pertains to the
gift of impassibility. On the contrary, divine providence disposes that they lack
punishment.62
60 Ttaurn paruuli decedentes ante baptismum puniantur pena sensibili': II Sent., d.33, a.3, q.1,
414-5.
61 `Respondeo, quod paruuli decedentes ante baptismum non puniuntur poena sensibili, quia
nunquam habuerunt in se actualem delectationem peccati, nec in spiritu nec in came. Punientur
autem pena damni, quia sine gratia gratum faciente decedunt, sine qua visio Dei non potest
haberi, quia etiam feditatem in carne habuenuit, ideo locum obtinebunt ignobilem, quamuis aliqui
dicant, quod habitabunt in superficie terre% ibid., 414.
62 `Corpora paruulorum non erunt impassibilia ab exteriori agente virtute resistentis, quod spectat
ad dotem impassibilitatis. Sed per carentiam penam inferentis, hoc diuina prouidentia
disponente' : ibid., 415.
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Richard thus agreed that the unbaptised would not receive sensual punishment
when they had experienced no sensual aspects of sin. Unlike his predecessors,
however, Richard did not debate the involvement of the will in relation to
suffering. His answer was more concerned with the state of the bodies of the
unbaptised. The bodies of those who had died unbaptised, although tainted with
the stain of original sin, were not subject to physical suffering like those on earth.
They were impassible to hell-fire. However, the bodies of the unbaptised did not
possess the gift of impassibility which the elect received in heaven, but another
kind of protection from divine providence.
In general, however, it appears that the masters were in agreement that physical
suffering was related to the presence or absence of free will. It seemed that
children in limbo possessed no free will and therefore no individuality; they only
had the stain of original sin and consequently had no chance to exercise their will
for good or ill. All masters agreed also that the loss of the vision of God was the
common punishment for unbaptised children. The difficulty which confronted
masters was how to interpret the meaning of the term mitissima poena, which
had been introduced by one of their most revered authorities, Augustine.
Bonaventure suggested that the reason for confusion over the issue of physical
suffering and the unbaptised was disagreement about how to interpret this
Augustinian term. However, in terms of their punishment, children had made no
personal movements of the will against God, but only had the potential to do so.
In this case, masters were all in agreement that the punishment by hell-fire was
not appropriate.
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Masters such as Aquinas were also sensitive to the types of words used for
suffering, and conscious that some words might be misleading. A vocabulary for
suffering was not sufficient for the masters on its own. It needed to be explained
according to the subject, location and reason for suffering. In defining the role of
the will in relation to suffering, masters gained greater control over their
knowledge of sin, suffering and the positions of those in the afterlife.
Furthermore, Aquinas used the issue of the Pelagian heresy to explain the
ambiguities of language which had been created by key theological authorities.
The nature of physical punishment in the afterlife was also clarified by the
masters' language for understanding suffering. The body was deemed to be the
focus for punishment of individual sins and the individual's movement away
from God. Unbaptised children lacked the sin-filled bodies of the damned and
although they still possessed unclean flesh, the nature of their bodiliness was
only addressed in any detail by one of the masters. This is further evidence to
support the relationship between the movement of the will and the effects this
would have on the body. Where free will was lacking, the status of the body and
its pains appeared to hold less importance.
b. Debates about internal suffering
Although the masters ruled out the presence of material fire in limbo, a privation
of the vision of God was understood to lead to internal suffering. Moreover, in
the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas stated that the poena damni was the greatest of
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all punishments.63 The lack of the divine vision, it was posited, might cause
internal, or spiritual suffering in the unbaptised, as it did in the damned. The case
centred around whether the unbaptised possessed any understanding of their state
in limbo, for understanding and interior suffering were closely linked. The
examination of a clearly defined set of questions by masters on this issue sheds
light on the relationship between understanding and internal pain, and further
increases our understanding of the way in which masters constructed limbo.
How, then, was the issue of internal suffering in limbo debated by the masters?
Alexander of Hales determined the difference between the pagan fathers and the
children in limbo and what they would understand. He came to the conclusion
that both groups were unjoined and separated from God, but the fathers felt and
understood this separation which caused them suffering, whilst the children did
not have any understanding of it at al1. 64 Alexander thus argued that unbaptised
children would neither feel the separation from God, nor would they understand
it. In this way, he appeared to be suggesting that they actually experienced no
suffering at all.
63 `Patet etiam ex parte poena sensus quantum ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad
poenam ignis non sint improportionabiles poenae. Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia
peccatwn mortale meretur carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest, ut
Chrysostom dicit': ST la2ae q. 88, a.4.
64 `Sed quaeretur in quo differt status parvulortun in limbo infemi a statu antiquorum patrtun.
Dicendum quod utrique sunt inconiuncti Deo et separati. Sed antiqui pan-es hoc discemebant et
sentiebant; ideo pro dilatione patriae dolebant. Sed pueri non hoc sentiebant nec discemebane:
Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quattor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi, (Bibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 12-15; Quaracchi, 1951-57), ii, d.33, 318.
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Albert the Great asked whether children would have some misery from lacking
the divine vision. 65 He replied briefly and succinctly that there would be some
sort of misery attached to the loss of the divine vision which the unbaptised
would experience and this amounted to a type of hopelessness. In this way,
argued Albert, unbaptised infants could not be protected from every misery,
although he underlined his statement that they would receive neither the
punishment of fire, nor of the worm of conscience.66
There appears to have been some difference of opinion between Alexander and
Albert. Alexander emphasised the lack of knowledge the unbaptised infants
would have of their situation. Albert, however, believed that the unbaptised
would possess enough understanding to feel hopelessness in their loss of the
vision of God. There was thus disagreement about the situation of children in
limbo with regard to interior suffering.
Bonaventure provided a detailed analysis of this particular question. 67 He stated
that the unbaptised will lack any interior suffering, but they will still possess
powers of understanding. He pointed out that neither scripture, nor the saints
tackled this particular question and therefore the doctors of theology had
conflicting opinions about it. 68 Bonaventure was thus articulating the
65 'Quid dicatur sinus Abrahae: et an paruuli decedentes sint in aliqua miseria': IV Sent., d.1, a.20,
21.
66 `Dicendum quod miseria est in pueris, scilicet desperatio visionis Dei: et ideo non ab omni
miseria proteguntur: tamen bene concedi, quod pueri non habent ignem nec verrnem': ibid.
`Utnun parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiore': II Sent., d.33,
a.3, q.2, 795-97.
68 'Ad praedictonun intelligentiam est notandum, quod quia super hac quaestione nec expresse
loquitur Scriptura, nec expresse earn Sancti determinant; ideo doctores theologiae hic opinantur
contraria': ibid, 796.
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discrepancies over this issue which existed in key authorities. He highlighted
three positions. First there are certain persons, probably including Alexander of
Hales, as seen above, who denied that unbaptised children possessed either
understanding or interior suffering. Bonaventure said he found it hard to imagine
that a soul separated from the body does not have use of reason and cannot know
itself, for its cognition is naturally given to it when it does not possess the
impediment of corporeal union. The second position he provided is that these
same souls have both understanding and dolor. Bonaventure argued that they
cannot have internal suffering which is the worm of conscience, a reference to
Isaiah, 69 because they have no remorse for the abandoning of any good due to
their own neglect." The third position was Bonaventure's own. The children
who have died with original sin have a middle position between those who have
grace and those who have actual guilt. In this way, the unbaptised communicate,
or participate, with the beatified in that they lack any exterior or interior
affliction, and they communicate with the damned in that they lack the divine
vision and are deprived of corporeal light. They remain in a uniform state, where
they do not progress, nor decline,where they do not become happy, or sad, but
hold perfectly to the medium.71
'Vermis eorum non morietur et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt ad satietatem visionis
omni carni': Isaiah 66:24.
713 'Quidam enim volunt dicere, quod parvuli carebunt et cognitione et dolore...Sed quia difficile
est intelligere, quod anima separata non habeat usum rationis et non cognoscat ea saltem, quorum
cognitio est ei naturaliter inserta, cum ex parte corporis impedimentum non habeat; ideo alii aliter
opinantur, quod animae parvulorum et habebunt cognitionem et habebunt etiam dolorem. Scient
enim, propter quid factae sunt, et scient, se illo bono merito originalis culpae esse privatas; et
propterea dolorem habebunt, et affectiones doloris in eis altemabuntur. Attamen non habebunt
dolorem, qui mereatur dici vermis, quia non habebunt remorsum, quod perdiderint illud bonum
propter propriam negligentiam et contempttun': II Sent., d.33, a.3, q.2, 796-7.
71 `Decedentes enim in solo originali quasi medium tenent inter habentes gratiam et culpam
actualem; et quoniam status retributionis debet respondere statui vitae praesentis, in tali statu
debent animae parvulorum poni, ut quasi medium teneant inter Beatos et aetemis ignibus
cruciatos. Quoniam igitur Beati carent malo poenae sensibilis et cum hoc habent Dei visionem,
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Bonaventure thus alluded to the conflict between masters of theology over this
issue, as seen in the above analysis of Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great.
Bonaventure took the issue further by rejecting both the theory that unbaptised
children possessed no understanding and the idea that they would receive some
misery from lacking the divine vision. Instead, he mooted an experientially-
defined middle place for the unbaptised, that is, a place which held the middle
point between heaven and hell in terms of the experiences which the unbaptised
would have. On the one hand, they would partake in some of the goods of the
elect, whilst on the other receiving the privation of God's vision like the damned.
Aquinas debated the same question, but deliberately focused on the use of
Augustine to support his argument.72 Aquinas noted that some authors believed
that children in limbo would experience some kind of suffering or interior
affliction as a result of their loss of the divine vision, although he argued that this
suffering would not stem from the worm of conscience because the unbaptised
are not conscious themselves of the power to avoid original guilt. But, he argued,
there would be no point in taking away exterior pain if interior pain was
damnati e contrario sum in tenebris et puniuntur poena sensibili; parvuli secundum rectum
ordinem divinae aequitatis debent communicare in uno cum damnatis, et in alio cum Beatis. Sed
non possunt communicare cum Beatis in habendo divinam praesentiam, quia tune in nullo
communicarent cum damnatis; praesentia enim visionis Dei non stat cum poena sensibili. Ideo
cum Beatis communicant in hoc, quod carent omni afflictione exteriori et interiori; cum damnatis
vero in hoc, quod privantur visione Dei et lucis corporalis....Ego respondeo, quod divinae iustitiae
aequitas et immutabilis in eodem statu quantum ad corpus et quantum ad anirnam, sive quoad
cognitivam et quoad affectivam, perpetualiter eos consolidat, ut nec proficiant nec deficiant, nec
laetentur nec tristentur, sed semper sic uniformiter maneant...et perfectissime teneant medium
inter superfluum et diminutum. Secundum hanc igitur positionem concedendae sunt rationes
ostendentes, quod parvuli non sentient spiritualem dolorem': ibid., 797.
72 'thrum patiantur afflictionem interioris qui cum solo originali decedunt': De Malo, q.5, a.3,
135-6.
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attributed to them, this being a much greater penalty, and it would go against
Augustine's notion of the children's punishment as mitissima.73
Thus, Aquinas also denied the belief that the unbaptised would have internal
suffering from loss of the vision of God. Children do not possess an inordinate
will, that is, a will capable of sin, before they have the use of reason. So, neither
will they have this will after death. The inordinate will always exists when
someone suffers from the lack of something that cannot be obtained. Thus,
because unbaptised children in limbo know that they can never attain the glory of
heaven, they do not suffer from this loss.74
Richard of Middleton also debated whether children who had died unbaptised
would experience spiritual suffering. 75 Richard believed that unbaptised children
had consciousness before and would have after the resumption of their bodies at
resurrection. However, they would experience no external or internal suffering.
For they would realise that they could not know God, nor possess free will which
they could use to merit the vision of God in a natural way.76
 However, Richard
73 `Dicendum, quod aliqui posuerunt quod pueri sentient aliquem dolorem uel afflictionem
interiorem ex carentia uisionis diuine, licet iste dolor non habet in eis rationem uennis
conscientie, quia non sunt sibi conscii quod in eorum potestate fuerit culpam originalem uitare.
Set nulla ratio esse uidetur quare subtrahatur ab eis exterior pena sensus, si attribuitur eis interior
afflictio, que est multo magis penalis et magis opponitur mitissime pene, quam Augustinus eis
attribuit': ibid., 135.
74 'Uncle cum pueri ante usum rationis non habeant actwn inordinatum uoluntatis, neque etiam
post mortem habebunt. Non est autem absque inordinatione uoluntatis quod aliquis doleat se non
habere quod numquam potuit adipisci...Quia igitur pueri post mortem sciunt se numquam
potuisse illam gloriam celestem adipisci, ex eius carentia non dolebunt': ibid., 136.
75 'Utrum paruuli decedentes ante baptismum pena spirituali puniantur': II Sent., d.33, a.3, q.2,
415-6.
'Paruuli decedentes ante baptismum habent sui status cognitionem, et habebunt etiam post
corporum resumptionem. Nec tamen habent, nec habebunt aliquam afilictionem, nec exteriorem,
ut ante ostensum est, nec interiorem: ipsi enim sciunt se ex naturalibus non posse Deum videre,
nec se habuisse usum liberi arbitrium per quem se disponere potuissent ad merendum Del
visionem': ibid., 415.
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did enter a caveat at the end of his question. He did not believe that the
unbaptised would suffer from nothing at all, unless divine providence were to
take away all suffering.77
This last statement by Richard is significant when the time-frame in which he
was writing is taken into account. Many rational explanations concerning
theology began to attract suspicion, especially in the period following the
condemnations of 1270 and 1277 by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris. Indeed,
by the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, the tide in
theology was turning. More conservative approaches of explanation were
favoured. 78 In the case of the unbaptised in limbo, at least one theologian,
Gregory of Rimini, followed Augustine to the letter and argued that the souls of
unbaptised children would be tortured by material fire. 79
 Although Gregory was
exceptional in this case, this move towards a more literal interpretation of
authority was symptomatic of the time.
The masters strove for a common position in respect of their main authority,
Augustine. Rational frameworks of explanation about the fate of the unbaptised
in limbo were used to alter and in some cases bypass literal interpretations of the
saint. The evidence clearly demonstrates that masters strove to reconstruct an
77-
`c.piod autem de nullo doleant non credo, quod praedicta consideratio huius sufficiens causa
potest esse, nisi adesset diuina prouidentia ab eis excludens dolorem': ibid.
78 For the thesis that theology changed from being speculative to a more conservative approach
dedicated to glorifying God, see G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier
Fourteenth Century', BJRL, 43 (1960), 354-72.
79 G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought
(Manchester, 1961). See also G. Leff, 'Faith and Reason in the Thought of Gregory of Rimini
(c.1300-1358)', BJRL, 42 (1959), 88-112.
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apparently conflicting authority and show how his idea of mitissima poena could
be embedded within their own frameworks for understanding pain and suffering.
The experiential definition of the place fcr unbaptised children was based upon
their previous ideas about suffering. The =baptised could not exercise free-will.
This meant that they had not deliberately moved towards the changeable goods
of this world. Masters equated such a movement with the external pain of fire.
Thus, the children were protected from this pain. They were also devoid of
interior suffering. Thus, by the middle of the thirteenth century, it was clear that
masters had defined the location of limbo in terms of its experiences. The
unbaptised held a middle place between the damned and the elect in terms of
their suffering. In fact, it was a state of neither delight, nor suffering: limbo was
neutral in terms of experience. Children in limbo were thus identified by their
suffering, or, rather, their lack of it. This, crucially, defined their communal
otherness in the afterlife.
3. Beyond the university: societal concern with the fate of the unbaptised
children and the authority of masters
To what extent did the authority of masters impinge upon the ideas about the fate
of =baptised children held by those outside the university? There appear to have
been various superstitions about dead children throughout the Middle Ages. Folk
tradition told of dead, =baptised and usually murdered children, who would rise
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from the dead to haunt their families, or even kill them. 8° It was also thought that
walking over such a child's grave would give rise to a skin disease known as the
'grave-merels' or grave-scab. 81
 Such fears led to the practice of posthumous
baptism and more sinister practices. The penitential of Burchard of Worms
written between 1008 and 1012 described the penance due for a practice
common at the time:
Have you done what some women do at the
instigation of the devil? When any child has
died without baptism, they take the corpse of
the little one and place it in some secret place
and transfix its little body with a stake, saying
that if they did not do so, the little child would
arise and injure many? If you have done or
consented to, or believed this, you should do
penance for two years on the appointed days.82
Recent work done on a particular type of university disputation, the quodlibet,
has demonstrated that they had a function which was far more practical and
relevant to society than their seemingly high theological nature would suggest.
Certain quodlibets contained questions about the fate of the unbaptised which
dealt with practicalities, or which voiced particular concerns of the community.
For example, Henry of Ghent was asked whether a child dying before baptism
83could be buried in the church cemetery. Henry answered that the purpose of a
cemetery is to look after the bodies of the members of the Church, with
8° This was also a belief held in medieval Byzantium. See J. Baun, 'The Fate of Babies Dying
before Baptism in Byzantium', The Church and Childhood: Papers Read at the 1993 Summer
Meeting and the 1994 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. D.Wood (Studies
in Church History, 31; Oxford, 1994), 124.
81 B.Kellum, 'Infanticide in England in the Later Middle Ages', History of Childhood Quarterly, I
(1973-4), 380.
82 J.T. McNeill and H.M. Gamer, Medieval Handbooks of Penance. A translation of the principal
libri poenitentiales and selections from related documents (New York, 1938, repr. 1990), 339.
83 `thruin parvulus iste moriens ante baptismum debeat sepeliri in coemeterio': Henry of Ghent,
Opera Omnia V Quodlibet I, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), q.24, 177-8.
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reverence, until they are resurrected. The Church presumed the souls of the
unbaptised to be damned. They were never members of the church through the
sacrament of regeneration, that is, baptism, and thus may not be buried there."
These children were effectively being excluded from the community. The
authority of the masters was sought to sanction this exclusion.
Other questions demonstrated the fear that children dying whilst being carried to
the baptismal font, would not be saved. 85
 For example, Henry of Ghent was
asked whether such a case might merit salvation, or whether the child would be
damned. 86
 He replied that we must not judge divine power. For, according to
natural law, the child cannot be saved except through the faith of his or her
parents; in the law of Moses the child is saved by circumcision within eight days;
and in evangelical law, according to the usual working of divine grace, that child
can in no way be saved except by ablution from baptismal water. 87 Other
religious communities also addressed this issue, but with a different emphasis. In
thirteenth-century Byzantium, for example, it was the parents who were deemed
guilty if their child died before baptism. 88
 So, in contrast to the West, Byzantine
`Dicendum breviter quod coemeterium non est nisi ad reverenter custodiendum corpora
filiorum ecclesiae in terra usque, quorum animae requiescunt cum Deo in caelis secundum quod
aestimatur...Quare , cum ecclesia supponit animam dicti parvuli damnatum, corpus eius in
coemeterio sepeliri non debet, maxime ea de causa, quod per sacramentum regenerationis
numquam ecclesiae membrum fuit': ibid.
85 Henry of Ghent, 'Utrum parvulus delatus ad baptismum, morte praeventus, danmetur.': qd1.1,
q.22, ibid., 175-6; Raymond Rigauld, 'thrum puer qui portatur ad baptismum, si moriatur et
nunquam baptizatus, damnetur': qd1.6, q.10, ms.Todi 98, fos.29c-32c.
'Utrum parvulus delatus ad baptismum, morte praeventus, danmetur': qd1.1, q.22, 175-6.
87 `Dicendum ad hoc...quod sicut in lege naturae non salvabatur parvulus nisi in fide parentum, in
lege Moysi a die octavo per cinuncisionem, sic in lege Evangelii secundum conununem cursum
divinae gratiae nullus salvatur nisi ablutus aquis baptismi': ibid., 176.
88 Baun, 'Fate of Babies', 124.
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parents whose child had died before being baptised were excluded from the
religious community on earth along with their dead children in limbo.
The comparison to Jewish practice concerning circumcision within an eight-day
period after birth was one used frequently by theologians in their discussions of
baptism and original sin. The Jews believed that even if the child died before
circumcision, it might well be saved from damnation by the faith of the parents.
This was an issue which clearly concerned the masters. The idea that one could
be saved without baptism and through the good intention of one's parents was
deemed to be heretical. For example, the early fourteenth-century inquisitor's
register of Jacques Fournier, Bishop of Pamiers, contains a confession from a
certain Johannes Rocas. 89 When asked about the sacrament of baptism, Rocas
replied that children who die unbaptised have not done any evil or any good,
because they have been unable to do either. They will be saved, but Jewish and
Saracen children will be damned. When asked why this is the case, he answered
that children of Christians will be saved because they are born of good, faithful
parents, just as a good tree bears good fruit. Jewish and Saracen children,
however, are damned because they are bad and born of evil parents." Henry of
Ghent had a similar quodlibetal question put to him, that is, whether there are
equal punishments for the child of Christian parents dying without baptism, and
89 Le Registre de 1 'Inquisition de Jacques Fournier Eveque de Pamiers 1318-25, ed. J.Duvernoy,
3 vols. (Toulouse, 1965), ii, 241-44.
98 `Dixit tamen quod pueri non babtisati qui in tali etate decedunt, licet non malum alicui nec
bonum fecerint quia non potuerunt, propter etatem salvantur; set Iudeorum et Sarrecenorum
perduntur per eum, ut credit. Dixit tamen quod pueri christianorum, quia sunt nati de bonis
parentibus, sunt boni et salvantur, licet moriantur antequam babtisentur, quia bona arbor bonum
fructtun facit, set pueri Iudeonun et Sarracenorum pereunt quia mali sunt, quia de malis
parentibus est natus': ibid., 244.
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a Saracen child. 91 Henry answered that the punishments will in no way be related
to the faith of the parents, but their lot will be equal: the privation of the divine
vision.92
This demonstrates a concern which went much further than the university
disputation chamber. Henry of Ghent's reply to this question unified the fate of
unbaptised children from different religious communities. In so doing, he crossed
the boundaries of differing religious communities. Whatever the beliefs of a
religious community, as far as Henry of Ghent was concerned, the fate of their
unbaptised children would be the same. Henry's questions demonstrate how
masters thus also pronounced upon issues about limbo which were of concern to
all in society. The opinions and authority of masters clearly carried considerable
weight outside the university. The sources presented here, unfortunately, do not
permit any further assessment of the impact of university debates on other areas
of society.
Conclusion
Masters of theology used their ideas about pain and suffering to create and define
children's limbo. Understanding the nature of suffering which was attached to
original sin was crucial in this definition. Debates surrounding the fate of
unbaptised children were not new. In fact, denying that the unbaptised suffered
91 'Utnun parvulus iste aequalem poenam sustineat pro suo originali cum parvulo sarraceni':
qd1.1, q.23, 177.
92 'In parvulis omnibus originale peccatum aequale est et aequalis poena ei debetur in omnibus,
poena danuii scilicet...Et ideo, cum, iam dictum est, parvulo decedente sine baptismo, in nubo
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in any way was synonymous with the Pelagian heresy. However, Augustine's
position that these children would be damned did not agree with the masters'
theories about pain and its relationship with sin. Masters explained that mortal
sin, a deliberate move on the part of the will, deserved the pain of fire. Children
who died before they were baptised had not had any chance of using their free
will; so they could not be punished by the pain of fire. Indeed, Gerard of
Abbeville even asked whether children who had been baptised and yet not used
their free will could be damned.93
Masters reworked Augustine as an authority. They interpreted his notion of
mitissima poena as the loss of the divine vision. In this way they could remain
respectful to a key patristic authority on the one hand, whilst not actually
following Augustine's belief in the damnation of unbaptised children on the
other. Masters thus also had to debate whether privation from the divine vision
would cause any internal suffering. Here, there was a little more variance of
opinion than over the issue of hell-fire. Some masters, such as Alexander of
Hales, writing in the earlier part of the thirteenth century, believed that these
children would suffer no interior suffering because they were ignorant of their
position. However, Bonaventure and Aquinas were clear that they did have
consciousness of their situation, but that this would not lead to interior affliction,
for this was greater than punishment by fire. Instead, the unbaptised held the
middle ground in terms of their experiences in the afterlife. Thus, it was the
suffraguntur secundum communem legem merita aut fides parent-tun, aequalis erit darrmatio et
poena parvuli fidelis discedentis sine baptismo et Sarraceni': ibid.
93 cUtrum parvuli baptizati ante usum liberi arbitrii possint dampnari': ms. BN.Lat. 16297, fo.
1606-160. For a transcription of this ms., see appendix I.
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precise definition of pain and suffering, based on masters' notions of sin and the
individual, which were at the heart of the creation of limbo as a place.
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5Anima Separata: Masters of Theology and the
Controversy surrounding the Suffering of the Separated
Soul
In previous chapters, the pain experienced in and by the soul has been considered
in terms of the embodied soul, that is, the soul as part of the human composite.
However, masters of theology followed the widely-held belief that when the body
died, soul and body were separated until resurrection. The suffering of the
resurrected body is the focus of the following chapter. This chapter examines the
period between death and resurrection, during which the separated souls of the
damned reached hell and experienced its torments. As we have seen in earlier
chapters, sense perception and the reception of pain and suffering depended upon
activity within the human composite. Masters developed a distinct vocabulary
and set of ideas to understand and explain the action of pain on the human body
and soul. Therefore, the soul without the body presented a different set of
challenges to this system. In the first section of this chapter, therefore, theories
about the separated soul and the questions masters asked concerning its nature
are considered in order to ascertain how they understood and described the soul
when it was separated from the body.
One issue which seems to have been high on masters' agendas was how the
separated souls of the damned in hell could suffer the torment of corporeal fire.
This was very important for two reasons. First, the theory of the composite did
not permit easy discussion of a soul without its co-element in the composite: the
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body. Second, the issue had a long history in the writings of patristic and more
modern authors who described the suffering of the separated soul in different
ways. This presented masters with various challenges. On the one hand, they
were compelled to discuss and resolve differences between their authorities. On
the other hand, masters sought to incorporate the language which their authorities
used for suffering within their own framework for discussing pain. This process
will be discussed in the second section.
The third section investigates the question of whether the separated soul could
suffer from corporeal fire in the light of the Paris Condemnations of 1270. The
denial that the separated soul could suffer in this way was one of the condemned
theses. This section suggests that this thesis ought not to have been included
among the other condemned positions, as the master of arts who was condemned
for it actually followed an orthodox line which masters of theology had already
formulated some decades before. Moreover, it demonstrates the influence which
ideas emanating from the faculty of theology had on the faculty of arts.
Ultimately, the question about the suffering of the separated soul appears to hold
greater importance as an issue to be explained within the masters' conceptual
framework for pain than it does as a challenge to the masters' authority from the
arts faculty at the University of Paris.
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1. Theories about the separated soul in the thirteenth century
i. Thirteenth-Century Theories on the Nature of the Soul
Thirteenth-century theology witnessed differing interpretations of the human
soul. This stemmed from two main traditions which offered different accounts of
the soul's relationship with the body and to the soul in a state of separation from
the body. As far as the soul's relationship to the body was concerned, Plato and
the Neoplatonists taught that the soul used the body as its instrument, just as a
pilot uses his ship.' Augustine received this tradition, probably through
Victorinus, and this christianisation of Plato held favour in the Middle Ages,
especially amongst the Franciscan school at Paris.2 The reception of more of
Aristotle's texts, through the activities of the Toledo translators and especially
William of Moerbeke, led to a greater interest in his works, especially in the
faculty of arts at the University of Paris. 3 In contrast to Plato, Aristotle described
the soul as the form of the body.4 This essentially followed Aristotle's concept of
the inter-relationship of potency and act, and its consequent bearing on matter
and form. The combination of soul and body was the same as that of matter and
form. The soul (as form) potentially has life. When combined with the body
'See chapter 1, 24.
2 There is no certainty that Augustine read Victorinus. There do appear to be other parallels: the
central theme of the Confessions is the soul's longing to return to God. This appears to be
analogous to the Neoplatonic idea of return to the One seen in Plato and more clearly in Plotinus.
For a fuller explanation of Neoplatonism, see A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical
Tradition From Plato to Denys (Oxford, 1981), esp. 132f.
3 See J. A. Weisheipl, 'The Parisian Faculty of Arts in the Mid-Thirteenth Century: 1240-1270',
American Benedictine Review, 25 (1974), 200-217.
4 II De Anima, 412°18-20: 'Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, viz, having
life, the soul cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it.
Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life
potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above
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(matter) its potency is converted into act. 5 This is what comprises the complete
human composite.
As we have noted in previous chapters, Aquinas followed Aristotle in his view
that the soul is the form of the body. However, Aquinas also understood the soul
to be a complete reality in its being and its species,6 and claimed that the soul had
a unity of form. The second of these positions led to significant discussion. The
availability of Aristotle's Metaphysics and libri naturales stimulated debate
about whether the soul had singular or multiple forms and thus masters held
different views about the soul's composition in this respect. Aristotle was not the
only source of this debate. Giles of Rome claimed that it was Avicenna who was
responsible for the theory of the unity of substantial form. 7 The translation of
Avicenna's De anima by Dominic Gundissalinus proved to be the cornerstone of
debate over the unity or plurality of forms in the sou1. 8 Aquinas argued for a
characterised': The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J. Barnes,
2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), i, 656.
3 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350). An Introduction (London, 1987), 96.
6 Substantia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie': ST la 76,1 ad 5.
7 Giles of Rome held Avicenna responsible for the phrase: `Quod in quolibet compositio sit una
forma substantialis tantum': D.A. Callus, 'Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form', The Thomist,
24 (1961), 120-49, p.262. See also: D.A. Callus, 'The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford',
Aquinas Society of London, no.5 (1946), 3-38. For Giles of Rome's condemnations of various
positions concerning the composition of the soul, see Giles of Rome, Errores Philosophorum, ed.
J. Koch, trans. J. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944).
This debate is very well known. It blew up in the 1270s and 1280s in Paris and Oxford. The
debate centred around whether the powers or attributes of the soul, vegetative (for growth),
sensitive (for sensing) and intellectual (for understanding and the intellect), were separate,
substantial forms of the soul, remaining separate in the composite; or whether forms passed away
when a more perfect form was created. Given that humans were a combination of matter and
fonn, two basic theories emerged. They can be summed up as follows: The Avicennan-
Aristotelian position of the unity of substantial form believed firstly that prime matter was
completely passive, and possessed no actuality; secondly, there was a privatio, which entailed the
passing away of the previous form; thirdly, the substantial form was the root of actuality and the
determining principle of a thing. If there is one soul and one substantial form, then all other forms
are accidental. In the case of humans, the intellectual form is the substantial form of the soul, but
the sensitive and vegetative forms exist virtually within it. The opposing view, thought to be
neoplatonist in origin and particularly held by Avicebron in his Fons Vitae, taught that prime
matter contained some actuality, that there was not a stripping (privatio) of the previous forms,
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succession of forms in an embryo by which process one would corrupt to allow
another superior form to take its place until God introduced the rational soul. He
thus argued that one substantial form was the source of multiple perfections
which come from inferior forms. 9
 This was an important and virulent debate
which ran through most of the thirteenth and the early part of the fourteenth
centuries. It demonstrates that there were radically different theories about the
composition and functions of the human soul. The nature of the soul within the
body was thus a much discussed topic in theological circles.
ii. Sense Perception and the Separated Soul
The nature of the soul separated from the body was also an issue of importance
for the masters, particularly when they came to discuss intellectual processes and
sense perception. For example, at different points in his career, Aquinas had
various theories about how the separated soul could understand. His main
and finally that the substantial form only determined the composite partially. See Callus, 'Origins
of the Problem of the Unity of Form', 258-61; Callus, 'The Problem of the Plurality of Forms in
the Thirteenth Century: The Thomist Innovation', L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du
moyen age, Acres du Premier Congres International de Philosophie Medijvale 1958 (Louvain
and Paris, 1960), 577-85; J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A
Study in Late Thirteenth Century Philosophy (Washington D.C., 1981), 314-337; B.C. Bathn, 'La
Corporalite selon S. Thomas', RPL, 81 (1983), 379-403.
9 Bathn, 'La Corporalite, 390-392. Bathn argues that the soul is the corporeality of man. The
soul is the substantial form which makes the human being. The physical body to which it joins
must be prime matter, which is pure potency. The soul, as substantial form, actualises the body,
that is the soul-body composite. As it is the actuality of the composite, it could also be seen as its
actuality. Bathn appears to be arguing this from the position of a modern philosopher, and he
offers no proof that Aquinas himself thought this. However, Aquinas did argue against the
existence of a forma corporeitatis. He believed that the first actualisation of prime matter is the
substantial form. If the first actualisation were this forma corporeitatis, then a man would not be a
man in essence, but only by accident. This position was attacked vehemently by John Peckham in
the 1280s. His conclusion was that if one denied the existence of this corporeal form, then the
body of Christ would not be one and the same before and after the crucifixion, nor would
religious relics or the Eucharist be identical to what they represented. Peckham thus argued for a
plurality of forms: J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 288-90.
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concern centred around whether it required phantasms, which were produced
when the soul was united to the body, in the process of intellection. 1 ° In his
Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas suggested that phantasms were not
needed and the separated soul could understand by divine infusion. 11 However, in
the Quaestiones de anima he maintained that phantasms were intrinsically
necessary to the intellectual activity of the soul and not extrinsically as Plato and
Avicenna had maintained. I2 Thus, there were also a variety of difficulties in
explaining the soul's activities when it was separated from the body.
However, it was not only the intellectual processes of the separated soul which
presented difficulties. Masters also faced problems when they discussed whether
sense perception could occur in the separated soul. Aristotle had taught that the
sentient subject was changed by the object sensed. 13 This implied that sense
perception within the separated soul would cause the soul itself to change. As the
separated soul was an incorporeal substance, this was an impossible position to
maintain. Masters therefore began trying to understand how it was that sense
perception could occur at all without the presence of the soul-body composite.
For example, in the 1240s, Albert the Great asked whether it was true that
separated souls lacked senses and affections. 14 Albert argued that there are three
'° For further information on the process of turning to phantasms to understand, see chapter 1, 25-
7 .
"111 Sent., d.31, q.2, a.4: A.C. Pegis, 'The Separated Soul and its Nature in St. Thomas', St.
Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies (Toronto, 1974), 139. See also A.C. Pegis,
St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto, 1934).
12 Ibid., 145.
13 II De Anima, 4161)-41 V.
14 'An verum sit, quod animae priventur sensibus et affectibus?': IV Sent., d.44, a.43, 862-3.
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ways of considering the virtues of the sensible soul: act, being and root or origin.
In the first case, after death, there are no senses because the acts of hearing,
seeing and imagination are not present. They do not remain in the second case
either, because the being of organic virtue is in the organ itself, which is also
lacking after death. Senses are present in the third case, however, because the
substance of the rational soul is the root of all the rational and sensible powers. It
remains and thus so do its powers.I5
Albert thus sought to explain which elements would remain after the body had
died and the soul was separated from it. He was willing to accept that there was
some essence of the senses left even when the soul was separated from the body.
In a quodlibetal question disputed at Christmas 1258, Aquinas asked whether a
soul separated from the body had action of its sensitive powers. 16 He argued that
it was impossible for sensitive powers to have any action in the separated soul.
He explained his answer by comparing man to beast. The operation of the
sensitive powers is perfected in the same way in both man and in animals. A man
sees in the same way as a horse. The act of the sensitive power in an animal is
not a sensitive function in itself, rather it happens through the medium of an
organ. If the sensible soul in an animal were to have a function in itself, it would
15 `Dicendum quod virtutes animae sensibilis et ipsa anima sensibilis possunt tripliciter
considerari, scilicet in actu, in esse, et in radice. Et primo quidem modo non manent post mortem,
scilicet quoad audire, videre et imaginari et huiusmodi. Secundo modo iterum non manent: quia
esse virtutis organicae est in organo...Tertio autem modo manent: quia substantia animae
rationalis est radix omnium suarum virium rationalium [et] sensibilium. Et quia illa manet, ideo
etiam vires istae manebunt': ibid., 863.
16 'Utnun anima separata a corpore habeat actus senstivarwn potentianun': AQQ, qdl. 10, q.4,
a.2, 203-4.
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have subsistence and it would be incorruptible. This is unfitting and so it is
impossible that the sensitive power either in animal or in man possesses its own
act, every act of the sensitive power is through the union of body and soul.
Aquinas also denied the Platonic theory on the soul that the sensitive soul can
have two actions: one through the body which does not remain after death, and
the other which acts through itself and remains after death.17
Unlike Albert, Aquinas appeared to deny all possibility that there were any
sensitive powers remaining in the separated soul. He used his position to argue
against theories which were directly influenced by Plato. It would seem from this
point of view that the functions of the sensitive soul were thought to be wholly
reliant upon the body and soul together. This is evidence that some masters were
denying dualist theories which taught that the soul drove the body.
In 1269-70, however, Aquinas changed his belief about the powers which
remained in the separated sou1. 18
 He began by arguing along the same lines as the
question in the quodlibets. Here too he attacked the 'platonic' theory that the
sensitive soul has its own functions and operations in itself. However, Aquinas's
ultimate conclusion added another dimension. He stated that no function of the
17 `Dicendum, quod impossibile est in anima separata alicuius potentiae sensitivae actum
esse...Operatio namque potentiae sensitivae eodem modo perficitur in homine et bruto; eodem
enim modo videt homo per oculum quo equus. Actus autem sensitivae potentiae in bruto non est
ipsius sensitivae per se, sed mediante organ°. Si enim per se haberet operationem anima sensitiva
in bruto, per se haberet subsistentiam; et sic esset incorruptibilis...Unde, cum sit hoc
inconveniens, impossibile est quod in bruto vel in homine potentia sensitiva habeat aliquem actum
proprium, sed (minis actus eius est coniuncti. Unde in anima separata remanere non potest.
Quidam tamen dicunt, animam sensitivam habere duos actus: unum quem exercet organo
mediante, qui post mortem non manet...et propter hoc Plato ponebat animas etiam brutorum esse
incorruptibiles: hoc enim de necessitate sequitur, quod tamen isti non concedunt': ibid., 204.
18 
'UM= potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata': De anima, q.19, 245-52.
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sensitive part of the soul can only be in the soul in terms of operation. The
composite obtains its sight and hearing and every feeling through the soul. It is
clear, argued Aquinas, that the powers of the sensitive part of the soul are present
in the composite just as in a subject, but they are from the soul as from their
origins. Therefore, when the body is destroyed, the sensitive powers are
destroyed, but they remain in the soul as in their place of origin. This, explained
Aquinas, is what is meant by the opinion which states that sensitive powers
remain in the separated soul as if in its origin only.19
Aquinas thus developed his position slightly and essentially adopted Albert's
position. He followed the theory that there could be some element of the
sensitive powers remaining because they have their root in the soul. This was an
important development. Masters avoided following the platonic idea that the soul
possessed some sensitive powers independent of the body composite. This ran
contrary to their theories about sense perception and the arrangement of the body-
soul composite. However, there was a need to explain how the soul could receive
sense information when separated from the body. Recognising that the soul was
the root of sensitive powers was one way in which the soul could be said to
possess some powers of the senses. Theories about sense perception in the body
composite meant that their language for describing it was dependent upon the
language of the corporeal. However, these tentative arguments were
19•
`Mandestum est igitur quod nulla operatio partis sensitivae potest esse animae tantum ut
operantis. Compositum igitur est videns et audiens et omnino sentiens sed per animam; unde et
compositum est potens videre et audire et sentire, sed per animam. Manifestum est igitur quod
potentiae partis sensitivae sunt in compositio sicut in subjecto; sed sunt ab animae sicut a
principio. Destruct° corpore, destruuntur potentiae sensitivae; sed remanent in anima sicut in
principio. Et hoc est quod alia opinio dicit, quod potentiae sensitivae manent in anima separata
solum sicut in radice': ibid., 249-50.
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unsatisfactory when masters came to discuss the punishment of the separated
soul in hell.
2. Suffering and the Separated Soul
Early Christian doctrine believed that, after death, the soul would become
separated from the body until the end of time, at which point it would be re-
united with its body.2° Those souls which ended up facing the torments of eternal
damnation were to experience the various sufferings of extreme heat from hell-
fire, extreme cold and the gnawing anguish of the worm of conscience. 21 A
significantly large number of questions asked by masters of theology concern
whether and how the separated soul could suffer from material fire. It is notable
that masters focused on the issue of punishment by fire in itself and did not set
their questions in the context of either hell or purgatory. However, the question
applied to the punishment by fire in both places. There appear to be two reasons
for their interest here. First, as seen in the previous section, there was much
theorising on the precise way in which the separated soul experienced sense
20 In the patristic period, it was believed that those destined for heaven would spend time sleeping
in a refrigerium until God returned to reign over an earthly kingdom. The early Christians, like
their Jewish contemporaries, thought that the person slept whole until resurrection. However,
Christian theologians of late antiquity viewed the soul as immortal and separable from the body. It
was the body that was to rise again. See C.W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western
Christianity, 200-1336 (Washington D.C., 1995), 13-14; 0. Cullmann, Unsterblichkeit der Seele
oder Aufstehung der Toten? (Stuttgart, 1964).
21 For the early history of hell and its punishments, see A.E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell.
Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (London, 1993); M.
Hinunelfarb, Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form of Jewish and Christian Literature
(Philadelphia, 1983); R.Baucicham, 'Early Jewish Visions of Hell', Journal of Theological
Studies, 41 (1990), 355-85. For the visionary experiences of the torments of hell and purgatory,
see in particular, P. Dinzelbacher, Visionen und Visionsliteratur im Mittelalter (Monographien
zur Geschichte de Mittelalters 23; Stuttgart, 1981); D.D.R. Owen, The Vision of Hell (Edinburgh
and London, 1970).
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information. Material fire's action on the soul thus needed explaining. Second,
and more important for this chapter, is that masters' theories about pain and
suffering were constructed around the interaction between body and soul within
the body composite. Certain patristic and classical authorities who described
suffering in hell used language which was neither consistent with masters'
theories about the separated soul, nor with the masters' own technical vocabulary
or conceptual framework for understanding pain. These two factors were crucial
in motivating discussion about this issue.
The conundrum which concerned the suffering of the separated soul was
certainly not new in the thirteenth century. It had troubled theologians for
centuries and different solutions had been offered to explain how material fire
could punish when the body was absent. The theories of three theologians are
examined: Augustine (354-430), Gregory the Great (c.540?-604) and Hugh of
St. Victor (d. 1141). The first two have been chosen because their theories were
often cited by masters in the thirteenth century. The third theologian was an
important predecessor to thirteenth-century thought.22
i. Augustine
Augustine addressed the issue of the separated soul's suffering in hell by
comparing the soul to a corporeal substance. He maintained that the soul had a
certain likeness to a body. Indeed, Augustine understood the soul to possess
22 Apparently Hugh was known as the 'new Augustine' and Aquinas revered his works: D.
Knowles, Introduction to Medieval Thought (London and New York, 1988), 130.
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certain sensory powers which would enable it to experience the fire of hell. He
explained this by stating that one cannot deny that the soul could possess a
likeness to a body because during sleep it perceives itself walking or sitting,
going to and fro, which would not happen if it did not have a certain likeness to a
body.23 Augustine thus believed that the separated soul could suffer from
material fire, but the imagery which explained the way in which the soul suffered
was dependent on the corporeal. This was a trait which the masters were to adopt
to some degree in the thirteenth century.
ii. Gregory the Great
In his Dialogues, written in the late sixth century, Gregory the Great debated with
his interlocutor Peter24 whether the incorporeal spirit could experience corporeal
fire.25 Gregory asked Peter if the incorporeal spirit of a living person was held in
the body could it not also be held after death in corporeal fire? Peter replied that
the incorporeal spirit is held in the body because it gives the body life. To this
Gregory retorted, that if the incorporeal spirit can give life in this way, why
should it not endure punishment sense in a place where it is mortified. The spirit
23 lAnimam] habere posse similitudinem corporis et corporalium omnino membronun quisquis
negat, potest negare animam esse, quae in somnis videt vel se ambulare, vel sedere, vel hac atque
iliac gressu aut etiam volatu fern ac referri, quod sine quadam similitudine corporis non fit': De
Genesi ad Litteram, xxii, cap.33, PL 34, 481. See A.E. Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William of
Auvergne and the Fires of Hell and Purgatory', Speculum, 57 (1982), 518. For my refutation of
Bemstein's theory that esoteric theology moved towards an incorporeal treatment of hell and hell-
fire, see chapter 6 below.
24 Peter the Deacon was a Roman associate of Gregory. See J.M. Petersen, The Dialogues of
Gregory the Great in their Late Antique Cultural Background (Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, Studies and Texts, 69; Toronto, 1984), 20.
25 'Qua ratione credendum sit ut incorporeos spiritus tenere ignis corporeus possit': Gregory the
Great, Dialogorum Liber, iv, cap. mcx, PL 77, 365-368. See also, Saint Gregory the Great,
Dialogues, trans. O.J. Zimmerman (New York, 1959), 225-6.
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is held in the sense that it is tormented by the fire through seeing and feeling. The
spirit sees the fire punishing itself and whatever perceives itself burning is
actually burnt. Invisible burning and pain are transferred from the visible fire so
that the incorporeal mind is punished by both corporeal fire and incorporeal
flames.26
Gregory the Great thus believed that the soul separated from the body could
experience suffering from material fire in the sense that it 'saw' itself punished in
the flames. Understanding the suffering in this way caused both corporeal and
mental suffering to the soul.
iii. Hugh of St. Victor
Hugh of St. Victor's De sacramentis christianae fidei, composed in the early
twelfth century, was one of the first attempts to provide a comprehensive account
of all areas of theological study. Despite examining the theory put forward by
Gregory the Great, Hugh's own position on this particular issue was quite
tentative. He claimed that God was able even without material elements to give
the sense of pain to souls which were tortured.27
26 `Gregorius. Si viventis hominis incorporeus spiritus tenetur in corpore, cur non post mortem,
cum incorporeus sit spiritus, etiam corporeo igne teneatur?
Petrus. In vivente quolibet idcirco incorporeus spiritus tenetur in corpore, quia vivicat corpus.
Gregor. Si incorporeus spiritus, Petre, in hoc teneri potest quod vivicat, quare non poenaliter et
ibi teneatur ubi mortificatur? Teneri autem spiritum per ignem dicirnus ut in tormento ignis sit
videndo atque sentiendo. Ignem namque eo ipso patitur, quo videt; et qui concremari se aspicit,
concrematur...ex igne visibili ardor ac dolor invisibilis trahitur, ut per ignem corporeum mens
incorporea etiam incorporea flamma crucietur': ibid.
22 `Poterat ergo Deus etiam sine elementis etiam materialibus animabus cruciandis sensum doloris
dare': Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, ii, pars xvi, cap. iii, PL 176, 585.
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There were thus various differing theories which existed to explain the way in
which the separated soul could suffer from material fire, but there was no
consensus among these authors as to how it might occur. The thirteenth century
thus inherited essentially conflicting accounts of the soul's experiences in
purgatory and hell.
iv. Thirteenth-century masters
In the late 1240s, Albert the Great asked whether demons could suffer from
corporeal fire. 28
 Although the question was about demons, he applied the body of
his answer to incorporeal substances in general. Corporeal fire can be understood
in two different ways, argued Albert. First, as a vindictive instrument of divine
justice for sin committed against God; and second, in terms of a corporeal
element. In the first sense, the corporeal fire has the incorporeal power of
afflicting even a nature nobler than itself, provided that it is under the stain of sin.
The second sense does not exist. Albert also replied to the claim that a spiritual
substance is not susceptible to the species of material fire. He argued that the
intellectual substance is not properly said to be hot, but 'scorched', unless it is
called hot through the intentio, that is the species, of heat. This is improperly said
because the intentio is spiritual. However, Albert stated that perhaps it can be
said that as the fire is an instrument of divine justice it can imprint something of
its quality on the intellectual substance.29
28 An ignis corporeus cruciat daemones': IV Sent., d.44, a.37, 858-9.
29 ‘Ignis ille corporeus potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae
vindicantis peccatum commissum contra Deum; et ut elementtun corporeum. Et primo quidem
modo habet corporeus ignis vim incorpoream affligendi etiam naturam nobiliorem se, dtunmodo
sit sub peccato. Secundo autem non habet...In veritate substantia intellectualis non propria dicitur
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Although the subject matter concerned the incorporeal separated soul, or another
incorporeal substance such as a demon, the language used was heavily reliant
upon corporeal imagery to explain how they suffered from material fire.
However, fire could also have a painful effect in as far as it was an instrument of
divine justice. What this meant precisely was not elucidated any further by Albert
in this question.
In a detailed answer to this question,3° Bonaventure analysed some of the
philosophical arguments that had been put forward to tackle such a tricky issue.
The first group of philosophers Bonaventure assessed were those who denied that
the separated soul could suffer. They believed that since it was incorruptible, it
must also be impassible. Bonaventure rejected this theory as a manifest error.
Second, he explained that more modern philosophers, such as the Arabic
philosopher Algazeli (d. 1111), understood the separated soul as suffering from
loss or privation. If original sin, which is simply privation of justice, requires the
poena damni and the loss of eternal beatitude, actual sin, which does not simply
comprise privation, but also disordinate pleasure, also requires some kind of
afflictive punishment. For this reason, there existed a third argument which
concerned the idea that the soul could suffer as if in sleep, a theory which came
from Augustine. 31 According to Augustine, the soul could experience acute
calida, sed magis proprie dicitur adusta etiam quam calida, nisi dicatur calida per intentionem
calidi apprehensam: et hoc est improprie dictum, quia illa intentio est spiritualis. Vel forte potest
dici, quod ut ignis est instrumentum diuine iustitiae, potest imprimere qualitatem suam in
substantiam intellectualem': ibid., 859.
30 'Utnun ignis infemi affligat spirittun': Bonaventure, IV Sent., d.44, p. 2, a.3, q.2, 931-5.
31 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, xii, cap. 33, PL 34,481.
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suffering from images of fire in sleep. Although, there was no passio corporalis,
there could be passio animalis. However, Bonaventure argued that the fire of hell
needed to have real action on the soul, not merely imaginary.32
Bonaventure's own answer about the suffering was split into two discrete parts.
In the first case, he described how the soul could perceive the action and heat of
fire. In the composite, he argued, there were two ways in which the fire had
action: natural passion which resulted in the heating of the body, which is true
passion; and passio animalis which was a change in the sense resulting from the
soul's movement. If the body can still be heated and burn when it is separated
from the soul, then the separated spirit is also still able to suffer from the passio
animalis. These explanations are according to the order of nature, explained
Bonaventure. The other way in which the soul could suffer when separated from
the body was according to the order of divine justice. In this case, the soul was
said to be indissolubly bound to the fire, as if in a prison. Bonaventure stated that
this was not against nature, for the soul was joined to the human body to give it
life, although one is spiritual and the other corporeal, and feelings of love begin
32 `Aliqui enim philosophorum negaverunt simpliciter spiritum incorporeum posse cruciari,
attendentes ad eius incorruptibilitatem, pro eo quod senserunt, omne incorruptibile esse
impassibile. Sed iste est error manifestus...Et ideo aliorum philosophorum modemorum positio
fuit, quod substantia spiritualis dolore potest et pati, non per actionem alicuius, sed potius per
privationem...Et ista positio fuit Algazelis...Si enim originali peccato, ubi est pura privatio
iustitiae, debetur poena damni et carentia beatitudinis aetemae; actuali peccato, quod quidem non
tantum consistit in privatione, immo etiam in deordinata delectatione, non tantum debetur
aetemae beatitudinis carentia, inuno etiam poena aliqua afflictiva. Et ideo alii sumere volunt
rationem ex parte naturae ipsius animae, quem modum sumere possumus ab Augustino in
duodecim super Genesirn, ubi ostendit, quod anima pati potest, corpore non patiente, etiam
acerbissimus passiones, sicut et ibi probat per exempla in somnis...cum separata erit, pati potent
in illis et per illas, praesente igne infernali; quia, quamvis ibi non sit passio corporalis, est tamen
ibi passio animalis sive spiritualis, quae vera passio est et vera afflictio, ac per hoc vera punitio.
Sed nec istud fideli animae sufficit, pro eo quod credimus...quod poena illa infemalis sit per
veram ignis actionem, non per phantasticam irnaginationem': ibid., 933-4.
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from this union. Therefore, in joining to fire and accepting punishment from it
horror and pain arise from the union.33
This explanation also involved extending the meaning for pain. Bonaventure
examined the way in which pain was described by two authorities: Aristotle and
Augustine. Following Aristotle, he acknowledged that suffering is caused by
division of parts.34 However, this is not the general definition; it is merely that
kind of dolor which comes to the soul from the flesh." However, the other
definition involves an aversion to things which are displeasing to us.'
Bonaventure did not provide the full reference to Augustine here, but the
quotation comes from book 14 of De civitate Dei:
Dolor est dissensus ab his rebus quae nobis
nolentibus acciderunt."
33 Cum enim ignis agit in compositum ex anima et corpore, ibi duplex est passio: una naturalis, et
haec est calefactio corporis; alia animalis, et haec est immutatio sensus. Prima passio est vera
passio, quia est ab igne ut vere agente; secunda passio est ab anima se ipsam movente et ab igne
occasionem praebente...Sicut ergo, postquam separatur anima, corpus potest pati ab igne passione
naturali, quia potest calefieri et inflammari, et hoc per naturalem potentiem utriusque; sic spiritus
pati potest passione animali et ab igne praesenti inunutari naturali potentia ignis et animae. Duo
igitur sunt ibi per ordinem naturae, alia duo per ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quod enim ignis
animae indissolubiliter alligetur, et anima in eo recludatur ut in carcere, divinae iustitiae est...Et
quamvis sit illud divinae iustitiae, hoc non est contra ordinem naturae...quod sicut anima in
hominis conditione iungitur corpori ut dans ei vitam, quamvis illus sit spirituale, et hoc corporale,
et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit ad corpus amorem; sic ligatur igni ut accipiens ab eo
poenam, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit horrorem ac per hoc et dolorem': ibid., 934.
34 Bonaventure claimed that this quotation came from Aristotle, when it actually is to be found in
Augustine. Aristotle's phrase is rendered in Latin as follows: 'Dolor est distantia naturalium
partium.': Aristoteles Latinus, Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis Alterius, et
Translatio Anonyma (Brussels and Paris, 1969), vi, c.6, 129. Augustine, on the other hand, quite
clearly uses the phrase quoted. It is quoted elsewhere by others and correctly attributed to him. It
is to be found in De Libero arbitrio, PL 32, 1305.
35•
'Ad illud quod obiicitur de dolore, quod est divisio partium; dicendum quod illa non est
defmitio generalis, sed solununodo doloris, qui est animae ex came.'
36 i`Sed lla quam assignat Augustinus, "dolor est dissensus ab his rebus" ': ibid., 935.
37 De civitate Dei, 14, ch.15, PL 41, 424.
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Bonaventure explained that this second definition of suffering equates to the
impediment of the operations of the soul, rather than the cutting of the body. This
is seen in the case of paralytics in whom parts can be cut without affliction. The
reason for this, he suggested, is that the soul does not have any powers of
operation in that part, because they have been impeded there. The powers of the
soul which are its parts, can be impeded and disturbed in certain situations. In
this respect, the separated soul can be said to experience pain."
Bonaventure's answer to this issue was significantly more complex than Albert's.
He was aware of various theories surrounding the suffering of the separated soul
which were both traditional and contemporary to him. He also agreed that the
separated soul could suffer, but did not include the theory that the intellectual
substance was essentially 'scorched'.
The corporeal played a significant role in describing the way in which fire had
action on the separated soul. However, developing the meaning and sense of
words for pain also facilitated masters' explanations. Language used by
authorities required close analysis and explanation. New terminology for pain
was developed by adapting existing vocabulary. For example, passio corporalis
and passio animalis were types of pain which masters employed to explain
suffering in the human composite. It appears that these models of suffering were
consistently applied when masters discussed suffering.
38 'Ut enim ostendit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei, dolor potius venit ex
impedimento operationis animae quam ex corporis sectione, sicut patet in paralyticis, in quibus
est partium sectio sine afflictione, quia anima in illis non habet operationem, quae ibi impediatur;
et quoniam potentiae animae, quae stint eius partes, quodam modo possunt in suis operationibus
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Defining the concept of passio was central to a question in Aquinas's
Quaestiones de Veritate, composed in the period 1256 x 1259." He attempted to
explain how it is that the separated sou l can suffer.' He argued that passio has
two meanings: one general and one specific. 4 ' In its general sense, passio is the
reception of something by whatever means; this is the significance of the word
from the Greek to receive. Specifically, passio is the reception of something
through movement." Movement is always between contraries: everything which
is received in suffering (in patiente) is contrary to that which is subverted by
suffering.' Let us look a little more closely at this idea of subversion. A few
inquietari et impediri occasione accepta; hinc est, quod spiritus dolere potest affligi': IV Sent.,
d.44, p.2, a.3, q.2, 935.
39 Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate, Issu Leonis XIII, 3 vols. (Rome, 1972-1976), iii,
q.26, a.1: 'Qualiter anima separata a corpore patiatur', 745-51.
40 M.-D. Chenu highlights the fact that words change in sense from one author to another
particularly when discussing the concept ofpassio: Towards Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A-
M Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964), 120. Aquinas also distinguished different senses of
this word in his Quaestiones de Anima. Question 6 dealt with whether the soul is composed of
matter and form. In answer to the fifth objection, Aquinas argued that one can attribute the
concept of passio and actio to immaterial and material forms. The word passio is used for both,
but they are not the same thing: 'Ad quinhun dicendum quod passio quae est in anima quae
attribuitur intellectui possibili non est de genere passionum quae attribuuntur materiae, sed
aequivoce dicitur passio utrobique, ut patet Philosophum in III De Anima, cum passio intellectus
possibilis consistat in receptione secundum quod recipit aliquid immaterialiter': Quaestiones de
anima (Toronto, 1968), q.6, 113.
41 `Sciendum est igitur quod nomen passionis dupliciter sumitur: communiter et proprie': De
veritate, q.26, a.1, 747.
42 The term motus is very difficult to render adequately in English, and indeed may mean different
things in different contexts. In the Blackfriars' translation of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, xx
(London, 1975), the glossary describes motus variously as `either local motion, or the passing
from potentiality into actuality, or from one state to another.': 158. It could also conceivably have
something to do with the movement of the appetitus towards or away from something. In this case
it seems to be this latter definition, whereby the appetitus will move away from suffering, for it is
against its natural inclination. This sense also appears in Albert the Great, De sacramentis, S.
Albertis Magni, Opera Omnia, Ordinis Fratrum Praedictorum, i-xli (Aschendorff, 1954-), xxvi,
De paenitentia, pars 2, q.1, a.2: 'Quae sit differentia inter contritionem et attritionem', 82-3.
Albert explained that `in contritione enim movet timor initialis, in attritione autem timor servilis',
82.
43 'Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo et hoc sequendo
significationem vocabuli, nam passio dicitur a patin graeco, quod est recipere. Proprie vero
dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in moth consistunt, prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in
patiente per viam moths; et quia omnis moths est inter contraria, oportet illud quos recipitur in
patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abicitur': De veritate, q.26, a.1, 747.
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lines further on, Aquinas stated that 'every passio subverts substance'."
Although he himself did not acknowledge it, the phrase came from Aristotle's
Topics." Properly speaking, passio is the reception of something, but it is also a
kind of subversion and something which leads to alteration, but the word is
extended according to the use of language in order that something which is
hindered from doing something, is said to be suffering." This was an essential
element in the theological understanding of sense perception. This particular
phrase from Aristotle was a source of great difficulty when applied to the
separated soul, for it meant that an incorporeal being would have to be altered.
The use of Aristotle in this way presents just as many problems as it did for those
who accepted Averroes' interpretations of him on other issues.
The concern for Aquinas was how this could be applied to the separated soul. It
seems that only bodies can suffer in this way, because contraries only exist in
them. The soul, being incorporeal, cannot be altered or subverted in this way and
thus does not suffer like a body. Aquinas therefore gave a third definition of
passio for the way in which the soul can suffer: by the impediment of its
operations."
44 
'Omnis passio abicit a substantia': ibid.
45 'Omnis enim passio magis facta abicit a substantia...Simpliciter autem dicendum, secundum
quae alteratur habens, nichil honun differentia illius, omnia enim huiusmodi cum magis fiunt
abiciunt a substantia': Topica, vi, c.6, 128. Aristotle was discussing the differences (differentia)
between genus and species and how things are classed. Things cannot have other things as their
dyferentia which cause alteration or which subvert substance.
46 'Quia ergo passio proprie accepta est cum quadam abiectione...ampliatur nomen passionis
secundum usum loquentium, ut qualitercumque aliquid impediatur ab eo quod sibi competebat,
pati dicatur': De Veritate, 747.
47 Passio vero secundo modo accepta non invenitur nisi ubi est motus et contrarietas. Motus
autem non invenitur nisi in corporibus, et contrarietas formarwn vel qualitatwn in solis
generabilibus et corruptibilibus...Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non
potest...Tertio vero modo quo nomen passionis transumptive sumitur, anima potest pati eo modo
quo eius operatio potest impediri': ibid., 748. Transumptive here signifies the use of passio in a
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Aquinas and Bonaventure used the same method for explaining the suffering of
the separated soul. The impediment of the soul's operations and functions was
the third definition of passio. Both Aquinas and Bonaventure used the corporeal
language of authorities, respectively Aristotle and Augustine, to create a model
for explaining the pain of a separated soul.
The language of the corporeal and the language of suffering were closely related.
Masters re-interpreted the terms which their authorities used to describe suffering
and placed them within their own vocabulary and set of ideas for suffering. New
terms also emerged to explain how incorporeal substances such as the separated
soul were related to physical ideas about pain and suffering.
Although written over a decade after the Quaestiones de veritate, Aquinas'
quodlibet of Christmas 1269 shows very little difference in its answer to the
same question. Aquinas only added his criticism of the opinion that the separated
soul could receive knowledge of the fire which would cause suffering. He argued
that this would amount to a perfection of perception and would not be punitive.
Aquinas then divided his definition ofpassio into two distinct areas: the first was
by means of the reception of contrary forms, just as water suffers from fire in the
sense that it is heated by it. However, the separated soul cannot suffer in this
way, stated Aquinas, because it can be neither heated nor dried. The second
definition of passio amounted to anything which deprived something of its
transumptive or metaleptic sense, that is using it as a substitute for another meaning than it usually
has.
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proper action or inclination, just as a man suffers when he is detained and cannot
go where he desires. The soul suffers from corporeal fire by this method of
detention. Aquinas acknowledged Augustine's use of this terminology in the De
civitate de i.48
Matthew of Aquasparta also tried to define passio in the context of the separated
soul suffering. His Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima Separata, written in the
1280s, comprise various questions on the nature of the separated soul. Question
6 examined whether the separated soul can truly suffer from corporeal fire." An
examination of Matthew's objections to the question precedes discussion and
analysis of his solution. Although he proceeded to reject these positions in his
conclusion, there are so many objections which are against the thesis that they
are worth examining carefully, to understand exactly which issues masters felt
compelled to address. His first objection stated that the separated soul could not
possibly suffer from corporeal fire. If it were to happen, said Matthew, then it
would have to be either by natural virtue or supernatural virtue. It cannot be by
natural virtue because every actio and passio occurs through contraries, but fire
is not contrary to the soul. It cannot occur by supernatural virtue either, for the
virtue is either spiritual or corporeal. The spiritual virtue cannot act in something
" 'Quosdam qui dicunt, quod anima separata a corpore...potest accipere cognitionem a rebus
sensibilis. Sed Si etiam haec opinio esset vera, tamen pati sentiendo et intelligendo est perfici, non
puniri...Et haec quidem passio dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo per receptionem formae
contrariae, sicut aqua patitur ab igne in quantum calefit...hoc modo separata anima non potest pati
ab igne corporeo, quia nec calefieri potest nec desiccari...Alio modo dicitur pati omne illud quod
quocumque modo impeditur a suo proprio impetu vel inclinatione...sicut dicimus hominem pati,
cum detinetur vel ligatur ne vadat quo vult: et ita per modum ligationis cuiusdam anima patitur ab
igne corporeo, ut Augustinus dicit, in XXI de Ctvitate Dei': AQQ, 34.
49 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de anima separata, (Bibliotheca Franciscana
Scholastica Medii Aevi, xviii; Quaracchi, 1959), q.6: 'Quaestio est de anima separata, utrum vere
patiatur ab igne infernali', 93-119.
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corporeal, and the corporeal virtue cannot act in the soul." Again this idea of
contraries is expressed in relation to passio. The problem for Matthew, as for
Aquinas, was to demonstrate the existence of contrary things to the separated
soul.
In another objection, Matthew explained that some passions impinge on the soul
as a result of its union with a body. The example he cited was dolor:
which is the perception of continual division as
Augustine says in III De libero arbitrio.5'
Other passions have an effect on the body by virtue of its union with the soul, for
example blushing from shame." In other words, within a soul-body union, some
passions are experienced by the soul through the body, and such a passion is
dolor; others are experienced by the body through the soul, such as blushing.
However, in no way may the body suffer from passions which are brought to it
by its union with the soul, when it is separated from the soul. Likewise, the soul
cannot suffer from passions which it experiences by its union with the body.
Dolor is one of these." The objection offered a definition of those passions
" `Si enim anima separata ab igne infemali patitur et ignis ille agit in animam separatam, aut agit
virtute naturali aut supematurali...quod enim non agat virtute naturali, videtur, quoniam omnis
actio et passio, quae est a virtute naturali, est per naturam contrarietatis; ignis autem ad animam
nulla est contrarietas. Quod non virtute supematurali, ostenditur, quia illa virtus aut est corporalis
aut spiritualis...nulla corporalis virtus potest agere in spiritum. Nec spiritualis, quia virtus
spiritualis in re corporali esse non potest': ibid., 93.
51 'Item, aliquae sunt passiones quas contrahit anima ex unione sui cum corpore, sicut dolor, qui
est sensus divisionis continui, ut dicit Augustinus, III De libero arbitrio' The reference to
Augustine is from c.23 of the third book on Free Will, PL 32, 1303-1305: 'Quid est enim aliud
dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?'
52 `Aliquae sunt passiones quas contrahit corpus ex unione sui cum anima, ex cuius affectione
immutatur, sicut rubendo ex verecundia': Matthew of Aquasparta, q.6, 95.
53 `Sed corpus nullo modo potest pati passiones quae sibi conveniunt ex unione sui cum anima ab
anima separatum; ergo nec anima potest pati passiones quae conveniunt sibi ex unione cum
corpore a corpore separata, sed dolor est huiusmodi, ut visum est': ibid.
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which required the presence of a body to be experienced. Dolor is amongst these
passions that cannot be experienced by the separated soul. In another of his
objections, he explains how passio is a 'movement of alteration'. When
something suffers from another thing it is changed by that thing. The soul cannot
be changed by corporeal fire, argued Matthew, and so it does not suffer from this
fire.m So in strict terms, Matthew's objections demonstrated that suffering
required a body to be present. The language he adduced from authorities
supported this claim. Nevertheless, this language required application to an
incorporeal substance.
In his reply to this question, Matthew discussed three defintions of passio,
reception, change and metaphor. Reception is feeling or understanding in some
way as suffering. Change refers to something which is caused by a contrary, for
everything passible is corruptible. The third definition is metaphorical and refers
to a state by which a thing's natural operations are impeded." Matthew then
applied these three definitions to the case in hand. The first definition was not
applicable to separated souls, for even if they could receive corporeal fire, the
species would be intellectual and this will not cause affliction, but delight. This
conformed to the idea that the intellectual knowledge of sensible species is not
the cause of suffering, but the cause of pleasure. The second definition also did
not apply because nothing is the contrary of corporeal fire, and the separated soul
54 Passio est motus alterationis; omne igitur quod patitur ab aliquo, alteratur ab illo; sed anima
nullo modo potest ab igne corporeo alterari; ergo nec pati': ibid., 96.
55 'Quidam enim posuerunt quod triplex est passio: una per receptionem, sicut dicimus quod
sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati...Alio modo per transmutationem, et ista est per naturam
contrarietatis, et omne quod est sic passibile est corruptibile. Tertia est passio metaphorice dicta
per naturalis operationis impeditionem': De anima separata, q.6, 102.
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is unchangeable due to its complete incorporeality." It would appear, then, that
the explanation hinged on the final definition. According to Matthew of
Aquasparta, the separated soul suffers by being impeded from performing its
natural operations. It is violently detained as if in prison and indissolubly bound,
by divine justice, to this corporeal fire."
Matthew of Aquasparta's conclusion ran along the same lines as Bonaventure
and Aquinas before him. He agreed with them that the only way in which the
soul could suffer pain from corporeal fire was in the sense that it was deprived of
its natural functions. Like previous masters, he also challenged the language used
by Augustine to describe pain in general and then applied it specilwally to the
separated soul.
The issue of the separated soul and its punishment by corporeal fire provoked
much discussion amongst masters of theology. All masters agreed that the
existing methods for describing sense perception were unsatisfactory and
incorrect when an incorporeal substance was the subject matter. They all
examined and refuted notions of experiencing sense information when the body
was not present. Instead, there appears to have been a solid consensus that the
soul would suffer on account of some kind of union to the material fire, and pain
56 'Primo modo non potest dici quod spiritus separati ab igne corporeo crucientur, quoniam aut
non recipiunt aliquid a corpore aut si recipiunt, cum illa receptio sit tantum speciei intellectualis,
non erit ad afflictionem, sed potius ad delectationem. Nec secundo modo, quia nullam habet
contrarietatem ad ignem corporeum, nec spiritus separatus est transmutabilis, cum sit omnino
incorporalis' : ibid., 103.
57 `Sed patitur tertio modo, scilicet per naturalis operationis impeditionem...spiritus in loco
indissolubiliter alligetur et violenter velut in carcere detineatur. Ergo pro tanto dicitur spiritus
separatus ab igne infernali pati et cruciari, quia illi igni, divina iustitia faciente, indissolubiliter
alligatur, propter quam alligationem et arctationem in suis operationibus naturalibus impeditur':
ibid.
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would arise from the inability of the soul to perform its natural functions. This
theory also had the backing of authority in Augustine.
The language which masters had at their disposal used terms and vocabulary
which applied to corporeal natures. Where the separated soul was concerned,
such language did not properly apply. For this reason, certain short formulae
from the works of Augustine and Aristotle were used to criticise loose
application of language for suffering and reinforce the view that pain, properly
speaking, occurred only in the body composite. Once this was established, the
language for pain was extended to include the separated soul. The belief in the
union of body and soul in the composite explained the union of corporeal to
incorporeal. A further union, that of the incorporeal soul to corporeal fire,
explained how the separated soul could suffer from this fire. In the soul-body
composite the soul was able to perform its functions properly; in the 'soul-fire
composite' the soul was hindered from its natural operations. In this sense, a new
form of suffering for the soul was created.
3. Suffering of the Separated Soul : the Paris Condemnation of 1270
On 1 April 1272 the faculty of arts at the University of Paris issued the statute
Noverint universi. This statute prohibited masters and bachelors in the faculty of
arts from disputing questions which were purely theological or which contained
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elements of both philosophy and theology. 58 This was tacit agreement by the
faculty of arts that the activity of their members had provoked in 1270 the
condemnation of thirteen theses by the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. This
was followed some seven years later by a more haphazard, blanket condemnation
of 219 heretical theses. Why did these condemnations come about? In the
prologue to the list of 219 condemned theses, Tempier attacked a master in the
arts faculty, Siger of Brabant, and others for holding what has been dubbed by
historians the 'double truth' theory:
For they say that they [certain philosophical
doctrines] are true according to philosophy, but
not according to the Catholic faith, as if there
were two contrary truths...' 59
One of the main issues which provoked the condemnation of 1277 was that
certain masters of arts were offering contradictory truths, according to faith, on
the one hand, and according to philosophy on the other. This was a claim levelled
against masters of arts in the 1270 condemnation also.
One of the thirteen condemned positions in 1270 was the belief that the separated
soul could not suffer from corporeal fire. It was argued in the previous section
that this issue aroused interest amongst masters of theology because it did not
conform to their own theories about suffering. Did external factors, in this case a
challenge from the faculty of arts, influence the theories put forward by masters
58 J.A. Weisheipl, 'The Date and Context of Aquinas' De aeternitate mundi', Graceful Reason:
Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, ed. L.P. Gerson
(Toronto, 1983), 239-271, at 258.
59 `Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi
sint due contrarie veritates': Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis sub Auspciis Consilii
General is Facultatem Parisiensium, ed. H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, i (Paris, 1889), 543.
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previous to 1270? This section argues that the conclusion offered to the question
of the separated soul suffering from corporeal fire by one of the condemned
masters of arts, Siger of Brabant, was similar to that given by masters of theology
some decades earlier. It also explores other attitudes of the so-called Averroists
to demonstrate how certain condemned theses were also being debated in similar
ways by masters of theology.
i. Averroism
The emergence of a movement which has been variously termed 'Latin
Averroism' or 'Radical Aristotelianism' in the faculty of arts at the University of
Paris, presented a challenge to some deep-rooted positions held by the masters of
theology. The phrase `Averroism' comes from a Latinisation of the name of the
Arabic philosopher Ibn-Rushd, 6° whose exegesis on Aristotle's De anima was
available in the West by the middle of the thirteenth century. 61
 The chief
exponents of this movement were Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Siger,
a young master in the Picard nation of the Faculty of Arts, is first mentioned on
27 August 1266 in a report by Simon of Brion, papal legate, about a dispute
between the nation of the French and the other three nations. 62 Thereafter, it is
60 'Latin Averroism' was coined by P. Mandonnet in his Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin
au Xille siècle (Paris, 1899). F. van Steenberghen objected to this phrase claiming that the Arts'
Masters were influenced by others as well, and in fact that Siger represented proponents of
'Integral Aristotelianism'. See J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 272; S. MacClintock,
'Heresy and Epithet: An Approach to the Problem of Latin Averroism', Rev.Met., 8, 1-3
(Sept.1954- Mar.1955), 1:176-99; 2: 342-56; 3: 526-45.
61 F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, ii (London, 1950), 437.
62 P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant (Louvain, 1911), 80-1. Siger was probably born around the
early 1230s, and from his name he clearly comes from what is now Belgium. Apart from his
prominence in the 1270 Condemnations, little is known of him. For a long time it was thought
Siger of Brabant and Siger of Courtrai, a Thomist, were the same person. He was murdered by his
demented secretary in 1284: Knowles, Evolution of Medieval Thought, 247-9. Dante affords
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not until the Condemnation of the thirteen propositions in 1270, in which he is
explicitly mentioned, that he again appears.
The 1270 Condemnations themselves may be summarised into four subject areas:
the theory that the world was eternal; the unity of the intellect; the negation of
Providence; and the suppression of moral liberty. 63 The areas which aroused the
greatest controversy or discussion were the claims that the world was eternal and
that there was only one intellect for all humans. For the purposes of this chapter
the latter holds the most significance, because one corollary of it was the belief
that the separated soul could not experience the punishment of corporeal fire.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the chronology of events that led up to the
Condemnations of 1270, and briefly examining the arguments surrounding the
eternity of the world thesis, before looking in detail at the arguments concerned
with the separated soul, for there is some evidence to suggest that masters of
theology and masters of arts held similar ideas to one another on both of these
issues. This may further suggest that distinctions between the philosophically-
motivated theology practised by some masters of theology and the radical
interpretations of Aristotle held by masters of arts were blurred.
Siger the honour in his Paradiso of placing him alongside Aquinas, pseudo-Denys, Isidore of
Seville, Richard of St. Victor and Albert the Great: F. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant
(Louvain, 1977), 11.
63 Mandonnet, Siger, 160. The thirteen condemned theses are as follows: 1.Quod intellectus
omnium hominum est unus et idem numero; 2.Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: Homo intelligit;
3.Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel eligit; 4.Quod omnia, que hic in inferioribus
aguntur, subsunt necessitati corporum celesium; 5.Quod mundus est etemus; 6.Quod nunquam
fuit primus homo; 7.Quod anima, que est forma hominis secundum quod homo, cornunpitur
corrupto corpore; 8.Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo; 9.Quod
libenun arbitrium est potentia passiva, non activa; et quod necessitate movetur ab appetibili;
10.Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia; 11.Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se; 12.Quod humani
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However, masters of theology clearly saw it as their duty to attack the Averroists.
The first directed attacks against the positions of the philsophers in the Arts
Faculty appear to have come from Bonaventure in his Lenten sermons of 1267-
68.64 He attacked three theses: the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect
and the idea that a mortal may not become immortal. Bonaventure called the first
a perversion of sacred scripture, saying it denied that the son of God was
incarnate. To posit that there is one intellect for all human beings is to deny the
truth of faith, the salvation of the soul and one's respect for the Commandments.
This, he said, is what comes from the perverse undertakings of philosophical
investigation.65
Aquinas also became involved in the movement against Averroism. He returned
from Viterbo to take up his second session as regent master of theology at Paris
in January 1269 66 and was apparently prompted by the interventions of
Bonaventure to mount his own attack against the Averroists. 67 Aquinas' reply to
the positions of the Averroists took the form of a polemical treatise, the De
unitate intellect us contra Averroistas Parisiensis, written before the 1270
Condemnation.68 In spite of attempts by the great Sigerian specialist Fernand van
actus non reguntur providentia Dei; 13.Quod Deus non potest dare inunortalitatem vel
incorrupcionem rei corruptibili vel mortali: Chartularium, i, 486-7.
64 Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, 34-5.
65 Tonere enim mundum aetemum, hoc est pervertere totam Sacram Scripturam et dicere quod
Filius Dei non sit incarnatus. Ponere vero quod unus intellectus sit in omnibus, hoc est dicere
quod non sit veritas fidei, nec salus animarum, nec observantia mandatorum...Hoc igitur ponere
provenit ex improbo ausu investigationis philosophicae': Collationes de decem praeceptis, ii, 25,
Opera Omnia, v (Quaracchi, 1902), 514-515.
66 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 352.
67 Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, 57.
68 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 277. The colophon of the Oxford Corpus Christi ms. 225
from the early fourteenth century states: `Haec scripsit Thomas (ms taliter) contra magistrum
Sigerum de Brabantia (ms. Barbantia) et alios plurimos Parisius in philosophia regentes anno
Domini 1270.': F. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, 58.
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Steenberghen to prove Aquinas's dependence on Siger, it looks unlikely that
Aquinas knew of Siger's commentary on the third book of De anima.69 Siger, on
the other hand, may have known and used Aquinas's works in his own treatise.
This will be discussed systematically with regard to the works of both men
below.
ii. Eternity of the World
The theory that the world was eternal was not considered only by masters of arts.
The thesis was tackled by Aquinas at various stages in his career, notably in his
Commentary on the Sentences (1253-57), in part one of the Summa Theologiae
(1266-68), and in his treatise De aeternitate mundi (c.1270).7° In his second book
on the Sentences, Aquinas outlined his position as to whether or not the world
was eternal. His overall conclusion was that everything apart from God began to
be, but this cannot be demonstrated by human reason. Only by revelation can we
know that the world was created. 7I In the De aeternitate mundi, written probably
in the Spring of 1271, 72 a few months after the Condemnation, Aquinas went
further than in previous works. He presented two positions which objected to the
possibility, and pointed to the absurdity, of something being created and having
existed forever. First, Aquinas argued, there is an absence of passive potency
69 Van Steenberghen admits that it is not easy to establish that Aquinas knew of the Quaestiones
in III de anima, and that all one can do is show that some of the positions in Siger's work are
refuted by Aquinas in his treatise: Maitre Siger, 60.
7° F. van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism (Washington D.C., 1980),
10.
71 11 Sent., d.1, q.1, a.5: J.F. Wippel, 'Did Thomas Aquinas Defend the Possibility of an Eternally
Created World (The De aeternitate mundi Revisited)?', JHP, 19 (1981), 24.
72 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 385.
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from which an eternally-existing creature might be formed. Second, it is absurd
and intrinsically contradictory for something to be created and to have always
existed. In his answer to the first proposition, Aquinas argued that we cannot
prove the existence of any passive potency, but this does not rule out the
possibility that God caused it to be. The implication here, as John Wippel points
out, is that creative production does not need a pre-existing passive potency.
Aquinas stated that whatever answer is correct, if God allowed that something
created by him could have existed for eternity, then it would not be heretical to
maintain that possibility of eternal creation. If creation and eternity are not
incompatible in this way, then not only would the assertion of an eternally-
created world be not false, it would be possible.73
Giles of Rome appears to have held a similar position to Aquinas which, in turn,
led to his condemnation and expulsion from the faculty of theology around
1279.74
 Godfrey of Fontaines also followed a similar line. 75 So it would appear
that various masters of theology argued that the possibility of an eternal world
73 Wippel, 'Did Thomas Aquinas', 30-1. The problem with the study of the text of De aeternit ate
mundi, as Wippel points out, is the existence of textual variants in regard to this passage. In some
manuscripts possibile has been substituted with impossibile. The fact remains, however, that
Aquinas believes that one cannot establish, or deny, by reason the existence of an eternally
created world.
74 In his second book on the Sentences, d.1, p.1, q.4, a.2, Giles wrote: `Concludamus ergo et
dicamus quod rationes factae...videntur nobis solubiles et non esse demonstrationes; tamen ut
supra tangimus quia multa sunt vera quae demonstrari non possunt et multa sunt demonstrabilia
ad quae non sunt inventae demonstrationes, ideo non tenemus quod mundus potuerit esse ab
aetemo, nec quod non possit demonstrari, sed quod rationes ad hoc factae non videntur nobis esse
demonstrationes. Si ergo in hac quaestione aliquando visi sumus dicere quod mundus potuit esse
ab aetemo, non tanquam asserentes diximus sed gratia disputationis hoc assumebamus, ut
possemus ostendere rationes contra hoc factas non concludere. Certum est tamen quod Deus
potuit facere mundum ab aetemo quia ab aetemo potentiam habuit et non accepit earn in
tempore': E. Hocedez, 'La condamnation de Gilles de Rome', RTAM, 4 (1932), 45.
J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington D.C., 1981),
168-9.
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could exist. In any case, it could not be demonstrated by reason that it had not
existed for eternity.
The view taken by Aquinas shows some correlation with the position held by the
master of arts Boethius of Dacia in his own De aeternitate mundi. Boethius made
various distinctions between faith and reason, and also between the various
branches of philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics. In so doing, he concluded
that in no way can any of these branches demonstrate that the world began to be.
He carefully avoided contravening Christian belief by saying that if natural
philosophy cannot demonstrate that the world began to be, then natural
philosophical conclusions surrounding this issue should be denied. The
implication here is that Christian belief exists apart from natural philosophy; he
did not deny Christian belief. Conversely, Boethius argued that one cannot prove
by reason that the world is eternal either. 76
 The position seems to be very close to
that of Aquinas. Moreover, this may support the view that Aquinas' De
aeternitate mundi was not directed against the Averroists, but against a disputed
question by John Peckham during his inception as a Master of Theology.77
Peckham had argued that God pre-existed before creation and thus the creation of
the world was demonstrable by reason. However, it is important to recognise that
certain masters of theology were deploying philosophical reasoning to understand
theological issues in similar ways to some masters of arts.
76 Ibid., 156-8.
77 I. Brady, 'John Pecham and the Background to the De aeternitate mundi of St. Thomas
Aquinas', St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1974), ii,
141-78. Weisheipl thinks, however, that the treatise was directed against nobody in particular, but
rather against the common position in Paris. He also thinks it may have resulted from Aquinas'
commentary on Aristotle's Physics VIII, in which Aquinas thought he had found evidence for
Aristotle's belief in eternity of motion, time and the world: Friar Thomas d' Aquino, 484-5.
209
It appears that masters of arts also used similar methods of argument to masters
of theology when they discussed theological issues. Siger of Brabant was
concerned with defining spheres of study to achieve understanding of apparently
conflicting issues. A question concerning the differences between theology as a
part of philosophy and theology based on sacred scripture appears in two
manuscripts attributed to Siger, both of which are commentaries on Aristotle's
Metaphysics. 78 There is evidence that Siger was influenced here by Aquinas,
even borrowing some of his language. 79 The first main difference, as we would
expect, is that philosophical theology relies on knowledge from the senses,
memory and experience and from the light of natural reason. Theology concerned
with sacred scripture, on the other hand, comes from divine revelation. 80 The
fifth difference has particular significance. The theology of sacred scripture is
more certain than philosophical theology because it relies on divine revelation
and thus cannot err. Philosophical theology, on the other hand, is conducted
through the route of human cognition, which can err. 81 Aquinas voiced a very
similar belief in the Summa Theologiae. 82 There is much evidence to suggest that
78 The manuscripts are Vienna ms.Lat.2330 and Peterhouse, Cambridge ms. 152: W. Dunphy and
A. Maurer, 'A Promising New Discovery for Sigerian Studies', Mediaeval Studies, 29 (1967),
364-9.
79 Ibid., 365.
80 'Primo quantum [differunt] ad modum considerandi seu procedendi. Nostra enim theologia
tantum procedit ex principiis cognitis lumine rationis humanae et habitis via sensus, memoriae et
experimenti; alia autem procedit ex principiis cognitis lumine divinae revelationis': ibid., 366-7. I
have taken this quotation from the Peterhouse manuscript. Notice how Siger calls the
philosophical theology 'ours'.
81 'Quint° differunt quia alia est magis certa quam ista [ie. philosophical theology]. Certitudo
enim scientiae est ex certitudine principiorum. Principia autem illius modo certiori accepta sunt
quam principia hujus, quia quoniam principia illius accepta sunt modo tali in quo non potest
accidere error, scilicet per revelationem divinam, principia autem hujus accepta sunt per viam
cognitionis humanae, in qua potest error accidere': ibid., 368.
82 'Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt necessarium fuit hominem instrui
revelatione divina; quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis hominibus et per
longtun tempus et cum athnixtione multonun errorum provenerit': ST Ia, q.1, a. 1. For Aquinas
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Siger was using Aquinas when he was disputing theological issues. Siger's
awareness of the limitations of human reason and his separation of philosophical
theology from theology based on scripture should be borne in mind.
Monopsychism
The other main tenet of the Averroist commentators was that of the unity of the
intellect, otherwise known as monopsychism. The theory was that there was one
soul in all people, and thus the active and passive intellects were one and the
same for all. This meant, of course, that there could be no individual immortality
after death.83 Instead of individuals thinking for themselves, the individual soul
was believed to think in them, using human phantasms in the abstraction of
ideas." The starting point for the controversy was Averroes' commentary on De
anima III, 5, 430a10-25. In this passage, Averroes described the intellect as
separable, impassible, unmixed, eternal and immortal." This was a logical
extension of the ideas of Aristotle. Aristotle believed that intellectual activity was
immaterial in nature. The intellectual soul had therefore to be an immaterial
substance. Aristotle also taught that immaterial substances were eternal and
incorruptible. The soul was thus perceived by Averroes to be eternal and
unique.86
and Albert the Great's views on theology, see: R. McInerny, 'Albert and Thomas on Theology',
Albert der Grofie: Seine Zeit, Sein Werk, Seine Wirkung, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14; Berlin
and New York, 1981), 50-60.
83 Although individuals would share in some sort of impersonal immortality, they could in no way
exist after death as individuals: F.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth, 1955), 176-8;
Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, 172ff.
84 Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol.2, 435; Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical
Aristotelianism, 29.
85 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 275.
86 Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism, 33.
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Siger of Brabant discussed the unity of intellect thesis in his Quaestiones in
tertium de anima, probably written in 1269. In this treatise, Siger described the
intellect as a single separated substance. It unites to the body as a power, rather
than a substantial form, for if it were to perfect the body by its substance, then it
could not be separate. 87 The intellect is also eterna1, 88 ungenerated and
impassible.
If Siger already believed that the separated soul was impassible, then the question
of passibility and whether the separated soul could suffer from corporeal fire are
issues which appear rather outside the parameters of the unity of the intellect
thesis. The second issue, as Siger himself stated, has not really anything to do
with the philsophical discussions about the intellect; it is more theological in
content:
Consequently, we inquire about the soul in a state of
separation. The question is not very philosophical, that
is, whether the separated soul can suffer from some
natural element like fire.89
The interesting point is that he would include it at all. Van Steenberghen seems
to think that Siger included this question almost to deride the theologians. 99 He
87 `Solutio. lntellectus perficit corpus, non per suam substantiam, sed per suam potentiam, quia, si
per suam substantiam perficieret, non esset separabilis': Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in tertium
de anima, ed. B. Baati (Philosophes Mddievaux, xiii; Paris and Louvain, 1972), q.7: 'Utrwn
intellectus sit perfectio corporis quantum ad substantiam', 23.
as qq.2-3, ibid., 4-10.
89 `Quaeritur consequenter de anima in statu separationis, et est quaestio non multum
philosophica, scilicet utnun anima separata pati possit ab aliqua natura elementari, ut ab igne':
q.11: 'Utrwn anima separata pati possit ab igne': ibid., 31-35.
99 'In a word, according to the Averroist point of view, the question of sanctions in the life to
come does not even arise and the problem of hell-fire is simply a false problem. But before
arriving at this conclusion, Siger permits himself the pleasure of criticising different views held by
the theologians': Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism, 40. Van
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Siger of Brabant
`Utrwn anima separata pati possit ab
igne': Quaestiones in tertium de anima
(Philosophes Mddievaux, xiii; Louvain
and Paris, 1972), 31-5.
1. Ad quaestionem istam dicunt quidam quod anima
separata potest pati ab igne; non autem patitur quia
comburitur, sed quia videt se in igne esse. Contra hoc
arguitur. Et licet anima videat se in igne, non tamen
percipit quod ei noceat ignis. (p.34)
also claims that the question is treated in purely philosophical terms, without any
explicit reference to the theological doctrine of he11. 91 Although Siger did not
explicitly mention hell, van Steenberghen's claim is misleading. A detailed
comparison of Siger's answer to this question with Aquinas' same question in the
treatise De anima will serve to illustrate that Siger was aware of accepted
theological conclusions of the time. Moreover, it would appear that Siger's own
conclusion to the question was closely dependent on the arguments of Aquinas.
The texts of each have been placed side by side in order that the maximum effect
of close comparison may be made.
2. Nam, Si anima patitur ab igne quia videtur ei quod
comburatur ab igne, tunc anima non patitur ab igne, sed
a specie ignis. Item passio non esset passio, sed
deceptio, quod videtur esse falsum, nam Aristoteles in
hoc tertio dixit quod intellectus ille, qui est sine materia,
non est falsus, sed semper verus. Quare, si iste
intellectus non decipitur, nec anima separata decipitur.
(p.33).
Aquinas
`Utrwn anima separata possit pati poenam
ab igne corporeo': Quaestiones de anima
(Toronto, 1968), q.21, 264-73.
1. Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima
separata patitur ignem hoc ipso quo videt;
quod tangit Gregorius, in IV Dialogorum,
dicens: Ignem eo ipso patitur anima quo
videt. Sed cum videre sit perfectio videntis,
omnis visio est delectabilis in quantum
hujusmodi. Unde nihil in quantum est
visum est afflictivum, sed in quantum
apprehenditur ut nocivum. (p.269)
2. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod anima videns
ilium ignem et apprehendens ut nocivum
sibi ex hoc affligitur; quod tangit
Gregorius, in IV Dialogorum, dicens quod
anima cremari se conspicit cum crematur.
Sed tunc considerandum restat utrum ignis
secundum rei veritatem sit nocivus vel non.
Et si quidem non sit animae nocivus
secundum rei veritatem, sequeretur quod
decipiatur in sua aestimatione qua
apprehendit ipsum ut nocivum. Et hoc
videtur inopinabile...Oportet ergo dicere
quod secundum rei veritatem ille ignis
corporeus animae sit nocivus. (p.269)
Steenberghen's claim that Siger considers the problem as false, is not found in the text. He does,
however, voice the position of Aristotle.
91 'Le problême est traitd en terrnes purement philosophiques, sans aucune rdfdrence explicite a la
doctrine thOologique de l'enfer': F. van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant (Louvain, 1977), 52.
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2a. Forte, si quaeritur ab Aristotele utrum anima
intellectiva esset passibilis, ipse responderet quod ipsa
intellectiva separata impassbilis est, et forte ipse cum
Conunentare eius diceret quod ipsa inseparabilis est, et
si separetur ab hoc corpore, non tamen ab omni corpore
simpliciter separatur...Ideo intellectus unicus in omnibus
est et secundum substantiam suam et secundum suam
potestatem. (p.34).
3. Item Aristoteles primo huius dicit quod non quaelibet
ars utitur quolibet instrumento, sed solum instrumento
sibi conveniente...Quare, ut videtur, non potent esse
instrumenttun suae punitionis nisi ab eo cui unitur in
principio...Dico [my emphasis] quod unietur ei non sicut
forma materiae, sed sicut locatum unitur loco, quia
operatur in eo...Anima ergo ita detinetur ab igne, detenta
tristatur, et in hoc patitur, cum ipsa desideret alibi
operari, et non possit. Dicit enim Averroes quod omnis
voluntas est delectabilis. Quod ergo irnpedit voluntatem
animae ei unire, in quo quidem delectaretur, si earn
compleret, facit earn tristari, et sic [my emphasis] anima
patitur ab igne. Rationes evidenter possunt solvi per jam
dicta. (pp.33-4).
3. Potest autem pati anima [separata] ab
igne corporeo secundo modo passionis, in
quantum per huitismodi ignem impeditur a
sua inclinatione vel voluntate; quod sic
patet. Anima enim et quaelibet incorporalis
substantia, quantum est de sui natura, non
est obligata alicui loco se transcendit totum
ordinem corporalium. Quod ergo alligetur
alicui et determinetur ad aliquem locum per
quandam necessitatem est contra ejus
naturam et contrarium appetitui
naturali...Et sic verum est quod ignis ille, in
quantum virtute divina detinet anirnam
alligatam, agit in animam ut instrumentum
divinae iustitiae, in quantum anima
apprehendit ilium ignem ut sit sibi
nocivum,	 interiori	 tristitia
affligitur...(p.270).
Siger's solution to the question begins with how Aristotle would tackle the
Pythagorean idea that fire is in the centre of the earth. Next, however, he turns to
the question in hand ( Siger paragraph 1). Some people, in fact it is Gregory the
Great,92
 argue that the separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire, not by
burning, but because it sees itself in the fire. 93 Siger's argument against this is
that even if the separated soul were to see itself in the fire, it could not perceive
the fire as damaging to it.
Aquinas responded to the same point in his Quaestiones de anima (Aquinas
paragraph 1). Like Siger, he criticised the idea that visual perception of the fire
92 And not Gregory of Nyssa as the editor of this volume claims.
93 Gregory the Great, Dialogorum Liber, iv, cap. xxix, PL 77, 365-368.
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can cause suffering. Sight is the perfection of seeing and, as such, will cause
pleasure. There can be no affliction except in that the soul apprehends the fire as
being afflictive. How is this to occur? Aquinas offered Gregory the Great's
opinion that the soul sees itself burning and this is what causes the suffering.
(Aquinas paragraph 2) But he argued that there must be some consideration taken
as to whether the separated soul suffers from something in reality, or not. If it
does not suffer in reality then it follows that the soul is deceived in its estimation
of apprehending the fire to be harmful. This is untenable, so it must be said that
corporeal fire is really harmful to the separated soul.
Siger's discussion of the same passage is almost identical (Siger paragraph 2).
His argument continued that if the soul suffers because it seems to it that it is
burned by the fire, it is not the fire itself which causes the affliction, but a species
of it. If this is the case, then there is no passio (suffering), but deceptio
(deception). But this cannot be the case because Aristotle stated that the intellect
can never be wrong, that is, deceived in this way, because it is always right. And
if the intellect is not deceived, neither is the separated soul. The implication here
is that the soul must suffer from fire in reality.
So what is Siger's final conclusion? As historians of Siger have noted, his final
words on the subject refer to Aristotle (Siger paragraph 2a). If Aristotle were to
answer this question, said Siger, then he would probably reply that the separated
intellect is impassible. However, what has been ignored is Siger's own
conclusion about whether the separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire. As
was discussed above, Siger appeared to be dividing what he deemed a theological
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question, from the theories of Aristotle on the soul. In his conclusion to this
particular question, he appears to offer a solution.
(Siger paragraph 3) Siger quoted Aristotle who stated that no quality can use any
instrument it likes, but only an instrument which relates to it. Fire can only be an
instrument of punishment by uniting to the separated soul by principle. Siger
argued that this is not a union like that between matter and form, rather it is place
to situation, because the fire acts in the separated soul. The soul is detained by
the fire, in the sense that it cannot perform its operations. This detainment causes
the separated soul suffering, because it desires to perform, but cannot. Siger,
capped this argument by quoting Averroes, who claimed that all will is
pleasurable. Hindering this will can only lead to sadness. It is thus, argued Siger,
that the separated soul suffers from corporeal fire. This formulation of the
argument suggests very strongly that Siger had his own conclusion to the
question and that his beliefs were very similar to those used by theologians.
(Aquinas paragraph 3) Aquinas, as we have seen previously, offered an almost
identical solution. He also explained that the separated soul can suffer from the
material fire in that it is detained by the fire and cannot exercise its natural
appetite, nor go where it pleases. This will cause the soul, or intellect, to interpret
the fire as harmful and this will lead to interior sadness.
Two main points of interest emerge from the foregoing analysis. In offering his
own conclusion to this tricky issue Siger was airing an orthodoxy, which, as we
have seen in the previous section, masters of theology had established some two
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decades before the 1270 Condemnation. Siger's own conclusion was not in doubt
on this score. He did not deny that the separated soul could suffer the pains of
corporeal fire. It would appear instead that he was condemned for this thesis as a
result of the context in which the question was set. Second, despite attacks on the
so-called Averroists by such mainstream masters of theology as Aquinas,
Bonaventure and Albert the Great, the overlap between areas where certain
masters of arts and certain masters of theology agreed is striking. At times, the
way in which masters of theology expressed their arguments in the period before
the condemnation was analogous to the mode of expression used by the so-called
Averroists. Furthermore, Siger of Brabant did not present his conclusion to the
question about the suffering of the separated soul at one point in terms of faith
and at another point in terms of reason." He did not even appear to advance two
different plausible conclusions. Although he did not explicitly quote from
patristic authority, his own solution was based upon reasoned argument with the
authority of Augustine, who first mooted the idea of fire being bound to the soul.
Siger did not conclude in a derisory fashion, but followed the arguments of a
respected master of theology and concluded himself that the separated soul could
suffer in this way.
" Averroist texts are generally acknowledged as such by the detection of questions which base
themselves almost entirely on the authority of Averroes and which end with a formal declaration
of faith. Z. Kuksewicz has used this premise to question whether Giles of Orleans was really an
Averroist. See Z. Kulcsewicz, 'Gilles d'Orleans etait-il averroiste?', Revue Philosophique de
Louvain, 88 (1990), 5-24, esp. 21-2.
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Conclusion
Lack of consistent opinion on many different levels about the nature of the
separated soul provoked much interest into whether it could experience
information which normally came through the senses. Chief among such debates,
it seems, was whether the soul could suffer from the pain of corporeal fire. This
was an important consideration because the soul might spend its time in
purgatory or hell, separated from the body, until the end of time. It was generally
believed by patristic authorities, and even later commentators, that the soul
would suffer in some way from material fire. However, theories which existed
before the thirteenth century were unsatisfactory for the masters of theology.
They did not conform to their ideas about the human composite, nor to their
theories about suffering. The question may also have received renewed impetus
in the late 1260s when masters of arts at Paris also discussed whether it would
suffer and appeared to deny that it would. However, close inspection of the
question casts some doubt on this theory.
The language of suffering depended on the presence of both soul and body. The
separated soul thus fell outside its normal remit. Certain short phrases about pain,
culled from the works of a discrete group of authorities, provided the essential
model to demonstrate that pain, properly speaking, depended upon the existence
of both soul and body. In this sense, attributing pain to the separated soul was not
possible. However, extension of the conceptual framework which described pain
was possible. The suffering of the separated soul was explained in terms of a
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compositional arrangement between material fire and the incorporeal soul.
Unlike the union of soul and body where the soul received information through
the senses, this 'punitive' composition of soul and fire prevented the soul from
performing its natural operations. This was an attractive and plausible argument.
It conformed to theories about union between incorporeal and corporeal
substances. The impediment of the soul's operations was another means of
describing pain and suffering.
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6Defining the Corporeal: Suffering in Hell according to
Masters of Theology at Paris, c.1230-c.1280
Defining the nature of corporeality in hell and its relation to eternal suffering was
an important concern for masters of theology. The masters asked questions about
the bodies of the damned because certain passages of scripture were traditionally
held to be significant where the suffering of the body in hell was concerned.
Furthermore, in many instances, the nature of different kinds of punishment was
disputed or left ambiguous in later commentaries by key authorities. Part of the
métier of a theologian was to resolve apparent conflicts in his main authorities.
However, by debating these issues themselves, other debates and questions arose
as a logical consequence. In discussing the natures of the fires of hell and the
worm of conscience, theologians wanted to know which would cause most
suffering to the damned. Their interest in applying scales or levels of suffering
was thus an important impetus here. These issues form the background to the
first section on the nature of pain in hell.
The second section examines the nature of the resurrected body in hell. The issue
of the continuity of the self-same person, evident in so many treatises on
resurrection through the centuries, influenced debate on the nature of the
resurrected body itself. Masters asked whether bodily deformities would remain
after death because the maintenance of personal continuity of the self-same body
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was steeped in tradition. New theories imbued with Aristotelian influences
caused this issue to be vigorously debated.
The third section explores the effects of bodily suffering. Theories of sense
perception also influenced masters' beliefs about the eternal suffering of the
resurrected body. However, the idea that only the spiritual attributes rather than
the material action of hell-fire would be experienced, which was proposed by
such theories, became a source of some dispute. Increasingly conservative
approaches to theological study influenced debate from the late 1270s onwards.
The supposed effects of bodily suffering forms the final section of this chapter.
Ultimately, this chapter seeks to explore new dimensions to the history of the
body in the Middle Ages.' Intellectual conceptions of the body in hell appear to
have involved the need to create a multi-layered conceptual framework of body
and corporeality. How ideas about pain and suffering were used to create these
layers is an important concern throughout.
1. The nature of pain in hell
i. Fire
Paris theologians of the thirteenth century sought to
prevent popular religion from confusing or
contaminating the rational exposition of doctrine. One
way they did that was to de-emphasise the corporeal
I Recent studies on attitudes to the body in the Middle Ages have given scant attention to
theological attitudes. This has been partly rectified by a recent collection of essays: P. Biller and
A.J. Minnis (eds.), Medieval Theology and the Natural Body (York Studies in Medieval
Theology I; York, 1997).
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aspects of Hell and to stress instead the spiritual
effects of its torments on the damned.2
The nature of the the fires of Hell and Purgatory 3 have been analysed by Alan E.
Bernstein with reference to a theologian of the early thirteenth century, William
of Auvergne, who was bishop of Paris from 1228 until 1249. 4 Bernstein contends
that William considered the fires of Hell to be incorporeal. Hell-fire was the
metaphorical fire of passion, desire and anguish, and just as the burning bush
experienced by Moses was not consumed, neither were the bodies of the
damned. 5 On this issue, William of Auvergne distinguished between this
explanation of the kind of punishment from fire experienced by the damned and
another explanation which was that the souls of the damned would be burnt by
real, material fire. He considered this latter explanation to be worthy of the
common man who was not conversant with theology. The first, 'esoteric'
explanation was reserved for the students of theology, whilst the 'exoteric'
version was that which would eventually end up being disseminated to the
masses through popular preaching. 6 However, there seems to be much more to
2 A.E. Bernstein, 'The Invocation of Hell in Thirteenth Century Paris', Supplementum Festivum:
Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. J. Hawkins, J. Monfasani and F. Purnell (New
York, 1987), 22.
3 There has been a considerable amount of research done on the idea of purgatory and purgatorial
fire. The present chapter seeks to explore the nature of eternal, punitive suffering, and
consequently discussion of the nature of purgatorial fire exceeds the parameters of this particular
section. On purgatory, see J. Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. A. Goldharruner (New York,
1990); G. Edwards, 'Purgatory: 'Birth' or Evolution?', JEH, 36 (1985), 634-46; A. Gurevich,
'Popular and Scholarly Medieval Cultural Traditions: Notes on the Margin of Jacques Le Goff's
Book', JMH, 9 (1983), 71-90; R. Ombres, 'Latins and Greeks in Debate over Purgatory 1230-
1439', JEH, 35 (1984), 1-14; idem, 'The Doctrine of Purgatory according to St. Thomas
Aquinas', Downside Review, 99 (1981), 279-81.
4 A.E. Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William of Auvergne on the Fires of Hell and Purgatory',
Speculum, 57 (1982), 509-31.
5 Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology', 513.
6 Ibid., 515. For further discussions concerning esoteric and exoteric theology see Bernstein's
article on William of Auvergne's refutation of the Cathar denial of the doctrine of hell: 'Theology
between heresy and folklore: William of Auvergne on Punishment after Death', Studies in
Medieval and Renaissance History, 5 (1982), 5-44.
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this particular debate than the mere distinction between what was to be believed
by an educated elite and what was to be preached to the masses.
William of Auvergne appears to have started a series of debates, that became
common in theological circles during the course of the thirteenth century.
Theologians were interested in discussing the nature of the fire of hell because
the notion of punishment by hell-fire was a traditional belief and the works of
certain authorities, especially Augustine, had introduced some ambiguities in the
nature of corporeality and corporeal suffering. This will be examined in detail
below. It is argued here that ideas about the corporeality of suffering in hell were
not waning; they were beginning to receive greater and more sophisticated
attention from theologians. Moreover, defining the nature of 'body' and
'corporeality' was central to the way in which debates were conducted and how
they determined the nature of suffering in hell.
One theologian who was almost contemporary with William of Auvergne, in the
sense that he took up his Franciscan chair of theology whilst William was still
bishop of Paris, was Alexander of Hales. 7 Alexander addressed a quodlibetal
question concerning the corporeality of hell, or hell-fire. 8 There is no precise
dating for Alexander's quodlibets, but they certainly fall within the years 1231 x
1238.9 Alexander began by using the authority of Augustine in De Genesi ad
7 Alexander took the first Franciscan chair of theology at the University of Paris in 1231.
8 'Utrum ignis infernalis sit locus corporalis': quodlibet I, q.15, Oxford, Bod1.292, fos.321-323".
A similar question is found in two manuscripts: `Queritur ultimo de igne gehennali utrum sit
corpoleus it irmorporeus% qd1.1, (1.15, Paris, BN Lat. 15272 fo.I 70" and BN Lat. 16406, fo.4e.
Transcriptions of each of these questions are to be found in Appendix II , 281-2.
9 P. Glorieux, La Litterature Quodlibitique de 1260 a 1320, 2 vols. (Kain and Paris, 1925-35), ii,
57.
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Litteram to demonstrate the proposition that the fires and location of hell are not
corporeal, but likenesses of corporeal things. 1 ° Next, the contrary position was
put forward. Here, Augustine's De civitate Dei is quoted to argue that the
sulphur-producing fire of hell is corporeal and will torment the material bodies of
the damned and the aerial bodies of demons."
So what was Alexander's reply to this question? In a similar fashion to William
of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales concluded that there are two ways of talking
about the fire of hell. On the one hand it is called corporeal, on the other
incorporeal. In comparison to bodies which are here now, this fire can be called
straightforwardly (simpliciter) incorporeal. In comparison to God, howews, it is
also called corporea1. 12 So the fire of hell was understood to be either incorporeal
or corporeal, depending upon what it is being compared to.
Alexander of Hales appears to have been in agreement with William of Auvergne
with the suggestion that there are two ways of talking about fire. However, there
is an important new development in his thinking: Alexander was not
distinguishing between esoteric and exoteric explanations of fire, but interpreting
I ° For example, `Deinde queritur utrwn ignis infemalis sit locus corporalis. Et videtur quod non.
Augustinus super Gen[esi ad Litteram] libro xii: inferiorum subiectwn spiritualem essentiae
arbitror non corporalem': Bodl. 292, fo.323`.
11 'Contra idem in eodem quaestionem defimctorum anime infemis digne carnis amore
peccauerunt hoc est perillas corporalium rerum similitudines exhibeatur quod ipsi cami solet ut
sub terrain recondatur ex quo apparet ignis gehenne corporeus est. Item augustinus de civitate dei
xxi: At uero gehenna stagnum (ms. stangnum) ignis et sulphuris corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit
corpora dampnatorum et horninum et daemonum, solida horn mum, aeria daemonum, corpora
horninum cum spiritibus daemon urn autem sine spiritibus similitudo sum endo penam non
imperciendo uitam corporalibus ignibus. [Et] Unus quippe utrius ignis erit sicut Veritas dixit
(Matthmv,41)': BN Lat. 16406, fo. 42'1'.
12 'Et dicendum quod ignis ille uno modo dicitur corporeus, alio modo dicitur spiritualis quia in
comparacionem corpori que hec agunt dicitur incorporeus simpliciter. Tamen dicitur corporeus
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the notion of corporeality in a new way. By using comparisons, Alexander was
able to explain what he meant by corporeality. He also seemed to be suggesting
that corporeality after death is not the same as it is on earth. As far as attitudes
towards the body and the corporeal are concerned, it would appear that there is
more than one meaning attached to body and corporeality.
In the late 1240s, Albert the Great also asked whether the fire of hell was
corporea1. 13 Albert tackled this question in a slightly different way. He set up the
propositions for the existence of a corporeal fire in conjunction with the location
of a physically defined place for hell. Hell-fire is corporeal, argued Albert,
because souls are said to be punished by the corporeal flames of material fire.
Also, hell is underneath us, and in the earth, as is seen in a passage from Isaiah.14
Albert was quite adamant that beyond the testimony of the saints, there is no
more to be said on this question because reason has nothing to do with it. It is the
testimony of those who have received the holy spirit that the fire of hell is
corporeal and hell is in the earth, and thus this is to be followed and believed.
Albert did, however, discuss Augustine's views on the matter. Albert contended
that Augustine does not make any specific assertions regarding this subject, but
ponders them. Perhaps, in addition, argued Albert, the subject was not fully
[ms. coporeus] sicut dicit Augustinus quod angelus in animam simpliciter est incorporetts in
comparacione ad deum dicitur corporeus': Bod1.292,
13 IV Sent., d.44, a.38: 'An ignis infemalis sit corporeus', 859. An almost identical question is to
be found in Albert's De Resurrectione. See De Sacramentis, De Incarnatione, De Resurrectione,
Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Bemardo Geyer praeside, ed. A. Ohlmeyer, I. Backes, W.
Ktibel, xxvi (Aschendorff, 1958), Tract. 3, q.5, a.1, 312-3.
14 `Ratione quidem primae partis: quia statim in sequenti cap. dicet, quod constat animas igne
materiali corporalibus flanunis esse cruciandas: ergo scitur cuiusmodi sit. Pro secunda autem
parte dicitur Isa.14: Infemus subter te conturbatus est in occursum aduentus tui. Ergo infemus est
subtus: ergo est in terra': IV Sent., d.44, a.38, 859.
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revealed to Augustine as it was to other saints. Alternatively, it might be said that
Augustine did not doubt the species of hell-fire itself, but rather the way and
virtue in which it afflicts the sou1. 15 It can be inferred from this gloss on
Augustine that Albert was referring to the work De Genesi ad Litteram seen
above, in which Augustine stated that the fire and location of hell are not actually
corporeal, but likenesses of corporeal realities. Augustine's theory was that the
souls of the wicked were to be punished in Hades by an immaterial fire which
could be perceived by the likenesses of bodies which the soul carries with •16
For Albert, however, there was absolutely no doubt at all that bodies and hell-fire
are corporeal.
Albert did not agree with either William or Alexander that the fire of hell could
be discussed in different ways. He argued that there was no reason to doubt that it
is corporeal absolutely. However, in mentioning the problems caused by using
Augustine as an authority in this case, Albert appeared to be hinting that the
painful effects of hell-fire are at the root of the difficulty in determining the
nature of something as corporeal or incorporeal.
With regard to attitudes to the body, there would appear to have been a turning-
point in the debates on this question with Albert the Great. Albert seemed to be
15 `Dicendum, quod in ista quaestione ultra dicta Sanctorum nihil est dicendum: quia ratio nihil
omnino facit hic, sed in toto standum est dictis illorum qui reuelationem a Spiritu sancto
acceperunt. liii autem dicunt, quod ignis sit corporeus, et infernus in terra. Et hoc ideo tenendum
et credendum est. Ad dictum autem Augustinus dicendum quod ipse dicit non asserendo sed
tamen ipsemet magis putat ita esse, quam aliter et forte quod Augustini non fuit plene reuelatum,
aliis Sanctis plene reuelatum fuit. Vel dicatur, quod Augustinus dicit non esse dubitandum de
specie ignis, sed de modo et virtute qua affligit animas': ibid.
16 A.E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early
Christian Worlds (London, 1993), 329.
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shifting the emphasis of debate about the corporeality of hell-fire from the idea
that corporeality and incorporeality are comparative terms to the belief that it is
the suffering to be experienced in hell which is the crucial issue. Moreover, it is
suffering which is the focus for defining the nature of corporeality, and by
extension, the nature of the body in hell.
Sometime between 1252 and 1256, 17 Aquinas debated whether the fire of hell
was corporeal in his Commentary on the Sentences. 18 He examined various
positions held by certain philosophers regarding the kind of fire that was to be
experienced in hell. For example, philosophers such as Avicenna who did not
believe in bodily resurrection, but only believed in the punishment of souls after
death, perceived it to be incongruous that an incorporeal soul is to be punished by
corporeal fire. Therefore, they denied that corporeal fire was the means by which
the damned are punished. Furthermore, just as the joy and delight of good souls
is not in any corporeal thing, but only in spiritual things, likewise the affliction of
the damned will only be spiritual in the sense that they suffer from being
separated from their end in God. 19 Another position which Aquinas attacked was
the assertion by Avicenna and also by Augustine that souls are not punished
through bodies, but through likenesses of bodies, just as one might imagine or
17 J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Washington D.C.,
1983), 359.
18 Divi Thome Aquinatis Super Quarto Sententiarum, 4 vols. (1520), iv,q.3,a.3, qa2: 'Utnun ignis
infemi quo corpora damnatorum cruciabuntur sit ignis corporeus': fos. 571". It is necessary
to use an early edition of Aquinas's Sentences because the Mandonnet-Moos edition only reaches
distinction twenty-two of the fourth book.
19 'Respondeo dicendum ad primum questionem quod de igne infemi fiiit multiplex positio:
Quidam enim philosophi ut Auicenna resurrectionem non credentes solius anime post mortem
penam esse crediderunt et quia eis inconueniens videbatur ut anima cum sit incorporea igne
corporeo punirentur negauerunt ignem corporeus esse quo mali punirentur...Sicut enim bonarum
animanun delectatio et iocunditas non erit in aliqua re corporali sed spirituali tantum...ita afflictio
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experience punishment in sleep. 2° This is not correct, says Aquinas, for the
imagination is a power which uses a bodily organ. There cannot therefore be
visions of imagination in the soul when separated from the body, as there is in
the soul of somebody who is in a state cf sltunber.21
Aquinas's own position was clear: whatever is said about the fire which causes
suffering in separated souls, the fire which punishes bodies of the damned after
resurrection must be said to be corporeal because the punishment cannot easily
adapt to the bodies unless it is corporeal. On the other hand, it might be conceded
that it is not material in the way in which we understand the term. Alternatively,
it could be said that this fire does not materially alter bodies; rather it performs
with a certain spiritual action in the punishment of them. It is not called material
in terms of substance, but in terms of its punitive effect in bodies and to a greater
degree in souls.22
Aquinas thus agreed with Albert that the debate over the corporeality of hell-fire
was centred around the kind of suffering the bodies in hell would experience.
malonun erit spiritualis tantum: in hoc scilicet quod tristabuntur de hoc quod separantur a fine':
ibid., fo.570.
'Auicenna alien= modum superaddit dicens quod anime malorum post mortem non per
corpora sed per corporum similitudines punientur sicut in somnis propter similitudines predictas
in imaginationem existentes videtur homini quod torqueatur penis diuersis. Et hunc etiam modum
punitionis videtur ponere Augustinus in 12 super Genesim ad litteram': ibid., fo.570". On the
claim by Augustine that souls are punished through likenesses of bodies, see Bernstein, 'Esoteric
Theology', 517-19.
21 `Sed hoc videtur inconuenienter dictum esse. Imaginatio enim potentia quedam est utens organo
corporali unde non potest esse quod visiones imaginatiue fiant in anima separata a corpore sicut
in anima somniantis': ibid.
'Quicquid autem dicatur de igne qui animas separatas cruciat: de igne tamen quo cruciabuntur
corpora damnatorum post resurrectionem oportet dicere quod sit corporeus, quia corpori non
potest conuenienter pena aptari nisi corporea...Ergo dicendum quod Damascenus non negat
simpliciter ignem illum materialem esse sed quod non est materialis talis qualis apud nos est. Vel
dicendum quod quia ignis ille non materialiter alterat corpora sed quadam spirituali actione agit
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However, he also developed the idea that there were two ways of talking about
corporeality and the body, as witnessed in questions by William of Auvergne
and Alexander of Hales. Aquinas's comparison was that hell-fire is not called
material in terms of its own substance, but in terms of the effect which it has in
the bodies it punishes.
For this to make sense, it was necessary to rethink the nature of corporeality in
hell. For Aquinas, having only one concept of body was insufficient to explain
what was meant by corporeality in hell. There was a need to develop different
levels of meaning for body and corporeality. Aquinas dispensed with previous
models developed to understand what corporeality was and developed further
Albert's suggestion that the effects of fire could define its corporeality.
Furthermore, the nature of the corporeal as a concept was defined by the type of
suffering. How bodies suffered in hell could be used to define their corporeality.
This section has demonstrated that masters were interested in discussing the
corporeal nature of hell-fire because the corporeal and physical aspects were
expounded in scripture. Augustine, however, doubted the corporeal nature of
hell-fire, describing it as a likeness of corporeal realities. So there was a tradition
of discussing this issue.
Most masters were in agreement that there was a certain ambiguity in what could
be termed corporeal or incorporeal. William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales
ad ea ad punitionem...ideo non dicitur materialis quantum ad substantiam, sed quantum ad
punitionis effectum in corporibus et multo amplius in animabus': ibid., fo.570".
229
agreed that there were two ways of talking about corporeality. Aquinas, on the
other hand, argued that hell-fire was not corporeal in terms of its nature, but
according to the way in which it caused suffering.
So what attitudes to the body emerge out of the foregoing analysis? First, there is
clear evidence that theologians held no single definition for body or the
corporeal. Second, ideas about the 'body' after death and resurrection appear to
change. Third, most masters could not apply one definition of 'body' in their
discussion of corporeality in the afterlife, so they used two different ways of
talking about corporeality to create different levels of what body meant. This led
to further intellectual development through which notions of the 'bodily' were
related to ways in which the body suffers. Thus, by describing the effects of
suffering, the nature of corporeality could be defined more easily. From the
sources in this section, the following arguments may be derived: 'corporeality'
could be understood on various levels. On earth, 'body' meant the soul-body
composite. After resurrection it could mean something corporeal in comparison
to God, but incorporeal in comparison to bodies on earth. Alternatively, corporeal
could denote a 'way of suffering'.
Bernstein identified the importance William of Auvergne attached to using two
definitions for the fires of hell and purgatory. Bernstein's extrapolation of
William's words was that this debate was crucial to the societal and pastoral
concern of masters in general. However, the analysis presented here concerning
the same issue later into thirteenth century shows that having two ways of talking
about fire was a method masters employed to discuss the corporeal nature of hell
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with greater sophistication, which ultimately enabled them to define the
corporeal in terms of pain and suffering. If they were doing anything
consciously, they were strengthening belief in the corporeality of hell-fire, rather
than 'de-emphasising' it. Moreover, the two ways of talking about fire did not
relate to two different audiences, as Bernstein has argued. In this way,
corporeality and the corporeal nature of hell remained high on the agenda of
theologians.
ii. Worm of conscience
Interest in the nature of the worm of conscience was traditional, but fraught with
ambiguity owing to the unresolved position of certain key authorities. The worm
of conscience as a medium for punishment in hell owed its existence to a passage
in Isaiah, where it was written about the damned: 'Their worm shall not die, their
fire shall not be extinguished.' 23 Augustine entered a debate on the subject of the
worm of conscience and hell-fire, and left speculation open on whether each one
was primarily applied to the body or soul, or both:
Now as for this fire and this worm, there are some who
want to make both of them refer to the pains of the
soul, not of the body. They say that those whose
penitence is too late, and therefore ineffectual, those
who have been separated from God, are burnt in the
fire of the soul's sorrow and pain; and therefore, they
maintain, 'fire' is quite appropriately used as a symbol
for that burning pain.. .Those, on the other hand, who
feel sure that in that punishment there will be pain of
both soul and body declare that the body is burnt by
the fire while the soul is, in a sense, gnawed by the
23 Wermis eorum non moritur, ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt ad satietatem visionis omni
carni': Isaiah 66:24. For many theologians the gloss on Isaiah by Jerome was cited often: `Vermis
est conscientia peccatonim quae cruciat in suppliciis constitutos': PL 24, 676.
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'worm' of sorrow...And yet for my part I should be
more ready to ascribe both of them to the body than
neither of them, and to assume that the scriptural
statement is silent about the pain of the soul for this
reason, that, although it is not stated, it is taken as
implied that when the body is thus in pain, the soul
also will be tortured with unavailing remorse.24
Bonaventure tackled this debate in his Commentary on the Sentences. 25 He
alluded to the passage in Augustine's City of God stating that there are two
opinions concerning the worm: one that it is material, the other that it is spiritual.
Bonaventure believed, however, that the worm was spiritual. He added a new
dimension to this position by stating that just as materially afflicting fire torments
the body and the soul united to it, so grave suffering and remorse of the soul
overflows into the body. Therefore, Bonaventure argued, there will be great
remorse of conscience and suffering in the damned and this will overflow into
the flesh. So in addition to arguing for a spiritual worm, Bonaventure was able to
support the passage in Isaiah which asserted that God 'gave them a worm in their
flesh' 26
For Bonaventure, the worm is incorporeal in itself, but the suffering it caused has
corporeal aspects. With reference to the previous section, the notion of
corporeality in this case was defined by Bonaventure in terms of the suffering
24 The City of God, trans. H. Bettenson (London, 1984), xxi.9, 984. See also Bernstein,
Formation of Hell, 380.
25 IV Sent., d.50, p.2,a.2, q.1: `Utruin damnati habeant vermem materialem', 1050-1.
26 `Dicendum, quod Augustinus vigesimo de Civitate Dei ponit circa hoc duas opiniones. Quidam
enim voluerunt intelligere, vermem ilium esse materialem propter verbum Scripturae; alii vero,
rationem sequentes, voluerunt dicere, quod vermis ille sit spiritualis. Et horum opinionem dicit
sibi magis placere; et ex quo sibi magis placet, et nobis similiter debet placere. Unde concedendae
sunt rationes, quod vermis ille non sit materialis...Dicendum, quod sicut ignis materialis
affligendo corpus affligit et punit animam ei unitam; sic vehemens dolor et remorsus sive tristitia
animae redundat in corpus...Quoniam igitur erit in damnatis magnus conscientiae remorsus et
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which the worm was thought to cause. The body here is the composite of soul
and body similar to that on earth. The relationship between each part of the
composite is stressed in terms of 'overflow' from one part to the other. The
worm's corporeality is defined by the corporeal effects it has during punishment.
In his Sentence Commentary and in a question from his Quodlibets, written
between 1252 and 1256 and at Christmas 1256 respectively, Aquinas addressed
the same question27 and also concluded that the worm of conscience was a
spiritual form of punishment. Nevertheless, it also had effects on the body
because of the body's association with the soul. This was felt in the experience of
tears. The mechanism of overflow from soul to body was used to explain both the
physical and spiritual forms of suffering inflicted by the worm of conscience.28
Aquinas was in agreement with Bonaventure that the worm was to be understood
as incorporeal in itself, but that there were to be aspects to the punishment which
were corporeal.
As in the previous section, there is a conscious effort to explain the nature of
'corporeality' in terms of the effects experienced in suffering. Although the
worm is spiritual, it can be defined as corporeal through the way in which it
causes physical suffering. The body in hell appears to function in the same way
as it does on earth in terms of how spiritual and material suffering are
dolor, ita etiam, ut redundet haec moestitia in camem; ideo vere dixit Scriptura, quod daret Deus
verrnem in carnem eonun': ibid., 1051.
27 IV Sent., d.50, q.2, a.3, q' 3; Qd1.7, q.5, a.3: AQQ, 145.
28 'Unde sequentes Augustinum, dicimus, quod vermis ille erit spiritualis, ut ipse remorsus
conscientiae interius animam corrodens, vermis dicatur; et similiter fletus erit spiritualis ut ipse
dolor fletus dicatur. Aliquo tamen modo posset dici corporalis fletus, etiam sine lacrimanun
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experienced by each part of the composite. Corporeality may be defined
according to the nature of suffering.
The ambiguity present in key authorities concerning the nature of the worm of
conscience is a major factor in leading to debate of this question. In addition,
current ideas on the composite nature of the human body are applied to the
discussion of corporeality in hell. Both Bonaventure and Aquinas agreed that the
worm can have spiritual and physical effects in hell. They used the concept of the
human body-soul composite to explain the idea of 'overflow' between body and
soul.
iii. Intensities of suffering: worm versus fire
As was argued in previous chapters, spiritual pains were believed to cause a
greater amount of suffering than physical. 29 This was one reason why theologians
tackled a question concerning the relative effects the worm of conscience and
hell-fire would have on the damned. Moreover, the question itself appears to
follow logically from previous questions on the fire and the worm.
Chronologically it occurs quite late on in the thirteenth century, suggesting a
further development in thought from earlier questions.
Some time in the early 1270s, Gauthier of Bruges30 tackled a disputed question
which asked whether the damned were afflicted to a greater degree by the worm
emissione; ut fletus dicatur non solum dolor animae, sed dispositio qua corpus disponitur, anima
dolente': AQQ., 145.
29 See chapters 1 and 3.
39 Gauthier was born in 1225 in Zande, near Ostende. He entered the Franciscan Order in Bruges
in 1240 and then went to Paris, where he was eventually made a Master of Theology at the
Franciscan school between 1267 and 1269. He was made Provincial minister of France and
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of conscience than the fire of he11. 31 His answer is striking in that the spiritual
suffering caused by the worm of conscience is frequently described using
corporeal imagery. In his initial arguments for the superiority of the punishment
by the worm, Gauthier employed an ana?ogy to explain the effect it will have on
the damned. Whilst there is the fire which causes suffering to the bodies of the
damned, there is a hotter fire, like one in a furnace, which causes suffering in the
mind of the damned. 32 Augustine used this analogy, but it is also to be found in
the Liber Moralium of Gregory the Great, in which the mind is described as
being burned and devoured by the fire of internal suffering (dolor), whilst the
body is burned by the fire of hell. 33 Gauthier argued that the worm of conscience
was more intimate; it was present in the soul per se, whereas the fire was only in
the soul through the mediation of divine justice (when the soul is separated from
the body), and by dint of the body's relationship to the soul after resurrection.34
Gauthier was in agreement with earlier masters debating the natures of the worm
and fire of hell, and how each one would afflict soul and body. Like earlier
questions, he also included the idea that there is some sense of overflow between
governed in this position until 1279. He died in 1307. See Quaestiones Disputatae du B. Gauthier
de Bruges, ed. E. Longprë (Les Philosophes Belges. Textes et Etudes, 10;Louvain, 1928), i-i; P.
Glorieux, Repertoire des Maitres en Theologie de Paris au XIlle siècle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933), ii,
84-6. Glorieux does not give a date for Gauthier's disputed questions, but they must surely come
post-1269 when he became a Regent Master of Theology.
31 'Quaeritur an damnati magis affligantur verme conscientiae quam igne gehennae': q.22, 171-
178.
32 `Sicut ignis clibani est calidior quam ignis exterior non inclusus, ita ignis, qui est dolor interior,
est gravior quam ignis gehennae qui exterius devorat; unde concludit quod per dolorem, qui est
ignis clibani, ardent in mente, et per ignem, qui exterius devorat, cniciantur in corpore': ibid.,
171
33 'Clibanus namque intrinsecus ardet, is vero qui ab igne devoratur, ab exteriori incipit parte
concremari...Per ignem crucientur in corpore, et per dolorem ardeant in mente': Gregory the
Great, Moralium Liber XV, cap. 29, PL 75, 1098-1099.
34 'Poena videtur ignis inesse animae, non a se nec secundum se, sed mediante exteriori
instrwnento divinae justitiae, scilicet materiali igne, et post judicium inerit ei etiam mediante
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each element of the composite. However, his ideas about suffering are more
precisely described in order to separate each type of suffering and explain which
one was greater.
In terms of his attitudes to the body, Gauthier used the language of the corporeal
to describe both incorporeal and corporeal beings. In some sense, his argument
for two types of fire is reminiscent of William of Auvergne. However, in this
question it is pain or suffering which is decribed variously as corporeal and
incorporeal fire. The bodies of the damned also appear to be receiving more
nuanced treatment. Although the composite was an important medium for
understanding suffering, a move towards separating each element of the
composite and examining them individually can be detected in Gauthier's
arguments.
Later on in the 1270s, Matthew of Aquasparta also examined whether the worm
of conscience afflicted the damned to a greater extent than the fires of he11.35
Although the actual question concerned the separated soul, the frequent
references to the condition of the body after resurrection makes it certain that his
conclusions would apply in that case as well. Matthew's response to this question
has four parts: first, he asks whether there is a worm in hell; second, whether it is
to be construed as a physical or spiritual worm; third, what the worm is and what
is its cause; and fourthly, whether it causes more suffering than the pain of hell-
corpore...propter quod Gregorius, XV Moralium, 2, g: 'Reprobi, inquit, per ignem cruciantur in
corpore et per dolorem ardent in mente': ibid., 175.
35 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, de anima beata, de ieiunio
et de legibus (Quaracchi, 1959), q.7: 'Quaeritur quae poena erit gravior in inferno animabus
separatis vel acerbior: verrnis conscientiae vel ignis gehennae', 120-34.
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fire.36 That there is a worm in hell, Matthew proved with reference to Scripture,
especially Isaiah. Secondly, he examined the discrepancies between authorities
about whether the worm is meant corporeally or spiritually, and had to concede
that there is a likelihood that there are two worms in hell: a spiritual worm and a
corporeal worm, according to the testimony of the saints. Thirdly, the worm of
conscience represents the memory of all the sins of the damned, and they see the
privation of good which they are missing and their conscience argues against
them and accuses them. The reason why it is called a worm is because the
suffering is similar to the worm which emerges from putrefying wood: it lives
there and corrodes it. In the same way suffering from the worm grows out of the
putrefaction of sin.37
In answering whether the worm caused more suffering than hell-fire in the
damned, Matthew believed that it did for four reasons. Firstly, the worm is more
directly linked to guilt. It is separate from the pain of fire; in fact there can be
suffering from the worm without the punishment of fire, and the suffering from
36 • 	 •
'Circa istam quaestionem quatuor attendenda stmt. Primum, utrumne sit aliqua poena in inferno
quae vocetur aut dicatur vennis. Secundo, utrum sit poena corporalis vel spiritualis, hoc est dictu:
si ad litteram vermis intelligendus est aut spiritualiter secundum aliquam metaphoram. Tertio,
quid est ille vermis et quare sic appelletur et unde causetur. Et tune demum, iuxta propositum,
patere potent quae sit poena gravior et magis affligens animam separatam': ibid., 124.37 Esse autem in inferno poenam vermis testatur Scriptw-a prophetica: Is.51,8: Sicut
vestimentum, ita comedet eos vermis, loquitur de damnatis; et cap. 66,24: Vermis eonun non
morietur et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni...Utrum
autem vermis erit spiritualis, metaphorice dictus, intus animam crucians, vel corporalis, corpus
corrodens, puto utrwnque vermem ibi esse: et spiritualem, interius animam affligentem moerore
et dolore, ut videbitur, et corporalem, corpus corrodentem et dilacerantem...Erit igitur iuxta
Sanctonun doctrinam in inferno ad damnatorum poenam vermis corporalis, corpus corrodens et
dilacerans; erit et spiritualis, spiritus interius moeore crucians...[Tertia] vermis est dolor ex actuali
memoria peccati animam deformantis veniens, conscientia arguente vel accusante. Quod patet sic,
quoniam in inferno erit actualis memoria omnium peccatorum. Ergo damnati omnia peccata sua
actualiter considerantes, attendentes naturam suam tarn deformem maculis peccatorum, videntes
se peccatonun merito omni bono privatos, arguente eos conscientia et
accusante...incomprehensibili moerore et dolore torquentur...Iste autem dolor ideo vocatur
vermis, quia sicut vermis nascitur ex ligno putrefacto et in ligno, a quo oritur, habitat et illud
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the worm would be sufficient to punish guilt. Secondly, in terms of the suffering
it causes, the worm causes more discord. This is an essential part of the
mechanism of suffering: where there is greater dissensus, there is greater
suffering. 38 Thirdly, the pain of the worm is more intimate. Here Matthew echoed
Gregory's analogy of the furnace. The internal fire of interior suffering is more
intense than the exterior suffering caused by fire. 39 Lastly, Matthew argued that
spiritual punishments are more intense than sensual by drawing a comparison
with the intellectual joys of heaven:
For just as in the beatified interior pleasure and the
spiritual good are much more intense than external and
corporeal good, so in the damned, dolor and affliction
from interior and spiritual things are much more
intense than from exterior and corporeal things. And
thus I say, without prejudice, that poena vermis is
much more bitter and grievous in the damned than
poena ignis."
continue corrodit, sic ex peccato damnatorum, quod quasi putridum est...iste dolor nascetur; et
quia peccatum semper durabit, ideo iste vermis semper manebit et semper corrodet': ibid., 126-7.
38 See Chapter 5, 193.
39 'Prima est, quia poena vermis est poena principalior et radicalior et directius respicit culpam et
quia poena redditur culpae, illa major est quae principalius culpam respicit; ideo poena vermis
gravior et major est. Hoc autem patet, quoniam si poena ignis nonnisi propter culpam infligitur,
tamen dolor ex illa poena non est dolor de culpa, sed dolor, qui est in poena vermis est dolor de
culpa. Huius autem signum est, quoniam potest esse in damnatis poena verrnis sine poena ignis; et
est poena qua sufficienter culpa punitur...Secunda ratio est, quia poena vermis est poena
essentialior et magis habet de ratione poenae. Nam ut dicit Augustinus, XIX De civitate, cap.28,
sicut vita aetema essentialiter consistit in pace, ita poena aetema essentialiter consistit in
dissensione. Et idem dicit, XIV, quod dolor proprie dissensus est; ubi autem est dissensus major,
ibi est poena acerbior...Tertia ratio est, quia poena vermis est poena intimior. Nam dolor interior
interius cruciat, sed ignis exterius molestat. Ideo Gregorius, XV Moralium...comparat poenam
dolor interioris, quia dicitur vermis, igni incluso in clibano, sed poenam ignis exterioris igni
exteriori. Poena autem quanto intimior tanto intensior, sicut ignis inclusus quam ignis exterius
appositus. Et ideo poena vermis vehementior et acerbior est quam poena ignis': Matthew of
Aquasparta, Quaestiones de anima separata, q.7, 127-8.
40 `Sicut enirn in beatis delectatio interior et in bono spirituali multo est intensior quam in bono
exteriori et corporali, ita in damnatis dolor et afffictio ex re interiori et spirituali multo est
intensior quam ex re exteriori et corporali. Et ideo dico, sine praeiudicio, quod poena vennis est
multo acerbior et gravior in damnatis quam poena ignis': ibid., 129. My translation.
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However, of greater importance to this thesis, is the way in which Matthew used
the concept of contrariety in a more detailed way than it had been employed
before. The importance of this development was that it represented a new level of
control in talking about suffering in hell, and pain and suffering in general. There
are two levels to his explanation, and they concern the description of harmony
and disharmony, on the one hand, and contrariety and diversity on the other. As
far as harmony and disharmony are concerned, Matthew argued that they arise for
two reasons. First, whether or not things belong to the same genus. Thus,
corporeal and incorporeal things are most distant from one another, whilst two
things of the spiritual genus are most harmonious together. However, this first
distinction will only cause joy or sadness by accident. The second reason for
harmony or disharmony is caused by the appetite or desire. This is the essence
behind the cause of joy or sadness. The damned are more horrified and distressed
at themselves because of their sin, than by the burning fire. So this explains why
the damned suffer and how the disharmony or discord, which is the hallmark of
suffering, arises.41
Matthew also distinguished between diversity and contrariety. Diversity is greater
between things belonging to a different genus: spiritual or corporeal, for
example. Contrariety and repugnance, on the other hand, are more evident
between things of the same genus. Matthew illustrated this concept with an
41 `Dicendum quod convenientia vel disconvenientia duplex est. Una est per conforrnitatem vel
diversitatem in genere, sicut corporeum et incorporeum maxime distant, et spirituale et spirituale
magis conveniunt...Prima...non facit ad delectationem vel tristitiam nisi per accidens... Alia est
per appetitus vel voluntatis placentiam vel displicentiam...secunda convenientia vel
disconvenientia est de ratione et essentia delectationis vel tristitiae. Ita est in proposito, quia
damnati magis horrent, ut dictum est, semetipsos propter peccati deformitatem et magis displicent
sibi ipsis quam ignis urens, et ideo [haec displicentia] magis eos contristat': ibid., 130.
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example: the contrariety between hot and cold, which are of the same genus ( a
spiritual genus) is greater than that between body and spirit, which are not of the
same genus, although the diversity is greater. Thus, the spiritual worm as a
contrary to the soul will cause greater suffering than between the soul and hell-
fire. In this way, the soul will suffer more from the worm of conscience than
fire.42
 By defining what is meant by 'contrary things' in the framework of
explanation for suffering, Matthew could distinguish more precisely between the
corporeal and incorporeal elements of suffering in hell.
Matthew of Aquasparta agreed with Gauthier that the worm of conscience would
cause more suffering in the damned than hell-fire. Their reasons are similar: the
worm is more intimately related to the soul. Also, both theologians believed that
just as spiritual delights were greater than the physical pleasures of the elect, so
spiritual suffering would be of greater detriment to the damned than its physical
counterpart. However, Matthew developed this way of separating discussion
about the physical and spiritual elements of the resurrected body with his theory
of contrariety. This theory was his tool for defining how the corresponding
punishments of hell can have differing effects on the bodies and souls of the
damned.
Matthew's attitudes to the body appear to demonstrate some level of change in
thinking. Although, like other theologians of his time, he believed in the
42 Praeterea, differt diversitas et contrarietas. Diversitas enim major est rerum diversonun
genenun, sed contrarietas et repugnantia major est rerum existentium in eodem genere. Nam et
`contraria sunt, quae posita sub eodem genere, maxime a se distant.' Unde magis repugnat
calidum frigido quam corpus spiritui vel e converso, quamvis illa magis diversa sint; et ideo,
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composite model of the body, even in its resurrected state, the preceding question
has shown that there was some attempt to discuss each element of the composite
separately. In this way, Matthew was developing new ways of looking at the
body. Also, it suggests that the compositc model in hell was different to the body
on earth. Furthermore, in using a complex theory of contraries to explain
different types of suffering, Matthew allowed the body in hell to be viewed and
discussed in new and more nuanced ways.
In the academic year 1282-1283, Gervase of Mont-St.-Eloi was asked in one of
his quodlibetal disputations whether the worm of conscience punished more
severely in hell than the pain of fire.43 Gervase assessed the question based
around the severity of punishment which the soul will experience in itself and
from connection with the body, which is punished by fire. He said that the pain
of the worm of conscience is more severe in itself than the punishment from fire
because the worm represents interior suffering and comes from that which is
repugnant to the interior appetite in itself. In contrast, the poena of fire, which is
external suffering, is repugnant to the appetite because it is repugnant to the
body. That which is repugnant in itself will always exceed that which is
repugnant through another. The suffering caused by fire is less than the
quando inter spiritualia est contarietas, major est repugnantia et contrarietas quam inter corporale
et spirituale, sicuti est hic. Et ideo, quia major repugnatia, major afflictionis vehementia': ibid.
43 Qdl. I, q.10: 'thrum vermis conscientie gravius puniat in inferno quam pena ignis': Paris BN
Lat.15350, fos.271 6-271". The full transcript of this question is in Appendix III, 283-4. For the
dates of his quodlibets see P.Glorieux, 'Les quodlibets de Gervais de Mont-Saint-Eloi', RTAM,
xx (1953), 129-37, especially 132-4. Gervais came from the abbey of Mont-St.-Eloi,
neighbouring Arras. He incepted as a Master of Theology between1277 and 1279, after which he
obtained the chair of theology at Paris from his former teacher Etienne du Fermont. He was
Regent Master in 1282 and again in 1286 as is recorded in the disputes between the seculars and
the mendicants, because he was involved in the discussions. In around 1291 he succeeded Etienne
as abbot of Mont-St.-Eloi. He died on 27 January 1314. See Glorieux, Repertoire des Maitres
286-7.
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punishment of the worm which is more intimate and more troublesome by
causing loss, which leads them to fight against themselves. Thus, this loss, which
comprises the worm of conscience is joined to the soul in as far as it really causes
affliction to the soul and causes it to move against itself.44
Like his predecessors involved with the same issue, Gervase shared the notion
that there was a degree of 'overflow' between each part of the composite.
However, he made no mention of the internal fire as a description for the spiritual
suffering of the damned. Nevertheless, the masters who discussed this issue
agreed that suffering was greater when there was direct contact. Corporeal
suffering from the worm of conscience could only occur in the soul according to
the soul's union with the body. The soul, however, could receive direct contact
with the punishment of the worm. Its suffering was consequently greater. Ideas
about suffering helped to explain the links between the corporeal and spiritual
effects of punishment in hell.
Theologians were compelled to discuss the nature of suffering which the worm
and the fire of hell caused in the bodies of the damned because each type of
suffering was one addressed by biblical authorities and the church fathers.
However, interest in determining which kind of suffering was greater was a new
" `Dicendum est quod pena vennis gravior est, per se loquendo, quam pena ignis, quia pena
vermis que est dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat appetui interioris per se. Sed pena
ignis, que est dolor exterior, est licet ex hoc quod autem repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori.
Semper autem excedit hoc quod est per se illud quod est per aliud...Pena vennis est intimior et
inportunior semper faciens dampnum contra se pugnare...Dicendum quod dampnum in quo
consistit vermis conscientie per apprehensionem suam est coniunctum anime in tanttun quod
realiter affligit earn et movet earn contra se': ms. BN Lat.15350, fos.270'.
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issue which developed as a logical consequence of their treatment of these earlier
theological discussions.
The issues which are evoked by this particular question display an agreement in
the approach towards suffering in the afterlife. There was a general consensus
that the spiritual and physical parts to suffering in hell were related in some way.
This is evident in the idea that the physical action of material fire also had
spiritual effects. The mechanism employed to explain this was that of 'overflow'
between each element of the body composite. However, despite this reliance on
the composite model, theologians seem to have been increasingly interested in
viewing spirituality and physicality, and concomitantly, corporeality and
incorporeality, as separate spheres of discussion. The affinity of ideas between
Gauthier of Bruges and Matthew of Aquasparta is perhaps related to their order
affiliation: they were both Franciscans. It is also noteworthy that no Dominicans
entered debate on this issue. However, a similar approach by another master,
Gervase of Mont-Saint-Eloi, suggests that this was the way in which thought was
moving at this time. In any case, by the 1270s the composite as a model for the
human body was commonly accepted among theologians.
This question would seem to offer yet another dimension to the multi-levelled
notion of corporeality which was developed by theologians during the thirteenth
century. A being's corporeality could be defined by the way in which it caused an
effect on something else, for example, the worm of conscience although
incorporeal in itself, was 'corporeal' in terms of the suffering it caused. What all
these different notions of corporeality have in common is their dependency on
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the conceptual framework of suffering to define them. Indeed, as earlier chapters
have demonstrated, the mechanisms for understanding the suffering of pain were
being consistently applied across various different theological contexts. Ideas
about suffering were used to define what corporeality could mean. They were
also used to define the nature of the damned body itself. The composite model
appears to have been a limiting factor in the sense that it hindered what was
termed 'bodily' or corporeal from being absolutely clear cut. The use of suffering
as a theory of explanation for corporeality not only made theories of the
composite more comprehensible, it also changed the way in which the composite
was perceived.
2. The nature of the resurrected body
All people arise with the bodies they now wear.45
This affirmation by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 provoked much
discussion in theological circles. However, the nature and timing of Resurrection
was by no means a new issue. Caroline Walker Bynum has shown that there was
an ongoing debate surrounding the way in which resurrection was perceived.°
The core issue she identified was the continual debate, over the centuries, of the
45 Fourth Lateran Council 1215, Mansi, xxii, cols.954-1086.
46 C.W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (Washington
D.C., 1995). See also 0. Cullmann, Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder Aufstehung der Toten?
(Stuttgart, 1964). On the theological developments surrounding the Last Judgement, see C. Viola,
`Jugements de Dieu et Jugement Dernier: Saint Augustin et la scolastique naissante (Fin XI%
milieu XIII' siêcles)', The Use and Abuse of Eschatology, ed. W.Verbeke, D.Verhelst and A.
Welthenhugsen, Mediaevalia Louvaniensia, Series 1, Studia xv (Louvain, 1988), 242-98.
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acceptance and rejection of the Pauline 'seed metaphor.' 47 It was in the second
century that Athenagoras first concluded that personal identity was crucial to the
resurrection. He believed that it would not occur unless the same body was re-
united with the same soul." By the fourth century, writers such as Augustine
maintained that complete bodily material and wholeness would be recovered.
People would arise with gender and they would be distinguished by their
differences and rank. For example martyrs would arise with the scars they had
received in the course of their martyrdom.°
The relationship between the continuation of the person and the resurrected body
was brought into sharp focus in the thirteenth century. The Aristotelian
metaphysical explanation of the relationship between body and soul had an
important impact on perceptions about the resurrected body. The idea that the
soul would remain immortal and that the same body would once again be joined
to it was problematic on the levels of natural science, philosophy and theology.50
In purely philosophical terms, Aquinas's belief in the soul acting as the
substantial form of the body and creating the composite by informing prime
matter meant that even with new or different prime matter, the soul would
inform it in the same way: it would thus be the self-same body. 51 In fact,
Aquinas's adherence to the idea of identity and soul being related led to
47 'Sic et resurrectio mortuorwn. Seminatur in corruptione surget in incorruptione. Seminatur in
ignobilitate, surget in gloria. Seminatur in infIrmitate, surget in virtute. Seminatur corpus animale,
surget corpus spirituale': Biblia sacra iuxta Vulgata, I Cor. 15, v.42-44.
48 Bynum, Resurrection, 32.
49 De civitate Dei, bk. 22, c.15 and c.19; Bynum, Resurrection, 98.
5° M. Schmaus, 'Die UnsterblichIceit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes nach
Bonaventura', L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age, Actes du Premier
Congres International de Philosophie Medijvale 1958 (Louvain and Paris, 1960), 505-19, at 506.
51 J.G. Hanink, 'Recovering the Resurrection', The New Scholasticism, 57 (1983), 146.
245
opposition and condemnation of this thesis which was not lifted until 1 336 with
the Bull `Benedictus Deus'. 52 The problem with explaining the continuation of
person which resurrection was meant to maintain was that death came in the
way. If a material thing passed away and then came back to life, could it be said
to be the same object? Is it, in other words, numerically the same? This was an
issue which was also applied to the resurrection of Christ's body. 53 It would
seem that Aquinas believed the 'being' of an individual to be present in the soul.
This 'being' created the composite. At death, the union of soul and body may
corrupt, but the essential principles which made up the body would not. In this
sense, then, Aquinas could maintain belief in a temporal gap between death and
resurrection, and yet still not fall into the trap of asserting that the soul was the
person. 54 However, this argument still left open the question of how important
the material body was as a medium for suffering after Resurrection in Hell. The
bodies of the glorified were to possess the gifts (dotes) of agility, impassibility
and clarity. In contrast, the bodies of the damned were to be heavy, opaque and
capable of suffering. The corporeality of suffering which was to be experienced
by the reprobate in Hell was to be individual and related to the sins of that
person. 55 With the idea of material continuity in mind, theologians felt
themselves obliged to ask whether the bodies of sinners which possessed
52 Bynum, Resurrection, 10.
53 For example, see Aquinas, qd1.II, q.1, a.1: AQQ., 22. For the metaphysical question of a human
body being resurrected without quantity, see Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Quodlibets cinq, six et
sept, ed. M. de Wulf and J. Hoffinans (Les philosophes belges. Textes et etudes, 3; Louvain,
1914), qdl.VI, q.16: 'thrum Si corpus humanum resurgeret sine quantitate esset idem numero
quod prius', 254-9.
4 J. Kearey, 'St. Thomas on Death, Resurrection and Personal Identity', Angelicum, 69 (1992), 3-
22, especially 10-16. Aquinas makes his own position clear in his Commentary on II Corinthians
in which he criticises the position of Tertullian who believed that the soul has corporeal form and
members. See In Omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentaria, 3 vols. (Leodii, 1857-58), ii,
lectio 5.
55 Bynum, Resurrection, 135.
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mutilations or defects in this life would be resurrected with those same
mutilations.
Masters wanted to know if the body which was resurrected in hell was identical
to the body on earth. The issue at stake for masters was the extent to which body
was equal to person. The traditional view of bodily resurrection was that exactly
the same person was resurrected. However, as was displayed above, Aristotelian
theories of continuity concerning matter and form produced new problems in the
belief that the individual person and exact bodily continuity after death were
mutually dependent. Moreover, a further question which theologians were trying
to answer was whether suffering required a numerically identical body.
In the fourth book of his Commentary on the Sentences, Albert the Great asked
two questions about this issue. First, he asked whether the damned would be
resurrected with mutilation of their bodily parts. 56 Albert concluded that pain or
punishment is caused in two ways: from nature and from guilt in the will. The
first kind of punishment, which meant some kind of mutilation of the body, will
be corrected, for it was not instituted by man. The second kind of punishment,
which will not be corrected, is guilt. This guilt was perceived by Albert in two
ways. In one way, it comprised the disobedience of the flesh to the spirit; in
another, it referred to fire and the worm of conscience in the will of the person.57
So, Albert distinguished between the bodily defects which are caused by nature
56 IV Sent., d.43, a.24: 'An mali resurgent cum mutilatione membrorum', 826-7.57-
`Dicendum quod poena causatur dupliciter, scilicet ex natura et ex culpa voluntatis. Prima
poena corrigitur: quia non est homini imputanda. Secunda autem non. Dico autem ex culpa
voluntatis remotae, aut propinquae: remotae, sicut est inobedientia carnis ad spiritwn, quae manet
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and the personal defects introduced to the will by a personal lapse into sin.
Punishment will be received for the latter but not the former, argued Albert.
In the following question, Albert asked whether pains caused by an inequality of
the humours in the body would remain in the resurrected bodies of the damned.58
Albert argued, drawing on the authority of Bernard of Clairvaux, that hell-fire
was the punishment for guilt and not nature. The inseparable link between
and the fire meant that the fire was eternal. Such eternal suffering for guilt cannot
occur if the bodily complexion is destroyed by inequalities; a balanced
complexion is required so that any inequality of the humours will not lead to
infirmity.59
 Furthermore, Albert stated that flesh that was corrupted in fact suffers
less. In order for the damned to suffer to a maximum extent, it was necessary that
their flesh was not corrupted.6°
Albert therefore believed that the bodies of the damned were physically different
from their living versions on earth. Any bodily defect, even for the damned,
would be removed at resurrection. Albert's main argument for this was that a
perfectly-formed body was required in order for it to suffer the punishments of
hell. This meant that in terms of the continuity of the individual in hell,
numerically identical continuity is less important than the presence of individual
in damnatis: propinqua autem, sicut est ignis, et verrnis conscientiae et huiusmodi, quae causantur
ex peccato voluntario inquanttun voluntarium voluntate personae, et non naturae': ibid., 826.
58 'An dolores causati ex inaequalitate humorum manebune: IV Sent., d.43, a.25, 827.
59 'Item, Bemardus dicit quod ignis infemi insequitur culpam, non naturam: et quia culpa
inseparabilis est, ideo perpetuus erit ignis. Ideo necesse est eos in igne perpetuari: sed hoc fieri
non posset, Si destrueretur complexio propter inaequalitatem. Ergo necesse est, quod complexio
aequalis servetur. Ergo nunquam habebunt infirmitatem ex inaequalitate humoris causatum': ibid.
60 'Item, caro corrupta minus dolet cum ergo impii maxime doleant secundum sensum, necesse est
quod semper caro viva et incorrupta perduret': ibid.
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guilt. Personal guilt, rather than an identical body, appears to be a key factor in
defining the person after resurrection.
Bonaventure also asked whether deformities would be resurrected in the bodies
of the damned in his Commentary on the Sentences. 61 However, he came to a
different conclusion. Bonaventure argued that the bodies of the damned would be
resurrected with their deformities. He pointed out that Augustine left this
question unsolved, but in Bonaventure's opinion the bodies resurrected for the
purposes of damnation will be in a worse condition, rather than a better
condition. In terms of their bodily resurrection, then, the damned will receive no
beauty, and no deformity which they possess will be removed. In other words,
the bodies of the damned will not be perfected in the same way as the bodies of
the elect, for example. God, argued Bonaventure, is the reforger, or re-moulder,
because he gives back to the bodies the same form which nature gave to them at
their first generation. God possesses the wisdom (sapientia) to 'repair' the bodies
of the damned to their original state, but he acts according to justice: those who
merit a beautiful body, the elect, will be rewarded with beauty. Those who sin,
however, should be punished in this terrible state. This punishment of deformity
ought to be confirmed, not taken away. 62 Bonaventure is thus clearly asserting a
61 'Utrum deformitates resurgant in corporibus darruiatorum': IV Sent., d.44, p.1, a.3, q.2, 915-17.
62 'Corpora damnatorum resurgent cum suis deformitatibus. Dicendum quod Augustinus in
Enchiridio istam quaestionem dimittit insolutam...si enim ad hoc resurgunt, ut damnetur, non ut
melioris, sed ut peioris sint conditionis; manifeste non habuerunt, nec auferetur deformitas, quam
habuerunt. Unde Deus quantum ad eos est purus reformator, quia secundum eandem formam
reformat, quam eis natura dedit in generatione primaria. In qua reformatione apparet Dei sapientia
et iustitia: sapientia, quia scit omnino eodem modo reparare, sicut ante fuit; iustitia, ut, sicut qui
meruit in corpore pulchro, remuneretur in eius pulchritudine; sic qui in turpi peccavit in eius
turpitudine cruciari debet; nec debet auferri, sed potius confirrnari': ibid., 916.
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material continuity between the suffering of the body in this life, and the state it
was to possess after resurrection.
In comparison to Albert the Great, Bonaventure seemed to be following a more
traditional line of argument. Bonaventure argued for a direct material continuity
of the resurrected body and that all factors which could contribute to maximise
the suffering of the damned should remain. Unlike Albert, he could not accept
the existence of a perfect body for the damned; for him, this was a gift of the
bodies of the elect in heaven.
The attitude to the resurrected body expressed by Bonaventure argued for
complete continuity and identity with the living body. Aquinas, however, did not
agree with this position. He tackled this question in his Commentary on the
Sentences. 63 It also appears in the Supplement to the third part of the Summa
Theologiae64 and a more succint question is to be found in his Quodlibets.65
Aquinas distinguished between two types of deformity. The first is any defect in
a bodily member, like a terrible mutilation, for instance. This kind of defect
cannot be in the bodies of either the elect or the damned because both groups are
resurrected with intact bodies. The other kind of deformity, is the possession of
an illness or a fever, for example. Aquinas stated that modern scholars are
divided on the issue of whether the damned have this kind of defect in their
bodies, or not. Some maintain, he explained, that this sort of defect will remain
63 'thrum damnatorum corpora cum suis deformitatibus resurgant': IV Sent., d.44, q.3, a.3, gal,
fos.566"- 5691.
64 S.Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae Supplementum Tertiae Partis (Ottawa, 1941), 411a-
412b.
65 Quodlibet VII.,q.5, a.2: AQQ, 144.
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in the damned and that it should be counted as the sum of misery; they argue, in
fact, that nothing causing disharmony to the clamed should be taken away.
Aquinas responded that this explanation is not rational. The resurrected body
resembles the perfection of nature to a greater degree than it did previously when
it was alive. Those who had natural defects in their bodies when they were alive
will have these repaired when they are resurrected unless sin impedes this.
Aquinas argued that punishment is measured according to guilt and he points out
the absurdity of the damned possessing such deformities by arguing that some
person with less sin and more deformities would suffer to a greater extent than
another who had sinned more, but who had no bodily defects. This would mean
that the poena, the pain or punishment, would not correspond to individual guilt,
but would rather reflect the punishments which the person was subject to on
earth. Such a position was absurd, stated Aquinas.66
The other opinion held by scholars, and the one to which Aquinas himself
adhered, was the idea that the author who fashioned nature repaired the nature of
the body in resurrection to an intact state. Every defect caused by corruption and
66 `Respondeo. Dicendum quod in corpore humano potest esse deforrnitas dupliciter. Uno modo,
ex defectu alicuius membri, sicut mutilatos turpes dicimus...Et de tali deformitate nulli dubium est
quod in corporibus darrmatorum non erit, quia omnia corpora, tam bonorum, quam malomm,
integra resurgent. Alio modo deformitas contingit ex indebita partium dispositione...sicut sunt
febres et huiusmodi aegritudines quae interdum sunt deformitatis causa. Sed apud doctores
modernos est duplex super hoc opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod huiusmodi deformitates et
defectus in corporibus damnatorum remanebunt, considerantes eorum damnationem, qua ad
summam miseriam deputantur, cui nihil incommoditatis subtrahi debet. Sed hoc non videtur
rationabiliter dici. In reparatione enim corporis resurgentis magis attenditur naturae perfectio
quam conditio quae prius fuit...Unde et illi qui aliquos defectus naturales in corpore habuerunt,
vel deforrnitates ex eis provenientes, in resurrectione sine illis defectibus vel deformitatibus
repararentur nisi peccati meritum impediret...Modus autem poenae est secundum mensuram
culpae. Contingit autem quod aliquis peccator damnandus minoribus peccatis subiectus aliquas
deformitates vel defectus habeat quas non habuit aliquis damnandus peccatis gravioribus irretitus.
Unde si ille qui in hac vita deformitates habuit cum eis resurgat, sine quibus constat quod resurget
alius gravius puniendus qui eas in hac vita non habuit, modus poenae non responderet quantitati
251
disability of nature was to be completely removed at resurrection. Such defects
were understood to be fevers and rheums, for example. On the other hand,
defects caused by natural principles in the human body, for example weight and
passibility, remained in the bodies of the damned. They were, however, removed
from the bodies of the elect.67
Aquinas was in agreement with Albert that the body required perfection in order
to suffer. In his denial of the belief that the resurrected body was identical in all
its attributes to its counterpart on earth, Aquinas disagreed directly with
Bonaventure. Aquinas held it to be irrational and unjust for a person to suffer
according to the course of nature. It was the sin and guilt of the individual which
merited punishment.
The person could thus be defined through their suffering in as far as this suffering
pertained to personal guilt. Thus, suffering was not only used by Aquinas as a
model to define the nature of the body, but also to define the individual being
punished. It is possible therefore to extrapolate from Aquinas's argument that
just as bodily suffering was personal to each individual who had sinned, so this
very suffering could define the individual who was resurrected.
culpae, sed magis videretur aliquis puniri pro poenis quas in hoc modo mundo passus fuit; quod
est absurdwn' : Supplement, 41 1 b-412a; IV Sent., fo.567".
67 `Et ideo alii rationabilius dicunt quod Auctor qui naturarn condidit, in resurrectione naturam
corporis intege reparabit. Unde quidquid defectus vel turpitudinis ex corruptione vel debilitate
naturae sive principiorum naturalium in corpore fuit, totrun in resurrectione removebitur, sicut
febris, lippitudo et similia; defectus autem qui ex naturalibus principiis in humano corpore
naturaliter consequuntur, sicut ponderositas, passibilitas et similia, in corporibus damnatorum
erunt, quos defectus ab electonun corporibus gloria resurrectionis excludet': Supplement, 412a;
IV Sent., fo. 568'.
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This particular issue arose out of a tradition which had been interested in
establishing exactly how the body would be re-formed at resurrection. Theories
introduced by Aristotle's theories of matter-form relations and their application
to the composition of the human body led to a renewed angst among theologians
trying to explain the resurrection. The particular issue which has been analysed
above arose as a direct result of these concerns. It was also important at the level
of defining individual responsibility for sin and the punishment deserved for it.
Two different areas of explanation emerged in response to this issue. Albert the
Great and Aquinas both believed that the individual should be punished
according to the individual's acts of will and its resultant guilt, and not according
to defects imposed by nature. For these reasons, the resurrected body needed to
be re-formed intact and perfected. The other opinion, which Aquinas attacked
directly, and was held by Bonaventure, upheld the belief in absolute bodily
continuity for the bodies of the damned. He argued that any punishment which
could contribute to the misery of the damned was to remain.
This series of debates demonstrates that the nature of the resurrected, damned
body was contested. A process of discussion and re-definition was occurring on
the subject of the body after death. There was clearly more than one way to
understand the body at this time. With regard to previous strands which have
emerged in this chapter, although they did not all agree on the nature of the body
which was to be resurrected, all three theologians used suffering to define what
they thought the nature of the resurrected body would be. Bodily suffering
defined the individual in different ways. For some masters, physical defects
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defined the individual. For others, it was personal guilt which defined the person.
This second position used a perfected body as the tablet on which to inscribe
suffering and guilt. Once again, the body after death was disputed and subject to
changes in definition.
3. Effects of bodily suffering
Ideas about bodily suffering in hell were imbued with notions of the suffering
body in this life. But the human body was mortal and subject to change, while
the pains of hell were to be experienced for eternity. The application of theories
of sense perception was clearly problematic to the extent that anything sensed
was liable to change bodies and bodily organs. Masters therefore debated the
effects which hell-fire would have on the bodies of the damned. Augustine had
also tackled a similar issue, which gave further impetus to this discussion. These
were all important considerations which incited interest in how incorruptibility,
despite the sufferings of hell, could be explained.
Albert the Great debated whether the bodies of the damned could bum, but not
be consumed. 68 Albert stated that sensibles act in the sense organ in two ways:
according to natural action and according to the action of the soul. In the first
case, the natural action of the fire will cause the body to corrupt and lead to the
presence of contraries. However, the second case, the action of the soul, occurs
with a reception of the intentio of the fire which causes pain or joy. The intentio
referred to is the spiritual action experienced in sense perception. This, says
68 'An corpora damnatorum ardeant et non comburantur?': IV Sent., d.44, a.34, 855-6.
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Albert, is the action in hell which leads to a change in the sense, without the
consumption of substance.69
Albert thus used a specific theory of sense perception to explain how the damned
body will remain uncorrupted by material fire. The theory has two aspects to it:
material and spriritual reception of the sense object. Albert argued that the bodies
of the damned must only experience the spiritual form of sense perception. So,
the physical action of the fire was not experienced by the body. The bodies of the
damned reacted to suffering in a different way from the bodies of the living.
Application of the theory of sense perception permitted this explanation.
Bonaventure debated the same question" and argued that the bodies of the
damned are indeed afflicted by fire, but they are not corrupted in their substantial
being, that is, according to their material substance. 71 He proceeded by arguing
that it is easy to negate the belief that the bodies of the damned are consumed by
fire, but if it is inquired whether the bodies are corrupted, then this requires some
element of distinction. In one sense, corruption is equal to the defect of things
according to substantial being, which is the same as consumption. However, the
bodies of the damned are not corrupted in this way because they do not die. The
`Dicendum, quod in veritate est quae dicuntur in litera, fidelia et vera sunt, et absque
dubitatione tenenda. Conseruans autem damnatonnn corpora, est iustitia Dei in poenis: et haec
credenda sunt potius quam discutienda. Ne tamen omnino nihil videamur dicere, sciendum quod
sensibilia dupliciter agwit in organa sensuum, scilicet actione naturae et actione animae. Actione
naturae est cum consumptione et contrarietate: et puto bene, quod talis non potest esse in aliquod
corpus, nisi ipsum corpus consumatur. Sed actio animae est per receptionem intentionis ad
affecturn doloris vel delectationis...et talis est actio in inferno, quae est ad sensus immutationem,
sine consumptione substantiae': IV Sent., d.44, a.34, 855.
70 'thrum ignis inferni consumat corpora damnatorum% IV Sent., d.44, p.2,a.3, q.1, 928-30.
71 'Corpora damnatorum ab igne affligentur, sed non corrumpentur quoad esse substantiale': ibid.,
929.
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other form that corruption takes is the privation of the disposition of goodness.
This disposition of good and rest is taken away from the bodies of the damned.
Thus, the corruption of affliction, but not of destruction or consumption, is
present through the burning of fire.72
Bonaventure supported this conclusion with various examples and with certain
rational explanations. There are, for example, some things which can live in fire
and not be destroyed, such as the salamander which lives in fire, as mentioned in
Book 21 of Augustine's De civitate Dei. However, it could be said that the
nature of this animal is similar to that of the fire, whereas the nature of the
human body is altogether dissimilar. Bonaventure said that the response to this
could take two forms. On the one hand, although the nature of the human body is
consumable by fire in its present state, nothing would prevent God from giving
humans a body which would not be consumed by fire. Bonaventure drew a
comparison with the body of Adam which was potentially mortal before the
lapse into sin, but not actually mortal in terms of corruptibility. 73 On the other
hand, he again gave various examples of precious metals and animals which may
be burned, but not consumed by fire. 74
 The fire, he went on to argue, is not
`Dicendum, quod si de corporibus damnatorum quaeratur, utrum ab igne affligantur, simpliciter
est concedendum. Si autem quaeratur, utrum consumantur, sitnpliciter est negandum. Sed si
quaeratur, utrum corrumpantur, hoc est distinguendum. Nam corruptio uno modo dicit
defectionem rei quantum ad esse substantiale, et hoc modo idem est quod consumtio; et tali modo
non corrumpantur, cum non moriantur. Alio modo corruptio idem est quod privatio bonae
dispositionis; et hoc modo, quoniam a corporibus damnatorum auferetur quies et bona
dispositio...Est igitur corruptio afflictionis, non interemptionis sive consumtionis, et haec fit per
adustionem ignis': ibid.
73 Compare with Chapter 2, 79-87.
74 'Si autem quaeretur, quomodo istud possit capi et intelligi; possumus ad hoc manuduci et
exemplo et ratione. Videmus, quaedam in igne vivere et non deficere, sicut ponit Augustinus
exemplum de salamandra in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei...quia natura illius animalis
conformis est igni, natura vero humani corporis omnino difformis; responderi potest dupliciter:
uno modo, quod quamvis natura humani corporis secundum statum praesentem sit ab igne
256
directed towards consuming, but towards igniting. In addition to this, the damned
have been given the potential nature to suffer, but not die. Moreover, just as the
bodies themselves are burned and not consumed, so also the composite made up
of body and soul, is afflicted and does not die. Bonaventure says there is both an
example and a reason for this. His example is that the immortal soul is afflicted
in the body, because the suffering (dolor) is more properly attributable to the
soul than the body. However, the soul does not die. It is, after all, immortal.
Bonaventure also considered the precise nature of pain itself. In this life,
suffering can cause death, but not because the pain (dolor) is contrary to life, for
if you suffer, you feel, and if you feel, you are living. The soul and body are,
nevertheless, not bound to one another by an indestructible link. For this reason,
intense suffering can lead to the separation of the soul from the body.
Bonaventure then explained that, for the soul in this life, the body is a temporary
prison. But in hell, circumstances were different. There, the body will be the
soul's prison for eternity:75 The impact of this last statement is clear: the bodies
of the damned are undying, like the immortal soul. No amount of suffering will
weaken the relationship between the bodies and souls of the damned.
consumtibilis, nihil prohibet, quin Creator, qui naturam, quam voluit, omnibus et singulis dedit,
talem naturam homini dare possit [Cod.K addit] ut eius corpus ab igne consumi non possit Nec
mirwn, cum homo ante lapsum alterius dispositionis et naturae corpus habuerit quam post lapsum,
quia prius possibilie ad mortalitatem, modo necessarium ad mortem': ibid.
75 Ex quibus etiam possumus colligere rationem huiusmodi...Isti enim igni data est virtus ad
inflanunandum, non ad consumendum; et corpori data est natura possibilis ad patiendum, non ad
deficiendum...Et sicut illa corpora uruntur et non consumuntur, ita etiam compositum ex anima et
corpore affligitur et non moritur. Et tamen ad hoc similiter possumus manuduci exemplo et
ratione; exemplo: quia anima immortalis in corpore affligitur, quia dolor est anima proprie, et
tamen non occiditur...Quod enim homo moriatur dolore, hoc non est, quia dolor sit contrarius
vitae, cum dolor non sit nisi in substantia vivente- unde sequitur: si dolet, sentit, et si sentit, vivit-
sed quia anima non est indissolubili vinculo corpori alligata; ideo intensus dolor earn expellit de
praesenti habitaculo. Nunc enim est carcer temporalis, sed tunc erit perpetuus': ibid., 930.
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Bonaventure differed from Albert in the way in which he approached this
question. He made no mention of the theory that the bodies of the damned could
experience the intentio of the fire, rather than its real action. On the contrary, he
believed that the fire would have natural action in their bodies. Unlike Albert
also, Bonaventure used Augustine to buttress his arguments to a large degree.
However, there is agreement between the two theologians that the body will react
differently to punishment after death, than it did when alive.
What comes across very clearly in these two questions is that masters believed
that the resurrected body would react in a different way to suffering. There is a
fundamentally different view about how the composite would respond to the
action of fire. Unlike the living body, the composite of the resurrected body
cannot be separated into its constituent parts by intense pain. Once again, ideas
about pain were used to define the body's nature.
Aquinas's response to this question was reminiscent of his teacher Albert the
Great and is to be found in his commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra
Gentiles and the Supplement to the Summa Theologiae. 76 Aquinas explained that
the main reason why the bodies of the damned are not consumed is due to divine
justice. However, he used rational explanation to explore the types of suffering
possible for a body. He argued that the living body suffers according to natural
passion, through which it will experience the heat of the fire, or according to a
`Utrum corpora damnatonun futura sint impassibilia': IV Sent., d.50, q.2, a.3, qua 1;
Supplement, 86, 3, 414a-415b; 'De qualitate corporum resurgentium in darnnatis': SCG, IV,
cap. 89.
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passion of the soul, through which there is the reception of the intentio of fire.
Aquinas stated that after resurrection, the motions of the heavens would cease
which would mean that no body will be altered from its natural equilibrium.
Thus, the damned body would not be able to suffer from the first kind of passion,
but could suffer from the second. The senses of the damned will be perfected,
and suffering will be experienced without changing the natural disposition of
their bodies.77
Aquinas also described how the bodies of the damned will suffer, but not be
destroyed, in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Here, he described it in terms of the
relationship of soul to body, as form to matter. In the case of the living, if
suffering is excessively intense, it will cause the soul to be separated from the
body. However, this occurs when matter changes from one form to another form.
The human body after resurrection will not be able to change from form to form,
neither into good nor evil, because in both cases it is completely perfected by the
soul with regard to natural being. 78 However, the resurrected body is not always
77 `Dicendum quod principalis causa quare corpora darnnatorum ab igne non consumentur, erit
divina iustitia, qua eorum corpora ad poenam perpetuam sunt addicta...Quia cum pati sit recipere
quoddam, duplex est modus passionis, secundum quod aliquid in aliquo recipi potest dupliciter.
Potest enim aliqua forma recipi in altero aliquo secundum esse naturale materialiter, sicut calor ab
igne recipitur in aere. Et secundum hunc modum receptionis est unus modus passionis, qui dicitur
passio naturae. Alio modo aliquid recipitur in altero spiritualiter per modum intentionis
cuiusdam...et haec receptio similatur jill receptioni qua anima recepit similitudines rerum. Uncle
secundum hunc modum receptionis est alius modus passionis, qui vocatur passio animae. Quia
ergo post resurrectionem, motu caeli cessante, non potent aliquod corpus alterari a sua naturali
aequalitate, ut dictum est, nullum corpus pati potent passione naturae. Unde quantum ad hunc
modum passionis corpora damnatorum irnpassibilia erunt, sicut et incorruptibilia. Sed cessante
motu caeli, adhuc remanebit passio quae est per modum animae...Unde et secundum hunc modum
passionis corpora damnatorum passibilia erunt. Et quia in tali passione sensus perficitur, ideo in
corporibus darnnatorum sensus poenae erunt, sine mutatione naturalis dispositionis': Supplement,
414b-415a.
78 `Videmus enim quod, si corpus diu in igne permaneat, finaliter consumetur; dolor etiam si sit
nimis intensus, anima a corpore separatur. Sed hoc totum accidit, supposita transmutabilitate
materiae de forma in formam. Corpus autem humanum post resurrectionem non erit transmutabile
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totally subject to the soul. It will be afflicted by corporeal fire according to the
perception of contraries of sensibles in as far as the quality of the fire, according
to its excellence, is contrary to the equality and harmony which is natural to the
senses. 79
Aquinas followed Albert in his explanation of the way in which resurrected
bodies can perceive the action of hell-fire through its intentio. However, he
developed this notion with the introduction of a new element: the cessation of the
heavens. Once the motions of the heavens have ceased, there can be no alteration
and thus no corruption of bodies. However, Aquinas agreed up to a point with
Bonaventure: he also argued that the soul could not be expelled from the
resurrected body under intense pain.
Theories of sense perception were used and developed further to formulate
precise notions about the resurrected body. The way in which the resurrected
body reacted to suffering was different to a living body's reaction. The argument
was put forward by the Dominicans that external factors such as the cessation of
the heavens affected how it experienced suffering. The Franciscan Bonaventure,
on the other hand, thought that a different kind of body was created by God,
which could withstand any amount of suffering. The nature of the body itself
determined how it experienced suffering.
de forma in formam, neque in bonis neque in malis, quia in utrisque totaliter perficietur ab anima
quantum ad esse naturae.': SCG, IV, c. 89.
79 `Sed quia damnatonun corpora quantum ad aliquae conditiones non erunt animae totaliter
subjecta, affligentur secundum sensum a cont-rarietate sensibilium; affligentur enim ab igne
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The secular master Ranulphe of Hombliêres was asked whether the bodies of the
damned were corruptible in a quodlibetal question from the academic year
1275. 80
 Ranulphe argued that the bodies of the damned are corruptible in the
sense that they contain contraries. Also, every mixed substance (containing body
and soul) is naturally destructible. However, the bodies of the damned cannot be
consumed by hell-fire. He provided four reasons for this. Firstly, bodies exist in
hell for the purpose of suffering, not dying. To support this first reason, he gave
references to various works by Augustine which cite the example of the
salamander which lives in fire. Secondly, the fire which causes the suffering
requires no fuel on the part of the body which it is afflicting, that is, it can burn
without using the substance of the body to burn. Thirdly, as soon as the motion
of the heavens has ceased, so will any alteration to the bodies. The last reason
had its roots in divine justice: just as the Lord was able to give a body which
could not corrupt to Adam in the state of innocence, so he can provide bodies
which can be afflicted, but not be consumed.81
corporeo, in quantum qualitas ignis, propter sui excellentiam, contrariatur aequalitati
complexionis et harrnoniae quae est sensui connaturalis...': ibid.
BO 
'Queritur ut probatur utrwn corpora dampnatorum sint corruptibilia': qd1.11, q.20, ms. Paris
Arsenal 379, fos.22e- 225`. Ranulphe was already a regent master in the early 1270s. In 1280, he
was appointed Bishop of Paris by Nicholas III, to succeed Etienne Tempier. He died on 12th
November 1288. This manuscript, dated as 1274 by Glorieux, has the incipit: 'Hoc est quodlibet
magistri ranulphi normanni canonici parisiensis de natali anno domini MCCLXXIIII': Glorieux,
Repertoire des Maitres, i, 379-81; Gloriewc, La litterature quodlibetique, i, 264-6. My own
transcription of this particular question not only puts the date in doubt, but also the author. At the
beginning of fo.225`, which is the end of this particular question, the line reads: 'Quodlibet est
determinatwn a trate Ferario Iacobota, feriale de paschate arum domini milla cco lxxa quinto'.
Not only is this date a year later, but it also suggests that a certain Ferarius Iacobota determined
the question. However, this may have been inserted by the scribe as a reference to someone else
who determined on the same question besides Ranulphe. The full transcription of this quodlibetal
question is in Appendix IV, 285-7.
81 'Ad istam quaestionem dicendum est quod quamvis sint corruptibilia eo quod ex contrariis sunt
composita, quia omne quod mixtus est natura dissolubile est, nonquam tamen consumentur. Et
prima ratio est ex parte corporis positioni data est uerus pro patiendi non deficiendi. Et ponit
exemplum de Augustino de civitate [Dei] 21; de Vermibus; de anima ccl: salamandra qui vivit in
ignis. Alia ratio est ex parte ignis affligentis que ignis pabulum non requirit ex parte corporis
quod affligit (ms. afligit). Tertia ratio est ex parte penis alterantis quia tantum cessabit motor
propter mouentis primo cessabit alteratio...Quarto sumitur ex parte divine justicie sic ordinantis
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One glance at his conclusion demonstrates that Ranulphe was influenced to a
large extent by the theories put forward by both Aquinas and Bonaventure. In one
respect he agreed with Aquinas in the assertion that the cessation of heavenly
motion would prevent any alteration in corruptible beings. In another respect, he
supported the idea adhered to by Bonaventure that the body after death will be
different in certain respects.
In his approach to understanding the body, Ranulphe appears to follow both
groups. Two distinct ways are used to define the body: the creation of a new
body by God, which will not perish; and the influence of external factors which
will protect the body's equilibrium. These two models of explanation had
become accepted as common and parallel methods for explaining the body's
composition after resurrection.
The nature of sense perception in the experience of suffering in hell was again
addressed in two questions from the early 1280s by the Franciscan master
Richard of Middleton. Richard asked whether the bodies of the damned could be
heated by hell-fire. 82 He stated that the bodies of the damned could be heated in
an immaterial way (intentionaliter) and perhaps also materially, because they
will not be impassible in the future (in hell). 83 However, he then identified the
key approaches to this question. Some thought that the bodies of the damned
sicut dominus potuit dare corpori Ade in statu innocentie ut posset non corrumpere. Ita prout
facere et dare corporibus ut non possint consumere tamen affligere': ibid., fo.224".
82 'thrum corpora damnatorum ab igne infernali califiene: IV Sent., d.44, a.2, q.6, 587-8.
83 `Damnatonun corpora ab igne illo, et intentionaliter, et forte et materialiter calefient cum
impassibilia non sint futura': ibid., 588.
262
were not heated by hell-fire, but could nevertheless suffer from it. Their bodies
are passible either materially or immaterially (intentionaliter). Richard then
rehearsed the arguments which we have seen already in the works of other
masters concerning the cessation of the motion of the heavens and what effect
this will have. He went on to explain that, according to this position, just as the
perception of an object proportionate to the senses causes them delight, so the
perception of an disproportionate object will cause suffering. Hell-fire is what
causes the perception of disproportion."
The other main position held by theologians which Richard elucidated was the
belief that because the bodies of the damned are composed of four elements, they
will be vehemently heated and susceptible to the fire, but not consumed by it.
Those who hold this particular thesis, argued Richard, could oppose the group of
philosophers who believed in the idea that fire would have no action following
the cessation of the heavens. The belief that the cessation of heavenly motion
would prevent the fire from having action was condemned by Stephen
•Templer. 85 So, some of the ways which had been employed to understand the
" 'Ad istam quaestionem dicunt quidam, quod corpora danmatorum ab igne infernali non
calefient, et tamen eo cruciabuntur, passiuum enim potest dupliciter recipere formam agentis aut
materialiter, aut immaterialiter seu intentionaliter secundum quem modum recipit formam
sensibilis...Quamvis ille ignis non sit calefacturus corpora damnatorum affligentur tamen ab eo,
quia sicut obiecti proportionati sensui proportionata receptio delectat sensum sic improportionata
receptio contristans...': ibid.
85 'Ideo dicunt aliqui, quod corpora damnatonun ab illo igne calefient vehementer, quia cum ilia
corpora sint ex quatuor elementis composita. Nec fient impassibilia, non tantum caliditatem
sentientia sed etiam caliditatis susceptiva: neque tamen per ilium ignem consumentur, ut
declarabitur in quaestione sequenti. Qui vult tenere hanc secundum opinionem potest dicere ad
primum, quod intentio Philosophi non fuit vel esse debuit, quod si coelum staret quod ignis
nullam actionem posset habere unde a domino Stephano Parisiensi Episcopo excommunicatus est
iste articulus scilicet, quod si celum staret, quod ignis in stupam non ageret.': ibid. This is one of
the condemned theses in the 1277 Condemnations: '156. Quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam
non ageret, quia Deus non esset': Chartularium, i, 552.
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nature of the resurrected body faced a challenge in 1277. Richard of Middleton
was unwilling to stake his claim for either side in this particular question.
However, in the following question, Richard stated his position quite clearly
when he asked whether the bodies of the damned were consumed or corrupted by
fire. 86 Richard did not believe that the argument that the damned only received
the intentio of the fire was sufficient explanation for their incorruptibility. If it is
true what certain philosophers put forward, stated Richard, this is not a sufficient
argument to explain why these bodies do not corrupt in this fire. In Richard's
opinion, there were three reasons why the bodies of the damned are not corrupted
in this way: the disposition of the matter into which the fire is incorporated; the
state of the bodies; but principally according to divine justice. 87 With regard to
the first two reasons, Richard provided many examples of elements which are
composed of fire, which heat, but do not burn, and he explained that there were
animals which could stand extreme heat without dying. The principal reason,
however, was the order of divine justice. It was this that allowed the bodies of
the damned to suffer from the eternal punishment of hell-fire and be heated, but
without being destroyed by it.88
86 'UM= corpora damnatorum per ilium ignem consumentur, vel corrumpentur': ibid., q.7, 588-
90.
87 `Sed haec ratio non est conueniens...tum quia si illus esset venun, quod supponunt, adhuc non
sufficeret ad ostendendum ilia corpora ab illo igne non corrumpi, quia sicut dicit Philos. 2 de
anima...Ideo videtur mihi dicendum, quod ratio quare illa corpora non consumentur ab illo igne
partim est ex parte dispositionis materiae in qua incorporatus est ignis ille et partim ex parte
dispositionis illonun corponun quam accipiet in resurrectione, principaliter est ex ordine diuinae
iustitiae': ibid., 589
88 'Ex parte tamen ordinis diuinae iustitiae sumi debet ratio principalis. Ille enim ordo exigit ilia
corpora in etemis suppliciis fore permansura, et ideo assistente Del influentia generali ad hoc ut
ignis infemalis ilia corpora fortiter calefaciat et affligat non adest tamen ad hoc ut consumat...':
ibid.
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Richard of Middleton highlighted the way in which discussion surrounding the
issue of the incorruptibility of the resurrected damned body had fragmented into
two distinct camps: those who used the intentio thesis' of sense perception, and
those who believed the fire had real, material effects on the bodies. The
condemnation by Stephen Tempier of a thesis closely associated with this
question meant that Richard was very tentative in his conclusions. The 'et forte'
in his own conclusion to the first question might have enabled him to avoid being
embroiled in controversy. However, he emphasised the power of God in
conjunction with the action of fire. Rational frameworks of explanation to define
the body became a sensitive issue following the condemnations. Some ways of
looking at the body were deemed inappropriate and more conservative
explanations were favoured. After the condemnations of 1277, more conservative
approaches to theology took hold and the integration of purely philosophical and
theological explanations broke down to some degree.89
On the surface, beliefs surrounding this issue appear to have been split according
to the religious order a master belonged to. The Dominicans, Albert and Aquinas,
favoured the use of rational, 'Aristotelian' theories of sense perception to explain
why the resurrected body could not corrupt. The Franciscans, Bonaventure and
Richard of Middleton, on the other hand, emphasised the power of divine justice
as the paramount reason for post-resurrection incorruptibility. The chronological
development of this important question demonstrates how different theories were
89 For this view, see G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century
Thought (Manchester, 1961); G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier Fourteenth
Century', BJRL, 43 (1960), 354-72.
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with the corporeal. The eternal nature of hell necessitated new ways of looking at
the body. An alternative conceptual system was needed to understand an eternal,
unchanging entity, which by its very definition, was corruptible and changing.
New theories were created in the development of this system. The resurrected
body was also described as a different body altogether; created by the divine for
the purposes of suffering. However, of crucial significance to the definition of the
body in hell was an understanding of the way in which the body suffered.
Conceptual levels of 'body' may be extrapolated from the masters' use of ideas
about pain and suffering to explain what they meant by the corporeal.
Furthermore, these ideas allowed them to define exactly what was meant by
corruptibility, mortality and ultimately eternity.
Conclusion
It would appear that masters were interested in discussing the nature of bodies
and corporeality in hell. Related to these issues was the question of bodily
continuity and thus whether the bodies of the damned were identical, similar or
different to the bodies of the living. One important method masters employed to
understand the nature of the body in hell was to explain how it suffered and
whether it would be corrupted by hell-fire. Ideas about pain and suffering were
thus tools of explanation used to understand the damned body.
There were various reasons why masters were interested in debating these issues.
Some arose out of the conflict of authorities, or were traditional points of inquiry.
However, new theories of sense perception, influenced by Aristotle, also had
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their role to play. The way in which the human body experienced sense data was
a constant concern for masters. The damned body as a sense-receptive being also
required attention. There were other reasons beyond the internal workings of
individual debates which ultimately may have had an effect on their conclusions.
The condemnations of 1277 certainly had an impact on the thought of at least
one master. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that masters were concerned to
discuss these various issues because they impinged upon the conceptual
framework of pain and suffering.
Masters agreed and disagreed about certain areas which concerned the damned
body in hell. Whether there was material continuity of the living body after death
was one issue which saw masters differ. Another area involved the reason for the
incorruptibility of the damned body when it was afflicted with material fire.
Some masters believed that the reason the body in hell could not corrupt was
because it only received the immaterial intentio of the fire. For other masters, the
real action of fire was necessary in order for the body to suffer. More important
for the way in which masters used their ideas about pain and suffering are the
points upon which they all agreed. All masters agreed that there were different
ways of talking about corporeality. At the beginning of the century, they differed
as to what the different ways of talking about the body might be. By the middle
of the thirteenth century, however, masters were using their theories about
suffering in order to explain different levels of corporeality. This was
demonstrated in their debates about hell-fire and the nature of the worm of
conscience. The latter, for example, was not corporeal in itself. However, it could
be said to possess corporeality from the corporeal suffering it caused to the
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damned. In this way, different ways of talking about body did not relate to the
audiences masters were addressing. Nor was the notion of hell tending more
towards the incorporeal. Rather, ideas about corporeality were receiving
refmement and a new complexity. The application of a conceptual framework for
pain and suffering enabled this refinement to occur.
So what do these sources say about attitudes to the body in hell? The defmition
of the body was not static. Ideas about the body after death were different to the
those about the living body. Masters used two different ways of talking about
corporeality to suit which body it was they were discussing. Moreover, notions of
what body and corporeality were became inextricably linked to the way in which
the body in hell suffered. By describing pain and suffering and their effects,
masters could more readily explain corporeal natures in hell. Some masters
created the idea of a body perfected for eternal suffering. Indeed, the identity of
the resurrected body appeared to become less dependent on an identical material
continuity from life to after-death, than on how it was perceived to suffer. During
life corporeality denoted mortality, decay and corruption. After death,
corporeality was unchanging and eternal. The masters' language of suffering
helped them to defme this difference. Issues about pain in hell developed and




Ideas about pain and suffering were developed by masters of theology into a
coherent technical language supported by a conceptual framework, which helped
them to elucidate important areas of discussion within their theological treatises.
This was achieved in various ways: the attention to and interpretation of a discrete
group of biblical, classical and patristic authorities; their use of new theories which
affected theology and the framing of specific questions about pain and suffering
within important areas of theology concerned with this life and the afterlife. The
language which masters developed was common to a variety of contexts iintheis
theological debates.
The authorities which masters used during theological debate provided the skeletal
frame upon which they developed their ideas about pain. Part of any theologian's
profession was to resolve the differences which were present in his main authorities.
In this way, when masters asked questions about pain and suffering, they were
obliged to consider what authorities had stated previously. This was seen, for
example, in relation to the development of limbo. As with other areas of
development within their conceptual framework of pain, masters re-interpreted the
beliefs of Augustine in order that they could deny that unbaptised children were
eternally damned, whilst, in other respects, they were able to maintain allegiance to
one of their key patristic authorities. However, masters also employed their
authorities in a way which helped them develop their language of suffering more
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exactly. Short phrases were gleaned from authorities, especially Aristotle and
Augustine, which could be used as formulae for describing the nature of suffering.
For example, these authoritative pieces of language were used to develop
understanding about the suffering of the separated soul. These phrases were then
used as a hook upon which masters could hang their own theories about suffering in
a variety of theological contexts.
Masters were also influenced by specific new theories which affected their study of
theology. One important development in theology concerned the application of
Aristotelian theories of sense perception to their debates. This newly-acquired theory
enabled masters to analyse the human body and soul with greater precision. It also
allowed masters to explain the differences between physical and spiritual suffering
and suffering after death. In every chapter, the reliance which masters placed upon
their understanding of the theory of sense perception is striking. For example, this
theory was used to describe both human suffering and the suffering of Christ and
ideas about sense perception were remoulded to explain suffering in the state of
innocence and the pain of the separated soul. Therefore, the conceptual framework
which masters created for their discussions of pain and suffering achieved a
significant degree of credibility and authority because it was imbued with ideas
about sense perception and the language of authorities. These were the two main
elements of a language of suffering.
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In general, therefore, masters possessed a common understanding of what pain and
suffering were and how they applied to different areas of their theology. The points
of debate where masters agreed are testament to the existence of this common
language. Where masters disagreed, there tended to be reasons beyond the debates
themselves which influenced an individual master's conclusion. On the other hand,
the way in which pain was expressed as a language was not static. Indeed, as more
masters debated certain issues, the way in which pain was understood and expressed
was refined and developed. Nevertheless, key elements in this language can be
identified throughout.
How, specifically, did masters create and apply this language within a variety of
spheres of theological discussion? As this thesis was broadly divided into two
sections: pain in this life and pain after death, it would seem appropriate to conclude
how ideas about pain were developed by masters in each of these areas, whilst also
paying attention to common strands which permeate the thesis as a whole.
In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that the conceptual framework for understanding
pain and suffering in this life was very complex and was deliberately created by
masters to elucidate their understanding of the relationship of the human body to the
human soul. This relationship could be destroyed by pain, but it could also be
strengthened by it. So pain was an important key which unlocked certain aspects of
the links between body and soul, and allowed masters to explain them with greater
precision. The nature of human suffering was also a critical element in explaining
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the humanity of Christ. Again, the application of theories of suffering within the
soul-body composite clarified a vigorously debated subject such as this. The human
and divine natures of Christ and how they were related were critical topics of
theological debate. Theories about the hypostatic union explained important issues
about the links between his humanity and divinity, but they also provoked some
degree of confusion. The language which masters of theology created to understand
human suffering and the links between the human soul and body helped to resolve
the difficulties which theories about Christ's human and divine natures had produced
because suffering was a human trait. Thus, theories of suffering were used in
discussions about Christ to help reveal the extent of his humanity.
A language for understanding pain and suffering was also central to theories about
sex difference as chapter 2 showed. Men and women had different types of
punishment which were related to the Fall. Masters of theology used the specific
punishments of pain for each of the first parents to examine the differences between
them. Pain was thus an important indicator of sex difference. However, the
experience of pain was devoid of gender. Masters employed a gender-specific
structure for their arguments when they debated the nature of suffering in the state of
innocence. However, the conclusions which the masters reached demonstrated an
equivalent experience of pain for both sexes. Although this equivalence of
experience existed, the use of a gender-specific structure of suffering, in which
masters only asked certain questions about Adam and others about Eve, served to
demonstrate the model of sex difference which resulted from the Fall. On one level,
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therefore, pain was an indicator of sex difference. On another level, it could
demonstrate gender equivalence.
In chapter 3 it was seen that the theological application of theories about pain also
demonstrated its beneficial and restorative effects. Physical suffering not only had
damaging effects on the relationship between soul and body, it could also improve
the links between them. It was thus necessary for masters to add a new dimension to
their conceptual framework for suffering. The links between physical and spiritual
suffering allowed masters to explain more clearly why fasting and penance were
important elements in spiritual improvement. Although pain, in itself, was
deleterious to the body and soul and the relationship between them, the definition of
contritional suffering as an additional branch to their language, within an existing
conceptual framework for suffering, made such suffering intelligible and worthwhile
in penitential practice. The creation of a typology of pain and suffering for this life
was thus central to the understanding and underpinning of key areas of theological
discussion.
Ideas about pain and suffering after death were used to define the locality,
experience and nature of those who were subject to eternal punishment. In chapter 4
it was demonstrated that the location and nature of limbo were defined by debates
which addressed the kind of sin which unbaptised children possessed. Masters
applied this to their understanding of the punishment due for such sin. The exact
274
definition of pain and suffering permitted the creation of a separate abode in the
afterlife.
Chapter 5 examined another important case study in thirteenth-century theology, the
suffering of the soul when separated from the body. The separated soul presented
difficulties for the masters because their language for suffering was dependent on the
interaction between body and soul together. It was for this reason that their language
necessitated a new conceptual dimension. In other words, suffering, which was
explained with the help of theories about sense perception, had to be explained
where sense perception, strictly, could not occur. Unlike the questions studied in
earlier chapters where the potential suffering of a body without sin could be used to
understand the suffering of an incorporeal nature, the separated soul was deemed to
require the real action of hell-fire. Masters developed the idea that the separated soul
could suffer on account of a special union with the corporeal fire of hell. Masters
thus created a type of 'punitive composite' structure. The link between the
composite of body and soul allowed the soul to perform its natural functions,
whereas the union between soul and fire hindered the soul in these same operations.
The language of suffering which was based upon the soul-body union thus also
provided the model which enabled masters to explain the suffering of an incorporeal
nature.
The language of suffering and the constant interaction between the issues of
suffering and the body also formed the basis of masters' analysis of corporeality in
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hell, as chapter 6 showed. Masters developed a way of expressing the corporeal
nature of hell through the suffering which was experienced there. The language of
suffering which described how incorporeal punishments could also affect the bodies
of the damned permitted masters to explain why both the fire of hell and the worm
of conscience had corporeal aspects. The conceptual framework of pain and
suffering was thus a tool which helped them understand the precise nature of hell
and its suffering.
This thesis has demonstrated how masters developed a technical language and ideas
for understanding pain and suffering. These developments took place in debates
about distinct theological issues. Pain was a theme which ran through many areas of
theological study. Understanding masters' ideas about pain is thus crucial if we are
to understand their theological work as a whole.
Some of the conclusions which have emerged out of this study are supplementary to
the main aims of this thesis and they indicate future areas of study. In creating a
system for understanding pain and suffering, masters were seemingly influenced by
events outside the immediate milieu of their intellectual disquisitions. For example,
the statements made by masters about the suffering required to complete penance
also appeared in confessors' manuals from the same era. The events which led to the
Paris condemnations of 1270 and 1277 were also shown to have had an effect on the
debates about the suffering of the separated soul and the fires of hell; although, as we
have seen, Siger of Brabant did not significantly challenge or deny the way in which
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the separated soul was thought to suffer. The opinion of masters also appears to have
been sought in relation to the fate of children in the Christian community who had
died unbaptised. In a number of ways, therefore, there are reasons to believe that the
ideas of masters affected and were influenced by events and circumstances in other
areas of society. What routes of inquiry does this suggest? One project might
undertake a comparative assessment of disputations with other sorts of media, such
as preachers' manuals, for example.' Alternatively, an assessment of the ways in
which ideas prevalent in intellectual circles permeated sermon literature might also
yield fruitful results. For both of these approaches, key questions would involve
exploring the ways in which ideas emerged and were expressed in other media and
whether there is any cross-pollination with ideas emanating from intellectual circles.
Where did specific ideas originate? How were they disseminated? How does this
affect our perception about intellectuals in society, or the way in which ideas were
articulated within it? All these are questions which, it is believed, follow logically
from the present study. It is hoped that the clarification of the ways in which a
distinct group of Parisian masters of theology created a technical language for pain
and suffering, supported by a conceptual framework which masters applied to a
wider theological context, will be of assistance to students of thirteenth-century
intellectual thought and its impact on society.
I For a work which has compared a range of different sources, including preachers' manuals, in the
study of ideas about public penance, see M.C. Mansfield, The Humiliation of Sinners. Public Penance
in Thirteenth Century France (Ithaca and London, 1989).
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Appendix I
BN Lat. 16297 Gerard of Abbeville
f0•1 601b
Quodlibet XVIII
q.13: Utrum parvuli baptizati ante usum liberi arbitrii possint dampnari.
Et ostendebat quod sic quia anima parvuli susceptibilis est virtutis. Virtutes enim
conferuntur in baptismo ergo susceptibilis est vitii.
5 Contra parvuli baptizati non habent usum liberi arbitrii sicut supponitur ex theumate
quia compressi sunt usque ad longam etatem. Sed dicit Augustinus de vera religione:
omne peccatum adeo est voluntarium quod si non est voluntarium non est peccatum.1
Ergo non possunt peccare ergo non possunt dampnari.
10 Dicendum quod parvuli baptizati non possunt dampnari in illa etate sed pertinent ad
sortem bonorum quadruplici rationes: Primo propter fidem offerentium in quorum
fide salvantur unde Augustinus de baptismo parvulorum: ad rem issionem originalis
peccati prodest eorum fides a quibus offeruntur ut quascumque maculas a quibus nati
(ms.orti) sunt contraxerunt (ms. extraxerunt) aliorum interrogationem ab eis
15 purgentur. 2
Secundo propter fidei sacramentum unde Augustinus in eodem parvulos: et si non
fides illa que nec credentium voluntate consistit prima iam tamen ipsius fidei
sacrament= fideles facit. [Ad] Romanos 6 : quicumque baptizati sumus [in] Christo
20 [Iesu]. 3 Glossa dicit quod mors Christi causa est huiusmodi purificationis.4
I 'Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, Si non sit
voluntarium': Augustine, De vera religione, c.14, CCSL, 32 (Turnhout, 1962), 204.
2 Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et rem issione et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum libri
fres, Operum, x (Antwerp, 1700). The text can be also be found at PL 39, 1537.
3 'An ignorantis quia quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus?':
Epistola B. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, 6, Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam Clementiam, 6th Edition
(Madrid, 1982), 1099.
4 The full text of this part of the gloss is as follows: `Mortui peccato quod sit in baptismo non debemus
ei itenun vivere ut iterum mori sit ei necesse. Quia in morte Christi et in similitudine mortis Christi et
sicut semel mortuus est carne et semper vivit ita non semel mortui malo per baptismurn semper vivamus
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Tertio propter meritum dominicae passionis quia merito sue passionis iram dei patris
mitigavit per oblationem et immolationen hostie reconciliantis et placantis. Offensam
divinae maiestatis de qua offensa in psalmo dicitur: tu terribilis es; et gul[s] resistet
25 tibi? Ex tunc ira tua,5 scilicet Ira peccatis originalis inflicti pro offensa primae
praevaricationis de quo placatione divina [est]. [Ad] Ephesios 2: eramus nulla flui
ire. 6 Glossa: necessarius erat mediator id est reconciliator qui hanc iram singularis
sacrificii sui oblatione placaret. 7
 Augustinus in 4 libro de trinitate c.13: factum est ut
vincula peccatorum multorum in mortibus multis per unius unam mortem quam
30 peccatum nullum praecesserat soluerentur quantum propterea dominus indebitam pro
nobis reddidit ut nobis debita non noceret. 8 13 librum de trinitate c.12: Si commissio
peccatorum et iram del iustam hominem subdidit dyabolo, profecto remissio
peccatorum pro reconciliationem dei begninam [ms. legntimam] eruit hominem a
dyabolo.9 Dicit ergo quod per fidem offerentium suscepit sacramentum fidei et per
35 fidei sacramentum (f.160") efficitur Christi membrum et tanquam membrum Christi
participat merito Christi -scilicet - illo excellentissimo merito sue passionis quia filii
sunt dei per fidem. [Ad] Ephesios, 3: Per fidem enim habitat Christi in cordibus
nostris. 1 ° [Ad] Galatas 4: Omnes filii dei estis per fidem." Per fides offerentium
impertrat divinam complacentiam et favorem. Ecclesiasticus 1: beneplacita sunt
40 domini fides et mansuetudo. 12 Hanc fidem habent parvuli in munere per sacramentum
fidei uncle Augustinus de parvulonun baptismo quis nescitit credere esse infantibus
baptizari non credere autem non baptizari.
bono vel in morte quia mors est causa huius purificationis.': Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria.
Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/81, 4 vols. (Turnhout,
1992), iv, 285.
5 Psalms 75:8.
6 Epistola B. Pauli ad Ephesios, 2. Biblia Vu/gala, 1134.
7 Glossa Ordinaria, iv, 371.
8 Augustine, De trinitate libri xv, bk. iv, c.13, PL 42, 899).
9 Augustine, De trinitate libri xv, bk.13, c.12, PL 42, 1026). The scribe appears to have had a problem
with the word begninam, perhaps suggesting that firstly he was not familiar with the particular
quotation and secondly that he had copied it incorrectly from another manuscript.
16 Per...Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris.': Ep.Pauli ad Ephesos, 3.
II 'Omnes enim filii Dei estis per fidem quae est in Christo Iesu.': Ep. Pauli ad Galatas,3. The ms.
attributes this phrase to chapter 4.
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Quarto ex virtutum decore et munere quas accipit in baptismo, accipit complacentiam
45 et favorem divine voluntatis propter quam adoptatur in filium regni. Ecclesiasticus,
23: Sic et mulier etc. 13 Glossa: deus sibi animam in baptismate copulavit et ornamento
virtutum decoravit." Et ita transit in amplexus sponsi tanquam sponsa et tanquam
filius in hereditatem regni et ita patet solutio quaestionis.
50 Ad argutnentum dicit quod susceptibilis est virtutis in munere et decore non in
exercitio et opere vitii autem non potest esse susceptibilis nisi exercitio et opere et
ideo quamdiu non est capax doli non est susceptibilis vitii non enim habent parvuli
usum liberi arbitrii quia usque ad longam etatem sunt compressi ut declaratur in prima
quaestione.
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Ad id autem quod arguebat de parvulo quandoquidem et blasphemo quem demones
rapuerunt inter manus patris sicut recitat gregorius in dyalogo. Dicit quod iam erat
capax doli quia malitia illa etatem supplevatur a patre enim illa blasphemare didiscerat
et ideo dominus iniquietatem patris in filio vindicavit. Exodus 20: Ego sum Deus
60 zelotes vindicans iniquietates patrum in filios huius qui oderunt me. 15 Hic est
....tatoribus patrum facinoris et sic patet plene solutio quaestionis.
12 `Sapientia enim et disciplina timor Domini; et quod beneplacitum est illi, fides et mansuetudo, et
adimplebit thesauros illius.': Ecclesiasticus 1: 34-35.
13 'Sic et mulier omnis relinquens vinun suum et statuens haereditatem ex alieno matrimonio.':
Ecclesiasticus 23: 32.
14 c Mystice autem hereticorum synagoga vel anima heretica pravita te decepta abominabilis est deo quia
relinquit virum priorem quod sibi earn in baptismate copulavit et ornamento virtutum decoravit': Glossa
Ordinaria, 768.
15 'Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus fortis, zelotes, visitans [ms. vindicans] iniquitatem patrum in filios, in
tertium et quartum generationem eonun qui oderunt me: et faciens misericordiam in millia his qui
diligunt me et custodiunt praecepta mea.': Exodus 20:5. There is another discrepancy with the words
here. The Biblia Vulgata clearly shows that the correct word is visitans and not vindicans. This, again,
may suggest a scribal error in copying. Alternatively, it may be a genuine mistake, given that the verb
vindico appears in the previous line.
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Append ix II
1. BN Lat.16406 Alexander of Hales
fo. 42"
Quodlibet I
q.15: Queritur ultimo de igne gehennali utrum sit corporeus aut incorporeus.1
5
Et primo uidetur2 augustinus super xii de genesi ad litteram: ad spiritualia loca
pro meritis fertur aut ad loca penalia similia corporibus.3 Item in eodem loquens
de inferno dicit in locis uidetur esse non corporalibus sed corporum similibus.
10 Contra idem in eodem quaestionem defunctorum anime infernis digne carnis
amore peccauerunt hoc est perillas corporalium rerum similitudines exhibeatur4
quod ipsi carni5 solet ut6 sub terram recondatur ex quo apparet 7 ignis gehenne
corporeus est. Item augustinus de civitate dei xxi: 'at uero gehenna stagnum (ms.
stangnum) ignis et sulphuris8 corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit corpora
15 dampnatorum et9 hominum et daemonum, solida hominum, aeria daemonum,
corpora hominum cum spiritibus daemonum autem l ° sine spiritibus l 1 similitudo
sumendo penam non imperciendo l2 uitam corporalibus ignibus.' 13 14 `unus quippe
utrius 15 ignis erit sicut Veritas dixit.' 16
20 Respondeo sicut angeli in se sunt incorporei sed comparati ad deum (f.43')
circumscripti et corporei, secundum quod dicit augustinus iiil de anima et
spiritu l7 et bernardus super cantica canticorum similiter, ignis geherme in se
corporeus est, tamen incorporeus 18 dicitur 19 relatione ad corpora que hic sunt.
1 The same question appears in BN Lat. 15272, fo. 170Th. I indicate where textual variations
occur. 2uidetur] add quod incorporeus 3 De Genesi ad Litteram, 12, cap.32, PL 34,480.
corporibus] corporalibus 4exhibeatur] exhibebatur 5carni] add mortue 6 lit] add. sit 7apparet]
add quod ssulphuris] sulphureus 9et] om. 1 °autem] aut "sine spiritibus] spiritus sine
corporalibus 12 imperciendo] impertinendo "De civitate Del, xxi, c.10, PL 44, 724-5 14 add et
15utrius] utriusque 16 Matth. 25:41. 12Alcherus Claraevallensis, De spiritu et anima, cap. 18, col.
793. ' stamen corporeus] unde corporeus. There is clearly some confusion here at the end of the
conclusion in the two mss. Reference to another ms with a similar question, Oxford Bod1.292
demonstrates that it should be incorporeus and not corporeus. When compared to the bodies of
the damned, fire is called incorporeal. When, however, it is compared to other things, such as
angels, or God, it is called corporeal. See Appendix 11.2. 19dicitur] add in.
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2. Oxford Bodleian 292 Alexander of Hales
fo.323'
Quodlibet I, q.15
Deinde queritur utrum ignis infernalis sit locus corporalis. Et videtur quod non.
Augustinus super Gen[esi ad Litteram] libro xii: inferiorum subiectum spiritualem
essentiae arbitror non corporalem.
5
Contra, de civitate [Dei]: Iehenna illa que stagnum (ms. stangnum) ignis et sulphuris ignis
erit et cruciabit corpora dampnatorum [aut] corpora hominum cum spiritibus daemonum
nec spiritus si non corporibus herentes ignibus ad non imperciendo uitam.1
10 Et dicendum quod ignis ille uno modo dicitur corporeus, alio modo dicitur spiritualis quia
in comparacionem corpori que hec agunt dicitur incorporeus simpliciter. Tamen dicitur
corporeus [ms. coporeus] sicut dicit Augustinus quod angelus in animam simpliciter est
incorporeus in comparacione ad deum dicitur corporeus.
''At vero gehenna illa, quod etiam stagnum ignis et sulphuris dictum est, corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit
corpora damnatorum, aut et hominum et daemonum, solida hominum, aeria daemonum, aut tantum
hominum corpora cum spiritibus, daemones autem spiritus sine corporibus haerented sumendo poenam, non
impertiendo vitam corporalibus ignibus.': De civitate Dei, xxi, c.10, CCSL, 48, 776.
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BN Lat. 15350 Gervase of Mont-Saint-Eloi
f.2716
Quodlibet I
q.10: Utrum vermis conscientie gravius ptutiat in inferno quam pena ignis.
Videtur quod vennis conscientie. Augustinus de vera innocencia dicit quod
graviores pene sunt pene conscientie. Item, graviores pene sunt interiores quam
exteriores sicut maius est gaudium interius quam exterius, non enim est
5	 oblectamentum sibi cordis gaudium. Ecclesiasticus x3oc: Sed pena interior est
pena vermis.
Ad oppositum, magis punit que sui meritatem (nervitatem?) et realem
coniunctivum est, unitum punito quam quod non. Huius est ignis non vermis.
10
Solutio. Dicendum est quod pena vermis gravior est, per se loquendo, quam pena
ignis, quia pena vermis que est dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat
appetui interioris per se. Sed pena ignis, que est dolor exterior, est licet ex hoc
quod anima repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem excedit hoc
15 quod est per se illud quod est per aliud. Signum huius est quia homo sepe suscipit
dolores exteriores et etiam [f.271 va] vitam que maxime diligitur contempuit et
morti se traditur ut vitet dolores interiores.
Praeterea, vermis conscientie est de amissione summi both set pena ignis est de
20 conunissione mali non summi et ideo ignis cruciativi et id minus nati
contristantur pena vermis est intimior et inportunior semper faciens dampnum
contra se pugnare. In Psalmis: arguam te et statuam contra faciem tuam i debet
verme loquitur. Bernardus in libro de colloquio simonis ad iesu caput L:
Immortalis [ms. In mortalis] factus internus [ms. in terminis] ille conscientie
1 llaec fecisti et tacui existirnasti in igne quod ero tui similis arguam te et statuam contra faciem
tuam': Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgata, ps. 49:21.
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25 vermis tota malignitate corrodet [ms. corrodens] sed non consumet animam
infelicem nec erit omnino dissimulationis locus aut spes nulla consolationis.
Quid enim tanti est quod ne modo [ms. nec inter] quidem conscientie stimulos
[ms. turn dos] sustinere aliquatenus possunt, sed avertunt oculos cordis et ad
consolationes miseras convertuntur, aut certe simulation/bus [ms.
30	 dissimulationibus] aliquibus [ms. alibus] decipiuntur semetipsos et mentitur
iniquitas sibi nisi quod intollerabilis ille est cruciatus, etc.2
Ad oppositum ignis reali coniunctione magis est coniunctus. Dicendum quod
dampnum in quo consistit vermis conscientie per apprehensionem suam est
35 coniunctum anime in tantum quod realiter affligit earn et movet earn contra se. In
tantum quod non potest adicere se a consideratione fediditatis peccatorum
suorum et dampni quidam est per huius patet quia incurrit.
2 Gaufridi Abbatis, Declamationes ex S. Bernardi sermonibus de colloquio simonis sum lesu,
c.50, PL 184, 469B.
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Paris Arsenal 379 Ranulphe of Homblieres
fo. 224'
Quodlibet II, q.20.
Queritur ut probatur utrum corpora dampnatorum sint corruptibilia. Ostenditur
quod sic. Omne quod situs ex contrariis est corporalis, sed illa corpora post
resurrectionem erunt ex contrariis composita. Ergo corruptibilia.
5
Ad idem: passio magis facta abicit a substantia.1
Contra: Job 20 de dampnato: Lucet quae fecit nec tamen consumetur.2 Ergo, etc.
10 Ad istam quaestionem dicendum est quod quamvis sint corruptibilia eo quod ex
contrariis sunt composita, quia omne quod mixtus est natura dissolubile est,
nonquam tamen consumentur. Et prima ratio est ex parte corporis positioni data
est uerus pro patiendi non deficiendi. Et ponit exemplum de Augustino de
civitate [Del] 21; de Vermibus; de anima ccl: salamandra qui vivit in ignis. Alia
15 ratio est ex parte ignis affligentis que ignis pabulum non requirit ex parte corporis
quod afligit. Tertia ratio est ex parte penis alterantis quia tantum cessabit motor
propter mobilis primo cessabit alteratio nulla licet sed remaneat actio aliis.
Quarto sumitur ex parte divine justicie sic ordinantis sicut dominus potuit dare
corpori Ade in statu innocentie ut posset non corrumpere. Ita prout facere et dare
20 corporibus ut non possint consimis tamen affligere. Exemplum point Augustinus
21 de civitate [Dei] circa de came pauonis que iusto tempore prout siccioris(?) ut
consimis sed sit corpulentiae [ms. corpulancie] rarioris.3
1 Aristotle, Topica VI, c.6.
2 Job 20,18.
3 De civitate Del, 21, cap. 7.
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Ad argument= dicendum quod licet sit corporis de se, non tamen corporis
25 propter ordinatione divine justicie. Item licet remaneant conceditur elementa
verumtamen non agat in alterationem licet omnia agant in corpora. Ad aliud cum
dicitur passio magis facta, etc. est quod abicio ab essentia sed ibi erit abicio a
bene essentia et ibidem nec sequitur consumptio substantiae.
30	 [fo.225r]
Quodlibet est determinatum a fratre Ferario Iacobota, feriale de paschate anno
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